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ABSTRACT 
 
The increasingly politicized presence of Muslim communities in Britain today is raising 
issues not only for society in general but for other faith communities as well.  Among 
these the Evangelical constituency, including the members of various Christian diasporas, 
is struggling to find a coherent response which is true to its Bible-based, activist roots.   
 
This thesis discusses the relationship of religion to the theoretical notion of the public 
sphere. Specifically it hypothesizes an Evangelical micro public sphere as the framework 
for an empirical exploration of the responses of British Evangelicals to Muslims since the 
events of 11th September 2001.  It describes the formation, composition and discourse of 
this sphere drawing on data gathered from books, articles, lectures and interviews with 
key participants.   The data reveal a marked tension, indeed a polarization, amongst 
Evangelicals, with an increasingly sharp disagreement between ‘confrontationalists’ and 
‘conciliators’.   
 
A detailed analysis of the interaction of this sphere with Muslims, the national media and 
church leaders follows, leading to a concluding discussion of the future trajectory of the 
British Evangelical movement.  Whilst it is still too early to say whether Evangelicalism will 
be strengthened or weakened, its encounter with Islam is likely to be an increasingly 
significant factor in British public life for the foreseeable future.
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NOTES AND ACCOMPANYING MATERIAL 
 
It should be noted that throughout the thesis “participants” refers to those who participate in the 
discussions and debates of the Evangelical public sphere rather than just those who participated in 
the study by agreeing to be interviewed.  These latter are referred to as “interviewees”. 
 
Some may question the capitalization of the word “Evangelical”.  I have chosen to do so as it 
better balances the capitalization of the word “Muslim”.  Both are used to refer primarily to a 
person as a member of a faith community.  As I have generally not inserted the word “Christian” 
after Evangelical the capital letter serves to remind of this parallel. 
 
Throughout the text I have used the § symbol to represent chapter and section.  Thus §4.3.c 
represents chapter 4, section 3, sub-section c. 
 
The full transcribed texts of the interviews are available should the examiners require them but 
are not included here in the public copy of this thesis for reasons of confidentiality.  The number 
references that I have used in the data section refer to the paragraph number of the interview 
transcription as assigned by the MaxQDA software program. 
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English origin.  I have chosen to retain this convention even where a word such as halal is now in 
common usage.  The word is listed in its Anglicized transliteration as it appears in the text and is 
then given in Arabic script.  Note that the transliteration has here been marked to indicate the 
presence of a long vowel (ā, ī, ū) to aid pronunciation.  The only attempt to Arabicize the 
transliteration in the text itself, however, is the presence of the right facing apostrophe (‘) to show 
the presence of the letter ‘ayn (ع - e.g. shari‘a) and the left facing apostrophe (’) to show the 
presence of the letter hamza (ء - e.g. Qur’an).  In the text I have also chosen to use Anglicized 
plurals instead of the correct Arabic plurals to prevent confusion (fatwās not fatāwā, madrasas 
not madāris and so on).  Likewise I have used the more commonly understood Anglicized form 
Shi‘ite in place of Shi‘i. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 SETTING THE SCENE 
In the big top at a large gathering of Evangelical1 Christians the speaker is receiving a standing 
ovation.  His talk has covered not just the basics of Islam but also the glories of the British Empire 
and the dangers of political Islam.  Christians need to be aware that there is a Muslim conspiracy in 
the UK able to subvert the political system.  They are taking over.  A vicar from a multiethnic 
neighbourhood in Birmingham rises to ask a question about the dangers of stirring racial tension.  
Members of the middle class Christian audience of over a thousand start booing and telling the 
questioner to sit down.  This is an extraordinary scene for an Evangelical audience.  Fear is out of 
the bag.  “The Muslims are coming to get us.  We have to mobilize and prepare to fight back”. 
 
A few weeks later in another much smaller conference of mainly older Evangelical Anglicans a lady 
is questioning the speaker.  She has read a book predicting that Britain will become a Muslim 
country within the next 15 years and is fearful (Pawson, 2003).  “I know I should love them but if 
I’m honest I’m afraid of them.  What should I do?”  Another lady joins the conversation.  She 
agrees and feels not just fear but anger.  “It’s not right what is happening.  Should we just let them 
get away with it? This is our country ...... isn’t it?” 
 
In a TV documentary, Stephen Green, the director of Christian Voice, a “prophetic ministry” 
campaigning on issues of concern to Christians2, says: 
 
you don’t have to be a prophet to predict that there is going to be war in this land within perhaps 
30 to 40 years.  If the Islamic population in this country continues to increase, they will assume 
power and that could be the point at which people here begin to feel they have to take up arms ….. 
people will not want to live under the yoke of Islam.3 
 
                                                             
1 The word “Evangelical” is capitalized throughout the thesis to balance the capitalization of the word 
“Muslim”.  Both are used to refer primarily to a person as a member of a faith community.  As I have 
generally not inserted the word “Christian” after Evangelical the capital letter serves to remind of this 
parallel. 
2 See http://www.christianvoice.org.uk. The strap line on the website is: “The enemies of God are 
having their say!  It’s time to hear the Christian Voice.”  
3 ‘In God’s Name’ (Modell, 2008b). 
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This dire prediction fictionally comes to fruition in the archaeological detective drama BoneKickers 
in an episode called Army of God.4  Brother Laygass, a TV evangelist and head of a “philanthropic, 
right wing Christian alliance”, declares that Britain is "at war for its Christian soul …. the day is 
coming when St Paul's Cathedral will be the grand mosque of London … we have the true faith in 
Jesus but we don't stand up for it and that is where the Muslims and others have us over a barrel".  
Inspired by his rhetoric, James, a mentally unstable devotee of Laygass, dresses as a crusader 
knight, goes out and is shown in gruesome clarity using a broadsword to decapitate a Muslim who 
tries to reason with him.  War has arrived. 
 
These stories paint a picture of a rising fear of Islam and an anger towards Muslims within the 
British Evangelical Christian community which resonate with the talk of a “clash of civilizations” 
proposed by Huntington (1996).  For some Islam is on an inevitable collision course with western 
liberal democracy.  But is it necessarily such a bleak prospect of doom?  Is the West, including the 
British Evangelical church, on an unavoidable path towards conflict with Muslims?  There are more 
hopeful stories. 
 
At another Evangelical conference a man relates how, when his church in Birmingham was 
struggling to find the resources to finish its new building, it was the local Muslims who helped 
financially.   There are also Evangelicals involved in the Christian-Muslim Forum (CMF) set up in 
2006 which exists to “create a space where Christians and Muslims meet, learn about and 
understand each other, so that we can live faithfully with difference, and work together to heal 
Christian-Muslim relationships”.5  And in an article in an Emirati newspaper a Muslim comments 
on his encounter with Evangelicals:  
 
they were religious people; they weren’t interested in diluting their faith. And in that, a type of 
sincerity emerged …. combined with a healthy respect for each other as people who believed in a 
loving God and loving one’s neighbour (Hellyer, 2008).   
 
These are some of the more positive stories. 
 
                                                             
4 Broadcast on BBC 1, 8 July, 2008 
5 http://www.christianmuslimforum.org/images/uploads/CD6_Strategy_Outline_Final.pdf (accessed 
25 January 2011). 
 31 Chapter 1 
 
1.2 ORIGINS OF THE PROJECT 
Despite predictions to the contrary, “religions are here to stay ….. playing important public roles in 
the ongoing construction of the modern world” (Casanova, 1994).  In particular Berger has 
highlighted Islam and Evangelical Protestantism as evidence of the global resurgence of religion 
and sees them as “reactive counter-formations” which in different ways challenge the secularizing 
tendencies of modernity (Berger, 1992, 32).   Indeed, in some parts of the world they seem set on 
a collision course both with liberal democracy and with one another.  This makes this research into 
their recent encounters all the more significant. 
 
It is also these two faiths that have formed the backdrop to my own adult life and in many ways I 
am “at home” as an insider in Evangelicalism but yet am also “at home” as a guest within Islam.  I 
feel a strong sense of empathy with both communities and see much to admire, and yet also much 
to critique, in both.  I was brought up in a Christian home and have attended Evangelical churches 
all my life.  At university I studied natural sciences but later completed an MA in applied linguistics 
whilst teaching English at the Université de Tunis.  During ten years working in Tunisia the majority 
of my colleagues were Muslims, many of my friends were Muslims and my family and I lived 
amongst Muslim neighbours. 
 
We returned to Britain in 2002 in the aftermath of the cataclysmic events of 11th September 2001 
(henceforth 9/11) and the extraordinary tensions were tangible: a Muslim community trying to 
come to terms with extremist violence in its midst, struggling to establish its own sense of identity, 
wanting to integrate into British society and yet appalled at the moral decadence and lack of 
sensitivity to the transcendent in the wider community; an Evangelical community frustrated with 
its sense of powerlessness in the face of moral decline, juridical reversal and antagonistic secular 
hegemony, anticipating a “revival” and yet fearful of the encroachment of a religious Other – Islam 
– into its own space; both communities angry at political correctness and exclusion from a 
secularized public sphere which could make no sense of allegiance to comprehensive truths and 
wanted to neutralize religious discourse by suborning and domesticating it. 
 
It was in this maelstrom that the idea of doing doctoral research developed through hearing the 
concerns and questions of Evangelicals, reading Christian books about Islam and listening to 
Christian speakers.  The fear and concern were evident.  So too was the diversity of response and 
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often the ignorance.  But rarely apathy.  Everyone was interested.  Everyone wanted to know.  
Some speakers focused on the threat of Islam, others majored on the need to build bridges with 
Muslims.  Some engendered fear, others respect.  Some were sensationalist, others more 
measured.  There were those who ignored difficult issues, whilst others faced them head on. 
 
My wife and I were occasionally asked to speak on Islam at various churches and conferences and I 
wanted to do a piece of research that would both help me personally to reflect on these issues 
and would also help the British Evangelical community take stock of its responses to Islam and 
Muslims.  So this thesis looks at how the increased presence of Islam and Muslims in British public 
life is raising issues not just for society in general but for the Evangelical Christian community in 
particular, including its many diaspora groups.  It explores how these often diverse groups are 
struggling to find a coherent response which is at the same time true to its Bible-based, activist 
roots.   
 
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE THESIS 
 
1.3.A THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The re-emergence of religion into the public arena, which has alternatively been described as the 
“deprivatization” of religion (Casanova, 1994, 5) or the “re-publicization” of religion (Herbert and 
Fras, 2009), has been greatly influenced by the increased global interaction between Islam and the 
West, including within Britain itself, through the growth of Muslim diaspora communities mainly 
from South Asia.  Islam is a public religion and the question is not so much whether Muslims 
should bring their beliefs and practices into the public domain but how they should do that – 
particularly in a modern state where they are the minority (Sachedina, 2003).  As Muslims, policy 
planners and politicians seek to answer this question, it inevitably parallels, and maybe even 
catalyzes, the same discussion in other faith communities, including amongst Evangelical 
Christians.     
 
As these debates are public rather than private, a framework for considering discussion and the 
public exchange of ideas is needed.  The debate surrounding Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere provides such a framework.  Whilst Habermas’ initial concept of a unitary bourgeois public 
sphere is not a suitable tool in itself for this thesis, later conceptualizations of multiple post-
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bourgeois public spheres developed by others are useful for positioning Evangelicals within the 
larger religious, secular and political discourses.  The participants in this public sphere may not be 
meeting in coffee houses (although they sometimes do!), but they have formed a definitive 
network that utilizes various media in thinking, writing, discussing and occasionally meeting 
together for the purpose of developing a distinctive Evangelical response to Islam.  The 
identification and description of such a religious “micro-public sphere” in Britain will be one of the 
first tasks of this project. 
 
1.3.B BRITISH EVANGELICALS 
The thesis focuses on the British context.  Clearly it could be extended to consider the global 
interaction of Evangelicals and Muslims as both are global communities experiencing rapid 
growth, and occasionally uncomfortable confrontation, in many parts of the world.  In an 
increasingly interconnected world it is inevitable that the boundaries of the project are somewhat 
porous and influence from outside of Britain has to be considered.  However, the need to limit the 
scope of the project, and also my own geographical location and experience, dictate that it is 
largely British Evangelicals and their particular interaction with Islam and Muslims that are 
considered. 
 
There are several reasons for focusing on Evangelicals as opposed to other Christian traditions.  
First, they are the largest and fastest growing section of the Christian church worldwide and this 
has also been true in Britain.  In the last two decades of the twentieth century they were 
effectively the only part of the British church to be growing and showing signs of vitality.  Today, 
although growth has slowed, there are more than 1.25 million Evangelicals in England (Brierley, 
2006) and maybe 2 million in Britain as a whole (Ashworth and Farthing, 2007).  This number is 
commensurate with the Muslim community in Britain which since the 2001 census will have grown 
to at least 2 million although it must be remembered that this community is hugely diverse and 
would not all be active in their faith. 
 
A second reason for choosing this group is the uncompromising commitment of Evangelicals to 
their understanding of revealed truth.  This in many ways mirrors the similar conviction of 
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orthodox Muslims, who often respect Christians who strongly hold to their traditional faith.6  Add 
to this that both Evangelicals and Muslims share a commitment to proselytism – evangelism and 
da‘wa (invitation) respectively – and it could be expected that these two faith communities may 
find coexistence challenging.  Does the resulting competition create a more vigorous religious 
market in Britain or does the increase of diversity cause a decline in belief?  The interaction gives 
an opportunity to explore some key themes in the sociology of religion. 
 
A third reason for choosing Evangelicals is that very little research has been done on interaction 
between Evangelicals and Muslims.  There is a large literature on Christian-Muslim relations in 
general yet little of specific application to Evangelicals. For instance, a recent edited volume 
entitled Christian Responses to Islam looked at the response of Anglicans, Catholics, Orthodox and 
other groups but had no chapter specifically on Evangelicals (O'Mahony and Loosley, 2008).  There 
has been some work on Evangelicals and Muslims in America where there is generally rather more 
interest among sociologists in this section of the church.  For instance Cimino (2005) and Hoover 
(2004) both wrote short papers and Kidd recently published American Christians and Islam: 
Evangelical Culture and Muslims from the Colonial Period to the Age of Global Terrorism (2009).  
However, these all focus on the North American situation.  So this thesis looks to fill a lacuna in the 
British context. 
 
Finally, Evangelical Christianity is my own social and faith background.  In some cases the people 
that I have interviewed or discussed are friends or acquaintances.  In other cases we at least share 
mutual friends.  This enabled ease of access but does not imply that I necessarily agree or 
sympathize with all or any of their views.  Indeed in a few cases my own views may have closed 
doors to me, even though I tried as far as possible to embark on this research in a nonpartisan 
manner.  The issue of my positionality and the benefits and challenges which it throws up are 
taken up at greater length in Chapter 8. 
 
1.3.C MUSLIMS 
Muslims feature in this research due to the remarkable re-emergence of Islam onto the world 
stage over the last 30 years and especially since the catastrophic events of 9/11.  Many observers 
see the role of Islam and its place in global politics as being pivotal in the twenty-first century 
                                                             
6 Note Hellyer’s comment above (§1.1). 
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(Hefner, 1998).  Today worldwide Muslims form the second largest religious population bloc after 
Christians and, with identity becoming increasingly important, “it may not be too much to claim 
that the future of our world will depend on how we deal with identity and difference” (Volf, 1996).  
This is certainly likely to be true of the interaction between Christians and Muslims.  As Said points 
out, for Christians historically “Islam came to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes 
of hated barbarians .... a lasting trauma” (Said, 1978, 59).  Sometimes it seems that little has 
changed. 
 
Yet essentializing, monolithic narratives which create dualist certainties are dangerous.  There are 
many different types of Islam just as there are many different types of Christianity and shades of 
liberal secularism.  These variations and nuances must always be borne in mind.   
 
So in a sense this study is somewhat asymmetrical in that it looks at the reaction of a specific 
subset of the Christian community and yet compares its reaction not to another subset but to the 
entire panoply of Islam and Muslim sects.  However, this is not an exercise in essentialism.  It 
simply recognizes that “Muslims en masse” often serve as “the Other” for Evangelical discourse.    
This is not a practice that is condoned in this thesis but is utilized as it reflects what so often 
happens in real life.   
 
1.3.D THE POST 9/11 WORLD 
Evangelical debate surrounding Islam has never been more polarized than since the events of 
2001.  Whilst there was discussion of Islam within the Evangelical community prior to that date, 
and particularly following the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989, 
9/11 gave the debate renewed urgency.  There is obviously a rich history of Christian-Muslim 
relations prior to this date stretching back to the early years of Islam, and a study of this would 
certainly be of interest.  However, whilst brief mention will be made of this history, the focus here 
is on the twenty-first century encounter and a comparison of pre- and post-9/11 Evangelical 
literature is beyond the scope of this research except for some contextual references. 
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1.4 PRINCIPAL AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to answer four questions relating to Evangelical responses to 
Islam and Muslims since 9/11: 
 
1. What is the nature of the Evangelical public sphere which has formed around the subject 
of Islam and Muslims in Britain and how is it mediated within British churches? 
 
2. What are the patterns of responses to Islam and Muslims exhibited within this public 
sphere? 
 
3. How will these responses affect community relationships amongst Evangelicals, Muslims 
and government? 
 
4. What are the likely trajectories of British Evangelicalism in the light of the Muslim 
presence? 
 
1.5 A MAP OF THE THESIS 
 
In a thesis of this nature it is usual to set out the contextual material before moving on to a 
discussion of theoretical concepts.  In this case, however, I have felt it more natural to reverse this 
order.  The reason is that my description of the context is dependent on my conceptualizing of the 
public sphere which only becomes clear in the discussion of the related theory.  For that reason 
Part I is a theoretical and historical exploration of religion and the public sphere.  This has the 
drawback that on occasion mention is made of concepts the context of which only becomes clear 
later in Part II.  I have tried to ameliorate this with brief explanations and cross references 
wherever possible. 
 
Chapter 2 develops the concept of a topical micro-public sphere.  It starts by considering 
Habermas’ (1989) description of a bourgeois public sphere  and the various criticisms that his work 
attracted due to his failure to account for, amongst other things, gender, class and religion.  From 
these critiques develop ideas of subaltern counterpublics (N. Fraser, 1992), multiple modernities 
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(Eisenstadt, 1999), transnationaIism (N. Fraser, 2007) and various other understandings of the 
public sphere (for instance Keane, 1998).  The work of Hauser (1999) and Warner (2005) is then 
used to develop the concept of the reticulate public sphere as the framework for this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the place of religion within the public sphere with particular reference to the 
histories of Christianity and Islam.  It finds that both communities at various times have hosted 
public spheres and have exhibited different reactions to temporal, political power.  However, 
whilst the Muslim public sphere has attracted significant recent academic attention (Eickelman 
and Anderson, 1999, Hoexter et al., 2002, Salvatore and Eickelman, 2004), no comparable 
research has yet been done into a corresponding Christian public sphere.  Following a brief survey 
of theoretical approaches to religion and society, and particularly Habermas’ (2006) own increased 
openness to the role of religion in a modern liberal democracy, the chapter concludes with a 
thematic discussion of the relationships between religion, multiculturalism, social cohesion and 
the establishment of the church in Britain. 
 
Whilst Chapters 2 and 3 provide the dominant theoretical framework for the thesis, Chapter 4 
begins the transition from theory to context.  As the majority of empirical research into 
Evangelicals has taken place in the USA, it is the American context which is frequently to the fore 
in this chapter.  Theory developed in North America, however, has to be carefully tested in the 
British context, as is stressed in Parts II and IV.  The chapter reflects on what happens when 
religious groups meet in a pluralized context.  It discusses various theories regarding how they 
maintain their identities through a shared habitus (Bourdieu, 1999), social imaginary (C. Taylor, 
2004) or sacred canopy (Berger, 1967, C. Smith, 1998).  This enables them to maintain their 
religious strength,  despite the predictions of some versions of the secularization thesis  
(Casanova, 1994).  Competition results between different groups of faith (and none) which Stark 
and Finke (2000) liken to a religious marketplace and others (Kaplan, 1960, Wilson, 2002) see as a 
form of evolutionary competition.  The chapter closes by considering various typologies for such 
competition (Bennett, 2008, Race, 1983, Lochhead, 1988, C. Smith, 2002) before describing some 
of the possible futures envisaged for faith groups in a modern plural society: isolation (Berger, 
1992), accommodation (Hunter, 1987), or engaged orthodoxy (C. Smith, 1998, Guest, 2007) and 
continued strength (Berger, 2010). 
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Part II provides the context for this thesis.  Chapter 5 paints an overview of Evangelicalism and 
pays particular attention to the issues of definition and global variety.  A brief history of British 
Evangelicalism leads into a discussion of the contemporary situation and an account of the 
Evangelical public sphere in Britain.   
 
Chapter 6 follows by painting a parallel picture of Islam and Muslims in Britain.  A statistical profile 
and a brief history of immigration are followed by a sketch of the Muslim public sphere and the 
issues which concern it. 
 
Chapter 7 brings these themes together and briefly looks at the interaction between 
Evangelicalism and Islam since the Reformation, particularly highlighting work done in both the 
United States and in Britain.  The chapter concludes with a description of the contemporary micro-
public sphere that has formed within the Evangelical community to debate the presence of Islam 
in Britain.  This sphere provides the framework for the empirical work that is to follow. 
 
Chapter 8 outlines the methodology used for the research which included textual analysis and 
semi-structured interviews, initially at a national level and then later in a cross-sectional study of 
church leaders in London.  It explains the rationale for the choice of people and churches as 
informants and recounts some of the difficulties and sensitivities experienced in gaining access to 
them.  It also discusses my own position vis-à-vis Evangelicalism and those whom I interviewed. 
 
The data presented in Part III are arranged thematically moving from the abstract, through the 
socio-political to the relational.  At every stage it is clear that there is considerable variety and 
even disagreement in how the Evangelicals in this survey view Islam.  Chapter 9 looks at the 
internal discourse of this public sphere and considers how British Evangelicals conceptualize Islam.  
It examines how they describe Islam and the various ways they explain its origin.  This has not just 
theological implications but also informs the way Evangelicals view Islam as an ideology.  The 
chapter closes with an important discussion of how different Evangelicals understand Islam’s 
relation to violence. 
 
Chapter 10 assesses the reactions within the Evangelical public sphere to the socio-political 
implications of the presence of Islam in Britain.  It begins by exploring how the Evangelical 
 39 Chapter 1 
 
participants view the relationship between church and state and the British expression of 
multiculturalism.  This provides the backdrop to their concerns about what some see as the 
creeping Islamization of Britain and of particular note is the discussion of whether Muslims can be 
trusted in the light of how some Evangelicals understand the Islamic doctrine of taqiyya.7  The 
chapter concludes by listening to various Evangelical predictions about the future of Islam in this 
country.   
 
Chapter 11 draws the data presentation to a close and forms a bridge to the analysis of Part IV by 
examining how the British Evangelical public sphere interacts with other public spheres in the light 
of the approaches to Islam set out above.  There is clearly a significant interaction with the Muslim 
public sphere.  However, the interaction with the wider British public sphere is also considered as 
is the interaction with the Evangelical grassroots.  The latter is highlighted by the presentation of 
the data from interviews with 14 church leaders in London.  The final section of the chapter 
explores the internal relationships and considerable tension within the current Evangelical public 
sphere. 
 
Part IV concludes the thesis with an analysis of the empirical material.  Chapter 12 brings the data 
and the theory together and seeks to answer the questions raised in the introduction.  The first 
part focuses on the nature of the micro-public sphere itself, the evident existence of an Evangelical 
micro-public sphere and the usefulness of this concept for the sociological study of religion.  The 
second part maps out the Evangelical approaches to Islam and proposes a typology to describe the 
various responses.  There is a brief discussion of the implications of these responses for 
community relations before the final part discusses likely futures for British Evangelicalism in the 
light of the Muslim presence. 
 
Chapter 13 concludes the thesis by looking at some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
research, suggesting topics for future exploration and discussing how the findings may benefit 
various groups within the community.  It ends by imagining how the Evangelical gathering 
mentioned in the opening paragraph above could have adopted a more pragmatic approach, 
which balanced both confrontation and conciliation, truth and grace. 
                                                             
7 Meaning dissimulation regarding one’s religion.  Arabic terms throughout are presented in italics and 
can be found in the ‘Glossary of Arabic terms’ at the front of the thesis (p27). 
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PART I – THE PUBLIC SPHERE, RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS GROUP 
STRENGTH: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
CHAPTER 2 THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
A colourful book; an open letter on a website; a sermon from a pulpit; a book review on a blog 
site; a circulated email; a seminar at a conference; an article in a magazine; a meeting of 
academics.  All of these examples and many more could be part of the response of Evangelical 
Christians to Islam and Muslims.  Each in some way represents an expression or communication of 
ideas and attitudes.  But what connects these events together?  How are we to make sense of 
them? 
 
As these public rather than private expressions form the focus of this thesis, a framework for 
analyzing the Evangelical discourse and exchange of ideas is required.  The debate surrounding 
Jürgen Habermas’ formulation of the public sphere provides a starting point.   
 
This chapter develops the concept of the public sphere and starts by defining terms and 
vocabulary.  The second section traces the rise of what Habermas calls the bourgeois public sphere 
and his postulation of an ideal type of public opinion formation in a liberal democratic society.  
Various criticisms of this theory are then discussed, along with the perceived fall of the bourgeois 
public sphere and the development of new models by other authors.  The chapter finishes with a 
clear definition of the type of discursive micro-public sphere that becomes the theoretical frame 
for what follows. 
 
2.1  THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Before commencing, it is necessary to say a word about terminology, as several different labels 
and definitions are used with respect to the public sphere.  Firstly, it is important to note that the 
phrase “public sphere” should be used with a degree of technical precision.  In sociological 
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thought it is not a generic term for just “anything that happens in public”, but is carefully defined.8  
Secondly, several other terms are frequently collocated with the word “public” but to different 
effect.  “Domain”, “arena” and “realm” are all broad terms which carry a wider, less technical, 
connotation and lack the specificity of “sphere”.  Public “space” is also commonly used as a 
synonym but strictly carries a physical or geographical meaning.9  The closest to a synonym is 
probably the public “square” which carries echoes of the Athenian agora (market place) as a place 
of public debate. 
 
It is also necessary to differentiate the public sphere from civil society.  As both are situated within 
what Habermas calls the lifeworld as opposed to the system (Habermas, 1987), there is often a 
good deal of confusion surrounding these two concepts and they “tend to be coupled, overlapped, 
almost conflated, often without any clear distinction between them” (Eisenstadt, 2002, 140).  Even 
Habermas himself admits that "a search for clear definitions in the relevant publications is in vain" 
(Habermas, 1992, 453). 
 
The key factor here is that, whereas civil society is associational, the public sphere is discursive.  
Taylor sees the public sphere as a subset or “dimension of civil society” and describes it as:  
 
a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: 
print, electronic, and also face-to-face encounters;  to discuss matters of common interest; and 
thus to be able to form a common mind about these (C. Taylor, 2007, 185). 
 
For Crossley and Roberts it is “a zone of mediation between the state and the private individual” 
concerned with discourse, debate and negotiation for the purpose of public opinion formation 
(2004, 2).  So for the purposes of this thesis all the churches, mosques, charities, groups and 
societies considered are part of civil society.  The debates that are generated by individuals within 
these associations form the public sphere.  This could be pictured graphically as in Figure 2.1.10   
 
                                                             
8 Note that ‘public sphere’ is used to translate the German word Öffentlichkeit, which can mean public, 
public sphere or publicity see Translator’s Note in Habermas (1989, xv). (Habermas, 1989, xv) 
9 See Crawford (1995) for an example of the collocation of ‘realm’, ‘space’ and ‘sphere’ correctly used 
and contrasted. (Crawford, 1995) 
10 The other major realm not considered here is the economic market which Habermas considers to be 
part of the system world but private and separate to the state. 
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Figure 2.1 – The public sphere 
 
 
Reetz gives a succinct summary of the difference between the two concepts: 
 
Because of its perceived autonomy from the state and private life, the ‘public sphere’ concept at 
times appeared to be close to the 'civil society' approach.  While Habermas focused on critical 
public debate, civil society came to describe the associational life of society.  Today they are used to 
offer different perspectives on public life.  Where the public sphere concept emphasizes the 
publicness of debate and activity, civil society looks at the level and quality of self-organization 
(Reetz, 2006, 15 italics added). 
 
Thus the two concepts perform different functions.  “Civil society organizations channel private 
opinion into the public sphere, they do not constitute the latter” (Herbert, 2003, 75).  So with 
these preliminary definitions in mind it is possible to move on to consider the genesis of the 
concept of the public sphere. 
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2.2  HABERMAS AND THE RISE OF THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Habermas is both a political philosopher and sociologist in the tradition of the Frankfurt School; his 
work has been highly influential in recent thinking about the philosophical basis of political 
democracy.  His early thinking on the public sphere appeared in The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere which was published in German in 1962 but was not translated into English until 
1989.   
 
The book is subtitled An Investigation of a Category of Bourgeois Society and traces the rise of the 
middle class in eighteenth century Europe with the aim of deriving an “ideal type” of the public 
sphere (Habermas, 1992, 422).  Habermas starts by considering the Greek idea of the polis (city or 
public), as opposed to the oikos (home or private), which met representatively in the agora 
(marketplace) as an ekklesia (gathering of citizen).11  He then traces these concepts through the 
period of Roman law and into the feudal Middle Ages.  It was the rise of trade and the 
development of printing from the thirteenth through to the sixteenth century, culminating in the 
appearance of daily journals in the seventeenth century, that provided "the elements of a new 
social order" (Habermas, 1989, 14).  According to Habermas the eighteenth century then 
witnessed the emergence of social circles of men, mainly from the bourgeois mercantile class, who 
began to gather together to discuss trade and labour.  These circles were centred on the salons in 
France,  the Tischgesellschaften (table societies12) in Germany, and the new coffee houses in 
Britain, of which by this time there were some 3000 in London alone (ibid 30, 32).  At the same 
time newsletters and journals began to circulate, focused on trades and guilds, which quickly 
evolved to include opinion and comment and were disseminated, uncensored by the state 
authorities.  Titles such as The Tatler and later The Spectator and The Guardian were “intimately 
interwoven with the life of the coffee houses” and formed the basis of discussion and public 
opinion forming (ibid 42).  Other “social nodes” were centred on libraries, reading rooms and 
                                                             
11  Interestingly the same Greek word that the New Testament uses to describe the gathering of God’s 
people, that is “the church”. 
12 It is interesting to note that in the 1990s an Evangelical grouping called Building Together launched 
‘kitchen tables’ the idea of which was “to bring together key people in a region or city to meet 
informally with the purpose of praying for their region/town, and strategising for the re-evangelization 
of said region/town” (quoted from a personal email). 
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reading societies as books also became more widely available and accessible to the general public 
thus breaking the monopoly of the state and church on learning (ibid 36).  
 
According to Habermas there was a common thread between all these nodes: they were all based 
on social intercourse; they problematized new issues of public concern; and they were inclusive 
and accessible to all.  Above all it was a reasoning public which could debate the main issues of the 
day to form a public opinion.  In fact, taken as a totality, Habermas saw them forming a 
“universalized public sphere” (Hauser, 1999, 55) which represented the public opinion of the 
people.   
 
2.3 CRITICISMS OF HABERMAS’ IDEAL TYPE 
 
In this description Habermas was doing more than present a historical backdrop to western liberal 
democracy.   He was searching for “the ideal type of the bourgeois public sphere” which would be 
both a model and litmus test for modern democracies (Habermas, 1992, 422) and which would 
“mediate between society and state by holding the state accountable to society via public 
opinion” (N. Fraser, 1992, 112).  However, his idealizing of the eighteenth century public sphere 
has not been without its critics who are quick to point out its shortcomings, both in terms of 
legitimacy, that is whether the bourgeois public sphere was truly representative, and efficacy, that 
is whether it was effective in overcoming systemic obstacles to influence political decision making 
(N. Fraser, 2007).  Of particular relevance to this thesis are its exclusiveness based on class and 
gender, its lack of recognition of other competing public spheres and most significantly its failure 
to recognize a salient role for religion.13 
 
Firstly, despite Habermas’ claims for universality, it is not clear that there was equal access to this 
public sphere for all citizens.  It was a privileged group of bourgeois businessmen, artisans and 
academics who, according to Fraser, far from championing the cause of the disenfranchized, 
wanted to displace the aristocratic elite and to rule the plebeian strata themselves (1992, 114).  
The movement was essentially a “public sphere in the world of letters” (Habermas, 1989, 30) to 
                                                             
13 For a fuller discussion of all the various criticisms see Calhoun (1992a) which contains a collection of 
critical essays emerging from a seminal conference on Habermas and the public sphere in 1989. 
(Calhoun, 1992a) 
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which, almost by definition, only the educated could belong, effectively excluding the working 
classes.  In other words the bourgeois public sphere "was oriented not just toward defence of civil 
society against the state but also toward the maintenance of a system of domination within civil 
society" (Calhoun, 1992b, 39).  Such overt classism is clearly unwarranted for an ideal type of 
public sphere in a modern democracy.  This sets a marker for our consideration of an Evangelical 
public sphere (henceforth EPS) around issues of Islam signalling that issues of class, education and 
race must all be considered.14   
 
Secondly, the bourgeois public sphere was almost exclusively male, a point highlighted by feminist 
academics (N. Fraser, 1992, 114).  This is a criticism now accepted by Habermas who later 
reflected that "the exclusion of women from this world dominated by men now looks different 
than it appeared to me at the time"(Habermas, 1992, 427).  This is all the more remarkable as he 
was clearly aware of this gender exclusivity when in his original work he made specific reference to 
“abandoned women (who) waged a vigorous but vain struggle against the new institution" 
(Habermas, 1989, 33).  Against a wider backdrop of the discourse on gender equality it will be 
necessary to investigate whether women have equal access to the EPS and if they do whether 
their involvement brings distinctive perspectives. 
 
Thirdly, Habermas has been criticized for ignoring other public spheres which existed at the time in 
order to argue that the bourgeois public sphere was the universal public sphere.  Fraser points out 
that not only were there competing public spheres centred around nationalists, peasants, elite 
women, and the working class but that the bourgeois public sphere also “deliberately sought to 
block broader participation” (N. Fraser, 1992, 116).  Again this is a criticism which Habermas now 
accepts acknowledging that "it is wrong to speak of one single public" and admitting the existence 
of a parallel plebeian public sphere “interlocked” with the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 
1992, 424). This for him, however, does not invalidate the concept of an ideal public sphere even if 
the likelihood of realizing a singular universal sphere is remote.  Of course participants within the 
public sphere are sometimes themselves oblivious to the existence of other equally legitimate, 
sometimes competing, public spheres.  A question to ask will be to what extent the EPS is aware 
                                                             
14 For the first use of the phrase “Evangelical Christian public sphere” see Ken Plummer, "The Square of 
Intimate Citizenship: Some Preliminary Proposals," Citizenship Studies 5.3 (2001), where the author 
suggests in passing that it is one possible example of “multiple, hierarchically layered and contested 
public spheres” (243). (Plummer, 2001) 
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and accepting of other religious public spheres.  Historically the Evangelical church has been 
somewhat myopic and has failed to appreciate debates within Catholic and Orthodox communities 
let alone within other faith groups.    
 
The final criticism to mention at this stage is rather more fundamental to this thesis and will be 
commented on at length later in this chapter.  In his early work on the public sphere Habermas – a 
liberal, “methodological atheist” (Harrington, 2007)15 – entirely neglected the role of religion, 
which Calhoun calls “his blind spot” (1992b, 36).  This is a position that Habermas has now publicly 
amended as will be seen in §3.3.  It is the contention of this thesis that religion cannot be ignored 
in the formation of public opinion and that the existence of faith-based public spheres should be 
recognized and admitted to the wider public sphere. 
 
2.4  THE RISE OF THE MEDIA, THE FALL OF THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE, AND NEW MODELS 
 
For Habermas the bourgeois public sphere was short-lived and the second half of The Structural 
Transformation deals with its decline and fall.  It is clearly a demise that Habermas himself regrets 
and Cohen and Arato feel that his assessment reflects his "negative philosophy of history" 
inherited from the Frankfurt School (1992, 242).  This sense of loss pervades his thinking on 
modern democracy and the public sphere today which is but a “pale imitation of these (bourgeois) 
ideals” (Crossley and Roberts, 2004, 2). 
 
Amongst the reasons Habermas gives for this decline were the blurring of the separation between 
the state and the public sphere, and the polarization of the private and public realms.  In the 
former the state began to intervene in and “colonize” civil society, particularly as it became the 
provider of services and social security.  This changed the attitude of individuals towards the state 
from that of participants to that of consumers and rendered them dependent, “unpolitical and 
indifferent” (Habermas, 1989, 211).  In the latter case, as the “world of work” became a more 
public realm to be differentiated from “leisure time” which was private to the individual, 
opportunity for public debate was stifled as time was divided between the private family, personal 
leisure and public work (ibid 154). 
                                                             
15 See Harrington (2007) and Adams (2006) for a discussion of Habermas’ interaction with theology. 
(Harrington, 2007) (Adams, 2006) 
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Habermas’ sharpest lament is kept for the rise of the mass media which have “transmogrified” the 
public sphere …. into nothing but a “pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption” 
(Habermas, 1989, 160, 162).  The newspapers, which started out as a means of disseminating 
information and opinion, became, in the nineteenth century, commercial interests concerned with 
profit and the agendas of their powerful owners.  Even worse, mass media television and radio 
turned debate into entertainment and "critical publicity (was) supplanted by manipulative 
publicity" (ibid 178) as the media became a tool for state management of the politics “stage show” 
(Crossley and Roberts, 2004, 5).  Such is the strength of Habermas’ criticism of today’s mass media 
that Goode accuses him of “technophobia” and a “logocentric antipathy towards the audio-visual 
media” (2005, 20).  According to Habermas, however, this whole decline has served to turn : 
 
“a culture-debating public into a culture-consuming public .… The sounding board of an educated 
stratum tutored in the public use of reason has been shattered; the public is split apart into 
minorities of specialists who put their reason to use nonpublicly and the great mass of consumers 
whose receptiveness is public but uncritical" (Habermas, 1989, 175). 
  
Such antipathy has led to criticism that Habermas fails to take adequate account of the media in 
the public sphere today.     For some such as Garnham, whilst Habermas’ work is a good starting 
point for a consideration of the role of the media in a democracy, it is underdeveloped (Garnham, 
1992).  As Goode observes “it is necessary for any serious investigation of the public sphere to 
foreground the issue of mediation” {, 2005 #197@89}.  At various stages, therefore, this thesis 
gives careful consideration to the role and influence of media, both Christian and mainstream, in 
influencing particularly the Evangelical grassroots.    
 
Despite the above criticisms and Habermas’ own pessimism about its political efficacy today, 
theorists persist in engaging with the concept of the public sphere as a tool for theorizing about 
democracy, in a belief that it still promises to “contribute to struggles for emancipation” and a 
fairer society (N. Fraser, 2007, 66).  Not all of the many models developed can be described here, 
but those most pertinent to this thesis are set out below with the aim of creating an ideal type for 
the British EPS that has coalesced around the discussion of Islam and Muslims.  In particular the 
work of Fraser introduces the concept of multiple counterpublics (1992) and the transnational 
public sphere (2007), and Eisenstadt (1999) proposes the concepts of both multiple modernities.  
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The concept of size and scope is further developed in the work of Keane (1998), which provides a 
measure for public spheres, and Hauser (1999), which describes the catalyst for a public sphere 
and highlights its rhetorical and reticulate nature.  Finally, Warner (2005) helps to clarify the 
necessary elements  and conditions for a public sphere. 
 
2.4.A FRASER AND SUBALTERN COUNTERPUBLICS 
In her critique of Habermas’ single, elite bourgeois public sphere Fraser proposes a multiplicity of 
publics, not as a threat to democracy but rather as a positive benefit in establishing participatory 
parity between different groups (1992, 121-8).  She terms these publics subaltern counterpublics 
and sees them as “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent 
and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, 
interests, and needs” (ibid 123).  In a stratified society multiple publics ensure that marginal voices 
are not lost and indeed a multicultural society entails such multiplicity by definition.  Nonetheless, 
at the same time there needs to be a larger public sphere that draws people together from 
different cultures for a reasoned debate on matters of universal concern. 
 
In addition Fraser introduces two other pairs of descriptors both of which are useful.  Firstly, public 
spheres may either be weak or strong.  A weak sphere is one that has no decision or implementing 
power and is merely a forum for debate.  Conversely a strong sphere is one which has a degree of 
self-governance, decision making power or influence with the state.  Secondly, the terms 
intrapublic and interpublic distinguish between communication internal to a public sphere and 
communication between different public spheres respectively.  
 
2.4.B EISENSTADT, MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AND THE NON-WESTERN WORLD 
Habermas’ failure to take into account developments in the non-western world has been seen as 
another major weakness of his work (Reetz, 2006, 16).  Viewing the West as normative can lead to 
a restricted view of the public sphere and its relations to other realms.  Eisenstadt (1999) points 
out that, whilst modernity has affected all societies, it has developed differently in each society 
under the various influences of existing institutions, culture, social movements and religion.  This is 
certainly true of “the different configurations of civil society and public spheres” which have 
developed (ibid 291).  In a later work Eisenstadt goes on to point out that these different public 
spheres should not be evaluated against a European “evaluative yardstick” (2002, 159).  This is 
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particularly the case in the Muslim world where historically “a very vibrant and autonomous public 
sphere crystallized that was of crucial importance in shaping the dynamics of Muslim societies” 
(ibid 147) (§3.2).   The important thing to note here is that not all public spheres are culturally 
alike, thus their interpublic interactions will be affected by their various contexts and worldviews.  
This is certainly the case in interaction between a mainly western EPS and a Muslim public sphere 
significantly influenced by Islamic values and historical models. 
 
2.4.C FRASER – AGAIN – AND THE TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
This global factor resurfaces in another way when we think about the “process of 
deterritorialization of public life” (Keane, 1998, 186).  This is a concept that emerges in the 
discussion of globalization, migration, transnational solidarities and global identities and has 
profound implications for public sphere theory (see for example Benhabib et al., 2007).  Fraser in 
her article Transnationalizing the Public Sphere (2007) points out that Habermas and all of his 
critics, including herself, had prior to the millennium seen the public sphere entirely within a 
Westphalian nation-state framework.   However, transnationalization cannot be ignored and 
throws both the legitimacy and the efficacy of the public sphere into question.  International 
media, the internet and migration all enable discursive interaction across national boundaries.  A 
public sphere which transcends national boundaries will therefore include “interlocutors who do 
not constitute a demos or political citizenry” (ibid 54).  In which case to whom does the public 
opinion belong and to whom is it addressed?  Moreover, in what way can that public opinion ever 
be efficacious in a world where sovereign states are no longer independent of transnational 
institutions and are powerless to enact laws that can solve transnational problems?  These are just 
some of the many questions Fraser raises and all of them point towards “yet another ‘structural 
transformation of the public sphere’” (ibid 54) in the light of the new global order.   
 
The crucial point in this study is that religious public spheres in Britain are clearly not isolated from 
their global, transnational counterparts.  As will be seen, key participants in Evangelical discussions 
on Islam may be resident on other continents; and this will also be true of Muslim public spheres 
where Muslims find their identity in the worldwide umma.  So, although this thesis focuses on the 
United Kingdom, the transnational connectedness of these publics should not be forgotten. 
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2.4.D KEANE AND THE SIZE OF PUBLIC SPHERES 
This line of thinking also raises the issue of scale.  Just how big is a public sphere?  It is clear from 
the earlier discussion that Habermas saw it as a large scale sphere, albeit made up of small groups 
meeting in coffee houses, which could accurately represent the public opinion of a whole nation.  
The discussion above of the transnational public sphere suggests that this is unduly confining.  At 
the same time, however, once the rationale for subaltern counterpublics is accepted then there is 
no limit on how small a public can be.  Indeed Hauser, maybe with a passing nod to Jesus’ 
comment in Matthew 18.20, is happy to suggest that “a public sphere is created whenever two or 
more individuals converse about a public matter …. (as) some portion of the public sphere is made 
manifest in their conversation" (Hauser, 1999, 62, 64). 
 
In order to better label the potential variation in size and scope of public spheres John Keane 
(1998) proposes a useful classification.  He suggests: 
 
Micro-public spheres -  "bottom-up, small scale" public spheres consisting of maybe "dozens, 
hundreds or thousands" of people (ibid 170).  This would seem to 
correspond most closely to the idea of an EPS in Britain.   
 
Meso-public spheres -   medium sized spheres that are “mainly coextensive with territorial 
boundaries" (ibid 174).  They involve millions of people, often sharing a 
common language, interacting with the same media on a huge variety of 
topics of mutual concern leading Taylor to label this the “metatopical 
public sphere” (C. Taylor, 2007, 187).  In this thesis the British public sphere 
is considered to be a metatopical meso-public sphere made up of many 
micro-public spheres and a host of media. 
 
Macro-public spheres – transnational public spheres involving hundreds of millions of people 
regionally or globally which are a "consequence of the international 
concentration of mass media firms previously owned and operated at the 
territorial nation-state level" and also crucially the internet (ibid 176-181).  
However, to what extent this can be said to be a meaningful public sphere 
is unclear.  Whilst media can clearly influence millions of people 
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simultaneously, for a public sphere to exist there has to be rational debate 
suggesting discursive interaction between participants in the sphere.  It is 
not clear how this could happen on the macro scale.  Nonetheless it is 
impossible to ignore such supranational influences.16 
 
2.4.E HAUSER AND THE RHETORICAL RETICULATE PUBLIC SPHERE 
Before moving to a working definition of a public sphere, it will be helpful to consider the work of 
Hauser in his Vernacular Voices (1999).  He imagines a “montage of publics” (ibid 35) and his 
preliminary definition of a public sphere is “a discursive space in which individuals and groups 
associate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common 
judgement about them” (ibid 61).  It is not confined to specialist language used within formal 
institutions but rather is the talk among a public's members, a “vernacular discourse” (ibid 109). 
He goes on to emphasize the rhetorical nature of the public sphere which focuses on particular 
issues about which participants may have conflicting interests.  In other words public spheres 
coalesce around issues rather than around static groups of individuals (ibid 63).  As will be seen 
this is certainly true of the EPS which has developed around the debate on Muslims and Islam in 
Britain.  
  
Secondly, Hauser applies the term reticulate to the public sphere meaning that it is networked 
together as a “lattice of spheres” (1999, 55, see especially chapter 3).  Reminiscent of Habermas’ 
use of the word “nodes” to describe the different sites of public discourse, Hauser’s public sphere 
has many “nested spheres” linked together at various nodes.  
 
Each of these individualized, local associative spaces is potentially included in larger, more 
polyphonous exchanges.  When the outcome is public opinion, what starts as a dialogue becomes 
part of the multilogue of voices along the range of individuals and groups engaged by a public 
question (Hauser, 1999, 62). 
 
This model allows for a wealth of diversity and complexity in the overarching meso-public sphere, 
admitting the contributions of the maximum possible number of discursive communities, groups, 
                                                             
16 For a discussion of the role of the internet in the public sphere see Bohman (2004) and Ch.4 
“Mediations: from the Coffee House to the Internet Café” in Goode (2005). (Goode, 2005) (Bohman, 2004) 
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movements and circles whilst at the same time allowing the possibility that these various groups 
may also intersect and interact with one another.  As Hauser puts it: 
 
public opinions are imbedded in the ongoing dialogue in which classes, races, religions, genders, 
generations, regions, and a host of other significant discriminators rub against each other, 
problematize one another's assumptions about meaning, create discursive spaces in which new 
interpretations may emerge, and lead to intersections that provide collective expressions of shared 
sentiments (Hauser, 1999, 110). 
 
2.5 DEFINING A MICRO-PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Drawing on all of these models I now propose a working understanding of the public sphere for 
this thesis.  It should be clear that there is a degree of ambiguity in talking about the public sphere 
with the definite article and that a more careful definition is required.  It should also be clear that 
it is possible to talk about a multiplicity of micro-public spheres.  So developing Hauser’s definition 
this thesis will consider micro-public spheres to be: 
 
public discursive spaces of variable size in which individuals and groups coalesce around 
matters of mutual interest or concern to form an opinion through rational debate, and 
which together are subordinate nodes of a larger network of public spheres notionally  
making up the meso-public sphere in a particular society or nation. 
 
This is represented diagrammatically in Figure 2.2.  It should be noted that some micro-public 
spheres will be subsets of other larger spheres.  Such is the relationship between the Evangelical 
micro-public sphere and the larger Christian sphere.  Other micro-public spheres, like the feminist 
and Christian spheres in the diagram, may overlap due to shared membership and interests.  
Others may not overlap but may be in contact with each other whilst having mutually exclusive 
memberships as do the Muslim and Christian spheres.  Other spheres may have very little or no 
interaction at all.  All of these spheres together create a reticulate national meso-public sphere 
and of course may also be part of larger transnational public spheres.   
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2.6 THE FORMATION OF MICRO-PUBLIC SPHERES 
 
The work of Warner suggests that such an understanding of micro-public spheres may be a useful 
analytical tool for understanding the various debates taking place within communities: 
 
publics are essentially intertextual, frameworks for understanding texts against an organized 
background of the circulation of other texts, all interwoven not just by citational references but by 
the incorporation of a reflexive circulatory field in the mode of address and consumption (Warner, 
2005, 16). 
 
Drawing on Warner’s work and also that of Hauser I suggest that there are three critical elements 
for the creation of a micro-public sphere: an issue of common concern, texts and participants.   
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Figure 2.2 – Micro-, meso- and macro-public spheres 
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Firstly, the formation of a public sphere is contingent on the emergence of a topic or matter of 
public concern around which the participants coalesce with the purpose of influencing public 
opinion (Hauser, 1999, 64).  This could be as local as a campaign to re-open a public footpath or as 
national as a law to ban fox hunting, but without such a catalyst the interlocutors in the sphere 
would never come together and would not constitute a public.  However, this means that public 
spheres should be seen as evanescent, forming and dissolving as the context and issues change 
(Keane, 1998, 184).   
 
Secondly, a public sphere is discursive and “comes into being only in relation to texts and their 
circulation” (Warner, 2005, 66).  This has been greatly facilitated by developments in modern 
media, and contemporary micro-public spheres utilize the full range of media from traditional 
publishing to web-based audio-visual.  The circulation of texts, however, is not in itself sufficient to 
create a public sphere.  It is the reflexive interaction with the texts and “the concatenation of texts 
through time” which facilitate the development of public opinion (Warner, 2005, 90).  Language is 
also critical to the dissemination of texts.  If the participants do not share a common language, 
then they have to utilize an international language, such as English, or allow for the facility of 
translation.  Beyond this, however, the use of technical language can also be exclusive.  Hauser, 
with no seeming hint of irony, observes that "institutional powers and epistemic elites …. often 
preempt the possibilities for vernacular exchange by substituting technical language as coin of the 
rhetorical realm" (1999, 78).  He makes vernacular language a criterion for the existence of a 
public sphere. 
 
Finally, a public sphere requires participants and an audience which is alert and active.  Warner 
insists that to be truly public these should both be strangers and self-organized.  There is no 
external coercion or framework bringing them together.  To fulfill the requirement of publicness 
Hauser also observes that a public sphere should have “permeable boundaries” (Hauser, 1999, 
77).  Whilst it may have a primary membership, its discourse and opinions must also be accessible 
to the wider public.  This creates the possibility that spheres can interact and even be 
interconnected. 
 
By way of example Warner’s work focuses on public spheres which coalesce around issues of 
gender and transsexuality.  Interestingly he also mentions examples of religious micro-public 
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spheres such as those that formed historically at the time of the Great Awakening in America and 
also more recently the debate generated around the Promise Keepers movement and Christian 
fundamentalism.  It is this concept of a religious micro-public sphere that I use as the analytical 
framework for this thesis. 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that, despite its detractors, Habermas’ concept of the public sphere has continued 
validity, if not as a normative construct for the formation of public opinion in a democracy then at 
least as an analytical tool for observing the discourse amongst networks of individuals within 
society.  Having clearly established the image of a micro-public sphere I now relate this to religious 
communities paying particular attention to the Christian and Muslim cases. 
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CHAPTER 3 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
In the previous chapter I noted that Habermas failed to take religion into account in his original 
conceptualizing of the public sphere.  Contrary to many people’s expectations, however, religion 
has re-emerged into western public consciousness at the beginning of the twenty-first century.17  
Even Habermas himself has had to recognize this and include the religious factor in his thinking.  In 
this chapter I locate the concept of the religious public sphere in both the Christian and Muslim 
historical narratives and return again to the thinking of Habermas and others as they reflect on the 
role of religion in a liberal democracy.  The chapter concludes by looking at some pertinent themes 
for faith groups interacting in contemporary British society: multiculturalism, social capital, social 
cohesion, and the establishment of the Church of England. 
 
3.1 THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Two questions are of importance in considering the history of Christianity, Islam and the public 
sphere.  Firstly, what was the general relationship between religion, state institutions and wider 
society in each era?  Secondly, what evidence is there of early religious discursive public spheres?   
McDonough (1995) suggests two dispositions for religion in society – “protesting” and “ordering” – 
as a simple typology which she applies to both Christian and Muslim histories.  Protesting reflects 
a period of political weakness and struggle against injustice, whilst ordering represents a period 
when religion is in a position of power, creating structures and institutions.  Of course these two 
conditions may exist at the same time for different expressions of the same religion and are 
obviously only ideal types.  It should also be noted that there is a close correlation between these 
types and the contrast between what Casanova (following Weber) terms “religious communities” 
and “community cults” (Casanova, 1994, 45).  In the former, membership of a religious community 
is voluntary and signifies some sort of conversion or “salvation” experience.  It may well be costly 
in terms of increasing tension with the rest of society (see §4.2).  In the latter a religious identity is 
closely associated with a political community and a person is unwittingly born into it.  In fact 
leaving the community may well cause tension.  The implications of these patterns with respect to 
                                                             
17 We could note, for example, the title of the controversial book God is Back (Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge, 2009).   
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Christianity and Islam are drawn out below in what is the briefest and most skeletal of accounts 
touching on only the most salient episodes of religious history. 
 
3.1.A  CHRISTIAN PROTEST: THE EARLY CHURCH 
Both Christianity and Islam trace their roots back to a rationalizing Jewish monotheism (Berger, 
1967).  In its early days Judaism was a theocratic, and later monarchic, community cult in which 
religion was intensely public but left no room for public dissent, although occasionally individuals 
dared to speak a critical prophetic word.18  God’s revealed law – as interpreted by scholars and 
jurists - was absolute.  This is crucial background for both Muslims and some Christians in thinking 
about society and law today. 
 
By the time of Jesus Judea was under Roman occupation and, whilst religion still played an 
important role in politics and public life, there was a double repression from hegemonic religious 
law and the occupying political power.  Despite his very public ministry and charismatic leadership, 
Jesus ultimately refused the path of political power and submitted to the humiliation of 
crucifixion.  Nonetheless, what Weber termed Jesus’ “indifference” to the world (Weber, 1965, 
273) was not a denial of  any political aspect to God’s kingdom, because seeking justice – a central 
theme of that kingdom – in itself has political implications.  Rather it was a refusal to be co-opted 
or to impose God’s kingdom on the world by political or military force. 
 
Following Jesus’ example the early church had no political power.  The first three centuries were in 
McDonough’s terms a time of protest.  Small clandestine meetings in houses, arrests and often 
martyrdom were the order of the day.  Their loyalty to King Jesus was seen as a threat to Caesar’s 
empire.   It was a religious community of salvation, very different to the earlier Jewish community 
cult.   Yet in many ways these early Christians, despite their limited media options, created a 
micro-public sphere with their meetings, public witness and letter writing, which often dealt with 
political issues.19  Despite, or in fact because of, this protest and powerlessness many Evangelicals 
look back on this period as normative for their faith – an idea that Muslims often find strange. 
                                                             
18 See Brueggemann (2001) for a discussion of the conflict between the prophets and the royal court. 
(Brueggemann, 2001) 
19 The epistles of Paul and Peter and the writings of the Early Fathers were widely circulated amongst 
the churches and gave instructions, for instance, about attitudes towards the authorities, obeying the 
law and suffering in time of persecution.  The later Patristic writings of Tertullian, Justin, Irenaeus etc 
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3.1.B  CHRISTIAN ORDER: THE RISE OF CHRISTENDOM 
The fourth century saw a marked change in the public standing of Christianity under Constantine’s 
reign leading to a shift to the ordering mode.  The Christian “salvation religion” metamorphosed 
from being a “religious community” into being a “community cult” which was “adopted by the 
Roman Emipre” (Casanova, 1994, 47).  Christendom was to last for fifteen centuries (O'Donovan, 
1996, 195) during which period the Christian church in its various manifestations became 
intertwined with the state, political and civil arenas in both the western and eastern parts of the 
empire.  Popes crowned emperors, theologians influenced lawmakers and the church began to 
acquire wealth, land and buildings.  Religious hegemony was established by the rule of law and, 
drawing much of its inspiration from the Jewish scriptures (Murray, 2004), Christianity became a 
religion of empire. 
 
This did not go uncontested.  Not all Christians welcomed the newfound temporal power of the 
church, and the history of Christendom is punctuated with the formation of dissenting religious 
communities protesting against lack of religious freedom, ecclesial corruption and perceived 
theological error.20  Like the early Christians these groups often formed networks akin to micro-
public spheres and were anathematized and persecuted for their pains, this time by the 
institutional church.  
 
This history is significant today amongst British Evangelicals.21  There is fierce debate about which 
history is normative. Should the church be a propehtic community on the margins of society or 
should it be more akin to a community cult at the centre of political power?  Should it demand 
special privilege due to history or should it expect to suffer?  The answers to these questions have 
a significant bearing on how Christians react towards other faith groups and nowhere more so 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
often addressed emperors or other public figures and dealt with issues of religion in public life.  See 
O’Donovan (1999). (O'Donovan, 1999) 
20 Donatists (C4th-C5th), Cathars (C11th-C12th), Waldensians (C12th-C16th), Anabaptists (C16th-) are 
just a few of the examples. 
21 It should be noted that this is a Eurocentric narrative.  From the time of the seventeenth century 
Puritan migration, Protestantism and Evangelicalism developed a rather different story in North 
America. 
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than in the encounter with Islam, which, as will be seen (§3.2), is a religious system tending 
towards the ordering mode. 
 
3.1.C  RETURN TO PROTEST: THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION AND DECLINE OF CHRISTENDOM 
For many the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation marks the beginning of the decline of 
religion in Europe.  Casanova calls it the “corrosive solvent” which “destroyed the system of 
Western Christendom” (1994, 21), as it undermined the monopolistic authority of the Roman 
Catholic Church in the West.  The Christian reformers returned to a protesting mode, although it 
was now a protest against not only political power but also the ecclesial power of the 
institutionalized Roman Church.   The reformers created a plurality of new denominations; people 
began to read the Bible for themselves; the recently invented printing press made possible the 
mass distribution of pamphlets; and a nascent Protestant public sphere emerged (Leth, 1994).22  
Although sometimes suborned by the state for its own purposes (see for example Lake and 
Questier, 2000, 625), this public sphere has continued in various forms to the present day, 
remembering that most Evangelicals consider their roots to lie in the Protestant Reformation 
(§5.3).  It has been concerned not only with theology and ecclesiology but also political and socio-
economic goals, not least during the reforming work of Wilberforce and Shaftesbury in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
However, almost immediately following the Reformation, Europe descended into what are 
frequently referred to as the European Wars of Religion, although they had more to do with 
political power and the acquisition of territory than with religion itself (D'Costa, 2009, 76).  
Following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of the “modern” nation-state, the 
writings of political theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and later Rousseau laid the foundations for 
tolerance and liberal democracy but also firmly subordinated religion and the church to the all-
powerful state.  Significantly transnational religious allegiances were challenged and Locke 
particularly questioned the loyalty of both Roman Catholics and “Mahometans” (Muslims) as they 
owed fealty to “another prince” and were in danger of becoming “soldiers against (their) own 
Government” (Locke, 1689).  Although what came to be known as the Enlightenment was not a 
                                                             
22 See Ozment (1992) and also Brockmann (1998) who details the contents of 562 German Protestant 
pamphlets written during the counciliar affairs of the C16th.  For a defence of the idea of a “post-
Reformation public sphere” in England and a detailing of its trajectory during the Elizabethan period 
see Lake and Pincus (2006). (Lake and Pincus, 2006) (Ozment, 1992) (Brockmann, 1998) 
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uniform process and was by no means always antithetical to religion, it was not just political 
thinkers that laid siege to the public role of faith; scientists too challenged the traditional 
teachings of the church.23  By the time of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, secularization was believed 
to be the inevitable corollary of modernization and social science was anticipating – and at times 
seemingly celebrating – the increasing marginalization of religion.  During the second half of the 
twentieth century, however, it became clear that such predicitions had been premature.  Religion 
had not disappeared, and indeed in places was flourishing, leading sociologists to seek an 
explanation. 
 
Martin (1978), one of the first sociologists to challenge the secularization theory, links 
contemporary religious trends to the different historical patterns that emerged under the post-
Reformation principle of cuius regio, eius religio (lit. whose realm, his religion).  He observes that: 
Catholic monopolies were more prone to later radical secularism, such as French laïcité; Catholic-
Protestant duopolies like Germany and the Netherlands developed a mixed pattern with Christian 
political parties; whilst pluralist nations like America enshrined a complete separation of church 
and state.  Britain, however, developed only a partial separation with a Protestant “state church 
confronted by varieties of Protestant dissent .... and a Catholic form of dissidence” (Martin, 1978, 
20).  This state church is “allied to an elite culture” and dissenting groups are found “particularly 
amongst the ‘respectable’ working class” (ibid 117).  These dissenting groups have today 
flourished into a large number of diverse denominations and sects and it is this complex religious 
heritage that forms the backdrop for the current interaction of Evangelicals and Muslims in Britain. 
 
3.2 THE HISTORY OF ISLAM AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
3.2.A ISLAMIC ORDER: FROM MECCA TO MEDINA 
Whilst there are some interesting points of comparison, Islam developed over a rather different 
trajectory to Christianity and exhibits some important differences.  During his early ministry 
Muhammad lived in Mecca and experienced significant opposition particularly from the mercantile 
community, leading McDonough (1995) to label this as a period of protest.  However, it was short-
lived as in 622 AD (the year of hijra) Muhammad was invited to Yathrib (later called Medina) and 
                                                             
23 See Sorkin (2008) for a discussion of different “Enlightenments” in various European contexts. (Sorkin, 
2008) 
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there set up what was to become the first Islamic community.  This very quickly became a time of 
political ordering with the writing of the Constitution of Medina and treaties with various Arab and 
Jewish tribes.  This community continued after the death of Muhammad, under the leadership of 
the caliphs and Islam soon took on many of the characteristics of a community cult.24  Within a 
hundred years Islam had conquered not just Arabia but the whole of the Middle East, North Africa 
and parts of Asia, and had entered on its Golden Age of political, intellectual and cultural success, 
which contrasted starkly with the so-called Dark Ages of Europe. 
 
Whilst there is debate about whether the protesting or ordering period of history is normative for 
Christianity, Islam’s rapid rise to power left little doubt as to its preferred mode.25   It has also 
contributed to the widespread assumption that din wa dawla (religion and the state) are 
inseparable in Islam.  For instance Gellner claims there is no church-state dualism in Islam because 
“it was the state from the start” (1992, 9 emphasis in original).26  Whilst non-Muslims were 
tolerated as dhimmis dependent on them paying a poll tax,27 the Muslim rulers were expected to 
implement the shari‘a and those that rebelled or left Islam were viewed as murtids (apostates) 
and traitors to be punished by death.28  
 
However, whilst such political and religious control might be an aspiration for many Muslims, it 
has not always been the historical reality and often there has been a “de facto separation between 
the rulers and the religious establishment” (Eisenstadt, 2002, 150). Brown (2001) argues that Islam 
has normally been politically quietest and that the ‘ulama (religious teachers) have been largely 
                                                             
24 Although it should be noted that outside of the Arabian Peninsula Jewish and Christian groups 
maintained their identities for a long time before in some cases being Islamized. 
25 Although note Taha’s (1987) argument for the normativity of the Meccan period of Muhammad’s 
ministry, a stance which cost him his life.  Taha’s disciple An-Na‘im (2008) argues that the Qur’an says 
nothing about an Islamic state and believes that a secular state is preferable in Islam. (Taha, 1987) (An-
Na'im, 2008) 
26 The concept of din wa dawla has been particularly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.  Qutb 
wrote that “wherever an Islamic community exists which is a concrete example of the Divinely-
ordained system of life, it has a God-given right to step forward and take control of the political 
authority so that it may establish the Divine system on earth” (Qutb, 1964, 76). 
27 A dhimmi was protected by the Muslim authorities in return for paying the jizya poll tax but did not 
have the right to build churches and had other restrictions on their property and freedom.  See Rippin 
(2000, 96). see (Rippin, 2000, 96) 
28 Doi confirms that historically “the punishment by death in the case of apostacy has been unanimously 
agreed upon by all the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence” (Doi, 1984, 266).  It should be noted, 
however, that this is an issue of contemporary debate within the Muslim community. 
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independent of the ruling elite. Of course Islam has also had its dissenting movements,29 which 
occasionally formed religious communities within the larger community, although not on the scale 
seen within Christianity.  Some authors have detected in such discord the beginnings of a Muslim 
public sphere.  For instance, the mihna (inquisition) and rebellion against the Caliph, Al-Ma’mun, 
of the ninth century is an example of public opinion prevailing and forcing the ruler to change his 
mind (Hurvitz, 2002). 
 
3.2.B RETURN TO PROTEST: THE DECLINE OF ISLAM 
After its Golden Age, Islam went into a period of decline that reached its nadir in the nineteenth 
century with the encroachment of European colonialism.  The Mughal Empire was displaced by 
Britain and the Ottoman Empire was eaten away as Muslim lands came under European influence.  
As Islam entered an unfamiliar period of powerlessness and protest the nascent Muslim public 
sphere expanded.  For instance, Kirli (2004) traces the formation of public opinion in the illiterate 
culture of nineteenth century Ottoman coffeehouses;  Frierson (2004) looks at the rise of printed 
material for the masses in the same period; and  Van der Veer (2004) examines the religious public 
sphere that was formed in opposition to the colonial power in India.30  The colonial period created 
a deep sense of confusion, loss and injustice that did not necessarily end with post-war 
independence from the European powers.  Even today there is a sense of struggle and protest 
against western hegemony which exhibits itself most acerbically in various forms of Islamist 
political extremism.  These frequently highlight the controversial concept of jihad (§9.4.b).  There 
are Islamists today who see jihad as the obligation on Muslims to strive against – violently if 
necessary - both the West and the regimes which they deem to be un-Islamic in the Muslim 
world.31 
 
With the increase in global political tensions, which partially arise from this history, a number of 
social scientists have turned to the concept of the Muslim public sphere hoping to assuage fears of 
the incompatibility of Islam with pluralism and liberal democracy.  Several volumes have been 
                                                             
29 The Kharijites were the earliest example and are often imitated by contemporary reactionary 
movements. 
30 All these articles were published in Salvatore and Eickelman (2004) (Salvatore and Eickelman, 2004) 
31 See for instance Ch. 4 ‘Jihad in the cause of Allah’ in Qutb (1964). 
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published outlining both the historical and contemporary existence of a Muslim public sphere.32  
Whilst the pluralism of modernity represents a challenge for Islam (Esposito, 2003, 94), the work 
of Hefner (2005) amongst others finds no inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy.  
Lynch, however, warns that “the popularization of the public sphere does not inevitably translate 
into liberal pluralism” (2005, 236). 
 
The concept of the Muslim public sphere will be picked up again below (§6.3), but it is interesting 
to note that so far there has been no parallel interest in a Christian public sphere as distinct from 
the general western liberal democratic public sphere.  Apart from the brief references to the 
Protestant and post-Reformation public spheres cited above, there seems to be little interest in 
research into any other religious public sphere.  Presumably this is due to the less political nature 
of most Christianity and a relative lack of concern about likely extremist or anti-democratic 
threats.  I hope that this thesis will in some small way contribute to an awareness of a Christian 
public sphere that is distinct from and often in opposition to the western liberal public sphere. 
 
3.3 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Today both Christianity and Islam are increasingly in the public spotlight and both form public 
spheres consisting of many micro-public spheres.  Casanova traces this “re-entry” of religion into 
the public sphere to the various international upheavals of the 1980s which resulted in what he 
terms “the ‘deprivatization’ of religion in the modern world” by which he means that “religious 
traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal status which theories of 
modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them” (1994, 5).  In similar vein 
Berger believes that it is particularly the “reactive counter-formations” of both Islam and 
Evangelical Christianity, especially in its Pentecostal form, which are contesting the secularizing 
tendencies of modernity (1992, 33).  These movements are especially prevalent in parts of the 
world where religion was never in fact privatized in the first place, suggesting that “re-
publicization” may be a better term than deprivatization (Herbert and Fras, 2009).  Whatever term 
one uses, religion is visibly back in the public domain. 
                                                             
32 See Salvatore and LeVine (2005), Hoexter, Eisenstadt and Levtzion (2002) and Eickelman and 
Anderson (1999) (Salvatore and LeVine, 2005) (Hoexter, Eisenstadt and Levtzion, 2002) (Eickelman 
and Anderson, 1999) 
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However one explains the trends in religious data, it is necessary to consider how liberal 
democratic states react to this shift.  In this respect one of the most influential political theorists of 
recent years has been John Rawls, whose views recently have been challenged somewhat 
surprisingly by Habermas, who has had a change of mind with respect to religion in the public 
sphere. 
 
3.3.A RAWLS, HABERMAS AND RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
As noted earlier, Habermas’ early work ignored the role of religion in the public sphere, which 
reflected his secular approach to political philosophy.  However, as Harrington notes, his more 
recent work “offers a considerably more sympathetic engagement with the arguments of 
theologians and, at least on the surface, a dramatic self-distancing from his earlier secularist 
advocacy” (2007, 45).  For example, in a post-9/11 lecture on embryology, religion was a major 
theme.   He suggested that secularization should not be regarded as being “a kind of zero-sum 
game between the capitalistically unfettered productive forces of science and technology on the 
one hand, and the conservative forces of religion and the Church on the other”(Habermas, 2001). 
 
In 2004 Habermas engaged in a public discussion with the then Cardinal Ratzinger in which he 
stated his view that: 
 
the neutrality of state power vis-à-vis different worldviews, which guarantees equal individual 
liberties for all citizens, is incompatible with the political generalization of a secularized worldview.  
Secular citizens, in their role as citizens, may neither deny that religious worldviews are in principle 
capable of truth nor question the right of their devout fellow-citizens to couch their contributions 
to public discussions in religious language (Habermas, 2008). 
 
This nuanced approach was developed in his much-quoted article on Religion in the Public Sphere 
(Habermas, 2006)33 in which he responded to Rawls’ political theory of religion.  Rawls (1973) had 
developed a comprehensive liberal doctrine based on fairness, which he presumed would be 
embraced by all members of society.  His later work (1993) acknowledged that this kind of society 
was impossible and introduced his pragmatic concept of public reason which was an outworking of 
                                                             
33 Note that this article along with his comments to Ratzinger appeared in Zwischen Naturalismus und 
Religion (2005) the English translation of which was published as Between Naturalism and Religion 
(2008) – a rather heterogeneous collection of several of his recent essays. 
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what he called a citizen’s duty of civility (1997), that is the duty, particularly of those in public life, 
to explain the reasons for their political positions including those inspired by their religious 
convictions.  According to Rawls, these reasons have to be couched in a way accessible to all and 
so religious language is necessarily excluded.  Religious communities may hold their own 
comprehensive doctrines of truth, but only as “long as those doctrines are consistent with a 
democratic polity” (1997, 807), and they “translate” all their public communication into non-
religious language.   
 
Habermas accepts much of Rawls’ thinking on the use of public reason but suggests that requiring 
faith communities to translate all their communication places an unfair burden on them that 
might exclude them from the political process – an undesirable outcome.  He feels that a liberal 
democracy needs the input of, not just one but, multiple religious voices.  Indeed they may contain 
“key resources”, “moral intuitions” and even “possible truth content” which could benefit the 
whole community (2006).  This includes the debates in the many different religious micro-public 
spheres.  Habermas fears that Rawls is in danger of setting the bar too high and losing these 
benefits and so places a burden of reasonableness on secular citizens too if they are to avoid “a 
narrow secularist consciousness” and presumably the zero-sum game mentioned above: 
 
the insight by secular citizens that they live in a post-secular society that is epistemically adjusted to 
the continued existence of religious communities first requires a change in mentality that is no less 
cognitively exacting than the adaptation of religious awareness to the challenges of an ever more 
secularized environment. .... the secular citizens must grasp their conflict with religious opinions as 
a reasonably expected disagreement (Habermas, 2006, 15). 
 
This adjustment needs to lead to “complementary learning”.  Both sides need to be prepared to 
listen and learn from each other, which requires the willingness of not just religious citizens to 
adjust and translate for a secular audience, but also the willingness of secular minded citizens to 
admit that their doctrine too may not be as comprehensive as they thought it was.   
 
Habermas, however, does draw a strict separation between the informal public sphere and the 
institutionalized proceedings of the state.  He insists on an “institutional threshold” beyond which 
no religious language is permitted to pass and even suggests that religious statements in a 
parliament should be “expunged from the minutes” if they have not been “translated” in the “pre-
parliamentarian domain” (2006, 10). 
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3.3.B CRITIQUES OF HABERMAS 
Is this fair, however?  Why should religious language be barred at the institutional threshold?  
Trigg points out "an institutional threshold barring religion …. privileges the non-religious (and 
anti-religious) over the religious" (2007, 42).   If Habermas insists that we live in a post-secular 
society in which secularists should accept that religious opinions may contain ideas that are at 
least worth considering, then why should the state not also benefit? 
 
Trigg feels that “religious voices must be heard in the public life of every country” (2007, 236).  
This is not just so that society can benefit from any available intrinsic truth but because it is also 
better for religion to be out in the open.  “Suggesting that reasons grounded in religion should not 
be advanced on the public stage merely protects religion, and the public behaviour inevitably 
flowing from it, from public scrutiny and rational debate” (Trigg, 2007, 235).  In other words 
religious voices need to be included in public debate in order to prevent the darker side of 
religions from developing unchallenged.  As will be seen, this is a point made forcibly by some 
within the EPS concerning Islam. 
 
Other academics are also open to a re-evaluation of the role of religion in public life.  Martin, for 
instance, sees religion – or at least Christianity - as being “a mode of rational thinking” and 
therefore admissible in the political arena (2008, 167).  He argues for “openness to the 
transcendent rather than dogmatic closure” (ibid 173).  Casanova has also identified a shift in his 
own stance.  Whilst his preference is still to restrict religion to the public sphere within civil 
society, he is no longer certain that “the secular separation of religion from political society or 
even from the state are universalizable maxims” particularly when one considers the lack of 
democratic values in some totalitarian secular states (Casanova, 2006, 21).  
 
3.4 SOME TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY THEMES 
 
In the British context these discussions are brought into sharp focus in three contemporary 
debates: the first surrounds multiculturalism; the second social capital and community cohesion; 
and the third the establishment of the Church of England.  Each debate has a vast literature and 
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only the briefest survey can be given here, with the aim of providing a context for the discussion of 
religious public spheres and the more detailed data that will subsequently be presented. 
 
3.4.A MULTICULTURALISM 
Following the postwar immigration of large numbers of workers from Afro-Caribbean and Asian 
backgrounds, Britain began to pursue an official policy of multiculturalism as opposed to French-
style assimilation.  In 1966 Roy Jenkins, the then Labour Home Secretary, defined the British 
government policy on integration as “not a flattening process of assimilation but (as) equal 
opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” 
(Sivanandan, 2006).  The term coined to describe this policy was multiculturalism, which Modood 
defines as “the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to western countries 
from outside the prosperous west” (2007, 5).  Whilst it has developed in a liberal democratic 
context, however, there is no consensus amongst either academics or politicians about how the 
various theories surrounding multiculturalism should be translated into practice.  Indeed more 
than 40 years later it is by no means obvious that this process has been successful.  Recent debate 
suggests that politicians are still struggling to determine exactly what constitutes being British.  Do 
new arrivals have to conform to any standards?  Is there a test of Britishness?34  The answers to 
such questions are clearly of major importance when considering Christian-Muslim relations in the 
UK. 
 
Early debates about immigration centred largely around the issue of race which, together with 
gender and sexuality, became part of the more general “rights discourse” built on the earlier 
socialist discourse about class.  Little thought was given, however, to the issue of religion amongst 
minority communities (Modood, 2008, 87).  Whilst multiculturalism has major ramifications for 
law, social planning, education and a host of other issues, it is the emergence of religion as a 
significant factor which is of interest here as it has brought multiculturalism into sharp conflict 
with liberalism. 
 
                                                             
34 See http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/10/insearchofbritishvalues1 for an example of a 
public discussion about the nature of ‘British values’.  Note also the appearance of then prime minster 
Gordon Brown on BBC Newsnight, Brown seeks out 'British values', broadcast 14 March 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4347369.stm  (accessed 5 April 2011). 
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Opinions on the nature and desirability of multiculturalism as well as the place of religion within it 
vary greatly.  There are those who oppose taking any account of religion in society.  In this respect 
Joppke highlights the “retreat of multiculturalism”, attributing it to a lack of public support, the 
shortcomings of public policies that have failed to address socio-economic marginalization, and a 
new liberal assertiveness (Joppke, 2004).  Perhaps this liberal assertiveness manifests itself in its 
most extreme form in the advertisements placed on the side of buses by the British Humanist 
Association (Butt, 2008) and a string of popular books by Dawkins (2006), Harris (2006) and 
Hitchens (2007) which “preach” a form of fundamentalist atheism.  Casanova points out that this 
sort of secular reaction to the re-emergence of religion in the public sphere illustrates that not just 
Christianity or even Islam but “religiousness itself” has become “the Other of European secularity” 
and gives some credence to Furbey’s suggestion that there may be “a capacity for oppression in a 
secular liberal public realm” - despite all its talk of liberty (Furbey, 2009).  
 
Then there are those who are not against religion as such but are strongly critical of 
multiculturalism on the grounds that it compromises liberal democratic principles.   For instance, 
Barry is concerned that the term tends to conflate its descriptive and prescriptive modes and 
results in inconsistent policy decisions based on special pleading and exemptions for some 
minorities but not others (2001).  Whilst he is not entirely negative about Christianity, he is 
particularly suspicious of Islam and points out that “no polity with a Muslim majority has ever 
given rise to a stable liberal democratic state” and even Turkey’s failing attempt required a 
“cultural revolution” away from Islam (ibid 27).  
 
Others support limited accommodation of religion within multiculturalism.  Kymlicka, for example, 
who has been a prominent theorist of multiculturalism and minority rights, advocates recognition 
for minorities and encourages their participation in politics and public life.  However, he sees 
religion as a personal choice and so only advocates limited provision and exemption for faith 
communities (Kymlicka, 1995).  He also sees the restrictions on non-Muslim proselytism and 
apostasy in the Muslim world as antithetical to the development of liberal society (Kymlicka, 1995, 
82). 
 
 This position has been criticized by Modood (2007) who accuses Kymlicka of “secularist bias” and 
not treating religion seriously enough.  To be neutral or even “difference blind” is not enough 
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(2007, 84).  Modood wants respect and inclusion for religion.   He too observes a recent retreat 
from multiculturalism in Britain exacerbated by concerns over the integration of Muslims into 
British society following 9/11 and 7/7.  Rather than a retreat, he advocates “the inclusion of Islam 
as an organized religion and of Muslim identity as a public identity …. necessary to integrate 
Muslims and to pursue religious equality”.  This emphasis on Muslim concerns within the 
multicultural debate is a feature of Modood’s work and despite the generic titles much of his 
recent work could be seen as advocacy for Islam in public life (Modood, 2007, Levey and Modood, 
2008). 
 
The issues surrounding multiculturalism are clearly of concern to both the Evangelical and Muslim 
communities.  Muslims are keen for official recognition and inclusion in the political process.  For 
some Evangelicals, however, there is a double sense of threat.  Not only is there the direct menace 
they perceive from Islam but also the backlash against all religion from secular elements in society 
– often fuelled by the visible presence of Islam. 
 
3.4.B FAITH COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND COHESION 
The challenges of multicultural pluralism raise questions about community cohesion in Britain 
today in which religion plays a key role.   Putnam’s (2000) influential work on social capital 
highlights the key role that faith communities, alongside other voluntary organizations, play in 
building democratic societies.  Three types of social capital, which may be defined as “a collective 
asset made up of social networks based on shared norms and trust and mutuality” (Gilchrist, 
2004), are commonly distinguished: bonding, bridging and linking (Furbey et al., 2006).  Bonding 
capital consists of intra-communal relationships and is what holds the group together.  All groups 
need this but there is also always the danger of isolationism and an inward turn that leads to a less 
than civil outcome for wider society (Hefner, 2005).  Bridging capital is formed by horizontal 
relationships external to the group, especially where interests overlap with the interests of other 
groups.  This may take some form of dialogue, co-operation or even co-belligerence.  Finally 
linking capital consists of vertical relationships “with those of a different ‘knowledge’ and other 
resources, including government” (Furbey et al., 2006, 7).   
 
With the increased profile of religion in public life, the government has shown a new concern to 
harness the social capital within faith communities and to involve them in programmes designed 
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to build community cohesion.  The Home Office now has a Cohesion and Faiths Unit35; reports are 
commissioned36; funds and grants are made available37; and consultation groups are formed.38  
 
Community and faith voluntary organizations are regarded as often playing a crucial role in 
fostering community cohesion and initiating and delivering effective work” not least because “faith 
organizations are also .... ideally placed to tackle cohesion since they have usually an existing 
leadership structure that can be used, as well as a membership that is already engaged (Ipsos-
MORI, 2007, 49-50). 
 
Government departments are even encouraged to “pursue ‘faith literacy’ and participate in 
internal faith awareness training” (Home Office Faith Communities Unit, 2004, 1).   
 
Bretherton, however, counsels caution and suggests that the church should “exercise a degree of 
scepticism about how open the state is to becoming religiously literate” as it may be “simply 
another chapter in the subversion of the church by the state” (Bretherton, 2006b, 390).  In 
particular he worries that “receiving money from the state .... forces the church to mimic the state 
in its forms and practices” (ibid 389). 
 
3.4.C THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHURCH 
This renewed interest of government in the church and faith groups raises the question of exactly 
what the relationship between state and church should be.  In 1994 Prince Charles controversially 
acknowledged the plural nature of religion in Britain when he claimed that at his coronation he 
wanted to be known as the “Defender of Faith” rather than the “Defender of the Faith” as the 
sovereign has been known since the reign of Henry VIII (Hoggart, 1994).  In this way he would 
move away from seeing Britain as a Christian nation and would promise to defend all religions 
                                                             
35 http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith (accessed 9 October 2008). 
36 e.g. The Commission on Integration and Cohesion report “Our Shared Future” (2007); the Home Office 
Faith Communities Unit working paper “Working Together: Co-operation between Government and 
Faith Communities” (2004); and the Department for Communities and Local Government report “What 
Works in Community Cohesion?” (2007). 
37 e.g. The Community Development Foundation’s Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund, 
http://www.cdf.org.uk/POOLED/articles/bf_techart/view.asp?Q=bf_techart_176308 (accessed 9 
October 2008). 
38 The Faith Communities Consultative Council (FCCC) which replaced the Inner Cities Religious Council 
in 2004; see also the government’s controversial 2006 launch of the Sufi Muslim Council 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/speeches/corporate/sufi-muslim-council (accessed 9 October 2008). 
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equally.  This, amongst other issues has caused heated debate.  Is it appropriate for there to be an 
established church in England at all in a plural society?  Should faith groups receive financial 
support from the state?  To what extent should laws be influenced by religious belief – past and 
present – and to what degree should religious groups be exempt from certain laws?   The 
following paragraphs capture the salient points of this debate. 
 
As Trigg points out: 
 
it is very difficult to disentangle the religious heritage of the country from the rest of its history.  
The repudiation of one can involve the repudiation of the other.  Issues about the position of the 
Church of England can then become bound up with questions about the identity of the English 
(Trigg, 2007, 21). 
 
The debate is complex and does not fall into neat categories of those who favour continued 
establishment and those who favour disestablishment.   Arguments for and against are presented 
both on ideological and pragmatic grounds and Figure 3.1 presents a simplified typology of 
positions with regard to state-church relations taking these factors into account.39 
 
Figure 3.1 – Views on church-state relationship 
 Preferred Church-State relationship 
M
o
ti
va
ti
o
n
 
 Establishment Disestablishment 
Ideology 
Ideological Establishmentarian 
“This is a ‘Christian country’ and 
should remain so” 
 
Ideological Disestablishmentarian 
“What does the church have to do with 
the state?” 
 
Pragmatism 
Pragmatic Establishmentarian 
“If it ain’t broke ..... It’s better than 
established secularism” 
  
Pragmatic Disestablishmentarian 
“If it is disadvantaging anyone ...” 
 
Ideological establishmentarians include those who believe that in some way Britain is a “Christian 
country” and should remain so.  Some maintain this on theological grounds, others on historical 
grounds.  For instance Birnie, talking about Christian “defeatism”, feels that “the alternative to 
                                                             
39 I have adapted this typology from one developed for the American situation by Jelen and Wilcox 
(1997). (Jelen and Wilcox, 1997) 
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Christian triumphalism is often the triumph of atheism” and advocates the retention of laws based 
on Old Testament principles (2000).  Clearly many Evangelicals would share this position although 
some would moderate it somewhat.  For instance, O’Donovan sees it as the result of “successful 
mission” but is concerned that a proper dialectic is maintained between church and state 
(Bretherton, 2006b, 388). 
 
Others, however, would not see Britain as a “Christian country” and could be described as being 
ideological disestablishmentarians.  These Christians would echo the cry of the North African 
schismatic bishop Donatus in the fourth century who exclaimed, “quid est imperatori cum 
ecclesia?” (what has the emperor to do with the church? - reported by Optatus in, Against the 
Donatists 3.3).  Some non-conformists, particularly those in the Anabaptist tradition such as 
Murray (2004), would still hold this view very strongly.   This is not at all because they do not see 
that Christianity has a public role but because they believe that role should be performed from the 
margins of society and not from a privileged position of power.  Ironically they would be joined in 
this by ideological secularists of the laïque tradition who do not see that religion has a public role 
at all but then go further and want not just to decouple church and state but also to eradicate 
religion from the public realm altogether (see for instance A. Phillips, 1997). 
 
Pragmatic disestablishmentarians would favour the removal of privilege from a “tyrannical 
majority” where minority rights were at risk (Casanova, 2006).  For some of these there is a sense 
of the inevitable.  Fergusson (2004) reflects a resigned acceptance that Britain is in the “twilight of 
establishment”.  There are dangers in both directions.  “The danger of assimilation is the loss of 
Evangelical and Catholic identity whereas the danger of withdrawal is the absence of any 
contribution to the common good” (ibid 194). However, “ecclesiologically, (the church’s) future 
resides in recognizing the primacy of voluntary, congregational and gathered communities” rather 
than the privileges of establishment (ibid).  
 
The final group are pragmatic establishmentarians.  These include many Christians who feel that 
there is more to lose than there is to gain by disestablishment.  Hastings sees establishment as 
preserving a “healthy dualism” where the state is not totally supreme, and humorously observes 
that "establishment seems to be little more than retaining a chair upon which to stand as one tries 
to shout from the edge of the crowd.  It would be silly to throw it away” (Hastings, 1997, 41). 
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Trigg also sounds a note of caution pointing out that it would be "dangerous to depart from 
centuries of tradition, because of current fashion" (Trigg, 2007, 26).  Interestingly, this is the view 
of many multiculturalists and those from other faith communities who see the Church of England 
in some way as the guarantor of a religious space in the public arena and on occasion as a 
champion of minority rights.  Parekh, who has been an influential advocate of multiculturalism in 
Britain, supports this view and wants to “both accept the privileged status of Christianity and to 
give public recognition to other religions” (Parekh, 1997, 20).  There is a fear that disestablishment 
would lead to “the establishment of the secular which prohibits the intrusion of religious 
convictions in public debate” (Fergusson, 2004, 187).  For this reason, according to Rosser-Owen 
most Muslims support continued establishment although they do want the Church of England to 
speak out more strongly on Muslim issues and to “rethink the traditional attitude (of the church) 
towards Islam and the Prophet Muhammad” (Rosser-Owen, 1997, 87).   
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
It should be clear that Christianity and Islam have gone through different although not entirely 
dissimilar processes with regard to their insertion into public life and their formation of public 
spheres.  And in both cases it is not possible for western societies, policy makers or the academics 
who inform them to ignore the role of religion in the twenty-first century.  However, both faith 
communities are facing significant challenges in making their voices heard.  In many Muslim 
majority nations civil society is not developed enough to host public debate of sensitive issues and 
the public sphere is at times suppressed.  On the other hand in the West, despite the greater 
freedom of expression, some Muslim groups still feel marginalized and discriminated against.  Yet 
in those same western nations many Christians feel that their opinion too is either unwelcome or 
ignored.  And as will be seen, a few even perceive that certain Muslim voices are heard more 
loudly in public life than Christian voices.  What implications does this have for the ongoing 
strength of both groups?  Are Christians and Muslim indeed in competition with one another?  Or 
are they in fact together in competition against an increasingly secularized society?  The 
interaction of such faith groups is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 THE PUBLIC INTERACTION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
 
The collisions of faiths, or the collisions of peoples of faith, are among the most threatening 
conflicts around the world in the new millennium.  They grow more ominous and even lethal every 
season.  Lulled as many in the West are when their neighbours and fellow citizens appear to be 
religiously indifferent and genially tolerant, they overlook trends that threaten the fabric of serene 
life everywhere (Marty, 2005, 1).   
 
This ominous warning reflects the particular perplexity that many in the West, not least 
Evangelicals, feel as they consider the presence of Islam in public life.  Many see it as a 
development of historic proportions and Lewis, for instance, believes that "the new Muslim 
presence in Britain and western Europe is, arguably, the most significant religious development 
since the Reformation”.  He goes on to say that “how we learn to co-exist creatively should be a 
national concern" (Lewis, 2001a, 1042).  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 developed the idea of a religious micro-public sphere as the dominant 
theoretical framework for this thesis.  The present chapter provides additional theoretical insights 
into the interaction between religious groups in general and Evangelicals and Muslims in 
particular.  In this way it forms a bridge to the discussion in Part II which describes more fully these 
two faith groups and their encounter in the British context.   
 
Before proceeding, however, a brief explanation of Evangelicalism is needed.  Whilst a more 
complete definition is developed in §5.1, suffice to say at this stage that Evangelical Christians are 
“gospel people” (Guinness, 2010) who distinguish themselves from nominal or cultural Christians 
by the degree of their commitment and belief.40  They are neither a specific sect nor a 
denomination but, according to Bebbington (1989), are voluntarists and activists found within 
many different Christian traditions.  Although present in Europe and particularly in Britain, they 
are arguably at their most visible in the North American context, where a significant body of 
sociological research has focused on them (see for instance Hunter (1987), Noll (2000) and Smith 
(1998, 2002)).  For that reason much of the theory and research in this chapter emanates from the 
USA. Less sociological work has been done in Britain (see Guest (2007)), although some have 
written on British Evangelicals from a theological or historical perspective (see Tidball (1994), 
                                                             
40 See Brierley (2000, 13) for a discussion of nominality. (Brierley, 2000, 13)  
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McGrath (1994), Bebbington (1989, 2009).  Whilst the American literature is of great interest, care 
must be taken in applying it to the British context as made clear throughout Part II. 
 
This chapter begins by exploring how religious groups form and maintain their identity and 
strength.  Some of the major themes in the sociology of religion are then discussed in order to 
throw light on the encounter between groups of different faiths (and none).   The chapter closes 
by outlining a number of typologies that have been developed to describe such encounters.  
Whilst such typologies are generic to interfaith relations, specific links will be made to the 
Evangelical-Muslim encounter although application to the British context is deferred until Part II. 
 
 4.1 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY FORMATION 
 
4.1.A THE SOCIAL IMAGINARY: A COMMON NARRATIVE 
Hunter suggests that it is theology that lies at the heart of the Evangelical identity (1987, 158).  
This theology creates a shared epistemology which is akin to what Bourdieu calls a “habitus” or 
what Taylor calls a “social imaginary”.  A habitus is “embodied history, internalized as a second 
nature and so forgotten as history” but which “produces individual and collective practices” 
(Bourdieu, 1999, 56, 54).  It shapes the way people “imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions 
and images that underlie these expectations”(C. Taylor, 2007, 171).  It is carried in symbols and 
stories and is shared by large groups of people, sometimes even the whole society.   So how do 
Evangelicals imagine the world?  What is the shared historical narrative that shapes their 
community? 
 
For an Evangelical there is a transcendent God who has created both the natural universe and also 
a supernatural realm, and who has chosen to reveal himself to mankind both through creation but 
more specifically through his own incarnation.  This event which climaxed in the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ is the normative event of history which is attested to by the written 
scriptures and by the church of faithful believers throughout history.   
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Evangelicals hold that to become such a believer requires a specific voluntary act of conversion 
involving confession and commitment, and that it is these believers, indwelt and empowered by 
God’s Holy Spirit, who together form the “body of Christ” on earth.  Those outside this body are 
“lost” and need to be “saved” which is the mission of the church as it passes on the “good news”.  
This is Evangelical orthodoxy which claims to be ultimate truth (Hunter, 1987).  Beyond this broad 
metanarrative, however, Evangelicals differ greatly in their particular doctrines and praxis (§5.1), 
as do Muslims who also have their own historically rooted social imaginary.   
 
4.1.B THE SACRED UMBRELLA: A SHARED WORLDVIEW 
This social imaginary creates what sociologists refer to as a “plausibility structure”.  Durkheim’s 
classic definition of religion as a “unified system of beliefs and practices … that unite its adherents 
in a single moral community called a church” stresses the significance of religion for social groups 
(Durkheim, 2001, 46).  In pre-modern societies these sorts of beliefs were often held in common 
by whole communities and formed what Berger called a “sacred canopy” (1967) protecting the 
whole of society from chaos and unbelief.  The rise of pluralism and liberal democracy, however, is 
seen to have eroded this canopy rendering it less universal, at least in Europe, thus contributing to 
the process of secularization. 
 
This European secularization may, however, be the exception rather than the rule (Davie, 2002).  
Clearly religion has not disappeared.  In Muslim societies the canopy is more intact than in most 
western societies and still tends to bind society together in shared belief and practice, although 
even in majority Muslim societies it is becoming increasingly vulnerable to pluralism.  In western 
societies whilst the canopy may not be as wide as it used to be, different religious groups, 
including Evangelicals, still find shelter under what Smith aptly calls their own “sacred umbrella”.  
Umbrellas after all are small and portable “like the faith-sustaining religious worlds that modern 
people construct for themselves” (C. Smith, 1998, 106).  They are easy to construct and move 
around, and new sects “create their own plausibility structures” (A. Walker, 1996, 192).  Anyone 
who wants to start a new church can “put up an umbrella”.  Muslims also have their sacred 
umbrellas, although for many of them this is a newer and stranger phenomenon, especially for 
those used to a larger sacred canopy in their country of origin.  This is a source of great tension for 
Muslims in diaspora today. 
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For Evangelicals a social imaginary such as that described above leads to the formation of what 
Woodhead and Heelas call “congregations of difference” – as opposed to “congregations of 
humanity”.   That is in their worldview they stress “the difference between God and humanity, 
creator and creation, and the necessary subordination of the latter to the former” (Heelas and 
Woodhead, 2005, 17).  The Gospel message provides a bridge across this gulf and God’s will, as 
revealed in sacred scripture, forms an external source of authority by which group membership 
and behaviour can be regulated.   Evangelicals come together around a shared belief in, and 
dependence on, this external authority. 
 
For some, however, there is more than just the authority of a written text.  Charismatic 
Evangelicals form “congregations of experiential difference” meaning that whilst still maintaining 
the same stress on the difference between the human and the divine they “believe that God can 
enter directly into subjective experience  as the Holy Spirit” (Heelas and Woodhead, 2005, 19).  
This seemingly subjective experience can often be considered as “guidance” and be authoritative 
in a believer’s life.  The shared experience of such divine encounter then binds believers together 
into the family of the congregation. 
 
Both of these types “make a powerful appeal to people who feel their lives are not working, by 
offering to heal their brokenness and restore joy, contentment, calm, hope and security in the 
Lord” (Heelas and Woodhead, 2005, 19).  In other words Evangelicals are offering certainty to 
people amidst the confusion and uncertainty of modernity.  As Guest puts it, drawing on the work 
of Bauman, they are offering safety from disintegrating boundaries and anomie (Guest, 2007, 6).  
They claim to make sense of the world and offer hope and a pattern to live by. 
 
This shared ideology and experience is the basis of what Soper calls the “social movement theory” 
of group formation.  Sociologically it is “the shared religious and cultural beliefs” of Evangelicals 
that provide cohesion for the movement (Soper, 1994, 2).  This ideology can transcend boundaries 
of denomination, class and race and provide the glue to enable Evangelicals to define themselves, 
identify one another and at times to cooperate together, although as Soper points out political 
action has been rather more successful in America than it has in Britain (see Lindsay, 2007, for an 
American account).  All of this is quite in keeping with the role played by Berger’s original 
“canopy”, even if it is now rather altered in nature. 
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4.1.C THE RELIGIOUS TRIBE: A SECURE BOUNDARY 
The social imaginary also provides a sense of security by drawing boundaries between the group 
and the world outside.  As the group shelters under its “umbrella” it must quickly become aware 
that there are others who are not under its umbrella but are under quite different forms of 
canopies.  Thus these “umbrellas” also describe the boundaries which religious groups draw 
between one another.  Such boundaries keep the faithful within and the Other without.  In that 
sense they are like the geographical boundaries drawn by a tribe marking out its territory.  
Straying outside of the boundaries is unwise and potentially dangerous as it may involve an 
encounter with the members of other tribes who may be hostile.  In their turn trespassers are 
likely to be challenged and should enter only by invitation. This is certainly true of Evangelicalism 
which “appears to construct and maintain its collective identity largely by its members drawing 
symbolic boundaries that create distinction between themselves and relevant outgroups” (C. 
Smith, 1998, 143).  This “outgroup intolerance” is the “evolutionary and cognitive flip side of 
ingroup commitment” and in fact the greater the cohesion and strength of the group the greater 
the degree of intolerance displayed towards outgroups (Atran, 2002, 120).  For Evangelicals these 
outgroups may consist of other Christians who differ from them, for instance Roman Catholics, 
theological liberals or “nominal” Christians.  Or they may be those of other faiths such as Muslims, 
as is the contention of this thesis.  Of course Muslims too have their outgroups both within Islam, 
such as the Sunni, Shi’ites and various other sects, and those outside Islam.  Significantly for both 
Evangelicals and Muslims secular liberals represent one of the most challenging outgroups.   
 
For Evangelicals, the idea of voluntary “conversion” forms “a boundary between those who have 
experienced this life-changing event and those who have not" (Soper, 1994, 41).  Those in 
Evangelical congregations are normally those who have a story to tell of how they came to a 
personal faith in Jesus Christ.  Those who do not share this experience are welcome but may well 
not feel part of “the group”.  This was born out by Heelas et al in the Kendal project where they 
found that “the testimony narrative” played a very important part in the life of an Evangelical 
“congregation of difference” (Heelas and Woodhead, 2005, 19).  Thus someone from an outgroup, 
even from a Muslim background, could be accepted into the community if they had a story of 
conversion to tell. 
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Other Evangelical characteristics mentioned earlier also serve as boundaries for groups and any 
one particular group would have other values or beliefs which produce boundaries be they 
theological, ecclesiological, social or political.  One key demarcation for charismatic Evangelicals 
would be whether a person was deemed to have been “filled” or “baptized” with the Holy Spirit.  
This would be especially true in Pentecostal congregations and, whilst a lack in this regard may not 
prohibit membership, such an experience would actively be sought, maybe accompanied by the 
sign of speaking in tongues, in order for the believer to be truly initiated and inducted into the 
group or “body”. 
 
Cultural markers such as ethnicity, class and even age also frequently form boundaries between 
groups.  Although these are formally absent they are often visibly obvious.  People feel 
comfortable among their own kind and so whilst two Evangelicals may hold similar theological 
positions, they may choose the local congregation they attend on grounds other than theological 
correctness.  On visiting a large church in East London recently I felt very conspicuous as the only 
white person present, whilst in another church in the city later that day I saw only one black 
person amongst a congregation of white Anglo-Saxons with some Asians.  Visiting a New Church 
meeting in a London theatre on another occasion I felt very old amongst a large congregation of 
mainly young people. 
 
4.2 THEORIES OF RELIGIOUS GROUP STRENGTH 
 
The key question at this point is to consider how, once they have formed and established their 
identity boundaries, such religious groups maintain their strength and interact with one another, 
especially considering the pluralized nature of modernity and multiculturalism.  In order to explore 
this further I look at two of the major themes of current sociological thinking about religion; 
secularization theory, and the religious market.  To this is added a brief discussion of evolutionary 
theory as applied to religion. 
 
4.2.A THE SECULARIZATION THESIS 
As already noted (§3.1.c) from the early days of sociology it has been widely expected that religion 
would not maintain its strength but would decline in significance as modernity advanced.   
However, global events have given pause for thought.  Perhaps the most high profile rethinking of 
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the secularization thesis has been undertaken by Berger, a former proponent who now openly, but 
controversially, discusses the “desecularization of the world” (1999).41  Others have followed suit.  
Casanova, for example, re-examined the secularization thesis and suggested that whilst 
“differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions ... remains the 
valid core of the theory of secularization” this does not necessarily mean that there is a decline in 
belief or practice and he points out that we are in fact witnessing “the deprivatization of modern 
religion”(Casanova, 1994, 212, 215).    Moreover, he suggests that: 
 
those religions which early on accept and embrace the modern principle of differentiation will also 
tend to accept the modern denominational principle of voluntarism and will be in a better position 
both to survive the modern process of differentiation and to adopt some form of evangelical 
revivalism as a successful method of religious self-reproduction in a free religious market 
(Casanova, 1994, 214).   
 
On this reckoning Evangelicalism should be in a much better place to survive in western societies 
than Islam, which tends to be more resistant to both differentiation and voluntarism.  However, it 
is by no means certain, given the levels of concern expressed, that Evangelicals are thinking in 
these terms. 
 
4.2.B RELIGIOUS MARKETS 
The discussion of “religious markets” has been a particular interest of sociologists working in the 
North American context.  In order to explain the persistent religious strength observed by Berger 
and Casanova some have drawn on rational choice theory and economic models.  For instance 
Stark and Finke (2000) describe society as a religious market place and build a series of hypotheses 
based on the balance between supply and demand.  Their contention is that demand for religion 
remains essentially constant within a society but that it is the supply side that changes.  Where 
there is a plentiful and diverse supply, religion thrives.  Thus Evangelicalism is just one more 
religious supplier competing for clients in the economic jungle.  This model has mostly been used 
in the USA to explain competition and vibrancy within the context of Christian competitors 
allowing for the presence of other types of spirituality in the form of New Religious Movements.  It 
is then argued that in Europe the monopolistic models of established or state churches (§3.1.c 
Martin (1978)) has constricted the supply thus failing to stimulate the market. 
                                                             
41 See Bruce 2001 for a trenchant rebuttal of Berger's “unnecessary recantation”. (Bruce, 2001)  
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Increasingly, however, in plural contexts other religions, such as Islam, and also non-religious 
movements and political trends have to be factored into this theory.  This is a point highlighted by 
Gorski in his formulation of what he calls a “socio-political conflict model” which pictures the 
competition as being not just religious but “between different worldviews, both religious and 
secular, (including) socialism, liberalism, nationalism and fascism” (2003, 116).  This multiple 
interaction forms the backdrop for this thesis as the interaction of Christians and Muslims cannot 
be viewed in isolation from wider social attitudes, political movements and government policy. 
 
In the cases of Evangelicalism and Islam, or more accurately some expressions of Islam, there is a 
similarity in how they fit into this market model.  Stark and Finke picture the demand for religion 
in society as a normal distribution curve (Figure 4.1) consisting of a spectrum of “religious niches” 
which they believe remain constant over time (2000, 197).  These niches reflect a preference for a 
greater or lesser “degree of tension” between the religious group and society.  Those niches that 
are at a higher degree of tension demand a greater cost but, so it is argued, offer a greater reward 
or benefit.  The converse is true of those at lower tension.  Building on the work of Weber they 
suggest that the greatest part of any society tends to prefer a moderate amount of tension and 
therefore settle for a moderate cost in return for a moderate reward. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Normal distribution of religious niches (reproduced from Stark & Finke 2000,197) 
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Lesslie Newbigin, an Evangelical missionary-theologian, suggested that the Evangelical Church 
tends to a higher degree of tension with society than mainstream or more liberal Christian groups 
as it “inhabits a plausibility structure which is at variance with, and which calls into question, those 
that govern all human cultures without exception. The tension which this challenge creates has 
been present throughout the history of Western civilization” (1989, 9).  Martin describes this 
tension between a religious group and society  as the “angle of eschatological tension” (1997, 
120).  The rule that Martin sees in operation is that “the original 'charter' (of the group) will 
undergo distortion, and the degree of that distortion will be related in the most complex manner 
to the angle of eschatological tension” (ibid 120).  In other words, the greater the degree of 
tension or the sharper the boundaries between groups, the greater will be the pressure to change.  
This is also the case with many expressions of Islam in the West.  There is often a sharp tension 
and a high cost to being a Muslim and maintaining traditional practices in the current socio-
political context.  This is a price that many Muslims, and indeed whole communities, are willing to 
pay and clearly they see rewards and benefits in doing so.  This is something that Evangelical 
Christians should have little difficulty in understanding and indeed respecting.   
 
None of this is to say that all Muslims or all Evangelicals occupy the ultra-strict extreme of the 
distribution.  The numbers expected at these extremes are relatively small in both communities 
(Figure 4.1).  It does, however, mean that both Evangelicals and Muslims today are more likely to 
be to the right of the median in their degree of tensions with society.  Whether or not this results 
in partnership with one another or whether it results in conflict will be one of the major questions 
to be addressed in the later analysis of the data. 
 
The angle of eschatological tension is particularly acute at the start of new sects.  For instance, in 
the early days of Methodism or Pentecostalism the newly formed groups were clearly in a higher 
tension with society than their present day denominational equivalents, which have moved 
towards the centre of this distribution according to the theory of sect-church movement (Neibuhr, 
1929).  This theory predicts that, in an effort to decrease tension with surrounding groups and 
society, religious groups will tend to liberalize their views and accommodate to those of others, a 
process which Hunter (1987) believes is happening amongst American Evangelicals.  Bruce also 
observes this amongst British Evangelicals as they move to “the softer, less dogmatic, charismatic 
‘new churches’” thus becoming more liberal (2003, 61).  He sees no possibility of a shift back to 
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strict sectarian conservatism and predicts that by 2030 Britain will be a “secular society” and 
“Christianity in Britain will have largely disappeared” with church attendance below 5% (ibid 61-2). 
 
Stark and Finke, however, presuming that religious demand does not decline, suggest that as sects 
move away from the higher tension end of the spectrum to take up a more denominational, 
moderate position, so a gap is created in the market for a new sect to form.  “This gives rise to an 
endless cycle of birth, transformation and rebirth of sect movements” (Stark and Finke, 2000, 203) 
which maybe explains something of the fissiparous nature of the Evangelical movement (§5.3).  As 
Percy puts it "New Wine, rather like New Labour, can only be “new” for a while.  Eventually it 
becomes part of the establishment: subversion gives way to maturity and participation” (Percy, 
2003, 99).   A new sect inevitably results, a process from which Islam is not immune.  Islam today is 
witnessing very similar processes with the rise of, for instance, Wahhabi teaching from Saudi 
Arabia which demands an acute angle of tension with society in the West and so tends to inspire 
the creation of radical groups. 
 
4.2.C CULTURAL EVOLUTION 
Another way of picturing this competitive market has been developed by cultural evolutionists.  
Kaplan has postulated what he calls “the law of cultural dominance” which considers how one 
culture develops at “the expense of other less effective systems” (1960, 75).  Wilson has also 
applied the theory of “group-level adaptation” to the development of religious groups (2002, 7).  
Evolution and religion are often seen as antithetical but Wilson’s evolutionary application, unlike 
Atran’s (2002), is sympathetic and not dismissive.  He views the religious group as an organism 
competing for survival against other groups or “species”.  His model is tentative and complex but 
his discussion of “multi-level selection”, which describes natural selection happening at both 
individual and group level, and both within groups and among groups, clearly has parallels with 
the market theory developed by Stark and Finke.  Only the strongest survive. 
 
Taking various examples from the animal kingdom, Wilson points out that it is a combination of 
individual and group benefit that ensures that a religious group thrives.  The cost and benefit to 
the individual cannot on its own ensure the survival of the group.  In the long term the group has 
to act and develop in such a way as benefits the longevity of the group as such and not just its 
members.  Otherwise another predator group will gain the ascendancy.   
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Maintaining this sort of imagery, outgroups can be seen as either predators, protectors or prey 
(Atran, 2002, 78).  This is particularly poignant in a multicultural society.  For an Evangelical 
“organism”, for example, this means assessing the other organisms around.  Is another faith group 
like Islam a predator moving on to “their patch” threatening their resources?  Are groups from 
other Christian traditions potential prey – sources of new converts (or “transfer growth”)?  Should 
Muslims also be seen as potential new recruits?  Conversely are there groups that can be seen as 
protectors?  Will they protect against other predatory groups?  Are the government, the local 
authorities or the legal community protectors – or are they really secular predators dressed in 
sheep’s clothing ready to stifle the free expression of religious opinion and to enforce a politically 
correct agenda?  
 
4.3 MODES OF INTERACTION 
 
Given the competitive nature of such models the following section explores some of the 
typologies that emerge from the literature to describe the interaction of religious groups, and 
introduces some of the terms and concepts that will be significant in the later empirical enquiry.  
Bennett (2008) contributes a simple, binary typology which becomes important in the later 
analysis.  Race’s soteriological model (1983) is elaborated on by Lochhead (1988), whom I discuss 
at greater length.  Finally, I draw on the work of Christian Smith (1998, 2002) in the American 
context to suggest some possible trajectories of Evangelicalism as it encounters both Islam and 
modernity.  
 
Hunter points out that in such interaction “the extremes almost always define the terms of 
reflection and debate” (2010, 34).  This is certainly the case in the polarization of the encounter 
between the West and Islam, Christians and Muslims.   Such a binary approach is illustrated by 
Bennett’s observation of “confrontational” and “conciliatory” approaches to interfaith relations, 
the former being characterized by “polemic, diatribe and debate”, the latter by “dialogue” (2008, 
9).  He reflects that in the Christian-Muslim case, “although conciliation has a long history, 
confrontation has dominated both sides” (ibid).  Of course conceiving of these poles as positive 
and negative is problematic.  There are times in any relationship when conciliatory peacemaking is 
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required.  There are also times when there needs to be the freedom to challenge, critique and 
respectfully disagree.   
 
The picture, however, as Gorski (2003) (§4.2.b) reminds us, is more complex than this.  The 
situation is not quite so straightforward as two opposing groups of “fundamentalist” believers.  
Both communities are highly hetergeneous and nuanced in their positions as becomes clear in Part 
II.  Furthermore there are others in a society who hold strong views on both groups but from a 
non-religious stance.  There are those that insist that all faiths should be considered equally true, 
and those who are equally adamant that all faiths should be dismissed from public life – a position 
which itself comes close to being a matter of faith.     
 
Such pluralism in a society pits  “relativism” against “fundamentalism”, a polarization which has 
recently been explored in a collection of essays emphasizing the importance of finding the 
religious “middle ground” (Berger, 2010).  Berger argues that both extremes are “bad for civility” 
and “make civil discourse impossible” – fundamentalism because it “produces irresolvable 
conflict” and relativism because it “precludes the moral condemnation of virtually anything at all” 
(ibid 1).  So a more nuanced typology is required that makes provision for a middle ground. 
 
An example which attempts to identify such a middle ground theologically is that developed by 
Race (1983) who labels religionists as exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralist. The basis of his 
categorization is soteriological.  “Exclusivists” hold that there is no eschatological salvation outside 
of their own religious community.  This is clearly the belief of many conservative Evangelicals 
today, although according to D’Costa “no major systematic theologian” holds this position (2005, 
630).  At the other extreme, “pluralists” take a relativist stance and see all religions as being 
equally true and therefore all as equally valid paths to salvation.  It was Hick who first proposed a 
“Copernican revolution” in the Christian approach to other religions which would remove Christ 
from the centre and picture all the world’s religions turning around a deeper, ultimate truth 
(1980).  This view is, of course, anathema to Evangelical Christians, as it is to many Muslims, and 
Goddard suggests that “exclusivism is the dominant view among Evangelical Protestant Christians” 
(2000, 150).  That said, an increasing number of Evangelicals would now adopt a middle 
“inclusivist” position which holds to the objective truth of Christianity and yet admits that God 
may in some mysterious way work salvation outside of the Christian Church.   The Catholic 
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theologian Rahner was maybe the best-known proponent of this standpoint with his concept of 
the “anonymous Christian”, which greatly influenced the writing of the Second Vatican Council 
document Lumen Gentium (meaning “light of the nations”) (D'Costa, 2005, 631).  Although Race’s 
typology has been severely criticized by some and modified by others (see for example D'Costa, 
2009), it remains a useful and widely recognized formulation and features in the later analysis.   
 
Lochhead, a Canadian theologian, extends Race’s model by taking a more sociological approach 
and looking at “kinds of exclusivity” and “kinds of inclusivity” (Lochhead, 1988, 28) which he 
summarizes as ideologies of isolation, hostility, competition and partnership. 
 
4.3.A ISOLATION 
Ipgrave (2008) has commented at length on aspects of Lochhead’s typology.  Only a brief overview 
is given here which includes some of the terms frequently used in such discussions.  The ideology 
of isolation, characterized by ignorance and disinterest, was the dominant European mode of 
interaction with Islam for over a thousand years.42   Due to globalization and the breaking down of 
geographical boundaries, it is no longer as commonplace as it once was.  However, Lochhead 
suggests that it is still seen in the ghettos formed by powerless minorities to protect themselves 
from the dominant culture.  Ipgrave also sees evidence of this ideology amongst Christians in 
"remnants of a 'Christendom' model” which assumes that “Britain is to be identified as a Christian 
country in a way that means other faiths can be safely ignored" (ibid 6).  Besides, struggling 
Christian churches may not have the "interest, motivation, energy or confidence" to engage with 
others (ibid). 
 
4.3.B HOSTILITY AND POLEMICAL DEBATE 
When boundaries begin to break down, however, communities often experience the Other as a 
threat leading to the development of an ideology of hostility.  Liechty and Clegg (2001), through 
their work amongst religious groups in Northern Ireland, have developed what they call a measure 
of “conflictual temperature” that illustrates how such hostile thought patterns develop:   
 
  
                                                             
42 Spain, Sicily and later the Balkans were of course notable exceptions. 
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1. We are different, we behave differently 
2. We are right 
3. We are right and you are wrong 
4. You are a less adequate version of what we are 
5. You are not what you say you are 
6. We are in fact what you say you are 
7. What you are doing is evil 
8. You are so wrong  that you forfeit ordinary rights 
9. You are less than human 
10. You are evil 
11. You are demonic 
 
It would certainly be possible to locate Christian responses to Muslims on such a scale.  Lochhead 
echoes this process and cites the anti-Papist writings of Luther (§7.1.a) and the more 
contemporary speeches of Ian Paisley as examples of hostility.  He also includes the premillennial 
fundamentalism of some major American TV evangelists which, given its Zionist support for Israel, 
is quick to see Islam, and Arabs in particular, as the enemies of God’s purposes.  Religious believers 
who espouse such hostility often engage in polemical debate, with its connotation of being 
aggressive and warlike (from the Greek πόλεμος meaning “war”), tending to focus on attacking 
the negative character of the Other. 
 
4.3.C COMPETITION, EVANGELISM AND APOLOGETICS 
Lochhead’s third type is the ideology of competition which, whilst acknowledging that the two 
sides are “in the same business” and therefore share similarities, still stresses differences (1988, 
18).  This could apply as much to different denominations within the same religion as between 
different religions.  A group espousing this ideology still believes that it alone possesses the total 
truth but concedes that others may have some partial truth.  It stresses the weak points of the 
Other and sees the groups as being in a battle.  Such competition is most clearly exhibited in the 
desire of the group to win converts, which for the Christian means mission or evangelism (passing 
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on the good news) and for the Muslim da‘wa.43  Such engagement inevitably involves apologetics 
(from the Greek απολογία, to speak in defence).  This may extend beyond intellectual argument to 
a concern for reciprocity and the equal treatment of co-religionists in other parts of the world.  For 
example, a lack of freedom for Christian minorities in Muslim countries, the persecution of 
apostates from Islam and a ban on the building of churches in countries such as Saudi Arabia are 
major concerns for many Evangelicals.   
 
4.3.D PARTNERSHIP, TOLERANCE AND HOSPITALITY 
The final type is the ideology of partnership in which similarities are more important than 
differences.  It can take different forms ranging from an assumption of the essential unity of all 
religions, through a total avoidance of the religious question “as long as people are 'nice'" 
(Lochhead, 1988, 24), to a common concern for cohesion and contributing to the common good 
(Ipgrave, 2008, 10).  Respect and tolerance are often words associated with such a position (see 
Kraft and Basinger, 2008).  Marty, however, is critical of the concept of tolerance (2005).  He 
suggests that tolerance is weak and condescending and has “no muscle” of its own but rather 
attempts to “remake ‘the Other’ into some manageable image” (ibid 126-7).  In the place of 
tolerance Marty advocates “counter-intolerance”, or what he calls “risky hospitality”, during 
which: 
 
we greet, eat, gesture, listen, speak differently because of the presence of the Other, become 
sensitive to the changes we must make in our own outlook and community, and emerge as 
different beings than we were before the possibly tense but often enjoyable experience of mutual 
hospitality (Marty, 2005, 130). 
 
This is reminiscent of the work of Bretherton who talks of “hospitality as holiness” (2006a) and 
also Barnes who pictures God as both host and guest in mankind’s encounter with the divine 
(2002). 
 
Hospitality, however, is also open to criticism.   Derrida (2000) discusses Kant’s account of 
hospitality as the stranger’s right but suggests that what often takes place is, in fact, what he 
                                                             
43 It should be noted that da‘wa for the Muslim has two emphases: “an invitation to non-Muslims to 
convert to Islam and the call to those born Muslim to be better Muslims” Esposito (2002, 53). (Esposito, 
2002, 53) 
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terms “hostipitality”.   In this sense offering hospitality subtly becomes “a reaffirmation of mastery 
and being oneself in one’s own home” which implies a conditionality to the hospitality offered that 
can be coercive and verge on hostility (ibid 14).  Sacks (2007) makes a similar point in discussing 
contemporary British multiculturalism.  He presents three metaphors for the way in which a 
society might seek to integrate newcomers.  The first, which tends to hostipitality, is when 
travellers are invited into a country manor as guests by the squire but never feel at home because 
the house belongs to someone else.  The second is a hotel that is inhabited by guests but owned 
by none of them, including the original inhabitants.  The third is Sacks’ preferred model of “the 
home that we build together”.  He pictures villagers giving land to new arrivals and helping them 
to build houses; in other words an action partnership where hosts and newcomers help to build 
society together. 
 
Notwithstanding such positive aspirations, Ipgrave points out that with an ideology of partnership 
"there is a danger of shutting out from the relationship precisely those distinctive affirmations of 
our respective faiths which mark out our identity and commitment” as faithful believers (Ipgrave, 
2008, 12).  This paradigm should, therefore, be seen as a dynamic collaboration between 
heterogeneous partners and not as an insipid compromise between those who do not value their 
faith. 
 
In summary Lochhead is careful to point out that these types rarely exist in pure form.  They 
almost always overlap and indeed may all be present at the same time.  Lest this sound like a 
contradiction he points out that a group often “depicts the followers of other traditions as 
innocent victims of the duplicity of their leaders.  Thus ignorance and hostility can be attributed to 
the same tradition without necessarily involving the apologist in contradiction" (Lochhead, 1988, 
29).  Lochhead also highlights the ambiguous causal relationship between theology and ideology.  
Sometimes theology is driven by social context but the reverse may also be true.  This is one 
reason why he sees a “dialogical imperative” and stresses the need for dialogue as “a distinct and 
preferable type of relationship" (ibid 29).  Interfaith dialogue, however, can all too easily become 
the preserve of an academic elite and Ipgrave suggests that whilst there is a need for 
“academically rigorous dialogue between Christian and Muslim theologians” there is also a need 
for “neighbourhood-level cooperation between Christian and Muslim communities (which holds) 
together competition and partnership models" (2008, 16). 
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Lochhead’s theoretically constructed typology is useful but needs to be tested empirically.  
Interestingly Smith’s study of Evangelical Christians in America produced a similar but not identical 
spectrum of responses (2002).  Whilst not specifically about Christian reaction to Muslims, the 
survey sought to explore the attitudes of Evangelicals to “social and cultural pluralism” and found 
four broad categories (ibid 61): opposition, ambivalence, realistic acceptance and enthusiastic 
tolerance. 
 
Significantly he found that enthusiastic tolerance was the dominant response.  He noted that this 
did not mean that Evangelicals abandoned their convictions but rather they rejected the use of 
force to control others.  This is maybe unsurprising as Berger suggests that most human beings 
“gravitate toward a more reasonable middle ground, though usually without being able to justify 
or even articulate why they believe and act as they do” (2010, 2).  Again it has to be emphasized 
that the American context is very different to the British and Smith’s study is not a piece of 
empirical research that has been done amongst Evangelicals in Britain.  Whilst this thesis is not a 
wide scale piece of quantitative research, it is hoped that it will give some indication of the 
relevance to the British case of both Lochhead’s theoretical and Smith’s more pragmatic 
categories. 
 
4.4 LIKELY TRAJECTORIES 
 
The final question to consider is the likely future trajectory of Evangelicals as they encounter other 
groups, and Muslims in particular, in an increasingly pluralized context.  Through his empirical 
work in the American context Smith has concluded that despite being “embattled” Evangelicals 
are not in retreat but in fact are “thriving” (1998).  Cimino (2005) in the American context and 
Guest (2007) in the British both draw on Smith’s work and contrast it with that of Berger and 
Hunter.  Berger in his earlier work suggested that for a religious group to maintain its strength it 
had to “retrench” in the face of pluralization (1992).  This retrenchment could be defensive in 
which the group retreats into a “sheltered enclave” (C. Smith, 1998) or what Guest calls a 
“counter-community” embarking on a “project of resistance” (2007, 7).  On the other hand the 
retrenchment could be offensive in which case it becomes a crusade (Berger, 1992).    If it does not 
retrench then Berger argued that the group would inevitably enter into what he called “cognitive 
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bargaining” with surrounding groups leading to “cognitive surrender” and capitulation to 
ideological pluralism.  Hunter concludes in his work that this is indeed what is happening amongst 
Evangelicals in America (1987).  Others, however, have observed the reverse.  For instance, 
Lindsay finds American Evangelicalism to be “a durable faith” (2007, 226) and describes how what 
he calls  “the elasticity of Evangelicals’ orthodoxy” is not in fact “a softening of conviction or a 
blurring of the lines that make Christianity distinctive” (ibid 217).  Rather it enables them to 
engage with other groups. 
 
This is exactly what Smith argues in proposing “an alternative theoretical perspective on the 
viability of traditional religions in modernity” (1998, 89).  He rejects not only the sheltered enclave 
theory above but also other theories put forward to explain the continued strength of Evangelicals 
in America.  For example, he discounts status discontent theory (Wald et al., 1989).  This theory, 
based on Weber’s idea of “status groups” which lay claim to “social honour and prestige”, suggests 
that religious groups will mobilize to reassert their privilege if they feel undermined (ibid 1).  
Whilst such mobilization clearly takes place, including in this study,  Smith argues that in the 
American case Evangelicals are neither economically nor socially discontent (1998, 69, 83).  
Likewise he dismisses strictness theory (see for example Kelley, 1978, Iannaccone, 1994) on the 
basis that the stricter American Fundamentalist Christians are not doing as well as Evangelicals (C. 
Smith, 1998, 71, 84).  Rather he believes that it is the competitive market theory outlined above 
(§4.2.b) that best fits the data that he gathered.  American Evangelicals are neither totally isolated 
from pluralist culture nor do they totally accommodate to that culture.  Rather they compete and 
occupy the middle ground, a point accepted more recently by Berger (2010) concerning religion 
generally.  This moderate practice is what Smith calls “engaged orthodoxy” (1998, 151).   
 
From his empirical work Smith develops two theories.  Firstly, his subcultural identity theory of 
religious persistence states that: 
 
religion survives and can thrive in pluralistic, modern society by embedding itself in subcultures 
that offer satisfying morally orienting collective identities which provide adherents meaning and 
belonging (C. Smith, 1998, 118). 
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However, as he points out, American Evangelicalism is not just persisting it is thriving.  So his 
second theory, which he calls the subcultural identity theory of religious strength, goes on to say 
that: 
in a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively stronger which better possess and 
employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction from and significant engagement 
and tension with other relevant outgroups short of becoming genuinely countercultural. (C. Smith, 
1998, 118) 
 
Smith goes on to discuss what he calls the “cultural tools” that Evangelicals use to “socially 
construct reality” and handle distinction, engagement and conflict (ibid 123).  These are really a 
set of attitudes and reactions some of which have already been seen (§4.1) and include a sense of:  
 
 Strong boundaries with the non-Evangelical world; 
 Possessing the ultimate truth;  
 Practical moral superiority;  
 Lifestyle and values distinctiveness; 
 Evangelistic and social mission; 
 Displaced heritage which laments the loss of an imagined Christian nation;  
 Being marginalized second-class citizens;  
 Being under threat or engaged in “spiritual warfare”. 
 
Of course it is by no means clear that Smith’s hypothesis is applicable or valid in the British 
context.  Firstly, there is controversy, even in the American context, over the different definitions 
of Evangelical used by Smith and Hunter.  Hackett and Lindsay have demonstrated that the 
research findings of both are “contingent upon how the subject under investigation is 
operationalized” casting doubt on the usefulness of the comparative analysis (2008, 511).  
Secondly, the quantitative study of the connection between pluralism and religious group strength 
is itself contested (see Voas et al., 2002, for a discussion).  Further, the British and American 
contexts are extremely different.  Despite historical transatlantic links Evangelicalism has 
developed differently in the two nations and in particular there has been a relative absence in 
Britain of the type of reactionary fundamentalism found in America, an issue which the 
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Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism in Britain Project (EFBP) has been seeking to explore.44  As 
Guest says “if there is a struggle on this side of the Atlantic, then it is far quieter and draws in far 
fewer participants” than in America (2007, 2) (see §5.2 for a brief comparison).  Finally, no 
comparable quantitative research has been carried out amongst British Evangelicals, a point made 
clear at an EFBP conference.45  Until this sort of quantitative work is done, comparisons will 
continue to be difficult to draw and theories of American Evangelical strength can only be 
tentative pointers awaiting further empirical investigation in the British context.  In the meantime 
this thesis offers some pointers and tests whether the Evangelical elite are utilizing the tools 
highlighted by Smith. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
44 See http://www.eauk.org/efb/index.cfm for more information (accessed 22 December 2009). 
45 Christian Fundamentalism and British Evangelicalism; Exploring the Relationship, King’s College, 
London, 15 December 2009. 
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The various theories and typologies discussed above are represented diagrammatically in Figure 
4.2 for ease of reference.  With the exception of Bennett’s they have all been developed in the 
generic context of interaction between different faith groups and the interaction between faith 
groups and a pluralized society often antagonistic toward faith.  Whilst Berger’s and Lochhead’s 
typologies have been developed in a theoretical context, Smith’s are largely based on empirical 
work in America.  The following chapters in Part II explore the specific context of British 
Evangelicalism and its encounter with Islam but these typologies are all revisited in Part IV in the 
light of my own empirical findings. 
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PART II – EVANGELICALS AND MUSLIMS: THE BRITISH CONTEXT 
 
CHAPTER 5 EVANGELICALS IN BRITAIN 
 
 
 
“Evangelicals are declining less rapidly than the non-Evangelicals, 
and are thus becoming a larger proportion of the whole.” 
(Brierley, 2006, 247) 
 
+ + + + 
 
The previous three chapters have discussed the concept of the public sphere and the role of 
religion and religious groups within it.  It is now necessary to consider in more detail Evangelical 
Christians as the particular focus of this thesis.  The aim of this chapter is to develop an 
understanding of who the British Evangelicals are and how they form public spheres.  The first two 
sections of the chapter attempt to clarify exactly what is meant by the term Evangelical by looking 
at some issues of definition  and the global variation of the movement paying particular attention 
to the contrast between the British and American contexts.  A brief historical overview then 
highlights the fissiparous nature of the movement and paints a picture of the contemporary 
Evangelical community in Britain.  The final section returns to the concept of the public sphere and 
describes the extent and character of the modern EPS. 
 
5.1 WHAT IS AN EVANGELICAL? 
 
The word Evangelical does not denote a denomination or any one particular church; rather it 
represents a family of churches, organizations and individuals held together by a core ethos 
compromised of theological, historical and cultural elements.  The etymological roots of the word 
lie in the Greek word euangelion (ευαγγελιον) meaning the “gospel” or “good news”, which is not 
so much contained in the sacred text of the Bible as in the person of Jesus Christ, who is believed 
to be the incarnate “Word of God”.  Simply put Evangelicals are “gospel people” (Guinness, 2010). 
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Stated in theological terms the traditional definition, described for instance on the Evangelical 
Alliance (EA) website, foregrounds the three great “truths” of the Protestant Reformation: sola 
scriptura (by scripture alone), sola gratia (by grace alone) and sola fide (by faith alone).46  For the 
purposes of this thesis, however, a rather more sociological description is required.  The one most 
commonly cited – for instance on the EA website – which combines both sociological and 
theological elements, is proposed by Bebbington (1989). He suggests that there are four key 
characteristics common to all Evangelicals: conversionism emphasizes the need for the individual 
to make a voluntary commitment; activism is the imperative to social action and evangelism; 
crucicentrism places salvation and the cross of Christ at the core of Evangelical doctrine; finally, 
Biblicism means that all doctrine is based explicitly on the Bible over and above Church tradition. 
 
Whilst this “quadrilateral” definition is widely used, it is not unproblematic.  For instance, Larsen 
points out that it would be quite possible for St Francis of Assisi to be considered an Evangelical 
using this measure and clearly "a definition of Evangelicalism that would include mediaeval Roman 
Catholic saints would not be serviceable for delineating the scope of scholarly projects" (Larsen, 
2007a, 2).  He proposes a “pentagon” which in addition to an emphasis on the Bible and the cross 
includes: the work of the Holy Spirit; the necessity of being an orthodox Protestant; and an affinity 
to the “global Christian networks arising from the eighteenth century revival movements” of 
Wesley and Whitefield (ibid).   
 
5.2 VARIATIONS WITHIN GLOBAL EVANGELICALISM 
 
Larsen’s historical emphasis is useful in indentifying Evangelicalism not solely as a theological but 
also as a cultural construction. It is in many ways a family which displays hereditary traits but also 
marked differences both globally and nationally. Despite a high degree of global networking 
Evangelicalism takes many different forms in different nations and in particular it is important to 
note that its American and British forms are by no means identical.  Evangelicalism tends to be 
more politicized and to have a higher profile in the United States.  Indeed all American presidents 
since Carter have had close relationships with Evangelicals (Lindsay, 2007). By contrast: 
 
                                                             
46 http://www.eauk.org/about/what_is.cfm (accessed 19 January 2011). 
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Evangelicals in the UK have little discernible political voice, and what is in evidence appears muted 
and with limited leverage in government. Popular protest is more visible, but mainly due to media 
interest in what has become colourful novelty within a nation notable for its apparent apathy 
towards things of a religious or spiritual nature (Guest, forthcoming). 
 
Consequently a lot more sociological research has been done on Evangelicals in the United States 
than is the case in Britain or the rest of Europe (see especially the work of Ammerman (1997), Noll 
(2000) and C. Smith (1998, 2002)).  However, whilst the body of American literature generated is a 
useful resource for British sociology, great care is needed in drawing parallels between the two 
contexts. 
 
Larsen’s comments on the Protestant nature of Evangelicalism also need careful explaining.  
Whilst on the European mainland the term Evangelical is denominational and is associated mainly 
with the Lutheran Church, in Britain the term carries no denominational association but is 
normally viewed as a subset of Protestant.  So whilst it is true that the vast majority of Evangelicals 
would consider themselves Protestants (although pace  Larsen the label may also occasionally be 
used by some Roman Catholics (Noll, 2000, 37)), it is not true that all Protestants would consider 
themselves Evangelicals.    The term Protestant normally stands as distinct from particularly 
Roman Catholic and Orthodox, whilst the term Evangelical tends to stand as distinct from liberal 
on the one hand and fundamentalist on the other, although the latter is not so marked in the 
British context as it is in the American (Guest, 2007, 14).   
 
McGrath (1994, 13) and Hilborn (2008) illustrate this by pointing out that in America the label was 
adopted in the 1940s by the National Association of Evangelicals precisely to distinguish 
themselves from those who were called Fundamentalists and who typically withdrew from society 
and held to a literal interpretation of scripture, espoused young-earth creationism, supported the 
State of Israel as a fulfilment of prophecy and opposed women in leadership.47  Whilst 
fundamentalism has not been a significant part of the Protestant church in Britain (Bebbington, 
1989, 276), the term is still sometimes used pejoratively to label any Christian opinion, or indeed 
any religious activity, that is judged to be extreme or overly conservative.48  
                                                             
47 See Ammerman (1987) for a fuller account of American Christian Fundamentalism. (Ammerman, 
1987)  
48 See for example Modell (2008a) where fundamentalist is used to label Christians teaching 
creationism in school, campaigning against abortion and speaking critically of Islam. (Modell, 2008a)  
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The association of the word Evangelical with fundamentalism and a feeling that in common 
perception Evangelicals are always against something has led some Evangelicals to consider 
jettisoning the label.  In America leading Evangelical social activists like Tony Campolo, Jim Wallis 
and Brian McLaren have coined terms such as “progressive Evangelical” or “red-letter Christians” 
(Campolo, 2008).49  This is an issue for British Evangelicals too, although many feel that it is 
important to retain the term and reclaim its true meaning (Watkin, 2008, Buckeridge, 2006). 
 
One final confusion is the relationship between the terms Evangelical, Charismatic and 
Pentecostal.  Charismatics are Christians who emphasize the role of the Holy Spirit and particularly 
the spiritual gifts, or charismata, such as prophecy, healing or miracles.  They are predominantly 
Protestant but there are significant numbers of Catholic Charismatics as well.  Some embrace the 
term Evangelical; a few have rejected it or split away from umbrella organizations.  Whilst 
charismatic is not a denominational label and is used to describe Christians in a range of traditional 
churches, including the Church of England, the term Pentecostal tends to have historical 
denominational associations (§5.3).  Examples of Pentecostal churches include the Elim, the 
Assemblies of God and many of the large back diaspora churches in cities such as London.   
 
Of course these terms are here being used as ideal types and the reality is often somewhat more 
imprecise.  For some, the huge diversity of churches with such heterogeneous theology and 
ecclesiology from so many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds do not fit comfortably under 
the single label of Evangelical.50  In fact in many cases the term Evangelical says more about what 
it is not than what it is.  However, it is still the best term that we have for what Smith describes as: 
 
a particular orientation of religious practice, an activist faith that tries to influence the surrounding 
world.  For the Evangelicals themselves, this involves a heartfelt, personal commitment to and 
experiential relationship with God, from which springs a readiness to take a stand and speak out for 
                                                             
49 The latter refers to certain editions of the Bible which have the words of Jesus printed in red ink and 
the message is that these Christians are basing their beliefs and morals on the teaching of Jesus himself 
rather than on any other traditions or interpretations that they feel have accreted to the term 
Evangelical.   
50 For further discussion of the sociological inadequacy of the label see the thread at 
http://www.ssrc.org/blogs/immanent_frame/category/evangelicals-evangelicalisms/ (accessed 16 
December 2010). 
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faith.  To many more mainline and liberal Christians, Evangelicalism suggests a more emotional, 
noisy, and, possibly, pushy version of faith”.  (C. Smith, 1998, 242) 
 
5.3 A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVANGELICALISM IN BRITAIN 
 
Bebbington (1989) provides a magisterial overview of the history of Evangelicalism in Britain.  The 
movement’s earliest roots were in the sixteenth century European Protestant Reformation as the 
Reformers challenged the ecclesial power of Rome and the dissenting churches were born.  The 
Congregationalists and the Baptists in particular trace their roots back to this time and especially 
to the Puritan movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which separated from the 
newly created Church of England. 
 
It was not until the eighteenth century, however, that Evangelicalism became prominent (Soper, 
1994, 36).  Indeed Bebbington claims that the decade following 1734 was the most important 
period in Protestant history as it saw the “the emergence of the movement that became 
Evangelicalism” (1989, 20).  John Wesley and George Whitefield were the epitome of this 
movement (Larsen, 2007a).  Thousands were converted through their ministry and the 
Methodists, as they became called, soon grew to number almost a quarter of a million.    Wesley 
himself was a committed Anglican to the end of his life and had no intention of leaving the Church 
or founding a new sect but many of his supporters left and the Methodist church was born.    
 
This new movement displayed many of the classic traits of a sect.  Adherents were drawn mainly 
from the working class, met in small groups and were led by a largely lay leadership.  There was a 
strong emphasis on individual salvation and turning away from sinful behaviour that inevitably led 
to a high degree of tension with the surrounding society (Stark and Finke, 2000, 144).  This 
changed, however, as affluence increased, itinerant preachers settled down to become 
professional clergy and Methodists, no longer a sect, were accepted amongst the mainline 
denominations.  Indeed as the clergy became increasingly liberal Methodism itself became “a 
source of dissenting sects” as new reformers sought to return to a more radical faith (ibid 265). 
 
This fissiparousness is characteristic of Evangelicalism as demonstrated by the springing up of 
many new movements over the past 200 years.  With the authority of the established church 
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diminished, Evangelicalism, with its emphasis on individual choice, suited the new mood of 
optimism and confidence, especially in the nineteenth century (Tidball, 1994, 38).  People began 
to read and interpret the Bible for themselves.  If they did not agree with the preacher they could 
always start a new congregation!  However, whilst this new Evangelicalism was clearly expressed 
in schism and the creation of new sects, it also had a profound and stimulating effect on the 
established church.  The revival hymns found their way into the mainstream – much as Graham 
Kendrick’s songs did in the 1980s – and there was a new energy among the clergy (Tidball, 1994).  
Moreover, there were even Evangelicals to be found amongst the Church of England clergy, 
although they remained unconnected with Methodism (Bebbington, 1989, 30).  Thus a sort of 
symbiotic, love-hate relationship existed between church and sect. 
 
The Evangelical Alliance was formed in 1846 and by the end of the nineteenth century Protestant 
missionaries like William Carey and Henry Martyn were taking the Gospel to the world under the 
auspices of a host of new mission organizations.  In London the Clapham Sect set about social 
reform under the leadership of Henry Venn.  William Wilberforce and later Lord Shaftesbury 
became household names at the forefront of Evangelical activism.  Both the non-conformists and 
the Church of England grew, with many bishops espousing Evangelicalism (Tidball, 1994, 41).  
“Revivalism” arrived from America with the coming of D.L. Moody and the evangelistic campaign 
was born.  Popular preachers like the Baptist Charles Spurgeon drew huge crowds and great 
conventions were held culminating in the start of the Keswick Convention in 1875 which continues 
to this day. 
 
The nineteenth century also saw the birth of at least two significant new sects looking to return to 
a New Testament pattern of the religious life (A. Walker, 1998).  Conferences at Albury, Surrey, 
and Powerscourt, Dublin, became focal points for a new interest in Biblical prophecy and 
interpretation inspired by the teaching of Edward Irving and John Darby.  Their premillennial, 
dispensationalist theology aided by the Schofield Bible greatly appealed to the middle classes and 
the aristocracy, but led to a disillusionment with the world that inspired a new branch of 
rejectionism within Evangelicalism.  Irving and Darby were soon to part company, the former 
becoming the founder of the Catholic Apostolic Church and the latter the leader of the Christian 
Brethren.  The Irvingites, as they were known, were more Pentecostal in outlook and embraced 
charismatic gifts but the Brethren rejected these manifestations of the Holy Spirit.  It was not long 
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before the Brethren themselves split again, the “Exclusives” following Darby declaring the 
“Plymouth Open Brethren” to be unsound. 
 
The early twentieth century saw a continuance of revival and schism within Evangelicalism.  In 
1904 the Welsh revival under the leadership of Evan Roberts was followed the year after by the 
Azuza Street revival in Los Angeles and the modern Pentecostal movement was born.  There were 
many “physical and ecstatic manifestations of the Spirit” (Tidball, 1994, 49) but suspicion within 
mainstream Evangelicalism meant that those affected by these events left their congregations and 
formed new sects.  Elim formed in 1915 and the Assemblies of God in 1924, tended to draw people 
from the working classes and differed from each other in their practice of governance and 
theology of the baptism of the Spirit (Bebbington, 1989, 197).  This Pentecostal outbreak has 
become known as the “First Wave” of the Holy Spirit (Tidball, 1994, 73) and both movements 
today are generally accepted as part of mainstream Evangelicalism. 
 
Meanwhile in the early part of the century mainstream Evangelicalism was struggling to come to 
terms with the challenges of the modern world and the liberal social gospel.  After a period of 
theological infighting, scholarly leaders such as John Stott, Michael Green and F.F. Bruce emerged 
who in the post-war years began to restore confidence in conservative Evangelicalism.  A seminal 
moment came in 1966 when Martin Lloyd-Jones called for Evangelicals to leave their historic 
congregations and form a new church together.  He was strongly resisted in this by Stott and the 
result was the Keele Statement which kept Evangelicalism within the mainstream of the Church of 
England and other historic denominations (McGrath, 1994, 40). 
 
In the 1960s a “Second Wave” of Charismatic renewal broke out, which resonated with the 
prevailing culture of optimism and freedom.  Within the mainstream Anglican movement Michael 
Harper set up the Fountain Trust to promote renewal (A. Walker, 1998, 57) and most of the 
historic denominations were touched by this movement over the coming decades.  Others, 
however, chose to abandon their congregations and form new groups.  These were initially known 
as House Churches, but were later referred to as the Restoration Churches, due to their emphasis 
on recovering what they saw as New Testament norms.  Today, and for the purposes of this thesis, 
they are simply called the New Churches.  In the early days they were characterized by strong 
“apostolic” leadership, belief in the priesthood of all believers and strong criticism of 
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denominationalism.  Ironically, however, this movement too became subject to schism (or 
different “streams”), the major split being between the more authoritarian “R1” stream initially 
based in the north of England under the leadership of Bryn Jones and Terry Virgo amongst others, 
and the less conservative “R2” stream in the south clustered around John Noble and Gerald Coates 
(see A. Walker, 1998, for a full history of these movements).  Many of those joining the New 
Churches came from a Brethren background and in many ways the R1/R2 split looks like a replay 
of the division between Open and Exclusive Brethren in the previous century.  Whilst these mainly 
middle class congregations saw large growth during the 1980s and into the 90s, this growth has 
now slowed, although the Vineyard (which came from America) and New Frontiers (of R1 origin) 
continue to grow through “planting” new congregations (Brierley, 2006, 40). 
 
The 1980s saw something of a rapprochement between the Charismatic congregations and 
mainstream Evangelicalism.  Part of this was due to the so-called “Third Wave” of the Spirit 
associated with the ministry of John Wimber.  Despite his emphasis on “power evangelism” and 
supernatural healing his close connections with mainstream Evangelicalism ensured that the 
Charismatic revival spread and continued through the 1980s (see Stackhouse, 2003, for a critique 
of Wimber and other "fads").  Another key factor during this period was the annual, week-long 
Spring Harvest training conference which “brought together keen charismatics and non-
charismatics in a way reminiscent of Keswick” (Bebbington, 1989, 247).   
 
This increasing openness to ecumenism is one the major shifts that Bebbington (2009) observes 
within British Evangelicalism over the last fifty years.  He also detects a decline in both anti-
Catholicism and premillennial dispensationalism which has significantly altered the character of 
Evangelicalism, broadening it and engendering a greater concern for social issues.  These trends, 
however, coupled with the growth of charismatic renewal, have provoked a resurgence in 
conservative reformed theology as witnessed by the formation of both the Proclamation Trust and 
Reform, which was set up in 1993 to reform the Church of England “according to the Holy 
Scriptures”.51  In response Fulcrum was founded in 2003 by “open Evangelicals” and “the main 
polarization was now between those who saw doctrinal fidelity as the primary responsibility of 
Evangelicals and those who, in their vigorous quest for conversions, were less insistent on vocal 
defence of orthodoxy” (Bebbington, 2009, 98).  The tension between these two tendencies within 
                                                             
51 http://www.reform.org.uk/ (accessed 17 January 2011). 
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British Evangelicalism is likely to be a very significant factor in determining Christian approaches to 
Islam and must be borne in mind during the later presentation of the empirical material. 
 
5.4 EVANGELICALISM IN BRITAIN IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 
 
Today Evangelicals constitute a significant and active part of the British church.  Brierley classifies 
50% of the general British population as “notional Christians” who are “neither members nor 
regular attenders of a church, but who would say they were Christian” (Brierley, 2000, 13).  This 
figure, when considered alongside church attendees, is roughly borne out by the 2001 UK Census 
in which 71.8% of the population identified themselves as Christians.  Most Evangelicals, however, 
would not view these people as “true Christians” at all as they have not “made a decision” to join 
the church or religious community.  After all, to be an Evangelical Christian requires both volition 
and activism (§5.1).  With this in mind Brierley estimates that there are 1.2 million Evangelicals in 
England today (2006, 52) and probably 2 million in Britain as a whole (Ashworth and Farthing, 
2007) which equates to 40% of all churchgoers including Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox. 
 
Unsurprisingly, however, these Evangelicals are far from being a homogenous group, a fact 
highlighted by a survey of 17,000 Evangelicals conducted by the EA and Christian Research (P. 
Green, 2011)52 which affirmed Bebblington’s observation of the polarization between those 
focused on doctrinal orthodoxy and those focused on cultural relevance.  It also revealed that 
denominational labels, whilst important, are of limited use in distinguishing Evangelicals both from 
one another and from other Christians.    Several taxonomies have been proposed (see Brierley, 
2006, McGrath, 1994, Tidball, 1994, Peck, 2008) which try to capture the various historical, 
theological and ecclesiological characteristics.  Rather than trying to impose a nomenclature for 
this thesis, however, what is needed is an “identity map” which corresponds to the one that 
people use in “real life to negotiate the religious identity world” (C. Smith, 1998, 233). 
 
Drawing on Brierley (2006), Peck (2008) and Bebbington (2009) certain labels and oppositions 
emerge that usefully distinguish the different strands of contemporary British Evangelicalism: 
 
                                                             
52 See www.eauk.org/snapshot for the full report (accessed 19 January 2011). 
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 conservative v open 
 mainstream v charismatic 
 denominational v non-denominational 
 
Thus, for instance, the New Churches tend to be charismatic and non-denominational but may 
either be conservative (New Frontiers International) or open (Ichthus Christian Fellowship).  
Pentecostal churches on the other hand tend to be conservative and charismatic but may either 
be denominational (Elim) or non-denominational (Glory House).  The majority of Evangelical 
leaders would be familiar with these distinctions making them a useful tool for self-identification 
(§8.2.b). 
 
A further significant feature highlighted by the English Church Census, and also noted by 
Bebbington (2009), is the increasing strength of the Black Majority Churches (BMCs), especially in 
the London area (see Sturge, 2005, for an account).  Although present in small numbers for many 
hundreds of years, Christians from the Caribbean and Africa began to arrive in Britain in large 
numbers during the post-war years in response to the need for labour after the ravages of two 
world wars and became “the solution that started a problem” (Cashmore, 1989, 79).  In the 
atmosphere of heightened racial tension the first black Christians did not find a welcome in the 
British churches – Evangelical or otherwise – a fact which Davie calls “one of the saddest 
indictments of mainline Christianity” in Britain during this period (1994, 26).  Instead, these black 
Christians founded “the free churches of urban Britain” (ibid 63) which became centres of 
“communal belief” helping to sustain the black community by providing “a whole range of support 
mechanisms for the immigrant population” (ibid 111).   
 
Today it is in the Global South that the church is growing fastest (Jenkins, 2007b).  This is reflected 
in the fact that some of the the fastest growing churches in Britain have African origins.  The 
Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCoG) with its roots in Nigeria is probably the largest BMC 
with its biggest congregation, Jesus House, attracting 2000 weekly worshippers (Petre, 2006); 
Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC) is reckoned to be the largest single “mega-church” 
with around 10,000 members; and Kensington Temple, an Elim Pentecostal church, is probably the 
largest mixed congregation with around 3,000 blacks attending out of a congregation of about 
5,500 (Brierley, 2006, 99, 275). 
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Figures from the 2005 English Church Census (Brierley, 2006) suggest that in all about 10% of 
churchgoers in England are now black (over 330,000).  As 60% of British blacks (and 80% of 
Africans) live in the capital (Reddie, 2009) unsurprisingly black churchgoers now outnumber white 
churchgoers in inner London (Brierley, 2006, 99).  This leads to the suggestion that the future of 
Christianity in Britain lies in the black community.  Indeed the phenomenon of so-called “reverse 
mission” has seen an influx of Christian missionaries from Africa as well as South America who see 
their task as being to re-evangelize Britain (Ojo, 2007, Catto, 2008, Adogame, forthcoming).  
However, there is no sign of these churches attracting significant numbers of white Britons and 
indeed many of the smaller ones are ethnically monocultural even to the extent of continuing to 
use their African tribal languages. 
 
Of course, there are many other ethnic churches in Britain many of which would be Evangelical.  
These include Chinese, Iranian and Arab examples centred mainly on London.  There is also 
influence from other international Evangelical movements.  For example the Vineyard movement, 
founded in the United States by Wimber, is active in church planting and Hill Songs from Australia 
has a large congregation of some thousands in central London. 
 
5.5 THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
The real focus of this study, however, is not so much the British Evangelical churches themselves 
as the public sphere associated with them.  And it is not just the churches that host this sphere.  
Rather it is all the associations, organizations, representative bodies, conferences, networks and 
media which could be termed Evangelical civil society and facilitates Evangelicals in debating the 
various issues around which micro-public spheres form. 
 
5.5.A EVANGELICAL ASSOCIATIONS AND NETWORKS 
One key association is the Evangelical Alliance (EA) which is perhaps the most visible, united face 
of British Evangelicalism, claiming to represent over 7000 congregations and 750 organizations 
across the Evangelical spectrum.  Clearly it sees its mission being to engage in the wider public 
sphere: 
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the Alliance speaks on behalf of its members and represents Evangelical concerns to Government, 
the National Assemblies, the media and key decision-makers. In resourcing its members and 
encouraging Christians to fully engage in their communities as responsible citizens, the Alliance 
strives to make Evangelical truths publicly accessible.
53
 
 
Through its Idea magazine, its website and regular newsletter it provides a focal point for many 
Evangelicals.   
 
Not all Evangelicals, however, choose to be part of the EA.  Other associations have sprung up, 
normally to affirm a more conservative position, such as Affinity, a “network of many hundreds of 
Bible-centred churches and Christian agencies throughout Britain and Ireland” which grew out of 
the British Evangelical Council in 2004.54  Reform is another similar “network of individuals and 
churches” committed to “reforming the Church of England from within according to the Holy 
Scriptures”.55 
 
There are also many organizations committed to social action, evangelism and political lobbying 
that are significant in the formation of the EPS.  Examples are too numerous to mention 
exhaustively but include such well-known agencies as the Bible Society, Scripture Union, Tearfund, 
Operation Mobilization and Faithworks.   Two groups of particular interest for their campaigning 
on Christian values are Christian Concern for Our Nation (CCFON) and Christian Voice which both 
feature in this study.  There are even a few Christian political parties notably the Christian Peoples’ 
Alliance, which despite having a few councillors has still not had a candidate elected to parliament.  
This does not mean to say that Evangelicals are not present in parliament though; indeed they are 
part of a growing number of Christian MPs across the parties (Tomlinson, 2010). 
 
Conferences also play an important part in this public sphere.  The Keswick Convention has already 
been mentioned (§5.3) and is still in existence today.  Even more significant though are Spring 
Harvest, founded in 1979, New Wine, founded in 1989, and the many other annual conventions of 
the various Evangelical streams.  These see tens of thousands of Evangelicals coming together for 
a week of teaching, preaching and training and are a major influence on the life of the churches in 
                                                             
53 http://www.eauk.org/about (accessed 14 December 2010). 
54 http://www.affinity.org.uk (accessed 23 October 2010). 
55 http://www.reform.org.uk/pages/whatisreform.php (accessed 23 October 2010). 
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Britain (A. Walker, 1998).  They not least provide Evangelical church and parachurch leaders with a 
wider platform than they normally have access to in their local churches, and their teaching is 
customarily distributed through CDs and, increasingly, internet podcasts. 
 
5.5.B EVANGELICAL MEDIA 
The latter are part of a highly developed network of Evangelical media in Britain ranging from 
subscription television to internet blogs and forums.  The traditional linchpin has been the 
Christian publishing house.  Nonetheless, whilst Evangelical leaders still write and publish many 
books, it seems that Christians are not reading enough of them and Evangelical publishers (like 
many others) are struggling in the present economic climate.56  Of course it is not only texts 
published in formal book and pamphlet formats that make up a modern discursive public sphere. 
Many different media are utilized.  Articles are published in Evangelical magazines and 
newspapers such as Christianity, Evangelicals Now, Evangelical Times and Third Way.  Evangelical 
authors are also represented in The Church Times.  Premier Radio and God TV are amongst the 
stations, including many from America and elsewhere, that broadcast Christian programming via 
satellite and the internet.  Websites and blogs too are increasingly used to disseminate Evangelical 
debate. Fulcrum is a popular internet forum committed to “renewing the Evangelical centre” and 
hosts discussion on many topics.57  Some Evangelicals even host their own websites and write 
blogs which generate debate within the community.   
 
5.5.C ISSUES FOR DEBATE IN THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
So what type of issues do Evangelicals discuss?  There are many different topics around which 
Evangelical micro-public spheres coalesce.  They tend to be broadly concerned with theology – 
that is what Evangelicals believe; ecclesiology – that is how Evangelicals organize themselves; or 
socio-political concerns. 
 
An example of the first was the theological controversy surrounding the publication of The Lost 
Message of Jesus which challenged the traditional Evangelical understanding of the atonement 
(Chalke and Mann, 2003).  Steve Chalke, the book’s co-author, is a popular Christian leader who 
                                                             
56 Note the sale of Wesley Owen and STL in 2009.  See http://www.thebookseller.com/news/107408-
wesley-owen-stores-enter-administration.html (accessed 16 December 2010). 
57 http://www.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk/forum/ (accessed 16 December 2010). 
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frequently appears on television and radio.  Following publication, "for the conservative stalwarts 
Chalke was a heretic, but for many others he remained a hero” (Bebbington, 2009, 98), and many 
media were deployed in the ensuing furore.  A rebuttal was published in book form (Jeffery et al., 
2007); a magazine article reported the new rift between Calvinists and Arminians (Roberts, 2008); 
blogs were written (e.g. Warnock, 2008); and even the bishop of Durham, Tom Wright, wrote an 
article on Forum (Wright, 2007).  The debate was so widespread that in July 2005 the EA arranged 
a special symposium at the London School of Theology bringing the main protagonists together.58  
It is a good example of the fears that surround any perceived liberalizing of Evangelical theology 
which is a very important theme in the Evangelical debate about Islam (§9.3). 
 
An example of an ecclesiological debate is the discussion surrounding the “Emerging Church” 
movement which seeks to find new, socially relevant expressions of the church (for a discussion 
see Murray, 2005).  This is also a good example of how the EPS is influenced by the wider 
transnational public sphere.  Brian McLaren (2001), an American Evangelical, is a particular 
proponent of new forms of church which have been heavily criticized by others such as Don 
Carson (2005), another American.  This conversation is carried on in Britain via magazines (e.g. 
Buckeridge, 2009), newsletters (e.g. Downes, 2008), internet fora  and national conferences. 
 
Finally, there are many socio-political issues about which Evangelical Christians feel strongly, and 
groups like Christian Action Research and Education (CARE), the Christian Institute and CCFON 
regularly campaign about topics such as abortion, embryology, gender issues and the family.  
Indeed it is the response of Evangelicals to one such particular socio-political concern – the 
increasing Muslim presence in Britain – that forms the focus of this research.   
 
Having given a brief overview of Evangelicals in Britain and the manner in which the EPS is 
constituted, I turn in the next chapter to consider this Muslim presence in Britain.  This is followed 
in Chapter 7 by an examination of the specific interaction between the two groups and an outline 
of the formation of an Evangelical micro-public sphere specifically concerned with Islam. 
 
                                                             
58 See http://www.eauk.org/theology/key_papers/Atonement/atonement-statement.cfm for a report 
(accessed 23 October 2010). 
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CHAPTER 6 MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN 
 
 
 
“It is clear that Islam is a crucial factor that we ignore at our peril.  Not only does it offer an 
additional religious choice for Europeans, it has become, simply by its existence, a catalyst of 
change. Islam must adapt to Europe (that is clear), but Europe must also adapt to Islam.”  
(Davie, 2006, 271) 
 
+ + + + 
 
Barely a weekly passes without some mention – positive or negative – of Islam in the British 
media.  Amidst the journalistic comment and occasional public hysteria it is sometimes hard to 
discern the truth.  However, as Muslims form the Other of this study, it is important to have an 
accurate understanding of their situation in contemporary Britain.  This chapter provides an initial 
overview by looking at the global context, the history of the Muslim presence in Britain, the 
development of a British Muslim public sphere and issues of concern to Muslims. 
 
6.1 THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
The situation of Muslims in Britain cannot be considered in isolation from certain interpretations 
of global events.  It is now common place to frame the discussion of Islam and its role in the 
international community as a supposed “clash of civilizations”, tragically encapsulated in the 
rubble of the Twin Towers.  Huntington’s seminal article (1993) and his subsequent book (1996) 
predicted a future of global conflicts between the great civilizational blocs of the world, the chief 
of which would be the clash between the West and the Muslim world with its “bloody borders” 
and rising fundamentalism.   An altogether more optimistic view of the “end of history” was held 
out by Fukuyama (1992), who predicted the imminent victory of liberal democratic ideals over all 
other ideologies, including Islam despite its current  resistance.  These two books are frequently 
used paradigmatically to illustrate polarized approaches to international relations with respect to 
Islam (see for example Hefner, 2005, Eisenstadt, 1999). 
 
There are those who feel that Huntington’s vision of the future has been confirmed by world 
events.  The spectre of Al-Qaeda and Islamist terrorism; the intractable wars in Iraq and 
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Afghanistan against Islamist-inspired insurgencies; the millenarian rhetoric of President 
Ahmedinejad of Iran; the worldwide riots following the publishing of images of Muhammad in 
Danish cartoons; reports of widespread human rights abuses in many Muslim countries; and fears 
of nuclear-fuelled political chaos in Pakistan all fit well within such a paradigm.  Against such an 
ominous backdrop the presence of unprecedented numbers of Muslims in the West causes 
considerable unease.  Some use reports of high birth rates amongst immigrant communities, 
street protests and ubiquitous conspiracy theories to stoke fears of an Islamic takeover of Europe, 
fears which are accentuated by the presence of radical preachers in mosques and the emergence 
of European-born suicide bombers.  It is little wonder then that there is talk amongst some 
commentators of a coming “Eurabia” (Ye'or, 2005) and even of an already-present “Londonistan” 
(M. Phillips, 2006).59   
 
Not everyone, however, agrees with such Manichean interpretations of world affairs.  Nielsen sees 
such views as “superficial and ignorant” (Nielsen, 1998a, 1).  Jenkins believes that “perceptions of 
a naked ‘clash of civilizations’ are wide of the mark” and declares that “Eurabian visions .... are 
wildly unlikely” (Jenkins, 2007, 205, 284).  Eickelman looks at the impact of mass education and 
media on Muslim populations and sees a coming transformation of Muslim societies in which “the 
idea of Islam as dialogue and civil debate” gains ground (2000, 20, see also Eickelman and 
Anderson, 1999).  Others argue that there is no incompatibility between Islam and the nation state 
(Piscatori, 1986), democracy (Hefner, 2005) or the separation of state and religion (C. Brown, 
2001, Hussain, 2004b).  Esposito & Mogahed draw on data from the Gallup World Poll to show 
that the majority of Muslims globally want democracy and in fact admire western values of 
freedom, whilst rejecting western hegemony, neo-colonialism and declining moral standards 
(2007).   
 
Clash of civilization theories are sometimes seen as influenced by the sort of Orientalist academic 
approaches heavily criticized by Said (1978).  Said describes Orientalism as "a kind of Western 
projection onto and will to govern over the Orient" (ibid 95).  Binary opposition, inculcated by 
terms such as West and East, inevitably “polarizes distinction ... and limit(s) the human encounter 
between different cultures, traditions and societies" (ibid 45).  Using this sort of reasoning 
                                                             
59 The term “Londonistan” seems to have been first used by French counter terrorism experts (O'Neill, 
2001).  See also Phillips (2010) for why she feels vindicated in her views. (Phillips, 2010)  
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“scholars of Islam and political scientists who emphasize the role of Islam as a system of norms 
and values ... run the risk of becoming essentialist and ahistorical” (Cesari, 2005, 1016).  Salvatore 
sees essentialism as an over-simplification in the construction of a “Self-Other polarity”, and traces 
it back to the work of Weber whose study of Islam was hugely influential, although deficient, for 
future generations of sociologists (Salvatore, 1996, 459).  Such essentialism fails to take into 
account the huge diversity within the Muslim world and finds it extremely difficult to admit that 
Islam could reform itself because in itself “reform is a betrayal of Islam" as understood from the 
Orientalist point of view (Said, 1978, 106). Thus Muslim reformers, such as An-Naim (1990), 
Souroush (2000)  or Ramadan (1999), are either not really Muslims and so doomed to failure, or 
are Islamist conspirators downplaying the Islamic agenda and so not to be trusted. 
 
However, whilst global Islam is often pictured as being in crisis between open reformers and 
intolerant radicals, there is also a crisis within the West of how to understand Islam – and itself.  Is 
there an essential, essence of Islam, or are different expressions of Islam too broad to be 
conveniently boxed?  With echoes of Locke, can an individual really be trusted to owe fealty both 
to a national polity and a transnational religion (§3.1.c)?   Why do distinct religious identities 
persist?   As Al-Sayyad and Castells point out: 
 
despite our academic preoccupation with globalization as a discourse, the world continues to 
demonstrate a movement towards cultural differentiation and not homogenization, in which each 
individual belongs to many cultures and in which people have multiple cultural identities (Al-Sayyad 
and Castells, 2002, 6).   
 
This is certainly true for Muslims in Britain but is, of course, true for all other communities too. 
 
6.2 THE MUSLIM PRESENCE IN BRITAIN 
 
6.2.A STATISTICS 
Given these global debates about the place of Islam in the modern world it is of paramount 
importance in this thesis to paint an accurate picture of the situation in Britain.  That said 
obtaining accurate statistics for the numbers of Muslims in Europe is problematic not least 
because some countries, such as France, do not include a census question on religion out of 
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principle (Cesari, 2004).  Happily, however, in 2001, for the first time in recent history, such a 
question was included in the England and Wales census and the relevant statistics for religion can 
be seen in Figure 6.1.   Although these statistics are now almost a decade old they offer a starting 
point for estimates of the current number of Muslims in Britain which vary between 2 and 3 
million - often depending on the point of view of the speaker.   
 
Statistics are emotive, often minimized by government for political purposes or maximized by both 
Muslims trying to attract greater benefits and by right wing opponents trying to foment fear 
amongst the majority.   For instance, a video entitled Muslim Demographics posted on YouTube in 
2009 had by April 2011 received over 12.8 million hits.60  The makers quoted high birth rates 
amongst Muslim immigrant communities and predicted that Islam would become the dominant 
religion in Europe in a few short years.  Some social scientists too point to the elevated birth rates 
of religious groups as a significant factor in projections about the future of religion globally 
(Kaufmann, 2010).  Others are more circumspect in their predictions (Jenkins, 2007a).  Whatever 
the case, it is interesting to note that Britain, in 2001 at least, had one of the lowest percentages 
of Muslims amongst its main Western neighbours (see Figure 6.2).  
 
It is also important to note that unlike the figures taken from the English Church Census (§5.4) 
these figures give no indication of what percentage of Muslims in Britain could be described as 
practicing Muslims.  As has already been said, a Muslim population tends to resemble a 
community cult and is in reality “simultaneously a religious community and a political community” 
(Casanova, 1994, 48).  However, when these two forms “meet, fuse, interpenetrate, and repel 
each other” all kinds of dynamics result (ibid 47).  Moving from one to the other can be hugely 
problematic and consequently Evangelicals and Muslims exhibit significant differences in how they 
view membership of their respective religious communities.  This causes great tension when 
considering issues of evangelism, religious freedom and the treatment of apostates.  Whilst Islam 
understands itself to be a universal religion and welcomes converts, some of its expressions find it 
harder to allow its adherents freedom to leave.  This is a significant problem for many Evangelicals 
and recurs throughout this study. 
 
                                                             
60 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-3X5hIFXYU (accessed April 2, 2011). 
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Figure 6.1 – The population of England and Wales by religion61 
Religion 
No. of 
adherents 
%age of 
total 
Christian 42,079,000 71.6 
Muslim 1,591,000 2.7 
Hindu 559,000 1.0 
Sikh 336,000 0.6 
Jewish 267,000 0.5 
Buddhist 152,000 0.3 
Other religion 179,000 0.3 
No religion 9,104,000 15.5 
Not stated 4,289,000 7.3 
 
 
Figure 6.2 – Muslim populations in Western Europe62 
Country No. of Muslims 
Total population 
(millions) 
Muslims as %age 
of population 
France 5-6,000,000 62.3 8-9.6 
Netherlands 945,000 16.3 5.8 
Denmark 270,000 5.4 5.0 
Switzerland 310,800 7.4 4.2 
Austria 339,000 8.2  4.1 
Belgium 400,000 10.3 4.0 
Germany 3,000,000 82.5 3.6 
Sweden 300,000 9.0 3.0 
United Kingdom 1,600,000 58.8 2.8 
Spain 1,000,000 43.1 2.3 
Italy 825,000 58.4 1.4 
 
  
                                                             
61 Data taken from the UK Office for National Statistics 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=293 (accessed 20 August, 2009). 
62 Data taken from BBC survey drawing on statistics from various national statistics offices and 
government agencies 2001-2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4385768.stm, 23 
December 2005, (accessed 20 August, 2009). 
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Figure 6.3 – Muslims in England & Wales by ethnic background63 
Ethnic Group 
%age of 
total no. of 
Muslims 
Asian or Asian British 73.65 
 
 Pakistani 42.52 
 
(of which) Bangladeshi 16.79 
 
 Indian 8.51 
 
 Other Asian 5.82 
White (inc. Balkans & E.Europe) 11.62 
Black or Black British 6.88 
Mixed 4.15 
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group 3.70 
 
 
6.2.B MUSLIM MIGRATION TO BRITAIN 
The census figures show that the majority of Muslims in Britain are of South Asian origin (Figure 
6.3), a fact attributable to colonial history.  Several authors provide a detailed overview of the 
history of Muslim migration to Britain (e.g. Lewis, 1994, Nielsen, 2004, Rex, 2002)64.  Early arrivals 
included businessmen, diplomats and lascars (sailors) from Yemen and South Asia, but the main 
period of Muslim migration to the West came in the post-war period when there was a need for 
labour and it was natural for European countries to look to their former colonial territories, which 
for Britain included the Indian Subcontinent.  This was the first stage of what is often seen as a 
“four phase pattern” (Lewis, 2002b, 17).  Pushed by political and economic turmoil at home and 
pulled by the promise of work, large numbers of men began to migrate.  Indeed in many cases the 
workers were specifically invited and British companies went to Asia and held recruiting drives 
(Vertovec, 1997, 169).  The initial cohort of workers came mainly from the newly created Pakistan 
and later from Bangladesh, although it should not be forgotten that Britain is somewhat unique in 
Europe in having large numbers of Asian Hindus and Sikhs in addition to Muslims (Davie, 1994, 
                                                             
63 data taken from the UK Office for National Statistics 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/ssdataset.asp?vlnk=6892&More=Y  (accessed 20 August, 2009). 
64 See also Sardar (2008) for a highly readable, Bryson-esque account of South Asians in Britain. 
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26).65  Next came a period of “chain migration” as the early workers helped their relatives and 
friends to migrate and in some cases the men folk of whole villages migrated en masse.  In the 
early days little thought was given by British planners and politicians to the future.  It was 
presumed that the migrant workers would eventually return home and indeed the migrants kept 
close links with their homeland sending remittances and visiting frequently.  The third stage of 
immigration, however, saw wives and families coming to join their husbands.  This was 
inadvertently accelerated by the Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1971 as families rushed to enter 
Britain before the door closed, and also by the fears of Asian women that their husbands would 
marry British wives.  With the arrival of families, religion, which had largely been associated with 
“over there”, became more important “over here” (Nielsen, 2004, 106).  Women needed the 
protection of conservative practices; a place was needed for prayer; and children needed to be 
educated in the Qur’an.  This required the creation of Islamic institutions such as mosques, 
madrasas (Islamic schools), and funding and lobbying associations (Vertovec and Peach, 1997, 24). 
Thus began the final stage in the process of migration as a new generation of Muslims were born 
and raised in Britain. 
 
Since this initial influx from South Asia there have been many other Muslim arrivals. East African 
Asians, Iranians, Turkish Cypriots, Kurds, Somalis and Afghans have all come to Britain in large 
numbers, driven by unrest in their homelands.  In addition to these asylum seekers and economic 
migrants there have always been numbers of Arab students and businessmen, particularly in the 
London area.  All of this means that the Muslim population of Britain is extremely diverse and 
tends to form separate, very localized, ethnically-based communities representing very different 
traditions and practices of Islam.  Around 85% of Muslims in the UK are Sunnis but there are also 
significant numbers of Shi’ites as well as other smaller groups like the Ahmadiyya66 and the 
Ismailis67 both of whom are seen as heretical sects by other Muslims (Rex, 2002).  Even the Sunni 
community, however, is itself extremely heterogeneous.    
 
                                                             
65 One particular ‘push’ factor that brought ‘Mirpuri’ Muslims to Britain was the building of the Mangla 
Dam in 1967 in Kashmir which submerged the whole of the town of Mirpur and its surrounding 
villages.  Virtually the whole population migrated, many going to Bradford, which now has the largest 
Kashmiri population outside Kashmir (Sardar, 2008, 121). 
66 See http://www.ahmadiyya.org.uk/ (accessed 6 April 2011). 
67 See http://www.theismaili.org/ (accessed 6 April 2011). 
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The two dominant groups, both of South Asian origin, are the Barelwis and the Deobandis.  The 
Barelwis form the largest group and follow a mystical Sufi form of Islam the most important of 
which is the Naqshbandi school.  The Deobandis, who have the largest number of mosques and 
madrasas, adhere to a strict, pietistic interpretation of Islam which specifically rejects Sufi practice 
(Rex, 2002).  Several other movements have branched out from its centre in Deoband, India.  The 
Tablighi Jama‘at (TJ) is a Deobandi “proselytizing and preaching movement, dedicated to 
reaffirming the basic principles of Islam and to drawing back into the fold Muslims who may have 
strayed” (King, 1997, 129).  It has recently come to public attention over its plans to build a so-
called “mega-mosque” adjacent to the Olympic site in East London (Johnston, 2006).  Whilst TJ 
claims to be non-political, there are concerns that it is isolationist and on occasion nurtures 
radicalism.   
 
Such radicalism is particularly influenced by the writings of Qutb (1906-1966) of the Egyptian al-
Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood), Mawdudi (1903-1979) of the Pakistani Jama‘at i-Islami and, of 
greatest concern, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) the spiritual influence behind the Saudi 
kingdom who preached a radical salafiyya,  which advocates a puritanical return to the practice of 
the early Muslim community.  His followers today are often referred to as Wahhabis.  More 
groups could be mentioned but this should suffice to demonstrate that it is problematic to talk 
about “British Muslims” as though they were one united group.  This diversity needs to be firmly 
held in mind during the following discussion. 
 
Initially Muslims were largely invisible in British society and were not distinguished from the rest 
of the immigrant population.  The main issue of the day was not religion but race and, as has been 
mentioned (§3.4.a), Britain chose to celebrate cultural difference rather than follow the French in 
insisting on assimilation.  Following the early period of immigration and relative anonymity, 
several events propelled Muslims into the British public consciousness.  The first was the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.  The shock of seeing robed clerics backed by Revolutionary Guards deposing 
the powerful, western-backed Shah and the horror of the American Embassy siege brought Islam, 
and particularly this new brand of Shi‘ite fundamentalism, onto the world stage.68  The second 
                                                             
68 See Armstrong (2000) for a short history of the Iranian Revolution including an account of how the 
CIA in 1953 supported the overthrow of a democratically elected government in Iran and the re-
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event was the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, which was followed by Muslim 
protests including book burnings in northern English cities and a death fatwa from the Ayatollah 
Khomeini in Tehran.69  The affair confirmed the worst fears of many that Islam was incompatible 
with western liberal democracy and freedom of speech.  Both of these events served notice to the 
secular elites of the West that religion was making an unexpected and, for them, unwelcome 
return to the public domain.70   
 
Other events reinforced these fears, kept Muslims in the public consciousness and significantly 
shaped the nature of the Muslim presence in Britain.  During the First Gulf War (1990-1) many 
British Muslims were opposed to the government action, although there was no united voice on 
the issue (Nielsen, 1998b, 135).  The Bosnian civil war (1992-5) caused even greater resentment 
and mistrust amongst Muslim communities.  The impression was of the West allowing Serbian 
Christians to massacre white Bosnian Muslims, which raised anxiety amongst Asian Muslims as to 
their own safety, and the resulting anger was harnessed to great effect by radical groups recruiting 
on British university campuses.71  More recently the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, the 
perceived police targeting of Muslims in incidents like the Forest Gate police raid, controversial 
detention without trial, and stop and search policies have continued to dominate the media and 
therefore to shape the place of Muslims in Britain.  
 
6.2.C MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY 
These events have happened in parallel with the establishment of many new Muslim institutions 
and associations giving rise to what Herbert terms a “Muslim civil society” in Britain (2003).  
Initially Muslims had negotiated and lobbied for rights and freedoms to do with education, food 
provision and mosque building at a local level.  However, with the increasing centralization of 
power during the Thatcherite period they began to adopt a national focus (Ansari, 2004, 235).  The 
Union of Muslim Organizations established in 1970 had had little success in unifying Muslims.  The 
difficulty of forming Muslim representative bodies was highlighted when, shortly after the 1984 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
instatement of the royal family, a fact which goes some way towards explaining Iranian anger at 
Western meddling in their internal affairs today. (Armstrong, 2000)  
69 For a recent account see Weller (2009). (Weller, 2009) 
70 For an account of fundamentalist religion on the world stage see Kepel (1994) in addition to 
Armstrong (2000).  (Kepel, 1994) (Armstrong, 2000) 
71 See for example Husain (2007). (Husain, 2007) 
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launch of a national Council of Mosques (COM), Barelwis launched a competing Council of Imams 
and Mosques, as they perceived COM to be dominated by Deobandis with Saudi connections 
(Ansari, 2004, 361).  The Rushdie crisis, however, precipitated the formation of the United 
Kingdom Action Committee on Islamic Affairs which was more successful in bringing together 
Barelwis and Wahhabi inspired Deobandis (Lewis, 1997) and eventually led to the formation of the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1996 at the urging of the then Home Secretary Michael 
Howard.  The MCB is still not truly representative as it lacks Shi‘ite participation and is seen as 
being dominated by Deobandis with close links to Jama’at-i-Islami  (Nielsen, 2004).  Despite this 
the MCB became for a time the chief Muslim interlocutor for the government and has encouraged 
Muslim participation in the political process including voting in national elections.  Managing the 
tension between the demands of the government and the expectations of the Muslim public has 
not, however, proved easy and the government has since distanced itself from the MCB, 
championing instead the formation of the Sufi Muslim Council despite the lack of grassroots 
support (Birt, 2005).   
 
Other Muslim groups such as the Islamic Society of Britain and the British Association of Muslims 
also encourage participation in wider British civil society.  The only attempt at forming a Muslim 
political party, the Islamic Party of Britain, has failed, however, and most Muslims tend to join or 
vote for one of the mainstream British parties, traditionally Labour (Ansari, 2004, 239). 
 
It is important to note that the Rushdie affair also catalyzed the emergence of rejectionist Muslim 
groups that eschewed participation in British public life.  The Muslim Parliament was formed in 
1992 by Kalim Siddiqui of the Muslim Institute who urged the Muslim community to “isolate itself 
from the damaging influences” of the wider society and form a “non-territorial Islamic state” with 
its own separate institutions (Ansari, 2004, 362).  Although still in existence, the Muslim 
Parliament is seen as a failure as it has never been truly representative and creates a negative 
impression amongst non-Muslims (Lewis, 1994).  Other radical groups have also emerged; some 
home grown, others with a transnational element.  Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was formed in Palestine as 
an offshoot of al-Ikhwan and became very successful at recruiting disaffected students on British 
university campuses in the 1990s with its talk of reviving the Muslim khilafa (caliphate) which had 
ended following Turkey’s defeat in the First World War (Nielsen, 2004).  The even more radical Al-
Muhajiroun split away from HT and later became Al-Ghurabaa, the Saviour Sect and most recently 
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Islam4UK as each successive group was banned by the government  (Neumann, 2008).  All such 
groups have in common a rejection of participation in British society and are closely monitored by 
the security services. 
 
6.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BRITISH MUSLIM PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
The discourse surrounding such events and the building of such institutions in Muslim civil society 
– whether participationist or rejectionist - points to the development of what has been called a 
“British Muslim public sphere” (Herbert, 2004, Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins, 2004).  Clearly this is 
another example of a discursive public sphere similar to the EPS outlined in the previous chapter.  
As Herbert points out, this sphere is already diversified and pluralized (2003, 190), and a more 
accurate comparison with the Evangelical sphere would be something like the “Shi‘ite micro-public 
sphere” or the “Barelwi micro-public sphere”.  For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is the 
wider Muslim public sphere which is of interest as it is largely that which Evangelicals are reacting 
to. 
 
As with other spheres, the British Muslim public sphere is mediated in many ways.  In addition to 
public meetings in mosques and community centres, the organizations and associations already 
mentioned provide fora for face to face debate, official communications and opportunities for 
informal meeting.  There is now a thriving Muslim publishing sector and books, cassettes and 
videos are available in English and many other languages.72  Whilst in the early days the only 
Muslim newspapers available were London editions of foreign newspapers, there are now several 
home grown newspapers, magazines and journals for diverse audiences including children, young 
people and academics.73 There are also television and radio stations broadcasting Muslim 
programming, such as the London-based Islam Channel,74 and many of these media have their 
own websites which encourage debate and comment.  Indeed the Muslim public sphere utilizes 
cyberspace as much as any other group.  This has been dubbed the “virtual ummah” and includes 
                                                             
72 The Muslim Educational Trust, Amal Press, An-Najm and Greenbird are just some of the Muslim 
publishers in the UK publishing everything from classical theology to Islamic fiction and children’s 
books. 
73 Publications include The Muslim Weekly, Islamic Times, Q-News (although the last edition appeared in 
2006), The Islamic Quarterly and The Revival, a youth magazine. 
74 http://www.islamchannel.tv  
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everything from information sharing, fora and online religious authorities to propaganda and 
“cyber-jihad” (Cesari, 2004, 111-3).75   
 
The internet opens up the public sphere to a wide range of participants who do not have access to 
more traditional Muslim media.  It is particularly noticeable that the young, who tend to be more 
comfortable with technology, and women, often excluded from the mosque and other fora, are 
well represented on internet bulletin boards and even on television and radio.76  Of course the 
internet also entails a substantial transnational aspect to the British Muslim public sphere, a factor 
utilized by the full spectrum of traditions representing contrasting intentions.77  These types of 
new media ensure that the boundaries of the emerging British Muslim public sphere remain 
blurred (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999, xi). 
 
Freedom of speech, however, is controversial within some parts of the Muslim community.  
Muslims almost without exception are very sensitive to comments about Muhammad and there is 
widespread support for the introduction of blasphemy laws which would restrict criticism of Islam.  
Also, as mentioned above (§3.2.a and §6.2.a), religious freedom is itself problematic.  It is clear in 
all schools of Islamic jurisprudence that ridda (apostasy) was historically forbidden.  There is much 
disagreement, however, over how this should be interpreted today.  Modernisers see it as 
historically redundant.  For instance, An-Na‘im says “I am unable as a Muslim to accept the law of 
apostasy as part of the law of Islam today" (1990, 183, emphasis in original) and Talbi believes 
that: 
Islam is a religion (promoting) religious freedom and there is no trace of the legal judgement 
concerning apostasy in the Qur'an itself, and that this legal judgement is the product of historical 
conditions in which apostasy was considered as treachery against the homeland in time of war 
(quoted in Nettler, 2004, 230). 
Conservatives, on the other hand, see it as still being an essential part of the shari‘a, although 
opinions vary as to how punishment should be implemented.  In 2007 Ali Gomaa, the Grand Mufti 
                                                             
75 See for example the Muslim Public Affairs Committee (MPAC(UK)) which maintains a large 
interactive website and forum (http://www.mpacuk.org) and Ask Imam, a North American based 
online authority http://www.askimam.org/ (both accessed 6 April 2011). 
76 See Muslimah Dilemma for an example of an all female chat show on the Islam Channel, 
http://www.islamchannel.tv/MD/ (accessed 2 December 2010). 
77 See Neumann (2008) for an account of the role of the internet in recruiting radically jihadists.  
(Neumann, 2008)  
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of Egypt, was reported to have declared that the Qur’an defers punishment for apostasy until the 
hereafter (Abdel-Tawab, 2007).  Qaradawi, however, in a 2006 ruling widely circulated on the 
internet distinguishes between “minor apostasy” (private conversion) and “major apostasy” in 
which the apostate openly proclaims his conversion.  According to Qaradawi, a popular theologian, 
broadcaster and founder of www.islamonline.net, the former is to be tolerated, the latter is to be 
“severely punished by the death penalty”.78  Such restrictions on freedoms within some parts of 
the Muslim community make the public sphere a contentious space for Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike.  
 
6.4 ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE BRITISH MUSLIM PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
6.4.A DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
The issues of concern to Muslims in the public sphere range widely from discussion of Islamic 
family life to national and international politics.  Muslims in Britain are interested in the daily 
practice of Islam and are talking about issues like times of prayer, correct procedure for fasting 
and what is permitted (halal) or forbidden (haram).  They are also concerned with their rights 
which does not mean that Muslims “compete with Christians, but rather is understood as the 
realization of freedom of religious belief and equality among citizens" (Cherribi, 2003, 210).  
Indeed the desire for these rights is often no more than “the exercise of liberal rights according to 
wholly British procedures and standards, but because they are made by Muslims – tarred with the 
same brush as Middle East extremists – the demands are not usually perceived as such” (Vertovec, 
1997, 173).   
 
Concerns over such rights are closely linked to the feeling that Muslims are socially disadvantaged 
and are increasingly forming an underclass in Britain.  Anwar (2003) presents statistics to 
demonstrate that Muslims in Britain face higher rates of unemployment, poorer housing and 
worse health than the rest of the population.  Education has long been an area of concern for 
Muslims, some of whom would prefer their children to attend gender-segregated schools or even 
Muslim faith schools.  Some ethnic groups, particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys, 
                                                             
78 http://www.slideshare.net/IslamicBooks/apostasy-major-minor-by-dr-yusuf-al-qaradawi-2777415 
(accessed 27 January 2011). 
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significantly underachieve educationally, although the reasons for this are complex (see Lewis, 
2002a, for a fuller discussion).   
 
Western foreign policy is also a high profile concern for many British Muslims.  Globalization has 
transformed the understanding and reality of the global ummah meaning that international affairs 
almost immediately become the local concern of British Muslims (Nielsen, 1997).  Since the First 
Gulf War and the Bosnian crisis some have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the 
“war on terror”, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and pre-eminently western support for 
Israel, with the plight of the Palestinians becoming a cause célèbre.  These policies are often seen 
as a war on Islam and a form of neo-colonialism reinforcing western global hegemony and are the 
subject of much reporting and comment in Muslim media and internet fora, although it should be 
noted that there is no clear consensus on what the Muslim response should be and attitudes vary 
considerably within the community. 
 
6.4.B MEDIA PORTRAYALS OF ISLAM 
The role of the media is key.    Foreign affairs, terrorism, immigration issues and the place of 
Muslims in Britain are all mediated to the general public, including other faith groups, through 
national and local newspapers, television, radio and other publications.  The media are by no 
means unbiased in their reporting and much has been written on the treatment of Islam in the 
media (Said, 1997, Poole, 2002, 2006).  According to one report there has been a substantial 
increase in the coverage of Islam in Britain in the new millennium, rising from 352 stories in 2000 
to 4196 in 2006 (Moore et al., 2008).   Two-thirds of the reporting treats Islam as a threat or a 
problem and even the images portraying Muslims tend to have negative connotations.  This sort of 
critical reporting has a profound effect in shaping public attitudes and in fuelling the anxieties of 
Muslims.   
 
The media, however, are not uniformly negative about Islam.  Godazgar (2007) has studied British 
terrestrial television documentaries and found that the majority of them portray the diversity of 
Muslims fairly.  Although they frequently emphasize difference, the majority of them take a 
modernist approach which is “less general and less absolute” than is the case with some other 
forms of media (ibid 153).  This suggests that some mainstream programming is not 
unsympathetic to Muslims and that “it is wrong to think that only dreadful or racist pictures of 
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Islam can be found in the West” (ibid 163).  That does not mean, however, that the media can be 
complacent and there are many ways in which the media could improve its coverage of Islam (see 
for example Stone, 2004, 69, 71).  In short the media cannot be ignored in this study as they are a 
major factor influencing public perception, including that of Evangelical Christians. 
 
6.4.C ISLAMOPHOBIA 
The term Islamophobia first came to prominence through a report by the Runnymede Trust 
Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia entitled ‘Islamophobia a Challenge for Us All’.  
The report defined Islamophobia as “dread or hatred of Islam – and, therefore, fear or dislike of all 
or most Muslims” (Runnymede Trust, 1997, 1).  Along with a later report (Stone, 2004) the 
commission found that there was endemic and institutional religious discrimination against 
Muslims in most sectors of British society.  It was suggested that, whilst part of the population had 
“open views” on Islam, a significant proportion had “closed views”.  These opposing views were 
summarized in a table, an abbreviated form of which is given in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Closed and open views of Islam (adapted from Runnymede Trust 1997, 5) 
 
 Open view Closed view 
Islam seen as:  Diverse Monolithic 
 Interacting  Separate 
 Different  Inferior 
 Partner  Enemy 
 Sincere  Manipulative 
Criticism of West:  Considered  Rejected 
Discrimination:  Criticized  Defended 
Islamophobia seen as:  Problematic  Natural 
 
 
A report for the Home Office found that the majority of Muslims surveyed did indeed feel that 
they were sometimes unfairly treated because of their religion (Weller et al., 2001).  This is 
reflected in a Muslim concern for greater legal protection and repeated requests for, amongst 
other things, the following: religious discrimination to be given the same weight in law as racial 
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discrimination; the extension of the blasphemy law to include Islam; and a law banning incitement 
to religious hatred. 
 
Fear of Islam, however, is deeply rooted in European history and is after all “informed by an actual 
history of military conflicts” (Weller, 2006, 317).  The “gates of Vienna” are still a potent symbol of 
fear as witnessed by the content of the weblog of that name which sees the West’s current 
encounter with Islam as “a new phase of a very old war”.79   So whilst it is clear that Muslims feel 
threatened and that discrimination is a major topic of discussion in both the Muslim and wider 
public spheres, it is equally clear that at least some of the majority also feel threatened by 
Muslims or are suspicious of their presence.  Although the situation clearly calls for a broad, open 
but sensitive debate, there is a concern lest the fear of Islamophobia is itself being used as a 
device to stifle debate (see Stone, 2004, 21 for examples).  Halliday warns that universalist 
sensitivity towards all religions should “not be at the expense of a critical examination of how 
these religions treat their members” (1999, 899) – a point acknowledged in the Runnymede Trust 
report: 
 
it is not intrinsically phobic or prejudiced to disagree with or to disapprove of Muslim beliefs, laws 
or practices …. In a liberal democracy it is inevitable and healthy that people will criticize and 
oppose, sometimes robustly, opinions and practices with which they disagree (Runnymede Trust, 
1997, 4). 
 
Halliday goes on to suggest that “the alternative to the ‘clash of civilizations’ need not be the 
mutual indulgence of communities” (ibid 901).  Weller also cautions that the term Islamophobia 
should not lead to special pleading for Muslims.  The issues at stake are generic issues for all faith 
groups and he recalls that non-conformists, Catholics and most recently Jews have also been in 
similar situations in Britain (§7.1.a).  Indeed today any legal provisions should include the rights of 
“atheists, agnostics and humanists” (Weller, 2006, 316, 324). 
 
To conclude, Islamophobia is a contested term.  Muslims suffer it, liberals campaign against it and 
conservatives are sceptical of it.  At its root are questions of identity and belonging.  Are Muslims 
an isolated minority in Britain forever condemned to be aliens or can they be embraced as part of 
                                                             
79 Refers to the Ottomans’ sixteenth century siege of Vienna. See http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com/ a 
very active blog maintained by the anonymous Baron Bodissey and Dymphna (accessed 16 December 
2009).  Interestingly it is included on the Nexus academic search engine. 
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society whilst maintaining their religious distinctiveness?  This issue of identity is of critical 
importance in the British Muslim public sphere and indeed to the country as a whole. 
 
6.4.D IDENTITY 
Set in the context of both a crisis within global Islam and a crisis within Western thinking about 
Islam, the question of Muslim identity, and particularly the identity of Muslims living within the 
West, is vital to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  Discussion of this issue has become therefore 
both a touchstone for the Muslim public sphere and a “key site for understanding the intersection 
of Islam, transnationalism, and the public sphere in Europe” (Grillo and Soares, 2005). Work on 
this identity has accumulated rapidly, reflected in titles such as To Be a European Muslim 
(Ramadan, 1999), Towards a European Islam (Nielsen, 1999) and Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam? 
(Al-Sayyad and Castells, 2002), which are all concerned with the relationship between minority 
Muslim populations and the western states in which they are living. 
 
In Britain, as elsewhere, this is not a straightforward question, not least owing to the huge ethnic, 
religious and ideological diversity amongst British Muslims which has already been described.  
Such diversity has led some to talk of many different “Islams” (Al-Azmeh, 1996, Loosley, 2008, 
241).  Others, however, prefer to talk not of “many ‘Islams’, but rather (of) many expressions of 
the Muslim way of life” (Hussain, 2004a, 99).  Whatever terminology is used, it is clear that this 
diversity results in a contested discourse of identity within Muslim communities, a fact which 
essentialist western discourse often loses sight of.   
 
At a time when Muslims are especially likely to be construed in essentialist terms and as an alien 
other, it is all too easy to assume that identification with a transnational Muslim community is 
integral to Muslim identity and that as an individual’s Muslim identification increases so does their 
psychological distance from their non-Muslim neighbours. The problem is that this takes one vision 
of Muslim identity as definitive when the reality is one of contestation (Hopkins and Kahani-
Hopkins, 2004, 55). 
 
Muslims in Britain today are assuming a wide range of identities some religious, some political and 
some social.  Whilst many of these identities are compatible both with traditional Islamic and 
western societal norms, there has also been a development of negative, oppositional identities, 
particularly amongst disillusioned, disenfranchized young men in some parts of Britain.  This has 
manifested itself either in a macho "assertive Muslim identity" which tends to criminality and has 
Chapter 6 128 
 
little to do with either traditional Islam or Islamic groups of any persuasion (Lewis, 2002a, 137), or 
a radical political identity that sees isolation from western society and "shouting at rallies and 
denouncing moderates” as the “most satisfying acts of worship” (Winter, 2003, 21).  Such 
developments are not only of concern to the government and the British public at large, but also 
the Muslim communities themselves and  a “heartfelt search” over the issue of identity and its 
relation to extremism has been in evidence particularly since the events of 9/11 (Hussain, 2004b).  
There is a real desire for the Muslim identity to be defined not in negative oppositional terms, but 
in terms of its positives (Winter, 2003). 
 
The key difficulty for Muslims in the West is the very strangeness of not living in a Muslim majority 
country.  In 1981 Zaki Badawi observed that, “Sunni Muslim theology offers, up to the present, no 
systematic formulation of the status of being in a minority” (Badawi, 1981, 27, quoted in Lewis, 
2007, 6).  One particular difficulty revolves around the issue of the shari‘a.  This word is often 
translated as “Islamic law” but in fact it is much broader than that.  It is “an Arabic word meaning 
the path to be followed .... leading not only to Allah, the Most High, but the path believed by all 
Muslims to be the path shown by Allah” (Doi, 1984, 2).  Thus as Rippin explains: 
 
(shari‘a) is a far broader concept than that generally perceived in the English word (law).  Included 
in it are not only the details of conduct in the narrow legal sense, but also minute matters of 
behaviour, what might even be termed ‘manners’, as well as issues related to worship and ritual.  
Furthermore, the entire body of law is traditionally viewed as the ‘revealed will of God’, subject 
neither to history not to change (Rippin, 2000, 83). 
 
Following such a path may clearly be difficult for Muslims living in a non-Muslim country with un-
Islamic laws and customs.  Certainly it is a cause of great concern for many Muslims who would 
like to follow its precepts.  However, the shari‘a is a controversial issue in a liberal western 
democracy with many people associating it with severe criminal punishments and the repression 
of women.  Debates around its compatibility within the British legal system ignite fierce passions, 
as the Archbishop of Canterbury discovered to his cost in 2008 (§10.3.e). 
 
Despite attempts to develop a rationale for Muslims living in the West, there is still little progress 
towards a consensus amongst Muslims.  At one extreme some argue that for both religious and 
social reasons Muslims should not live in a non-Muslim country, especially if it causes Muslims or 
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their children to lose their faith.80  As Britain is traditionally seen as part of dar al-harb (the abode 
of war), does not enforce shari‘a law, is immoral and is at times involved in aggression against 
Muslim countries, it is argued that Muslims should migrate back to dar al-islam (the abode of 
Islam).  Hussain has no time for such arguments and points out that ironically many who maintain 
this stance still choose to live in the West and in any case Muslim countries are also immoral and 
condone unjust policies (2004a).  Ramadan, among others, reframes the traditional understanding 
and suggests that the West should in fact be seen not as a place of conflict (dar al-harb) but as dar 
al-da‘wa (the abode of testimony) (2004, 63).  He is concerned to identify the essential teachings 
of Islam and make them central, whilst stripping away all cultural accretions.   This he believes 
would allow the development of a truly European Islam (ibid 215).81  However, given that da‘wa 
means “invitation” involving proselytism and given the universal claims of Islam (ibid 78), this may 
not greatly reassure British citizens and politicians of either the right or the left who are wary of 
Muslim intentions in the West.   
 
Again echoing Locke (§3.1.c), their concern is over the issue of loyalty.  Are Muslims loyal to their 
religious identity or to the nation of their residence?  The suspicion is, as a BBC Panorama program 
put it, that they are Muslim first, British second,82 the implication being that they are not 
trustworthy and pose a threat to national security as some sort of “sleepers” or “fifth columnists” 
allied to an “axis of evil” (Allen, 2005, 51).  Many prominent participants in the Muslim public 
sphere, however, argue vociferously that, to the contrary, "Islam supplies arguments for loyalty" 
(Winter, 2003, 20).  To suggest otherwise is to confuse the philosophical with the political 
(Ramadan, 2001).  Recent opinion polls seem to lend support to this argument.  A poll of Asians 
found that 87% of Muslims feel either “very loyal” (42%) or “fairly loyal” (45%) to Britain even 
                                                             
80 See for instance the argument of Joshim Uddin in ‘21st Century Islamic State - A Case for Hijra’ on the 
website of the Grande Strategy, http://www.grandestrategy.com/2010/01/21st-century-islamic-state-
case-for.html, (accessed 18 January 2011).  He feels that “it was the superficial understanding of Islam 
of our parents which led them to abandon the lands where the adhan is heard without fail fives times a 
day to settle in countries bereft of spirituality and religion .... It is clear from the shari‘ah evidences that 
our presence in the West should leave us worried indeed”. 
81 It is interesting to note the parallels here with the discussion of “contextualization” within Christian 
mission literature (Parshall, 1980) and also discussions about the nature of church in the twenty-first 
century (§5.5.c). 
82 First broadcast on Monday 16th February 2009.  See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7886000/7886578.stm (accessed 6 April 
2011). 
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though 64% “opposed” British and American military strikes against Afghanistan (MORI, 2001).  A 
second survey shows that 77% of British Muslims identify “extremely” or “very strongly” with the 
UK, whilst only 50% of the general public do so (Gallup, 2009, 19). 
 
That the loyalty of other religious groups is not questioned in the same way is a source of 
resentment to Muslims.  Seddon points out that:  
 
Protestants have the privilege of being largely excluded from scrutiny when their religious 
convictions are in contention with their national identity.  When there is contention it is usually 
presented or contextualized as a matter of moral conscientious objection rather than a question of 
allegiance or loyalty (Seddon, 2004, 142).   
 
Ramadan makes the argument that Muslims too have a right to a “conscience clause”, although 
only in limited circumstances as Muslims who live in the West are obliged to obey western laws 
(2004, 96).  He sees no necessary conflict for Muslims and argues for the development of a 
“corpus of adapted law, a fiqh for the West” (ibid 99).   
 
This does not mean, however, that Muslims are not looking for recognition and inclusion.  Religion 
is a highly significant self-descriptor, especially for South Asian Muslims in Britain (Modood et al., 
1997).  This is linked to a rise in “Muslim identity politics” which “has brought new or renewed 
importance to religion in public policy” (Modood, 2002, 121).  Not only do Muslims want an end to 
religious discrimination and parity with native religions but they also want “positive inclusion of 
religious groups” (ibid).  Such an approach is reflected in the development of “hyphenated 
identities” whereby young Muslims are “blending the local identities of their environment and 
friends and the culture of their parents” to arrive at descriptions such as “British-Pakistani-
Muslim” (Hussain, 2004a, 86 see also Modood, 2007).  Identity markers of this type are not 
negative oppositions to majority identities but are rather creative attempts to be true to both 
religious and civil allegiances.   
 
Looking to the future Winter (2003), himself a Muslim, believes that extremism will eventually 
disappear and that the mainstream will prevail.  Similarly Hussain feels that Muslims need to be 
given “time to settle down” and to realize that “Britain belongs to them and they to Britain” 
(2004a, 116, 118).  Recent angst within the British political establishment over the lack of a clear 
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definition of “British-ness” has created new problems for Muslims, requiring a process of 
reflection, discussion and negotiation that it would be unwise to rush.  This is obviously still very 
much work in progress. 
 
Ironically, the debate has also created problems for the majority population who are ill equipped 
to debate the place of religion in society.  Schnapper points out that "Britain itself is facing a crisis 
of identity linked with the end of empire and entry into the European Community" and this is 
becoming more rather than less acute (1994, 158).  So not only is there a crisis of identity within 
global Islam and a crisis within the west in the understanding of Islam, there is also a crisis within 
the West as to its own identity which suggests that “the debate with Islam is in fact a European 
search for a European soul” (Roy, 2005, 7).  This search is clearly reflected in the interaction 
between the various faith groups in Britain and particularly in the relationship between Islam and 
the Evangelical community to which I now turn. 
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CHAPTER 7 THE EVANGELICAL-MUSLIM ENCOUNTER 
 
 
 
 “Consciously or unconsciously Christians and Muslims have developed in the past, and to a large 
extent continue to develop, all sorts of strategies in order to avoid recognizing the very fact of 
religious plurality.”  
(Basset, 2000, 286).   
 
+ + + + 
 
The encounter of Christians and Muslims, be they nominal adherents or religious zealots, is 
unavoidable in the pluralized society of contemporary Britain.  The outcome, however, is not 
necessarily negative: 
 
some Christians and some Muslims, perhaps even an increasing proportion of the membership of 
both communities, see the relationship as being intrinsically and essentially an adversarial one, but 
history itself points to the existence of a more positive irenical way of thinking among both Muslims 
and Christians at certain stages of their history  (Goddard, 2000, 4). 
 
That said, in what follows it will be seen that Evangelical Christians have tended to a more 
negative view of Islam than other Christian traditions.  The chapter begins by very briefly sketching 
the history of the Protestant Christian encounter with Islam and looks at the ways in which British 
churches have begun to come to terms with the presence of large numbers of Muslims.  It then 
reviews what has been written about Evangelical responses to Islam, particularly comparing the 
American and British cases.  It finishes with an account of the development of a British Evangelical 
micro-public sphere relating to Islam - the EPS - which is the focus of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
7.1 THE PROTESTANT ENCOUNTER WITH ISLAM 
 
7.1.A THE REFORMATION PERIOD 
What follows is a necessarily brief sketch of the contours of the history of the Protestant 
encounter with Islam.  As previously described (§5.3) Evangelicals trace their roots back to the 
sixteenth century Protestant Reformation, a period during which the Ottoman Empire was at its 
zenith and its armies were threatening Europe having conquered the Balkans and laid siege to 
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Vienna.  Christian-Muslim relations in the West at this time were largely characterized by an 
“ideology of isolation” (Lochhead, 1988, §4.3), ignorance and, on the part of “Christendom” at 
least, fear.83  Following medieval thinking, Islam was generally seen as being a Jewish or Christian 
heresy.84 Space does not permit an in depth examination of the corpus of Reformation writings, 
but suffice to say that the Reformers along with others of their time saw Islam as a satanic 
deception, Muhammad as a degraded moral character, often associated with the Antichrist, and 
Muslims as being sexually depraved on the grounds that they permitted polygamy.  They also 
emphasized what they saw as the theological errors of Islam in denying the Trinitarian nature of 
God and the sonship of Christ.  All of these themes are present in modern day polemic against 
Islam.85 For Calvin, an Ottoman invasion of Europe would have been “the end of Christianity as a 
power to be reckoned with” (Slomp, 1995, 129), a sentiment with continuing resonance.  For 
Luther the Turks were a judgement from God and constituted one of the three great enemies of 
God along with the Pope and the Devil (Basset, 1998, 79).  For some, however, Islam was a lesser 
threat than Catholic Rome. Zwingli even hoped that Protestants would be able “to propagate their 
teachings faster under Islam than under Catholic rule" (Vehlow, 1995, 247). 
 
In parenthesis, this strong historical reaction of Protestant Christians to the Pope and Roman 
Catholicism has many parallels with western responses to diaspora Islam today.  Casanova 
considers that, in the American context, “today's totalizing discourse on Islam as an essentially 
antimodern, fundamentalist, illiberal and undemocratic religion and culture echoes the nineteenth 
century discourse on Catholicism” (Casanova, 2009, 147).  The same could be said of Victorian 
Britain where Larsen observes that: 
 
                                                             
83 As already noted both Spain and Sicily were of course part of Muslim empires.  Christians and Jews in 
these areas of Europe as in the Eastern parts of the Muslim empires lived as ahl al-dhimma, meaning 
‘people under the convenant of protection’ (see note 26 in §3.2.a). 
84 For an example of early eighth century Christian polemic against Islam see the second part of John of 
Damascus’ Fount of Knowledge (Concerning Heresies) where he says “(Muhammad)  after having 
chanced upon the Old and New Testaments and likewise, it seems, having conversed with an Arian 
monk, devised his own heresy”, available at http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/general/stjohn_islam.aspx 
(accessed 8 January 2010). 
85 For a more detailed treatment of the reformers writings on Islam see Francisco (2007), Slomp (1995) 
and Vehlow (1995). (Francisco, 2007) (Slomp, 1995), (Vehlow, 1995) 
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 the Church of Rome was seen as a persecuting, illiberal body. There was a long tradition of viewing 
Catholicism as a threat to the established government of the nation, with the Gun Powder Plot as 
just one link in the chain (Larsen, 2007b, 239).   
 
Charles Kingsley in an exchange with the Catholic Cardinal Newman famously remarked that "truth 
for its own sake had never been a virtue with the Roman clergy” thus mirroring contemporary 
concerns over the Muslim doctrine of taqiyya (dissimulation – see §10.4.b).86  The comparison 
with Muslims today is striking: both groups are seen as having aberrant values; both have 
transnational loyalties; both are associated with the extreme violence of a minority; and both are 
at times distrusted by the rest of society.  This prompts Weller to: 
 
look at the possibility that the place of Roman Catholics and of anti-Catholicism in English social, 
political and religious history might be helpful for illuminating aspects of current debates around 
‘terror’, ‘religious radicalism’, ‘religious freedom’ and public policy’ in the UK” (2009, 185).   
 
Clearly there are examples that would provide further fruitful comparisons if studies were 
undertaken, including European Jews and possibly American communists under McCarthyism. 
 
7.1.B THE PROTESTANT MISSIONARY MOVEMENT 
Khalaf in his review of seventeenth to nineteenth century Christian literature on Islam observes 
that "once images are firmly rooted in the collective memory of a community, they die hard" 
(1997, 217).  So it was that much subsequent Protestant writing followed the polemical tradition 
of the medieval and Reformation periods.87  The development of Evangelical thought on Islam is 
particularly closely connected with the literature of the Protestant missionary movement of the 
late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which was a period dominated by an “ideology of 
competition” (Lochhead, 1988, see §4.3.c).  Islam was no longer a threat but was still to be 
engaged in spiritual battle.  The apologetics of Henry Martyn, the polemics of Karl Pfander, the 
criticism of Samuel Zwemer, and the appreciation of Temple Gairdner all represent different 
strands of the Evangelical approach during this period.  Goddard (2000, 125) suggests that 
Gairdner’s more irenical approach had the greater influence within denominational missionary 
                                                             
86 MacMillan’s Magazine, 1864, quoted on http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/kingsley/ckbio.html. 
I am indebted to Archbishop Rowan Williams for drawing my attention to this example. 
87 See chapters 1-3 in Kidd (2009) for an overview of mainly American literature in this period. 
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societies but that it was Zwemer’s confrontational approach that was dominant amongst 
Evangelicals.  In either case the common thread was the general expectation, increasing with the 
confidence engendered by colonial expansion, that Islam would decline and Muslims must be 
converted to Christianity (J. Smith, 1998).  This optimism reached its zenith with the Edinburgh 
missionary conference of 1910 with its goal of world evangelization within a generation. 
 
Smith, however, (1998, 366) notes an irony here.  The success of the resulting global missionary 
effort to plant churches led to the foundation of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1948, an 
organization which today is held in deep suspicion by many Evangelicals wary of its emphasis on 
ecumenism and dialogue.  During the same period there was also a crisis of confidence amongst 
Evangelicals engaged in mission to Muslims.  In a typical example Sharkey (2008) recounts how in 
Egypt the meagre fruit from the effort expended amongst Muslims caused a reappraisal of the 
missionary enterprise within the Protestant agencies.  The decline of colonial power and the rise 
of Arab nationalism, coupled with a growing appreciation of Islam, caused some Evangelicals to 
move away from conversionism towards helping “to make Muslims better Muslims” (Watt, 1991, 
364).  The American University of Cairo and other philanthropic efforts embraced an “ideology of 
partnership” (Lochhead, 1988, see §4.3.d) and during the post-war Arab-Israeli crisis many 
missionaries withdrew altogether.  To many Evangelicals this, along with developments at the 
WCC, smacked of accommodation and led to a “growing divide between (those) in favour of 
dialogue and those who (were) not” (Basset, 1998, 88).  Since that time a dialogical approach has 
been favoured by more liberal mainstream Protestants but has been treated with scepticism by 
conservative Evangelicals. 
 
7.1.C THE CONTEMPORARY ENCOUNTER 
During the latter part of the twentieth century the development of a Christian public sphere 
concerning Islam can be observed.  According to Nielsen it was only in the early 1970s that the 
churches in Britain began to respond to the interreligious encounter (1999, 119).  Given the lack of 
expertise in interfaith issues amongst clergy, the church often turned for advice to missionaries 
returning from Muslim countries, some of whom would have had Evangelical connections.  
“Personal networks and resources crossing over all the sectors, public and private, home and 
abroad, came together to establish both formal and informal responses to the Muslim presence" 
(Nielsen, 1999, 121).  In other words a micro-public sphere was beginning to emerge. 
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A full account of the history and complex nature of contemporary dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims is outside the remit of this thesis.88  Lewis (2008) notes some of the challenges.  Firstly, 
the participants in dialogue have often been unequally matched as the first generation of Muslim 
leaders were ill-equipped linguistically, culturally and intellectually to engage with specialist 
Christian Islamicists.  Secondly, it has been difficult to move on from polite conversation to 
address “contentious societal problems” (ibid 96).  A particular challenge in this regard has been 
the tension between mission (evangelism and da‘wa respectively) on the one hand and dialogue 
on the other.  Mitchell especially mentions the distrust engendered by the “decade of Evangelism” 
promoted by former Archbishop George Carey.  She sees it as particularly problematic that 
“overtures to dialogue tend to be instigated by Christians rather than Muslims” thus fuelling 
suspicion of evangelistic motives (Mitchell, 2008, 27).   Thirdly, partly because of this, it has taken 
time to build long term trust, although Nielsen is optimistic that a good foundation has been laid 
for the future (1999, 128).  Finally, there has been a need to establish institutions and initiatives to 
facilitate the dialogue. 
 
In 1977, the British Council of Churches (BCC) formed the Committee for Relations with People of 
Other Faiths (CRPOF) which in 1993 spawned the Churches’ Commission for Inter Faith Relations 
(E. Harris, 2007).  The Church of England has also been active in putting such structures in place 
and Sudworth (2009b) highlights key reports including Towards a Theology for Interfaith Dialogue 
(Board of Mission and Unity, 1984) and Jews, Christians and Muslims: the way of dialogue (Nazir-
Ali and Pattinson, 1994).  He points out, however, that these reports raised concerns, “especially 
amongst Evangelicals, that too much was being given away and presumed positively of Islam”.  He 
especially notes Bishop Nazir-Ali’s objections to some of the language used (Sudworth, 2009b).  
Two more recent reports of note are Presence and Engagement (Mission and Public Affairs 
Council, 2005) and Generous Love (Network For Inter Faith Concerns, 2008) which specifically 
respond to the fact that today 900 parishes out of a total of 13,000 in England have a more than 
10% presence of minority faiths (Presence and Engagement, 27) .  Alongside the various reports, 
the Inter-Faith Consultative Group was set up in 1980 and the Network for Inter-Faith Concern in 
                                                             
88 For more detail see Bennett (2008), Goddard (2000), Siddiqui (2000), Haddad and Haddad (1995) 
and Barnes (2002). (Bennett, 2008); (Goddard, 2000); (Siddiqui, 2000); (Haddad and Haddad, 1995); 
(Barnes, 2002) 
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1993 in order to advise the Church of England on its relationship to other faiths.  However, it was 
not until the creation of the CMF in 2006 that a formal national body was established to bring 
Christians and Muslims together. 89   Of course there have been other initiatives in this time 
including Carey’s engagement with al-Azhar University in Cairo and his launch of the Building 
Bridges seminars in 2002.90  There have also been regional initiatives such as the St Philip’s Centre, 
Leicester, and Bradford Churches for Diversity and Dialogue.  Interestingly Evangelicals have been 
involved in some of these later initiatives and it is important to note that - despite its problematic 
nature - there are an increasing number of Evangelicals who are engaging in dialogue.  The 
evolution of this Evangelical engagement and the development of an EPS concerned with Islam is 
explored further below (§7.3).  Before turning to this, however, I review the recent literature on 
the Evangelical encounter with Islam in both the American and British contexts. 
 
7.2 THE MODERN EVANGELICAL-MUSLIM ENCOUNTER 
 
7.2.A THE AMERICAN CONTEXT 
The literature reviewing the Evangelical contribution to writing on Islam is rather sparse.  In 
particular little research has been done on British Evangelical responses to Islam – a lacuna that 
this thesis aims to fill.  Kidd’s recent book (2009) American Christians and Islam provides an 
excellent overview of work in the American context and as the subtitle suggests deals with 
Evangelical culture and Muslims from the colonial period to the age of terrorism .  He finds that for 
American Evangelicals “discussions of Islam have historically revolved around several key themes: 
the desire to see Muslims convert to Christianity, the fascination with missionary work among 
Muslims, the mixing of political policy and theology as it relates to the Muslim world (and Israel), 
and the insertion of Islam into eschatological schemes” (ibid 165).  This latter category has 
particularly been associated with the premillennial dispensationalism of authors like Hal Lindsey91 
who, in his provocatively entitled The Everlasting Hatred, states that “Islam represents the single 
greatest threat to the continued survival of the planet the world has ever seen” (Lindsey, 2002, 11 
                                                             
89 See Goddard (2009, 108) for a description of the structure and work of the CMF. Also see 
http://www.christianmuslimforum.org/ (accessed 6 January 2010). (Goddard, 2009, 108)  
90 The first of the annual seminars was held in 2002 (see Ipgrave (2002)). (Ipgrave, 2002) 
91 Lindsey is best known for his The Late Great Planet Earth (1970) which has sold millions of copies.  
More recently pre-millennial eschatology has been made popular by LaHaye & Jenkins’ Left Behind 
series published by Tyndale. (Lindsey, 1970) 
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quoted in Kidd, 2009).   The prevalence and influence of such theological views amongst politicians 
in the United States has been dubbed “theopolitics” and has not gone unnoticed by Muslims, 
particularly in the Middle East (Murad, 2009). 
 
Casanova corroborates Kidd’s findings.  He believes that a pre-existing “mainly Protestant native 
backlash against Islam” was exacerbated by 9/11 (Casanova, 2009, 161).  He identifies three main 
sources of the “new anti-Muslim evangelical discourse”: “militant pre-millennial Zionism” which 
sees all Muslim countries as enemies of Israel; the “missionary competition between Muslims and 
Christians” which leads to the "evangelical frustration of being unable to preach openly the gospel 
of Jesus Christ in Muslim countries”; and finally support for the global “war on terror” which some 
Evangelical leaders have characterized as a crusade against "an essentially violent Islam". 
 
Kidd also notes a great increase in Christian publishing on Islam and terrorism since 9/11 which 
has generally “essentialized and stereotyped Muslims out of pain, anger and fear” (2009, 144).  
Ironically he points out that when Evangelicals paint the current military conflicts as the harbinger 
of “an inevitable spiritual clash hurtling toward Judgment Day” they “unwittingly ape the rhetoric 
of the Muslim jihadists they demonize” (ibid 163).   He also finds that in many cases it is converts 
to Christianity from a Muslim background who have “supplied the conservative American 
Protestant with inflammatory characterizations of Islam” (ibid 147).92  This suggests that the 
influence of ex-Muslims will certainly be a factor to consider in the UK context. 
 
The rush to reveal the “true nature” of Islam is not entirely new and neither is it uncontested.  
Despite the litany of invective against Islam from such high profile Evangelical leaders as Pat 
Robertson, Jerry Falwell and Franklin Graham there are still some who “call for charity and 
understanding amidst the din of apocalyptic warnings and denunciation of Islam” (Kidd, 2009, 
145)93.  For instance Tony Campolo, who describes himself as a “radical Evangelical prophet”, 
clearly does not believe that Islam is essentially violent and says that it upsets him that “some of 
                                                             
92 Examples include Caner and Caner (2003) and Gabriel (2002). (Caner and Caner, 2003) (Gabriel, 
2002) 
93 In a 2003 CBS interview Falwell said “I think Mohammed was a terrorist. I read enough of the history 
of his life, written by both Muslims and non-Muslims, to know that he was a violent man, a man of war.” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/03/60minutes/main524268.shtml (accessed 6 January 
2010).  In a 2009 interview with CNN Graham repeated his contention that Islam is essentially a violent 
religion http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByovBdIRV2o (accessed 6 January 2010). 
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America’s most prominent Evangelical leaders contend that God is on our side in the war” (2004, 
144).  He cites St Francis of Assisi and Louis Massignon as models of peaceful reconciliation 
towards Muslims.  The lasting impression from Kidd’s book, however, is that the majority of 
American Evangelical writing on Islam is negative and this seems to be reflected in the poll data.  
Kidd draws attention to a 2004 Pew Forum poll which showed that, compared to a national 
average of 37%, 46% of white Evangelicals viewed Islam unfavourably and this rose to 54% 
amongst those who attended church more than once a week.94  
 
Cimino quotes similar polls in an article which includes a content analysis of five books written by 
American Evangelicals before and 13 books written since 9/11 (Cimino, 2005).  He identifies four 
broad types of Evangelical writing on Islam.  Firstly, apologetic writing displays a “distinctively anti-
Islamic thrust” (165).  Since 9/11 there has been “a noticeable change of emphasis” and writing 
now tends to draw “sharper boundaries” with Islam being painted as “an essentially violent 
religion” which worships a “false god distinctly different than the God of Christianity and Judaism” 
(ibid 162, 166).  The second type of writing involves the prophetic interpretation of the place of 
Islam in the end times, often as the enemy of Israel.  For instance George Otis sees Islam as the 
Last of the Giants (1991) and identifies the mahdi , or messiah, of Shi‘ite Islam with the anti-Christ.  
Cimino also finds Otis’ book to be influential in the third category of writing which is the 
charismatic spiritual warfare literature which pictures Christianity as locked in a spiritual battle 
with the demonic powers which are supposed to be behind Islam.  Finally, Cimino does find that a 
minority of Evangelicals, motivated by a desire to evangelize Muslims, take a softer more 
contextual approach which is more affirming of Muslim culture.  In his concluding discussion 
Cimino points out that, although a majority of Evangelicals in America view Islam as an enemy of 
their faith, a fact which helps to maintain their own religious identity, Christians and Muslims 
actually “share a consensus on several moral/social issues” and should see the real struggle as 
being against “secularists and religious liberals” (ibid 172).  
 
It is important to recognize that American Evangelicalism is not a monolith and embraces a variety 
of responses.  This was made clear by Hoover through a quantitative analysis of articles appearing 
in Christianity Today and World, two right wing American Christian magazines, which “did not 
suggest a gathering storm across all of evangelicalism” (Hoover, 2004, 14 emphasis in original).  He 
                                                             
94 http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=54 (accessed 16 December 2009). 
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cited inflammatory comments by high profile Evangelicals such as the Southern Baptist Jerry 
Vines95 but also pointed out that there were more irenic responses which were given very little 
media coverage.  One example was an open letter published in the Washington Post urging 
President Bush to adopt a more balanced Middle East policy which was signed by 59 leading 
Evangelicals, including Campolo, Phillip Yancey and Gordon MacDonald (Murphy, 2002).  Hoover 
concluded that "we must beware of simplistic assumptions about a homogenous Evangelical 
population girding for battle with Islam, for they do not bear up under empirical scrutiny" and sees 
"strong indications of a divide between the centre right and the hard right" in America (2004, 15, 
16).  Whether this divide exists in the British context will be a major question for later analysis. 
 
It must again be emphasized that, although it is helpful to consider attitudes amongst American 
Evangelicals, the context is very different in Britain and, as with the empirical and theoretical work 
of Smith and Hunter (§4.4), comparisons can only be drawn with extreme caution.  Moreover, 
Evangelicals in the United States are a much larger group than Muslims, a crucial distinction from 
the context in Britain, where their numbers are more commensurate and both groups tend to view 
themselves as minorities. 
 
7.2.B THE BRITISH CONTEXT 
As mentioned, little has been written specifically about British Evangelical reactions to Islam.  
Ipgrave gives three examples of Evangelicals who typify Lochhead’s “ideology of hostility” (2008, 
see Lochhead, 1988, §4.3).  He refers to David Pawson as a conservative Evangelical expecting 
“Islam to supplant Christianity as the dominant religion in Britain” due to the “laxity and error” of 
the church (Ipgrave, 2008, 7). Ipgrave describes Patrick Sookhdeo of Barnabas Fund as taking a 
“more nuanced approach” in distinguishing between the religion and the people but who 
nonetheless represents Islam as “a unified and monolithic system” (ibid 8).  Along with other 
Evangelicals Sookhdeo is “fed by the concern which many Christians feel over the situation of their 
co-religionists who are members of minority communities in Muslim-majority states” (ibid).  
Ipgrave sees him as being “widely influential in the historic churches” and suggests that his views 
                                                             
95 In 2002 Vines told a Baptist conference that “Islam was founded by Muhammad, a demon-possessed 
paedophile who had 12 wives, the last one of which was a 9-year-old girl", 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A14499-2002Jun19?language=printer, (accessed 6 
January 2010). 
Chapter 7 142 
 
converge with “secular views in the effort to exclude Islam from public recognition”.  Ipgrave’s 
third example of Evangelical hostility is the website Answering Islam which in its apologetic 
approach he believes to be close to Lochhead’s “ideology of competition” (ibid 9).96 
 
In her discussion of the response of the Church of England to Islam, Mitchell makes reference to 
three Evangelical “practitioners” of Christian-Muslim relations (2008).  Bishop Kenneth Cragg is a 
pioneer in the field who has written over 30 books.  Mitchell rather snidely describes him as 
someone who “despite his Evangelical upbringing always asked deep theological questions and 
was not satisfied with simplistic answers” (2008, 30).  For Cragg, God is at the centre of both faiths 
and “communication and relationship” are consistent themes (ibid 31).  Mitchell does not 
specifically describe Philip Lewis as an Evangelical but sees him as an educator who takes a rather 
more sociological approach: “Lewis argues that the Christian vocation is to go forward in 
confidence rather than certainty; in faith and hope, rather than knowledge” (ibid 34).  Finally, 
Mitchell portrays Michael Nazir-Ali, the first Asian bishop in Britain, as an influential Evangelical 
Anglican who draws on Cragg for his ideas of hospitality. 
 
Cragg’s significance is widely recognized and Siddiqui describes him as being “very influential 
among a generation of Christians across all denominations” (Siddiqui, 2005, 673).  Wood has 
recently written a monograph comparing the oeuvre of Cragg with that of Newbigin, another very 
influential Evangelical bishop writing on the theology of religions (Wood, 2009).  As Wood, a 
Baptist, is a participant in the EPS no further comment is made on his work here.  It will, however, 
re-emerge in later chapters. 
 
The most comprehensive review of Christian writing on Islam which includes some British 
Evangelicals is Zebiri’s Christians and Muslims Face to Face (1997).  Her “analytical survey” of both 
popular and scholarly, post-war Christian and Muslim literature again mentions Cragg as “the most 
influential figure in contemporary Protestantism” with regard to Islam (ibid 186).    She rehearses 
the historical legacy of Christian views on Islam as either a man-made heresy or satanic deception 
portending the apocalypse and judgement of God; she then reviews both the popular and 
academic contemporary responses of Christians and Muslims to one another.  Whilst apart from 
Cragg none of the specialist Christian Islamicists or theologians she mentions could be described as 
                                                             
96 See www.answering-islam.org (accessed 6 April 2011). 
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Evangelical, she does mention several British-based Evangelical writers as having contributed to 
the “Protestant missionary literature” on Islam, namely Colin Chapman, Ida Glaser, Martin 
Goldsmith, Chawkat Moucarry and Michael Nazir-Ali, all of whom I consider to be part of the 
national elite of the EPS.  Although the works analysed by Zebiri predate the period under 
consideration in this thesis, her comments are of interest.  In particular the themes she draws out 
provided a useful pointer for the data collection.  She categorizes the attitudes in this mainly 
derivative material under three headings: Islam and Qur’an; Muhammad; and the relationship 
between God and humankind.  There is considerable disagreement over many issues including: 
whether Allah is the God of the Bible; whether the origins of Islam are human, demonic or neither; 
whether the rise of Islam is an indictment against the church and its failure to preach the Gospel 
to the Arabs; and whether there is any common ground between Islam and Christianity.  Contrasts 
are often made between the relative emphases on themes such as love and sin in Christianity and 
power and law in Islam.  Attitudes towards Muhammad also vary from a guarded admiration 
which compares him to the Old Testament prophets with all their failings, to outright rejection and 
severe criticism of his moral failings and use of violence.  In contrast to some of the American 
literature, however, Zebiri found that there was “no suggestion of an apocalyptic role for Islam” in 
the end times amongst British writers (ibid 101).  These are all themes which reemerge in Chapter 
9.   
 
Interestingly Zebiri notes that “most of the works cited quote extensively from books on Islam 
written by Muslims, and many refer to the diversity of interpretation among Muslims.  At the very 
least the authors could be said to have made a serious attempt to engage with Islam as professed 
by Muslims.”  She also notes that the “poor quality evangelistic literature” is mainly written by 
people that “have not lived in Muslim countries” (1997, 125).  This leads her to remark that "one 
should not overlook the possibility that friendships with Muslims might have not just an emotional 
but also a philosophical and epistemological impact" (ibid 224).  This idea is explored further with 
reference to my own material (§11.1.b). 
 
Zebiri also recognizes the difficulty that Christians face in writing about Islam whilst trying to: 
 
maintain a delicate balance between acknowledging Muslims as fellow believers and recognizing 
and respecting their ‘otherness’.  To go too far in either direction is to entail opposing risks: the 
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temptation to harmonize Muslim and Christian beliefs may lead to an undue Christianizing of the 
Islamic, while laying emphasis on the otherness of Islam may lead to alienation (Zebiri, 1997, 220).   
 
This balance is particularly acute as it is no longer possible to write for a solely Christian 
readership; it must be assumed that the work will be read by Muslims.  Indeed it will be read not 
only by Muslims but also by those of other faiths and none.  
 
Goddard (2000), in his exploration of the history of Christian-Muslim relations, also reflects on why 
Evangelical Christians find the relationship with Islam particularly difficult.  He recounts the 
anecdote of a Muslim who, observing the presence of missionaries in Pakistan, said, “the 
Protestants seem to come here because they hate Islam and the Catholics because they love God” 
(ibid 189).  Reflecting on this revealing story Goddard suggests four reasons why some Evangelicals 
might struggle with Islam more than other Christians.  Firstly, conservative Evangelicals have a 
high view of the infallibility of the Bible which is challenged by the Qur’an.  Likewise their high 
view of Christ is also challenged.  Thirdly, he believes they tend to identify Islam as a threat to 
western culture which they regard as being Christian.  Lastly, he again identifies the Christian 
Zionism prevalent in North America as leading to the demonization of Islam.  These themes will 
reoccur throughout Part III. 
 
One further piece of British research that should be mentioned at this stage is Herbert’s (1996) 
PhD thesis The Common Good in a Plural Society, not least because the subtitle, Christians, 
Muslims and the public arena, is very similar to the title of this thesis.97  Herbert’s work, however, 
has a very different focus.  His concern is with philosophy, law and public policy.  He does not seek 
to understand Christianity – Evangelical or otherwise – on its own terms but rather sees it as a 
community identity label juxtaposed rather perfunctorily with “Muslim” on the one hand and 
“liberal” on the other.  Neither is he interested in Evangelical Christian discourse.  None of the 
subjects of my research appear in his work apart from Nazir-Ali, whose early work Herbert lists in 
his bibliography but does not discuss.   He does critique the work of Newbigin but mainly engages 
those writing from within a philosophical framework, particularly MacIntyre and Millbank.  Whilst 
in earlier chapters I have drawn on Herbert’s publications with respect to civil society, his doctoral 
research is not of direct relevance to the Evangelical-Muslim encounter. 
                                                             
97 Herbert later wrote a book based on his thesis entitled Religion and Civil Society: Rethinking Public 
Religion in the Contemporary World (2003).  
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Finally, it should be noted that on occasion the various participants in the EPS themselves refer to 
types of Evangelical responses to Islam in their writing.  For instance, Chapman identifies five 
emphases and their proponents although he notes that they are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
positions (Chapman, 1989, 8): 
 
 “A traditional response: no compromise with Islam” - conservative exclusivists 
who see no good in Islam. 
 “A new threshold: we need a new theology of religions” –an inclusivist if not 
pluralist approach.98   
 “The call of the minaret:  let's approach Islam at its best” – Cragg (2000).99 
 “Folk Islam and power encounter: let's recognize Islam as it is” –Zwemer and 
more recently Musk (1989). 
 “Gospel and culture:  let's reduce every unnecessary hindrance” –Parshall 
(1980) and the contextualization movement. 
 
Sookhdeo (2006, 103-7) also identifies different Evangelical approaches to Islam: 
 
 Evangelistic – looking for common ground and similarities between the two faiths as a 
basis for sharing the Gospel. 
 Caring and sharing –seeking to love, show concern and offer practical help to Muslims. 
 Apologetic –defending the Gospel against Muslim polemical attack. 
 Didactic - teaching and equipping Christians to understand the differences and avoid 
confusion. 
 Eschatological –focusing on the role of Islam in the End Times possibly as an antichrist 
agent.  
 Motivated by justice – expressing concern for the rights of minority communities in Muslim 
lands. 
 Reconciliatory -  Christians and Muslims co-operating together on social issues (although 
he feels the use of the word “reconciliation” is unbiblical in this context). 
                                                             
98 Taken from Brown (1976). (Brown, 1976) 
99 Call of the Minaret was originally published in 1956. (Cragg, 2000) 
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 Societal –Christians taking social and political action to warn the authorities and policy 
makers about the dangers of Islam. 
 Dialogical –highlighting the positives but ignoring the negatives.  
 Pluralistic –seeing Islam as theologically compatible with Christianity. 
 
These various responses illustrate the breadth and diversity that exist within the EPS.  The later 
analysis (§12) draws these together with the typologies explored in Part I (§4.3) and suggests that 
the discourse of Chapman, Sookhdeo and other British Evangelicals like them forms a religious 
micro-public sphere (§2.5) around the topic of Islam in Britain. 
 
7.3 THE FORMATION OF AN EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE CONCERNED WITH ISLAM 
 
In the last twenty years there has been a surge of interest in mission to Muslim majority countries 
amongst Evangelicals, especially through the focus of the AD2000 Movement on the so-called 
“10/40 window” (see Kidd, 2009, 129).100  However, during the post-war years the locus of the 
Evangelical-Muslim encounter moved towards Western Europe and North America, and it is the 
presence of an increasing number of Muslim communities in previously Christian majority 
countries which is of immediate interest in this thesis.  The perception of this presence as a threat 
has meant a rise in an “ideology of hostility” (Lochhead, 1988, §4.3) towards Muslims in society as 
a whole and amongst some Evangelicals in particular. 
 
Many Evangelical books on Islam were written prior to 2001 including the prodigious output of 
Cragg and the no less influential work of Sir Norman Anderson, the Arabist and legal specialist who 
led Evangelicals into “re-engagement with culture, society, politics, and ecumenism .... and spoke 
frequently on .... the relationship of Christianity to Islam (arguing) for the compatibility of 
proclamation and dialogue” (Thompson, 2008).  There was also the work of former missionaries 
like Charles Marsh (1975, 1980) and stories of Muslim conversions to Christianity such as that told 
by Bilquis Sheikh (1978).  To these can be added books on how to evangelize Muslims such as 
Reaching Muslims Today (North Africa Mission, 1976) and many on the issues facing Christian 
                                                             
100 The ‘10/40 Window’ refers to the region between latitudes 10:N and 40:S between which, 
Evangelicals, lie the greatest number of non-Christians or ‘unreached peoples’ - mainly Muslims, Hindus 
and Buddhists. 
  147 Chapter 7 
 
mission to Muslims.101  Moreover several of the current participants in the EPS started their 
writing careers from the 1970s onwards including Sookhdeo (1977, 1990),102 Goldsmith (1982), 
Nazir-Ali (1983, 1987, 1998), Musk (1989, 1992, 1995) and Chapman (1995, 1998).   
 
There was also significant Evangelical involvement in the Anglican engagement with Muslims 
despite the objections already noted (§7.1.c).  Reports from Evangelical theologians Newbigin and 
Sanneh led to the founding of the BCC’s CRPOF (§7.1.c) and the EA sent Sookhdeo as an observer 
to the committee (E. Harris, 2007, see 7.1.c).  Chapman also wrote a couple of influential articles 
(1978, 1989) that are cited in later works. 
 
In 1997 a conference entitled Faith and Power was held in London which Lewis observes was: 
 
organized by Evangelical Christians who realized that Muslims were understandably concerned with 
such issues.  This (was) a new and welcome departure for many Evangelical churches which, 
historically, if they thought of Muslims at all, did so in terms of debate and evangelism (Lewis, 
2001b, 194). 
 
Out of this conference grew the Faith and Society dialogue group which held three further 
conferences from 1998 to 2000 as well as forming focus groups to look at various social issues.  
Chapman, Glaser, Riddell and Christopher Lamb were all involved in the organization (Glaser, 
2000a, 29).  Although these events were attended by more Christians than Muslims, they are an 
example of how “Evangelical Christian approaches to other faiths have diversified beyond 
traditional mission activities” (Riddell, 2004b, 147 see Glaser, 2000a, for a more detailed history). 
 
This all sets the scene for the dramatic increase of interest in Islam in the new millennium.  In 
particular all of the big annual Evangelical conferences including Spring Harvest, New Wine and 
Keswick now routinely feature seminars on Islam attracting anything from 50 to 1000 people.  
Articles appear in Evangelical magazines such as Christianity, Evangelicals Now, Evangelical Times 
                                                             
101 For example a collection of the work of the missionary Vivienne Stacey can be found at 
http://www.stfrancismagazine.info/ja/content/blogcategory/35/49 (accessed 11 November 2010). 
102 Sookhdeo wrote six books prior to 2000 but interestingly none of them mention Islam in the title 
although the two cited dealt with Asians in Britain.  It is also interesting to note that he placed a lot 
more emphasis on the need to welcome Asian migrants in his earlier writing.  He said, “Asians in Britain 
need love and compassion …. Christian love will speak to the heart of the Asian in sharp contrast to the 
rejection which he so often experiences” (1977, 13). (Sookhdeo, 1977) 
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and Inspire.  It is the Evangelical authors and speakers – some of whom have already been 
mentioned – who take part in these initiatives that I have identified as the elite participants in the 
emerging EPS.  In the next chapter I go on to describe how I went about identifying this group and 
the methods I used to conduct my research. 
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CHAPTER 8 THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
 
"I know that I am caught up and comprehended in the world that I take as my object." 
(Bourdieu, 2004, 114) 
 
+ + + + 
 
This chapter sets out the methodology I adopted to investigate the EPS and its interaction with 
other public spheres.  It provides an overview of and rationale for the strategy employed and 
explains how the research informants were chosen.  It then describes the empirical phase of my 
research paying particular attention to the difficulties I experienced and the changes that I had to 
make to the original plan.  An account of the analysis follows and the chapter closes with a 
consideration of my own position with respect to those I interviewed. 
 
8.1 THE BEST LAID PLANS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
The initial challenge was to design a project collecting data that would elicit answers to my first 
two research questions: 
 
1. What is the nature of the Evangelical public sphere which has formed around the 
subject of Islam and Muslims in Britain and how is it mediated within British churches? 
2. What are the patterns of responses to Islam and Muslims exhibited within this public 
sphere? 
 
The discussion of this data would then suggest possible answers to the remaining two questions: 
 
3. How will these responses affect community relationships amongst Evangelicals, 
Muslims and government? 
4. What are the likely trajectories of British Evangelicalism in the light of the Muslim 
presence? 
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Although I had an initial plan, this changed and evolved as I “determin(ed) the most practical, 
efficient, feasible and ethical methods for collecting data as the research progress(ed)” (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999, 138 emphasis added).  I originally intended to trace the flow of activity in the 
EPS from the national elite through local church leadership to congregational membership in the 
hope of identifying, not just attitudes, but also the influences fuelling those attitudes.  Due to time 
constraints it proved impractical to collect data at the congregational level.  Consequently this 
thesis addresses primarily the attitudes of the Evangelical national elite and church leaders. 
 
I chose to adopt a qualitative approach using purposive sampling (Bryman, 2004, 333) which I 
believed would yield the most nuanced data reflecting the thoughts and feelings of these leaders 
with respect to Islam.  I gathered and reviewed all the naturally occurring material in the public 
domain (§8.3.a) and supplemented this with interviews (§8.3.b) which I felt would provide rich 
insights and help me to explore the attitudes and motivations of the participants.  They also gave 
me an opportunity to build a network of relationships. 
 
A quantitative survey was a more attractive option at the local church leadership level.  A 
nationally circulated questionnaire, for instance, would gather data from as many church leaders 
from as wide a range of backgrounds as possible.  This, however, was clearly beyond both my time 
and resource constraints.  I decided therefore to conduct a limited geographical study with a 
sample of church leaders and London seemed the obvious location.   
 
London is the heart of influence within the nation, not just politically and economically, but also 
within the churches.  The Greater London area encompasses 11% of England’s church 
congregations, 20% of all churchgoers and 23% of all Evangelicals, not least because of the 
presence of the African and Caribbean diasporas (§5.4).  According to the 2005 English Church 
Census it is the one area in the country where attendance is increasing and it is home to several 
“mega-churches” which have congregations in their thousands made up particularly of young 
people.  Indeed, countrywide 57% of all churchgoers in their 20s attend church in London 
(Brierley, 2006, 44, 249).    
 
Secondly, London was likely to offer a full range of the different types of Evangelical churches that 
I needed to include in the study.  Every denomination and stream is represented there.  Finally, 
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London is also home to 38% of Britain’s Muslims (UK Census 2001).  So although the churches in 
the survey are not necessarily geographically adjacent to Muslim communities, the cosmopolitan 
nature of London means that the church members and their leaders cannot fail to be aware of the 
presence of Muslims.  I felt that this should ensure that the presence of Muslims and Islam was a 
live issue for these churches without it necessarily being a special concern.  This would have been 
the case had I chosen an area with a very large Muslim population.  I was frequently asked why I 
did not interview churches in Bradford, for instance.  However, I was trying to gauge the reactions 
to Islam of typical British Evangelicals rather than of those who have been forced by their 
circumstances to give Islam special consideration.  
 
My original plan was to interview the church leaders and then trace the influence of the EPS into 
the congregation itself by conducting either focus groups or questionnaires with members in each 
of the churches.  In the event both proved difficult to operationalize.  Contacts were difficult to 
make and some church leaders were either too busy or felt it was too sensitive to permit.  I did 
pilot a questionnaire in my home church and distributed it to three of the London churches where 
I had contacts and could get permission.  After a long period of effort, however, I received but a 
dozen replies from one church only.  With time and resources running out I took the decision to 
limit myself to the survey of local church leaders supplemented by observations at their churches. 
 
8.2 WHO’S WHO?  ESTABLISHING THE SAMPLES 
 
8.2.A THE NATIONAL ELITE 
From the outset it was clear that there were certain key participants in the post 9/11 British EPS 
who were regularly writing and speaking about the issues surrounding the presence of Islam and 
Muslims in Britain.  In order to identify them I examined different Evangelical media including 
books, pamphlets, magazines, conference audio and internet material.  I collected 46 books 
written specifically about Islam by 29 British-based Evangelicals writing as Evangelicals.  In 
addition to this I found 6 chapters in edited volumes and 11 widely circulated booklets.  I did not 
include books written for an academic audience (e.g. Riddell, 2001) or those books that deal more 
generally with all faiths, the uniqueness of Christ or missionary biographies (although I have drawn 
from these books once an author was included as a key participant e.g. Cotterell, 2006).  Neither 
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did I include older books that have been reprinted since 2001 (e.g. Miller, 2008) unless it was a 
new edition (e.g. Musk, 2003).  As I was focusing on the British context I included books written by 
non-British nationals resident in Britain but did not include books either published overseas or by 
authors not actively participating in the British EPS.  The resulting list of authors was: 
 
Azumah, John 
Bell, Steve 
Brother Andrew 
Challen, Ed 
Chapman, Colin 
Cotterell, Peter 
Cox, Caroline 
Dye, Colin 
Glaser, Ida 
Goldsmith, Martin 
Green, Stephen 
Hicham, E. 
McRoy, Anthony 
Moucarry, Chawkat 
Musk, Bill 
Nazir-Ali, Michael 
Orr-Ewing, Frog & Amy 
Pawson, David 
Riddell, Peter 
Smith, Andrew  
Smith, Jay 
Solomon, Sam 
Sookhdeo, Patrick 
Sookhdeo, Rosemary 
Steer, Malcolm 
Sudworth, Richard 
Taylor, Jenny 
Wood, Nicholas 
Zeidan, David 
 
 
In order to identify which of these authors are key participants I considered who of them had been 
invited to speak at the major Evangelical conferences by looking at the listing of audio recordings 
available for purchase from all conferences held since 2001.  I also took into consideration other 
texts from magazines and the internet.  I discounted those authors who had written a book but did 
not appear to be active in other media.  This eliminated Challen, Hicham, Steer and Zeidan.103  It 
should also be noted that the Dutch “Brother” Andrew is not resident in the UK but I included him 
as an occasional participant due to his influence through Open Doors, his occasional appearances 
at British conferences and because his books are very popular with British Evangelicals. 
 
At the same time it became clear that there were others who had not written books or chapters 
and hence were not on this list but who were influential in other ways. These people became 
apparent to me through the quantity of informal texts they produced, through the references 
made to them by other key participants and through the organizations they led.  Alan Craig for 
example was a local councillor in Newham, was leader of the Christian People’s Alliance (CPA) and 
was actively engaged in opposition to the East London “mega-mosque” (§6.2.b).  Andrea Williams 
leads CCFON and is frequently involved in issues involving Islam.  Bryan Knell speaks at 
conferences and is also a key player in Global Connections (an affiliate of the EA).  Finally, former 
                                                             
103 Although I do refer to one text by Zeidan in §11.4.c. 
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Archbishop George Carey, whilst he is not a specialist on Islam, is well-known as an Evangelical and 
has made several widely reported speeches commenting on Islam.  I included him as an occasional 
participant along with Joel Edwards the former general secretary of the EA.  Both were kind 
enough to grant me interviews. 
 
There were also others I considered but discounted.  These included Hugh Goddard, Toby 
Howarth, Christopher Lamb, Philip Lewis, David Marshall and Guy Wilkinson, who have all been 
affiliated to Evangelicalism in the past but on further enquiry either do not currently self-identify 
as Evangelicals or are not actively addressing Evangelicals.  Rather they are involved in academia 
or in the organizational structure of the Church of England.  As their writing is not published for an 
Evangelical audience and they do not speak at Evangelical conferences or churches I decided not 
to consider them as active participants in the EPS.104   
 
The process of refining this list of participants continued over the first 20 months of the project as 
I collected the data.  Indeed the identification of the participants in the EPS is in a sense one of the 
findings of this research.  Further biographical details for each of the key informants are provided 
for reference in Appendix A.105  The final list I adopted to represent the national elite of the EPS is 
given in Figure 8.1.  Added to these are four occasional participants: Brother Andrew, Carey, 
Edwards and Marshall. 
 
I do not claim that these individuals are the sole participants in the elite EPS or that there are not 
important contributions from other actors.  Rather I have identified these people as the key 
participants who are actively and regularly seeking to influence British Evangelical opinion with 
respect to Islam and so represent the major strands within the EPS.  It is these 28 participants that 
I chose to be the particular focus of my study. 
 
  
                                                             
104 It should be noted that Marshall has taught Islam at a theological training course organized by Holy 
Trinity Brompton and I did in fact interview him before deciding that he should not be included as an 
elite participant in the EPS.  I include him here as an occasional participant. 
105 A fold-out copy of Appendix A is provided on the back cover of the thesis for ease of reference. 
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Figure 8.1 – The national elite of the EPS 
Azumah, John 
Bell, Steve 
Chapman, Colin 
Cotterell, Peter 
Cox, Caroline 
Craig, Alan 
Dye, Colin 
Glaser, Ida  
Goldsmith, Martin 
Green, Stephen 
Knell, Bryan 
McRoy, Anthony 
Moucarry, Chawkat 
Musk, Bill 
Nazir-Ali, Michael 
Orr-Ewing, Amy & Frog 
Pawson, David 
Riddell, Peter 
Smith, Andrew 
Smith, Jay 
Solomon, Sam 
Sookhdeo, Patrick 
Sookhdeo, Rosemary 
Sudworth, Richard 
Taylor, Jenny 
Williams, Andrea 
Wood, Nicholas 
 
 
8.2.B THE CHURCHES 
In selecting the London churches to survey I needed to identify a manageable sample that I could 
realistically gain access to.  Bearing in mind the discussion of diversity within British Evangelicalism 
(§5.4) my aim was to include a range of: 
 
a) Evangelical churchmanship from conservative to open and from mainstream to 
charismatic 
b) denominational affiliation from established church to non-denominational 
b) ethnic identities especially including the BMCs 
c) the biggest most influential Evangelical churches in London 
 
I drew up a list of large Evangelical churches in central London using personal knowledge, internet 
search engines, directories of churches and advice from other church leaders.  From these I 
selected what I considered to be a practical and representative sample.  I was not able to establish 
contact or obtain interviews in all the churches that I hoped to due to the lack of response to my 
letters or the health of various leaders.  I was helped, however, by one of the black church leaders 
who gave me introductions to several other churches.  I eventually interviewed leaders from the 
the 14 churches listed in Figure 8.2 (see Appendix B for further details).106 
 
                                                             
106 A fold-out copy of Appendix B is provided on the back cover of the thesis for ease of reference. 
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Figure 8.2 – Churches in the London case study 
Church name or pseudonym Churchmanship 
All Souls, Langham Place  
Chinese Church of London  
Christchurch (New Frontiers International) 
East London Tabernacle  
Glory House  
Holy Trinity Brompton  
“a large Evangelical Charismatic Church” 
Kingsway International Christian Centre 
Redeemed Christian Church of God  
“a conservative Evangelical Anglican church” 
“a central London church”  
St Paul’s Ealing (New Wine) 
World Harvest Christian Centre  
Greenwich Vineyard 
– Conservative mainstream Anglican 
– Non-denominational 
– Conservative charismatic New Church  
– Conservative mainstream Baptist 
– Conservative Pentecostal 
– Open charismatic Anglican 
– Open charismatic New Church 
– Conservative Pentecostal 
– Conservative Pentecostal 
– Conservative mainstream Anglican 
– Conservative charismatic non-denominational 
– Open charismatic Anglican  
– Conservative Pentecostal 
– Open charismatic New Church 
 
To these could be added Kensington Temple (KT), a large multiethnic Elim Pentecostal church.  
Although I was unable to obtain an interview there, the pastor, Colin Dye – included as a 
participant in the EPS (§8.2.a), – has written on Islam and there are a significant number of texts in 
the public domain emanating from KT including audio of sermons by Jay Smith and Sam Solomon.  
I had also hoped to interview a leader in the Caribbean churches and the pastor of a large Baptist 
church.  Unfortunately despite several attempts both interviews had to be cancelled due to ill 
health.   
 
Again I do not claim that this sample is exhaustive or indeed representative of Evangelicals in 
London.  From the size of the congregations, however, these churches represent over 20,000 
Evangelicals (half of them in KICC) which is 7.5% of Evangelical churchgoers in inner London and 
more than 1.5% of the total in England (Brierley, 2006).  So the views and attitudes of their leaders 
are not insignificant. 
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8.3 WHAT’S WHAT? COLLECTING THE DATA 
 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) suggest that qualitative researchers typically adopt four methods for 
collecting primary data, and at different times I have utilized all four in one way or another.  
Firstly, I have unavoidably been a participant observer in the research as I have previously been 
involved in church leadership, have taught about Islam and know some of the participants 
personally.  I reflect on the implications of this involvement further in §8.5.  Secondly, my 
observation has entailed “the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviours and 
artefacts” (ibid 106) and I collected and organized all texts, events, meetings or observations 
relevant to the EPS throughout the period of my research.  Thirdly, as discussed below, I have 
systematically collected and analyzed all the naturally occurring documents related to the EPS.  
Finally, I have conducted in-depth interviews with the participants. 
 
8.3.A TEXTS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
As I began reviewing the more than 50 books and booklets written by the key participants it 
quickly became clear that I needed to devise a system for organizing such large amounts of 
material.  I initially attempted to use NVivo analysis software but experienced technical problems.  
I then reverted to a purely paper collection but found the quantity unmanageable.  Eventually I 
used MaxQDA software, which, whilst it lacked some of the more advanced features of NVivo, is 
specifically designed for qualitative data analysis (QDA) and worked extremely well for my 
purposes.  It enabled me to organize all my notes and texts, to code them and to perform complex 
searches to retrieve relevant information. 
 
For every book I noted down quotes and significant issues raised that pointed to the author’s 
attitudes or responses to Islam and wrote a short summary.   These notes were then loaded into 
the analysis software.  As the reading of the books ran concurrently with the interviews, the two 
processes informed each other.  I did, however, ensure that I thoroughly familiarized myself with 
an author’s work before interviewing him or her.  As the data in Part III are presented thematically 
rather than by author or publication, an annotated bibliography of all the books reviewed can be 
found in Appendix C. 
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In addition to the books, as part of a wider monitoring of Evangelical media, I collected any other 
texts written by or quoting the key participants, along with other relevant articles about Islam.  
Where possible I utilized the online archives of periodicals to search for texts on the topic.  The 
publications reviewed are listed in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3 – Evangelical periodicals, magazines and newsletters 
Periodicals Newsletters & magazines of 
organizations 
Anvil 
Christianity Magazine 
Church Times107 
Evangelicals Now 
Evangelical Times 
Inspire 
Third Way 
Barnabas Aid (Barnabas Fund) 
Frontline (Open Doors) 
Go (Interserve) 
Idea (Evangelical Alliance) 
New Wine magazine 
 
The majority of these publications are explicitly Evangelical.  The Church Times whilst being 
broader still carries articles by Evangelicals like Riddell, a regular correspondent, as well as 
repeated references to particular Anglicans such as Nazir-Ali. 
 
I also monitored Evangelical internet websites, forums and blogs (Figure 8.4).  That said due to the 
huge volume of material available this study cannot claim to be a comprehensive survey of 
Evangelical websites in the post-2001 period.  The work in this respect should be seen as indicative 
and is used to support other sources.  Where key participants were writing on these forums, 
however, I included their texts in the analysis. 
 
In order to include the major Evangelical conferences in my review I obtained 73 audio recordings 
of talks or seminars on Islam by 24 of the key participants.  I listened to these over the whole of 
the empirical phase of the project and made notes on their content and main points.  Only the 
most relevant quotes were transcribed for use in the analysis and loaded into MaxQDA.  In most 
cases these sermons repeated material that could already be found in the speaker’s books.  There 
                                                             
107 Note that the Church Times is not specifically an Evangelical publication. 
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were on occasion, however, illuminating illustrations and views expressed on current affairs that 
offered an additional perspective. 
 
Figure 8.4 – Evangelical websites, forums & blogs 
URL address Name of site 
www.alansangle.com 
www.answering-islam.org  
www.barnabasfund.org  
www.christianconcern.com  
www.christian.org.uk 
www.christianvoice.org.uk  
www.distinctlywelcoming.com 
hwww.fulcrum-anglican.org.uk 
www.licc.org.uk 
www.youtube.com/user/PfanderFilms 
www.pilcrowpress.com 
– Alan’s Angle, the blog of Alan Craig 
– a website focusing on apologetic and polemic material 
– Barnabas Fund 
– Christian Concern for Our Nation (was www.ccfon.org) 
– Christian Institute 
– Christian Voice 
– Distinctly Welcoming, the blog of Richard Sudworth 
– Fulcrum Forum 
– London Institute for Contemporary Christianity 
– Pfander Films, the video site of Jay Smith 
– Pilcrow Press 
 
Christian television and radio are not as influential in the British Evangelical community as they are 
in the United States.  They are present though, and American programming is also available via 
satellite.  In the event it proved very difficult to obtain information on programming dealing with 
Islam on these media.  Detailed programming schedules are not published and producers did not 
reply to my email enquiries.  Nonetheless, I was able to retrieve a small amount of data from 
online archives but found no accurate records of the involvement of key participants apart from a 
few interviews and debates. 
 
Finally, I gathered all the texts either written by or mentioning the key participants in the 
mainstream media using the Nexis search engine.  These again were loaded into MaxQDA for later 
analysis. 
 
8.3.B INTERVIEWS 
Marshall and Rossman discuss the particular nature of interviews with elite subjects who have 
been selected “on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research” (Marshall and 
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Rossman, 1999, 113).  Such interviewees have the advantage of being “intelligent and quick-
thinking people, at home in the realm of ideas, policies and generalizations” (ibid 114).  This was 
certainly true of the national Evangelical participants I interviewed and also the church leaders.  
Such subjects, however, also present a number of challenges. 
 
I started interviewing the national elite in July 2008, somewhat earlier than anticipated due to the 
personal circumstances of some of the interviewees.  Approval for the research phase had been 
received from the university’s Ethics Committee in April 2008.  The submission to the committee 
included assurances that my research objectives would be clearly explained to each participant, 
that information gathered would be held securely and confidentially, and that any participant who 
so chose would be granted anonymity.108  This final assurance was important as I anticipated that 
some of the key participants would be concerned about security, or indeed might even refuse to 
participate at all.  This proved to be the case. 
 
The reason is not hard to understand.  Evangelicals are active evangelists and they are committed 
to making disciples, including among Muslims.  This sort of venture meets with fierce resistance 
from the Muslim community and both evangelist and convert can face real danger as a 
consequence.  Indeed, several of the participants have reported receiving death threats (see 
Gledhill, 2008).  For this reason I had to give assurances to church leaders that I would not ask 
questions about evangelism or converts amongst Muslims as they feared for the safety of their 
congregations and the converts involved.  I was also requested not to ask questions about 
overseas mission in Muslim countries.  Security is clearly a significant issue for many of these 
people and I have respected their concerns.  Where anonymity was requested I have used a term 
or phrase of the interviewee’s own choosing such as “leader of a large Anglican church”.  
Consequently I have not been able to name all the churches in the London case study (see Fig. 8.2 
and Appendix B). 
 
My task was made more difficult by the screening of Unholy War (Barnett, 2007), a Channel Four 
Dispatches documentary primarily about the plight of apostates from Islam.  The programme 
featured interviews with several of the EPS participants and was – unexpectedly for them – highly 
critical of Christian evangelism amongst Muslims in Britain.  This unsympathetic public exposure 
                                                             
108 Copies of the letter sent to interviewees and the consent form are included in Appendices D and E. 
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meant that my research was conducted against a backdrop of defensiveness and suspicion 
amongst some Evangelicals who felt that they had been deceived and betrayed by the media.   
 
A few of the interviewees, both in the elite and in the churches, were already known to me 
personally and there was little trouble in arranging interviews.  Others I had either met briefly at 
conferences or shared mutual friends with.  Yet others, however, I had to approach without such 
introductions, relying on my association with various churches to lend credence to my request.  
This I usually did by a combination of e-mail and letter (Appendix D), although I also telephoned at 
a later stage if no reply was received. 
 
A few failed to reply, particularly amongst church leaders, which I initially interpreted as 
inefficiency, over-busyness or lack of interest.   Some, however, were unable to participate due to 
health or family circumstances.  More interestingly, there were others that refused to take part 
either for reasons of security, as discussed above, or possibly due to my own identity.  As I 
occasionally speak publicly on the topic of Islam, these individuals may associate me with an irenic 
response to Islam.  In an increasingly polarized community this may have put me in the “other 
camp”.  This is a factor which I have had to take into account throughout the research. 
 
In total I conducted 37 interviews: 
 
18 with key participants in the national EPS 
4 with occasional participants 
14 with church leaders 
1 with Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, as background to my research 
 
The interviews were conducted mainly in the office or private home of the interviewee.  This 
created ideal conditions for recording and the digital device used produced high quality recordings 
for later transcription.  A few people opted to meet in cafés where the background noise was 
occasionally an issue.  One interview was by telephone and so was unrecorded and a further 
interview was via Skype which I was able to record with the interviewee’s permission.  All 
participants were given the option of reviewing the transcript before analysis but in the event all 
declined. 
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At the outset of each interview I explained my research clearly and sought to establish a rapport 
with the interviewee.  I offered the option of anonymity but quickly found that it was difficult for 
them to make a decision.  Signing the ethics consent form (Appendix E) at that point also 
introduced an awkward, formal dimension to the conversation.  So I adopted the tactic of 
explaining the concept of consent, optional anonymity and the need to sign a form at the 
beginning but suggesting that we wait until after the interview before they made a decision.  For 
those who were nervous about what might be asked this seemed to reassure them as they would 
be making a decision in the light of what they knew they had said.  As it turned out none of the key 
participants opted for anonymity as their opinions were already well established in the public 
domain.  Several of the church leaders, however, asked for anonymity.  In one case this was for 
reasons of security.  For others, who were not necessarily the senior leader, it was because they 
felt unable to speak for their church as a whole and felt it better if the name of their church was 
not included.   These churches are referred to by a generic description of the interviewee’s 
choosing (Appendix B). 
 
The interviews lasted 45 to 90 minutes and being “semi-structured” were “much more like 
conversations than formal events with predetermined response categories” (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999, 108) and left me “ freer to probe beyond the answers”  seeking  “ clarification and 
elaboration on the answers given” (May, 2001, 123).  Nonetheless in order to keep the 
conversation on track and to ensure a level of comparability I used an interview schedule 
(Appendix F).  This evolved during the early interviews and adjustments were made in response to 
ideas arising.  This had to be the case given that it was not possible to fully pilot my schedule.  As 
the questions were highly specialized and formulated for a certain elite group of people, it was 
difficult to conduct a trial interview with those not part of this group.  I did pilot it with someone 
relatively familiar with the topic area, but it was a rather unsatisfactory exercise.  In some cases I 
was able to obtain missing data through a follow up email.109 
 
Despite the interview schedule my aim was to allow the interviewee to talk freely without too 
much interruption.  This was a difficult judgement to make.  As Marshall and Rossman point out 
                                                             
109 The interview schedules for both the key participants and the church leaders can be found in 
Appendix F. 
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“an elite person may turn the interview around, thereby taking charge of it” (1999, 114) and this 
was a particular danger as many of the interviewees were preachers and had little difficulty in 
talking!  Indeed in several interviews I collected a great deal of material that was not central to my 
research.  I was also conscious of the time involved as I had promised that the interview would be 
60-90 minutes and I wanted to honour that commitment with busy people.  Sometimes I had to 
move the conversation on to ensure that we touched on all the necessary areas. 
 
Finally, during the course of the fieldwork, I visited 8 of the churches in question and observed a 
Sunday worship service in order to get an understanding of the variety amongst these 
congregations and to see the context in which they met together.  I kept notes of all these visits 
but do not specifically cite them in my later analysis, although they provided me with an 
interesting insight into the life of the churches.  These visits also gave me an opportunity to 
examine the various books on Islam available in the churches and to look out for other relevant 
literature. 
 
8.4 WHICH “BUCKET”? ANALYSING THE DATA 
 
The progression from data collection to analysis is rarely linear and sequential: 
 
along with choosing appropriate strategies for data collection, the researcher must address the 
complex processes of managing, recording and analyzing data .... these processes occur dialectically 
throughout the conduct of a qualitative study .... as modifications are made in the initial design 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999, 140). 
 
This certainly proved to be the case in my research.  As I gathered the empirical material, I loaded 
a total of 165 separate texts into MaxQDA including all the interview transcripts, observations, 
texts and book notes.  This became the focus of a “content analysis”, understanding this as “the 
intellectual process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or 
conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables or 
themes” (Julien, 2009, 120).  Based on my reading and my experience in the field, I developed a 
provisional set of themes which I expected to find present in the data.  Some of these were broad 
topics such as attitudes to “violence”; others were more specific subsets of these topics, such as 
the “war on terror” or “Islamic terrorism”.  As I began the analysis further themes emerged from 
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the texts themselves such as the recurring theme of the “Crusades”.  To each theme I assigned a 
code. 
 
In the coding process “categories are generated through prolonged engagement with the data” 
which “then become buckets or baskets into which segments of text are placed” (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999, 154).  The MaxQDA software allowed me to select portions of text and 
mechanically assign them to these different codes.  These portions could then be retrieved using 
automated searches.  The development of these codes proved to be an iterative process in which 
my understanding developed throughout the analysis necessitating many and repeated 
adjustments to the system.  
 
In the early stages I was too ambitious in trying to label every slight nuance and I created far too 
many codes (some 18 main categories with a total of 159 sub-codes) that proved impossible to 
deploy with any consistency.  As a result I broadened the categories and reduced the codes to 16 
main categories with 70 sub-codes (Appendix G) and at the end of the analysis had over 4150 
individually coded segments of text.  These I collected together under the various categories, 
printed out and read through again in order to identify patterns and connections.   
 
From this reading I was able to discern a natural progression within the themes which dictated the 
eventual order in which I presented the data: Evangelical perceptions of Islam (§9) inform their 
reactions to socio-political events (§10), which in turn affect their relationships with both Muslims 
and other spheres (§11).  Before turning to this empirical material, however, I must address the 
issue of my own position with respects to the informants and the Evangelical community. 
 
8.5 WHO AM I?  THE REFLEXIVE QUESTION 
 
From the outset I had to confront the insider/outsider dilemma.  As has already been made clear 
not only am I from an Evangelical background but I am also an occasional participant in the EPS.  I 
am sometimes invited to speak and teach on the topic of Islam at churches and conferences; I 
attend meetings with some of the subjects of this study; and I am now beginning to write on the 
topic.  This was initially of some concern to me.  How could I “objectively” study a group of people 
of which I am a part?  How could I critically analyze beliefs with which in some cases, though 
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certainly not all, I have sympathy?  Furthermore I was undertaking the research because I was 
concerned about developments within the EPS and wanted to make a positive contribution to the 
community.  Did this not make me an “improver” or a “reformer” with a compromising “external 
agenda”, someone whom Bruce at least believes has no place in sociology (1999, 83)?  Moreover, 
given that within the social sciences “hatred of religion has been a more respectable scholarly 
emotion than love, particularly hatred of one's own religion” (O'Flaherty, 1999, 341), how could I 
undertake sociological research as a person of faith? 
 
My concerns, however, were alleviated by the many sociologists who recognize that no-one can 
obtain complete objectivity.  Hufford, for instance,   observes that, whilst “disinterest is urged on 
scholars of religion, disinterest is impossible in religious issues” (Hufford, 1999, 297).  Even more 
specifically Hammersley admits that “researchers are always part of the social world they study; 
they can never step above it in order to gain an Olympian perspective or move outside it to get a 
‘view from nowhere’” (2003, 934).  Indeed one’s background can be harnessed as a positive 
benefit: “experience linked to one's social past can and must be mobilized in research, on 
condition that it has previously been submitted to a rigorous critical examination” (Bourdieu, 
2004, 113). 
 
Whilst it would be exaggerating to say that I had undertaken a “rigorous critical examination”, I 
have come to realize that it is better to admit openly my position so that the reader can take this 
into account in the following analysis, than it is to pretend that I am completely free of all bias and 
prejudice.  At the start of the research I strongly identified with an irenic approach towards Islam 
and would have had considerable sympathy with those in this study who espouse such a position.  
I still do.  However, as the research draws to a close I also have a greater appreciation of the 
reasons why others take a more combative stance.  In short I feel that I have been changed 
through the process. 
 
To explore this further, McCutcheon (1999) outlines four possible methodological approaches to 
the study of religion that account for the position of the researcher.  The first is the empathetic 
approach, associated with the Verstehen school, whereby the researcher tries to enter the 
subject’s world in order to understand their experience from within.  To a large extent, however, I 
could not “move in” because I had never really been “out”.  Despite the fact that I do not always 
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“fit” comfortably in the Evangelical world, I am perceived by many of the participants as an insider 
and I do indeed have a privileged insight into the issues.  In fact, it has come as quite a shock to 
realize that some Evangelicals now view me as an outsider because in a sense I have become a 
part of another community - the academic research community.  If anything I have moved from 
“in” to “out”! 
 
The second methodological approach is explanatory.  This is the rationalist approach, firmly rooted 
in the Enlightenment, which gives a privileged place not to the observed but to the outside 
observer.  It takes a reductionist approach, confident in its academic and religious neutrality.  
Certainly, coming from my natural science background, it is tempting to believe that one can 
ascertain the facts, cut to the root, and find the definitive answer without the impediment of 
ambiguity.   I know how it feels, however, when this reductionist knife is applied to one’s own faith 
by supposedly unbiased academics.  Paradoxically, it is a knife that I see wielded within the 
Evangelical community, which is in so many ways rooted in modern, Enlightenment thought.  The 
sort of rational criticism which causes such outrage when focused on the Christian faith is itself 
turned against others, not least the Muslim community.  Such reductionism is regrettable and I 
have sought to avoid it during this research.   
 
McCutcheon’s third approach is agnostic and does not comment on religious truth.  Berger 
reminds us that sociology and theology answer different questions.  Even if sociology must view 
religion as a human projection, that does not preclude an objective reality (Berger, 1967).  In other 
words our research has nothing to say about ultimate truth but looks rather at the social and 
political implications of the various beliefs that actors hold.  This is a sort of neutral “mediating 
position” between the empathetic and explanatory approaches (McCutcheon, 1999, 215).  Again 
this has some resonance with my research.  My aim was not to pass judgement on the EPS and 
their responses to Islam.  It was not to decide who was “right”.  I did, however, want to examine 
the implications of those responses and make an assessment of where they may lead in the future.   
 
Of course one cannot suspend all judgement and so the final approach is reflexive.   “Reflexivity is 
a metaphor from grammar indicating a relationship of identity between subject and object, thus 
meaning the inclusion of the actor (scholar, author, observer) in the account of the act and/or its 
outcomes” (Hufford, 1999, 294).  The necessity of including “myself” in this thesis was plain from 
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the start.  By this I do not mean that I included my own texts in the analysis.  Indeed at the outset I 
had no published texts either in books or magazines of any consequence.  Rather I mean that at 
every stage of the process it has been impossible to ignore my own opinions and allegiances which 
I have commented on above. 
 
Not only this but “both researchers and participants undergo reflexivity” (Dowling, 2008, 748).  
This means that, not only did my views change during the course of the research, but I also 
influenced the subjects of my research.  For example, one church leader wrote to me after our 
interview and said: 
 
it was good to meet with you the other week and I found it very helpful to talk through the issues 
you raised. It certainly set me thinking about all the inconsistencies between thought and practice. 
We will certainly be looking to change some of the ways we go about things as a church, and I 
would probably change some of my answers to you if we had the interview again!! 
 
Whilst there are many diverse approaches to reflexivity, it essentially involves “actively reflecting 
on personal, interpersonal, institutional, pragmatic, emotional, theoretical, epistemological, and 
ontological influences on our research and interpretive processes” (Doucet and Mauthner, 2006, 
emphasis added).  My experience of growing up in an Evangelical environment but then living 
amongst Muslims; my relationships with some of the participants; my institutional involvement 
through membership in various groups and committees; my access to certain facts, conversations 
and arguments that would not have been available to outside researchers; the openness or 
otherwise of people to talk because it was me interviewing them; all these factors had an 
immediate bearing on how I gathered and interpreted my data and should be borne in mind in 
moving on to the presentation of the empirical material. 
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PART III – BRITISH EVANGELICAL RESPONSES TO ISLAM: THE DATA 
 
Chapter 2 explored the theoretical concept of a micro-public sphere and Chapter 7 described the 
formation of such a sphere amongst Evangelical Christians in order to discuss the presence of 
Islam in Britain.  The previous chapter (Ch.8) laid out the rationale I used in deciding who to 
include within the elite of that sphere and the method I adopted to gather information from 
interviews, published texts and other media.  In the following three chapters I present that data 
before proceeding to an analysis in Chapter 12. 
 
The data are arranged thematically and are divided into three chapters moving from the abstract, 
through the socio-political to the relational.  The first chapter looks at the internal discourse of the 
British EPS on the nature of Islam itself.  What is Islam?  What is its origin?  How can it be 
understood from a Christian theological perspective?  Is Islam essentially ideological and violent or 
not?  Chapter 10 then moves on from this conceptual discussion to consider how Evangelicals 
assess the practical implications of the Islamic presence for British society as a whole.  It explores 
how Evangelicals envisage the relationship between church and state, their reactions to 
multiculturalism and the concerns of some about “creeping Islamization”.  It concludes by listening 
to their hopes and fears with regard to the future of the Muslim presence in Britain.  Finally 
Chapter 11 examines the relationships of the EPS and the way it interacts with other spheres.  It 
considers its interface with Muslims, the wider public sphere and significantly its own grassroots in 
the Evangelical churches.  At this point the material from the interviews with the London church 
leaders will be presented.  Part III concludes with an exploration of the internal tensions within the 
EPS, especially as highlighted by recent events and publications, which form a bridge to the 
analysis in Part IV. 
 
These tensions become increasingly evident throughout the following chapters.  For virtually every 
theme there are Evangelicals who demonstrate a closed, negative view of Islam and conversely 
those who encapsulate a more open, positive approach to Islam.  On occasion there may be some 
who occupy more middle ground and indeed sometimes those who on one issue seemed closed 
may appear on another issue to be open, although it must be said that this is rare - to a large 
degree the demarcations are clear. 
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In presenting the data I also try to maintain a balance between those gathered through the 
fieldwork interviews and those gathered from other media.  However, this is more problematic in 
the case of the closed view of Islam as I was unable to interview some of the key representatives 
of this position (§8.3.b).  As a result this view is disproportionately represented by quotations from 
published sources and other material in the public domain. 
 
I have also tried to maintain a balance in reporting the opinions of all the different participants in 
the EPS.110  Inevitably, however, some are rather more prolific than others and this is reflected in 
the number of quotes garnered from the various participants.  There are those who are 
particularly active and influential and at times they become – naturally enough – the dominant 
voices in the narrative.  The views of Sookhdeo111 and Chapman are particularly prominent; indeed 
these two important figures have in many ways come to represent, not so much the extreme poles 
– which are inhabited by others - but rather the “mainstream” of the closed and open views 
respectively.
                                                             
110 It should be noted that when I refer to ‘participants’ I mean all those who participate in the 
discussions and debates of this Evangelical micro-public sphere rather than just those who participated 
in my study by agreeing to be interviewed.  These latter I refer to as ‘interviewees’. 
111 Note that, due to the frequency of occurrence of his name, I use “Sookhdeo” to refer to Patrick 
Sookhdeo and “Rosemary Sookhdeo” to refer to his wife.  I also use the first names of Andrew Smith 
and Jay Smith in order to avoid confusion. 
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CHAPTER 9 EVANGELICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ISLAM 
 
How do British Evangelicals conceptualize Islam?  This query is a vital antecedent to understanding 
how Evangelicals respond to Muslims and Islam.  The following chapter interrogates the empirical 
material in order to create a map of Evangelical thinking about Islam by posing a series of 
questions for the data to answer.  It is necessarily more conceptual and abstract than the following 
chapters and the responses often reflect the participants’ own theological preconceptions as much 
as their experience of relating to Muslims. 
 
9.1 WHAT IS ISLAM? 
 
One of the most important questions concerns “the true face of Islam” (Riddell and Cotterell, 
2003, 150).  Before the worldwide resurgence of Islam, Chapman suggested that “the Christian .... 
questions the value of studying “ideal Islam”, especially when it seems to bear so little 
resemblance to the actual Islam that he sees in the society around him” (Chapman, 1978, 66).  
Since 9/11 this situation has changed dramatically leading others to argue that Christians “must 
have a clear understanding of the nature of Islam – its theology, ethics and culture - (in order to) 
help in the crucial decisions that have to be made on how to approach Muslims” (Sookhdeo, 2006, 
11).  But what is “the nature of Islam” according to Evangelicals? 
 
9.1.A IS THERE AN ESSENCE OF “TRUE ISLAM”? 
Whilst some take an essentialist view of Islam, others emphasize that Muslims themselves should 
be allowed to define what they understand Islam to be. All the participants agree that Islam has an 
identifiable core, which Riddell calls the “glue that binds Muslims together into a common 
religious system” (2004b, 210).  This core, he suggests, consists of: Muhammad, the Qur’an, the 
shari‘a and the basic pillars of Islam.  This list coincides with what Taylor calls “distinguishable 
family likenesses which render discussion about ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ valid without running the 
risk of stereotyping” (2005b, 80). 
 
Some participants, however, see not just a small common core but an “essence” of “true Islam” 
which is “total”, “territorial”, “imperial”, “militant” and “in its concentrated form .... intolerant of 
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all other religions” (Pawson, 2003, 56-65).  This is reflected in Sookhdeo’s Faith, Power and 
Territory, a title which “is intended to sum up the Muslim concept of their own religion” (2008a, 
vi).  Sookhdeo believes that many of the distinctions made between different types of Islam are 
meaningless, as “Islamism is simply the essence of classical Islam” (2007a, 10 emphasis added) and 
so is in effect the “core orthodoxy” or “standard Islam” (2006, 6).  In other words for Sookhdeo 
and others like him, it is so-called radical political Islam which is the true Islam.  
 
In contrast other participants are wary of making any definitive statements about the nature of 
Islam.  The Orr-Ewings are typical when they say that “statements such as, ‘Islam is a religion of 
peace’, or ‘Islam is a religion of war’ are too general to be meaningful” (2002, 103).  Azumah felt 
that it was “very patronizing and very condescending for non-Muslims to begin to pontificate” 
about Islam (Azumah, Interview 29).  Similarly Chapman was concerned about approaches that 
“find these negative things in some parts of Islam and then with this essentialist approach say this 
is inherent in Islam, this is a vital part of Islam that all Muslims believe and practice” (Chapman, 
Interview 62).  He felt that “there is a danger that Christians are breaking the commandment that 
says ‘thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour’” (Chapman, Interview 52), a 
sentiment echoed by Glaser (2005, 235).  In short, stark reductionist statements about Islam are 
treated with suspicion and avoided by some Evangelicals.  Taylor demonstrated such a reticence in 
her blog: 
 
Maryam Namazie, co-founder of the Council of Ex-Muslims, ..... wants to ‘re-brand Islam as fascist’.  
Note the lack of any adjective before Islam.  Islam per se.  Not just extremist Islam.  I believe that’s 
going too far (J. Taylor, 2008b). 
 
Participants that reject such essentializing of Islam tend to follow Chapman’s line that “Islam is 
what Muslims say it is” (2007b, 59).  For instance Azumah said: 
 
Islam is what Muslims make it to be and say it is and therefore I will engage with the Islam of my 
Muslim neighbour who is next door to me and I will respect that rather than go out and tell him, as 
many Western Christians tend to do, that ‘oh your Islam is not really true Islam.  The true Islam is 
Osama bin Laden’s Islam’ (Azumah, Interview 29). 
 
In similar vein Knell considered what it would feel like to be on the receiving end of such 
essentialization: “I want to turn that the other way.  If a Muslim comes to me and says the Bible 
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says this, that and the other, I want to say, ‘hold on; I’m the Christian.  I want to tell you how to 
interpret this’” (Knell, Interview 28).  This willingness to put themselves in the place of the Muslim 
is characteristic of several of the participants – a stance that modifies their approaches to Muslims 
if not necessarily to Islam. 
 
9.1.B SHOULD WE FOCUS ON ISLAM OR MUSLIMS? 
This distinction between the people and the religious system is key for many of the participants.  
Most of the interviewees, including those who insisted that Muslims should be allowed to define 
Islam, also wanted to make a clear distinction between “Islam” and “Muslims”.  Riddell suggests 
that “engagement should be two-pronged: engaging with people, and engaging with the system ... 
the human faces of Muslim people, which reflect the diversity of Islam, and a system of Islam, 
which provides its elements of unity” (2004b, 210).  In reality, however, most participants, whilst 
holding these two separate, do tend to emphasize one or the other. 
 
There are those whose main focus is on Muslims as people:  
 
a Christian perspective on Islam ought to be at the same time incarnational, sympathetic, and 
critical. It should be concerned more with Muslim people than with Islam. Muslims are first and 
foremost human beings, made in God's image and loved by God as much as we are (Moucarry, 
2010).   
 
In her teaching, Glaser said, she emphasizes this with a PowerPoint slide where the words 
“Muslims - are - human - beings” drop down one by one (Glaser, Interview 23). 
 
On the other hand there are those who tend to focus on Islam as a system.  Solomon is typical: 
 
let me make a clear distinction here.  We are talking about Islam and not Muslims.  Muslims are 
people.  We love them.  They are sinners.  They need the love of Christ.  They need to hear the 
gospel and repent ..... But Islam is a different thing.  Islam is an ideology (Solomon, 2006a). 
 
In the sermon he then goes on to focus on the ideology of Islam rather than Muslims.  Sookhdeo is 
at pains to make a similar point: 
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Muslims as people should be protected in our societies .... in no way should we denigrate people.  
.... We are called to love Muslims with the love of Christ ... even when they persecute us .... When 
we come to their religion that is another matter.  In a secular society all religions must be fair game 
(Sookhdeo, 2009b). 
 
So whilst these participants in the EPS may want to befriend Muslims, they feel a sense of conflict 
with Islam as an ideology (§9.4).  This was a point that came out strongly in the interview with Jay 
Smith.  He reported that the former Nigerian Archbishop, Peter Akinola, had once said to him 
“make sure you don’t confront Muslims; confront Islam.  Confront their traditions; confront their 
Qur’an.  Do that.  That’s the battle.” (J. Smith, Interview 83).  The concern of many such 
participants is that those who have “sought to embrace Muslims as people .... have unwittingly 
embraced Islam the faith” (Sookhdeo, 2009a, 12).  The counsel of Riddell above would be that an 
overemphasis on either would be a mistake. 
 
9.1.C WHO ARE THE “TRUE” MUSLIMS? 
Some participants, however, are not sure that it is so easy to detach Muslims from Islam and 
choose instead to focus on the diversity of Muslims and Islam.   Andrew Smith said “I’m not sure 
I’d want to separate them out completely” (A.Smith, Interview 23) and Sudworth felt: 
 
that’s too simplistic.  It’s a cute kind of throw-away distinction which enables you to say all sorts of 
things about Islam whilst supposedly being polite to Muslims.  So I wouldn’t say that.  There are 
tendencies within Islam but which Islam, which group?” (Sudworth, Interview 43).   
 
As the Orr-Ewings put it “any thoughtful response to Islamism must take Muslim diversity 
extremely seriously and avoid religious and socio-political reductionism” (2002, 74).  
 
Some of the participants reported that such diversity was indeed their own experience of Muslims.  
For instance, Jay smith mentioned having Muslim friends who were moderates, liberals and 
radicals (J.Smith, Interview 37, 67). Bell recounted how one Muslim had said to him “show me two 
Muslims and I’ll show you three opinions!” (Bell, Interview 61).  Many participants are careful to 
emphasize this diversity in their teaching and writing: 
 
now you know, one is aware that obviously Muslims are deeply divided on a multitude of topics 
and attitudes and so on, and I think that is part of the truth that one teaches. .... You can quote 
Islamists and the sort of extremes on that side, and then that leads to very strong opposition and 
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even dislike and fear; or you can quote the very moderate and that can lead to a politically correct 
tolerance, or you can point out that actually both are there with everything in-between (Goldsmith, 
Interview 24).   
 
To highlight this variety Moucarry (2008, 39), Bell (2003, 15), Riddell (2004b, 62) and Chapman 
(2007a) all adopt some sort of typology of Muslims.  Such typologies normally include categories 
of Muslim such as “non-religious”, “reformist”, “moderate”, “radical” and “extremist” amongst 
others.  The more significant factor for many Evangelicals, however, is the perceived polarization 
between these categories within the Muslim community.  Riddell and Cotterell in a frequently 
referenced statement declare that “there is a titanic struggle taking place between moderates and 
radicals for the hearts and minds of the Muslim masses in the middle” (2003, 192).  Cotterell later 
expands on this: 
 
there’s another kind of division in Islam: between the traditionalists, the violent Islamists, and the 
modernists. The traditionalists want to get back to what Islam was at the beginning. The Islamists 
want the same, but see their main task as getting rid of the obstacles standing in the way of getting 
back to the past. The modernists are ready to let Islam change to fit into the twenty-first century 
(Cotterell, 2007). 
 
For some Islamism is clearly winning and they treat it as being the dominant contemporary form of 
Islam.  In his foreword to the Islam in Britain (ISIC, 2005) report Sookhdeo states that "while it is 
important to recognize that there are a variety of currents within the Muslim community, it is also 
important to discover the dominant trends and look at their agendas and methods” (2005a, iii).112  
The report goes on to make it clear that traditionalist Islam and Islamism rather than modernist 
Islam are considered to be the dominant forms in Britain today.  It is certainly this type of Islam 
which is causing a negative reaction among many Evangelicals.  For instance, Bell, who is usually 
quick to stress love for Muslims, says, “I am angry with such Muslims who are engaged in 
‘politicized Islam’ ....  Militant Islam clearly has a case to answer in the twenty-first century .... (it 
is) the dark side of Islam” (2006b, 43). 
 
This leads some to point out the relative weakness of moderate Muslims.  “The so-called 
'moderate   Muslims' have yet to produce one authoritative fatwa that would counter those which 
                                                             
112 This report was produced by the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (ISIC), the research 
wing of Barnabas Fund, of which Sookhdeo is the director.  
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are being stated by the traditionally accepted orthodox Muslim channels who remain the 
authoritative bodies for all  Islamic issues the world over” (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2009a, 11).  
Likewise Cox and Marks find that the work of moderates and reformers is "tortuous, time-
consuming and may well be a waste of effort given the lack of response to it or resonance with it 
by most Muslims”(2006, 198).  Green, of Christian Voice, goes further and declares that “there are 
observant Muslims, and non-observant Muslims, but a moderate Muslim is hard to find” (2005, 
15).  Such authors tend to draw mainly on Islamist and historical Islamic sources for their quotes 
and illustrations rather than on the writing of more moderate contemporary progressive and 
secular Muslims. 
 
In an interesting analysis Riddell remarks that "Muslim radicals are often seen by Christian 
Evangelicals (especially fundamentalists) as 'real Muslims' because of their scriptural-literalist 
approach.  This response, however, is really more of a window into the mind of the Christians 
concerned” (2004b, 166).  In other words Evangelicals see in the radicals some reflection of 
themselves.  Other participants are rather less focused on the extremists.  Musk believes that the 
“majority of Muslims .... live as though Islam is primarily a religion about peaceful living”  but have 
been “upstaged by the Islamists’ claim to be more authentically Islamic” (2008, xvi).  
Consequently, he feels the need to place his emphasis on this more moderate Muslim voice.  Musk 
along with others such as Glaser and Chapman are much more likely to quote and be sympathetic 
towards the work of Muslim reformers and to accept that these too may represent a genuine 
expression of Islam. 
 
9.2 WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF ISLAM? 
 
9.2.A GOD? 
In their discussion of the nature of Islam Evangelicals frequently pose another important question.  
What was the origin of Islam?  What inspired it?  Obviously Muslims believe that the religion of 
Islam is a divine revelation.  However, as McRoy bluntly stated: 
 
well obviously I can’t accept that it comes from God simply because that would negate my own 
Evangelical  faith because like I said, rivalry without hostility, salvation is found in no-one else.  So I 
don’t believe it can come from God (McRoy, Interview 40).   
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Indeed no Evangelical I interviewed or read has said that they believe that Islam in its entirety 
does come from God.  Many, however, admit that it contains some truth and allude to the maxim 
that “all truth is God’s truth”.  For instance, Musk suggests that wherever Muhammad spoke truth 
about God he was being prophetic as “truth, after all, is truth, wherever it is found” (2005, 83).  In 
his interview McRoy also concluded, “I don’t believe (Islam) can come from God.  There are 
aspects of truth in it where it agrees with the Bible .... so obviously I would accept those parts” 
(McRoy, Interview 40).   
 
Interestingly, Bell particularly expresses the conviction that the appearance of Islam could not be 
outside the sovereignty of God (Bell, 2003, 7).  For him whilst God did not expressly send Islam, He 
has obviously permitted Islam to flourish for some purpose. 
 
9.2.B HUMANS? 
If Islam is not divinely inspired then Evangelicals have to give some other account of where they 
believe Islam has come from.  From the general reaction of most participants who were 
interviewed they find this a difficult and sensitive question to answer.  Rather than stating a 
definite source, some suggest a possible cause, which, following Cragg, they explain as being the 
failure of the Christian church at the time of Muhammad to properly evangelize the Arab people.  
If the Arabs had heard the gospel clearly in their own language they would not have needed Islam 
(Musk, 2005, 84, Bell, 2006b, 79).  Others suggest a human source, Muhammad being the obvious 
candidate: 
  
Well I don’t know.  God knows!  I don’t know.  You know it is quite possible that Muhammad being 
the founder of Islam is the main source of Islam as well. .... Muhammad was both exposed to 
Christian and Jewish influence on the one hand and he came from a polytheistic background on the 
other hand and I think that Islam is Muhammad’s way of reconciling these two traditions, the 
Biblical tradition, the monotheistic Biblical tradition with the Arab polytheistic tradition.  So it is a 
sort of synthesis between the Arab tradition and the Biblical tradition (Moucarry, Interview 60-61). 
 
Yet Evangelicals also find it difficult to know what to think of Muhammad.  Although some, like 
Glaser, seek to have “as positive and realistic an assessment of Muhammad as possible” (2000b, 
47), others are rather more negative.  Despite some extreme examples, like Green (2005, 7) who 
believes that Muhammad had an obsession with sex and generally attacks his character, most try 
to avoid the sort of notorious inflammatory statements occasionally made by leading American 
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Evangelicals (§7.2.a).  This sensitivity notwithstanding most British Evangelicals feel that 
Muhammad compares poorly to Jesus, particularly in terms of moral character and the use of 
violence (Riddell and Cotterell, 2003, 196).  As Sookhdeo puts it “the real difference between 
Christianity and Islam lies in the core issues of their sacred writings and the persons of their 
founders” (2006, 48).  This suggests that the source of Islam is not just a person but also a text – 
the Qur’an. 
 
9.2.C THE QUR’AN? 
In practice many Evangelicals treat the Qur’an and the Sunna as the de facto source of Islam.  For 
some this is obvious given the large amount of derivative material they see in the Qur’an.  Jay 
Smith reckoned that: 
 
a good 70% of the Qur’an we can source back to other sources, most of it Jewish apocryphal 
writings which is interesting because almost all of those stories in the Qur’an with the biblical 
characters are not in our Bible.  But we know where the stories come from (J.Smith, Interview 47).    
 
In a sermon at Kensington Temple Smith traced some of those sources and made the point that 
they were written by men, not necessarily even Muhammad (J. Smith, 2007a).  When questioned 
further on this in the interview he suggested that the rise of Islam may have come about as part of 
a wider social movement rather than as the result of a revelation to Muhammad:   
 
Smith:  I think what you have there is very little to do with Muhammad.  From what they’re telling 
us a lot of this is redacted back to a person named Muhammad ..... So it looks like it’s not a religious 
phenomena, it looks like it’s an identity, an Arab identity that wants to have the same identity in a 
prophetic line coming through Ishmael as the Jews and the Christians had coming through Isaac.  
Interviewer: So it’s a human socio-political structure? 
Smith:  Absolutely (J.Smith, Interview 47-49).    
 
For Musk too minor variations in texts: 
 
suggest that authority for today’s text of the Qur’an cannot simply lie in a claim that the current 
Arabic Qur’an contains the exact words of God as dictated or confirmed by the angel Gabriel to 
prophet Muhammad.  That would appear to be a claim too far ... Beneath the surface, however, 
one may discern that the redacting and editing process involved human choices as to what the 
unified text should finally look like (Musk, 2008, 150). 
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So for most of the participants the Qur’an is not a divine revelation but is a rather more human 
compilation and is, along with the Hadith, the cause of many of the trends seen amongst Muslims 
today.  Sookhdeo believes that Muslims can find in their texts anything they want to find: “by far 
the majority of Muslims today live their lives without recourse to violence, for the Qur’an is like a 
pick-and-mix selection. If you want peace, you can find peaceable verses. If you want war, you can 
find bellicose verses”(2005b).113  Thus the Qur’an becomes the source of different types of Islam 
depending on how it is interpreted. 
 
9.2.D SATAN? 
For Evangelicals there is one further possible source of Islam.  As Pawson puts it: “there is another 
explanation for the ‘truth’ in the Qur’an which Christians must consider ... it is not hard to see an 
‘unearthly’ force behind it” (2003, 82).  He goes on to develop the idea that Satan is behind Islam 
as it is about “deception”, “distraction”, and “destruction”.  This is not an uncommon view 
amongst Evangelicals.  For instance, Williams said, “(Islam) has a spirit behind it that is untrue”, 
although she stressed that this demonization was “not personalized” about Muslims but rather 
about Islam as a system (Williams, Interview 18).114  Understandably Evangelicals are sometimes 
reluctant to express this view publicly.  Williams herself in a TV documentary when directly asked 
this question says "I believe Islam is a false religion" and then becomes visibly uncomfortable and 
asks for the microphone to be turned off (Modell, 2008b).  Even moderate interviewees believed 
that Islam, and indeed, in some cases, all religion, including Christianity, is at times partially 
demonic: 
 
the whole question that comes up quite a lot is ‘is Islam demonic’?  I believe Islam is demonic in the 
sense that the devil uses it and the devil is using it as a weapon today against the church.  And the 
devil uses all sorts of things. ....I don’t believe that Islam is demonic in that it was originally planned 
or initiated by the devil.  I don’t believe that at all. (Knell, Interview 30) 
 
                                                             
113 Cotterell makes much the same point with reference to what he identifies as the four authoritative 
sources in Islam: Qur’an, abrogation, Hadith and shari‘a - “With four places to look, and thousands of 
pages to read, it’s not surprising that Muslims can find justification for almost anything: it’s a real 
Woolworth’s pick’n mix” (Cotterell, 2007). 
114 Note that throughout Part III ‘Williams’ refers to Andrea Williams of CCFON.  Where I refer to 
Archbishop Rowan Williams the first name or title is included. 
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Chapman, whilst partly agreeing, is uncomfortable with the way that some Evangelicals demonize 
Islam: 
 
I feel very, very uneasy with the Evangelical approach that writes Islam off as a religion inspired by 
the devil.  Having said that I feel I have to recognize an element of the satanic in every world 
religion.  .... I have to recognize that there are some things in Islam which are deeply antagonistic to 
the Gospel and to Jesus as we understand him (Chapman, Interview 34). 
 
Probably the majority of the participants in the EPS take the view that Islam is from a mixture of 
sources but want to show sensitivity towards the feelings of Muslims.  In answer to a question at 
the end of a seminar about the source of the Qur’anic revelation Amy Orr-Ewing suggested that it 
was a mixture of truth and error but that one has to be careful about calling it demonic so as not 
to offend Muslims (A. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 2003).  This type of prevaricating agnosticism also 
came out clearly in some of the answers to the interview question about the source of Islam: 
 
I genuinely don’t know.  Genuinely I don’t have a kind of fixed view on that.  I think I’m tempted to 
believe that it’s a human construct that Muhammad was grasping at something, had influences 
from particularly Jewish understanding but also from Christians.  Clearly he had read bits of the 
Bible and there were good things that he did and brought but I don’t see Islam and I don’t see the 
origins of Islam from God.  I see them from humans. .....  Not overarchingly.  I have no fixed view on 
this but I’m prepared to believe that there may be demonic aspects to individual pronouncements 
of Islam as there doubtless are in certain pronouncements of the church over the years (Sudworth, 
Interview 33-35). 
 
As a mixture.  The same as Christianity.  So I think that Islam in its essence is a mixture that there’s 
some aspects of it in which I really think God is involved.  ..... At the same time I think that within 
Islam there is some very human stuff, human frailty, a mixture in terms of how what may come 
from God gets worked out on earth in the prophet Muhammad’s life and in the lives of other 
Muslims, and I also think that there is some stuff which is from the Devil.  ... and I think the same 
about Christianity (Musk Interview 51). 
 
9.3 HOW IS ISLAM TO BE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY? 
 
Clearly Evangelical evaluations of the origin of Islam have an enormous impact on their 
assessment of the theological relationship between Christianity and Islam.  In their turn these 
theological assessments have significant implications for personal relationships between 
Evangelicals and Muslims.  This section briefly examines some of the most contentious theological 
issues and the various opinions held across the Evangelical spectrum.  Of course whilst these 
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positions reflect the specific resources that the participants draw on in reflecting on Islam, they 
also reflect the general theology of different Evangelical streams. 
 
9.3.A WHAT THEOLOGICAL RESOURCES DO EVANGELICALS DRAW ON? 
The majority of participants, but by no means all, draw explicitly on Christian theology, historical 
and contemporary, in formulating their approach to Islam.  Notable exceptions include Green, 
Pawson, Solomon and even Sookhdeo.  These participants focus almost exclusively on interpreting 
Islamic source texts, traditions and history and draw very little on Christian theology.  Most though 
would agree with Chapman who, referring to those who have gone before, says, “we are heirs to a 
long tradition .... (and) we want to stand on their shoulders” (1998, 108).  The Evangelical writer 
most frequently referenced both in interviews and in written texts was clearly Cragg.  Sudworth 
calls him “possibly the greatest living Christian writer on Islam” (2009d).  He is regularly quoted, 
especially in the work of those who see Islam in a more positive light such as Bell, Chapman, Glaser 
and Musk.  That is not to say that they always agree with him: 
 
I think I would have to say that I've been influenced by Kenneth Cragg more than anyone else. I 
don't think I go all the way with him on some points, but I feel sure that he has been the most 
significant influence on myself and many other Evangelicals (Chapman, email follow up to 
interview).  
 
Newbigin is another twentieth century missionary theologian who has been an important 
influence on several of the participants including Musk (2008, 206) and Taylor (Taylor, Interview 
5).  Others who are occasionally mentioned include Sanneh, Waardenburg, D’Costa and 
O’Donovan.  Barth, does not seem to have had a wide influence, except in the work of Glaser, who 
also, referring to the world congress initiated by Billy Graham in 1974, places her work “in the 
Lausanne tradition of understanding the Bible as God’s written word” (2005, 32). Andrew Smith is 
distinctive in that he is clearly aware of more diverse resources and mentions the work of Volf,  
Gunton and Barnes amongst others (A. Smith, 2009). 
 
Not many authors draw on older theological works.  Glaser’s booklet Crusade Sermons, Francis of 
Assisi and Martin Luther (2010a) examines earlier attitudes to Islam and the Orr-Ewings mention 
the work of John Wycliffe (F. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 2002).  That is not to say that there is no 
influence from past Protestant theologians but rather that it is not made explicit. What is quite 
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clear is that the participants draw on one another’s work.  This is obvious not only from the 
number of direct quotations but also from the plethora of mutual acknowledgements, forewords 
and endorsements which reflect the internal alignments within the EPS (§11.4). 
 
9.3.B IS THERE CONTINUITY BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM? 
Islam claims to be the fulfilment and proper outworking of the earlier Jewish and Christian 
traditions, a claim vigorously contested by both these faiths.  There is disagreement amongst 
Christians, however, over the degree of continuity or discontinuity which exists. To illustrate this, 
Wood contrasts the work of Cragg and Newbigin (Wood, 2009).  Wood sees Cragg as championing 
continuity between Christianity and Islam.  In fact Cragg believes that it is possible for Muslims to 
“retrieve” from Islam “the Christ whom they have missed” (Cragg, 2000, 220).  Nazir-Ali also refers 
to Cragg in his work and comments on the close connection of the three major monotheist 
religions: "with both Judaism and Islam, Christianity has close historical and, whatever the 
differences, theological connections"  including the fact that both believe in one God who is the 
creator of the world and who is involved with the destiny and guidance of humankind (2008e, 30).  
Similarly Chapman lists seven “propositions” (2007b, 252) that suggest an overlap between 
Christian and Islamic beliefs (see Figure 9.1).  For the disciples of Cragg their acceptance of some 
partial continuity between the faiths is a major contributing factor to their focus on the similarities 
between Christianity and Islam. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 –Overlapping propositions (reproduced from Chapman, 2007, 252) 
 
 
God creates 
God is one 
God reveals 
God loves 
God judges 
God forgives 
God rules 
 
Christian Belief Islamic Belief 
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On the other hand, there are those who tend to focus on the discontinuity between the two faiths 
and inevitably highlight the differences.  Whilst Wood acknowledges that Newbigin saw “total 
discontinuity” as “inconceivable”, he suggests that Newbigin’s work is in some respects 
paradigmatic for these Christians (Wood, 2009, 130).  For instance, as Cotterell puts it “we can’t 
have two histories; both books can’t be right. .... it’s one or the other, or neither, but not both.  It’s 
Allah or it’s Yahweh” (2006, 35).  The stress for these participants is on the differences and this 
often leads to a more Manichean view: light versus darkness; right versus wrong; “love” versus 
“power” (Sookhdeo, 2006, 101).  This particularly becomes the case when one considers some of 
the important elements of Christian theology that are explicitly denied by Islam. 
 
9.3.C HOW ARE ISLAMIC DENIALS OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE TO BE UNDERSTOOD? 
Christianity and Islam clearly have enough in common that they at least share some of the same 
vocabulary.  However, these commonalities are often the sites of great tension and make the 
relationship more problematic.  Furthermore, Islam denies some of the foundational beliefs of the 
Christian faith.  One interviewee put it this way:  
 
from the Christian theological point of view, I see real differences between Islam and Christianity 
and therefore it cannot be the same things that we’re talking about. .... Because we claim we share 
common territory and a common tradition that is where our deepest differences arise from.  So for 
me theologically we have to be realistic that there are issues here and we have to engage that 
(Azumah, Interview 27). 
 
Chapman summarized the main Islamic denials of Christian theology in this way: 
 
Islam not only denies the Trinity, it denies the incarnation, it denies the atoning death of Jesus on 
the cross, it denies the resurrection, so the fundamentals of the Gospel are denied.  So I have to 
take account of that (Chapman, Interview 34). 
 
These denials centre almost entirely around the person and identity of Jesus Christ who is, by 
definition, of central importance to all the participants in the EPS.  Moucarry emphasized this 
point: 
 
my problem with Islamic teaching is not about God, it’s more about Jesus Christ.  And as you know 
Jesus Christ is seen as a great prophet in Islam but is not the Lord and the Saviour of humankind 
which is why I cannot accept Islam as a God-given religion because we have here conflicting truth 
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claims about who Jesus is.  And one has to choose either the Islamic perspective on Jesus as the 
right one or the Christian perspective.  We can’t accept both perspectives as being compatible with 
each other because they are not (Moucarry, Interview 59). 
 
Virtually all the participants would share this sentiment.  However, whilst some would accept that 
at least Christianity and Islam are talking about the same Jesus (or ‘Isa), others feel that they are 
not: 
 
the far, far bigger problem with Islam is they are undermining and downgrading Jesus Christ.  That 
is the essence of the problem and, if they can get that thought, it completely neuters Christianity.  If 
we accept that ‘Isa is the same as Jesus and we accept, of course we’re all talking about the same 
people, we can all agree he was a good prophet, but of course I mean you are then missing the 
essence of the Gospel.  Either Jesus was God or there is no faith.  Either He died and rose again or 
we have no faith.  We’re wasting our time.” (Craig, Interview 29) 
 
9.3.D WHO IS ALLAH? 
If the identity of Jesus is the focus of debate and disagreement between Evangelicals and Muslims, the 
identity and nature of Allah is the more contentious debate amongst Evangelicals themselves.  Brother 
Andrew suggests that Islam "presents a far greater challenge for Christians" than communism as, 
compared with communism’s "absurd claim that there is no God", Islam poses the question "who is 
God?" (Brother Andrew and Janssen, 2007, 245).  It is not necessary here to go into all the arguments 
surrounding what Musk calls “the big question” (2005, 147).  He seeks to answer the question by 
considering history, philology, theology and missiology.  Of greater interest here, however, is to note the 
sharpness of the disagreement amongst Evangelicals over this question.  Whilst some Evangelicals accept 
that Christians and Muslims are referring to the same God, others fiercely contest this and believe they 
worship different gods – the ultimate discontinuity. 
 
Those that identify Allah with the Christian God often do so on the basis that he is described by 
Muslims as the creator.  "If Christians and Muslims agree that there is only one God, the creator of 
the universe and of humanity, and both claim they are worshipping this God, then clearly they are 
both worshipping the same God" (Azumah, 2008, 139).  Bell includes a whole appendix on this 
question in his manual and concludes that “it is more helpful to see Allah as the God of the Bible, 
with the proviso that the Muslim understanding of Him is faulty” (2003, 82).  This final caveat is 
important and is common to all those who hold this position, as participants on both sides of the 
argument recognize that at the very least Christianity and Islam describe the character of God and 
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his actions very differently.  
 
Cotterell is typical of those who see a greater discontinuity in the nature of the gods described.  
Based on the denials discussed above he says:  
 
Islam rejects the Trinity, and makes it clear that Allah is not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus 
Christ.  Allah is not Yahweh, not the God defined in the Christian creeds, not the God who is 
described in the Bible as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one God" (Cotterell, 2006, 42). 
 
 Jay Smith believes that “all fundamental differences between Islam and Christianity are rooted in 
the perception of God” (quoted in Bell, 2003, 40).  In his interview he said: 
 
the difficulty is how do you define the name?  So I’m very careful. .... Who’s the character behind 
the name?  It’s completely different.  ..... the first question I ask any Muslim is ‘Can your Allah enter 
time and space?  Can he come to earth?’  Immediately then I let them answer that and then I say 
‘Well then you can see that we’re talking about two different Gods.  Get a bigger God – His name is 
Jesus!’ (J.Smith, Interview 51-53). 
 
In a YouTube video Smith points out that God’s proper name in the Bible is Yahweh, a name not 
found in the Qur’an.  He then mentions that it is unfortunate that Arab Christians also use the 
word Allah and suggests that "sooner or later we are going to have to change that" (J. Smith, 
2006).  This video attracted almost 2000 responses and a Muslim group made a video in reply that 
particularly referenced “Evangelical Christians” who were attacking the identity of Allah.115 
 
This question is of critical importance for some participants.  It appeared to be the reason one 
well-known Evangelical teacher declined to be interviewed by me. During a telephone 
conversation he asked me whether I believed that Allah was the God of the Bible.  My answer to 
that question, along with another about the source of Islam, was clearly enough to persuade him it 
was not worth meeting me.  Certainly there is a sharp criticism of each other amongst Evangelicals 
over this issue.  For example, speaking of those who consider Allah to be the same as the Christian 
God, Dye laments: 
 
                                                             
115 See Allah is the God of the Bible 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=moFwW4Sv9Ro&feature=watch_response (accessed 11 August 
2010). 
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tragically, their understandable love for the lost and opportunity for dialogue seems to have caused 
them to downplay the biblical revelation which shows unequivocally that the Allah of the Qur’an 
cannot be our God (Dye, 2009, xiii). 
 
The May-June 2010 edition of the Barnabas Aid magazine included a lengthy article discussing 
which term – God or Allah – should be used.  It concluded that: 
 
The important question is not whether Muslims and Christians use the same term for God or even 
whether they believe in the same God or in different gods, but what they each believe about God 
and His character.  Christians understand the nature of God by looking into the face of Christ, who 
revealed God to humanity.  They believe that God’s primary attribute is love and call him ‘Father’ 
(Barnabas Fund, 2010a). 
 
The article goes on to suggest that “as Muslims do not accept Christ as the only way to God”, 
whom they view as transcendent and “other”, then “they can have no valid access to the one and 
only true God they claim to worship” (ibid).    A rather different approach is taken by prominent 
Evangelical Steve Chalke writing in Christianity magazine (2010).  He is critical of the “insularity of 
so much Western Christianity (which) has often failed to do justice to the humility, devotion and 
longing for fellowship with God that is present in some other religions” (ibid 44).  For Chalke a 
“rejection of equality does not imply a denial of commonness”.  His article prompted letters to the 
editor that clearly revealed the division within the Evangelical community over this question 
(September 2010 issue). 
 
As in many other cases Green is at the extreme of this spectrum.  In a TV documentary he says 
bluntly “Allah is Satan” (Modell, 2008b).  This view is expanded on the Christian Voice website: 
 
when Muslims go into a mosque and bow down before their false god, ‘Allah’ (‘the god’ in Arabic) 
they are engaging in idol worship without realizing it.  It is only necessary to look at the symbol of 
Islam, the crescent moon, to realize the identity of the real spirit behind Islam.  It follows that a 
mosque is a place where demonic principalities and powers are glorified (Christian Voice, n.d.). 
 
Such stark statements emphasize what an important and contentious theological argument this is.  
Moreover, it is one that is bound to have implications for interaction between Evangelicals and 
Muslims.  As Bell says: 
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it is a critical question because how you answer it will determine everything else about your response to 
Muslims .... whether you take an apologetic or a polemic approach .... look for similarities or the 
contrasts (Bell, 2003, 82). 
 
9.3.E IS THERE SALVATION IN ISLAM? 
This discussion about the identity of God is certainly very much part of the Evangelical debate 
about Islam and salvation.  Moucarry in a seminar at Spring Harvest explained Race’s three-fold 
typology (§4.3) and clearly linked it to the different views that Christians hold about Islam 
(Moucarry, 2006).  Exclusivists, he suggested, tend to see Allah and Islam as demonic and “believe 
that (Christians) should engage with Muslims in terms of spiritual warfare and are not opposed 
even to the idea of engaging in polemics .... a war of words” because Muslims are seen as “God’s 
enemies”.  Pluralists, on the other hand, see Islam as God-given, focus on dialogue and want to 
encourage Muslims to be “genuine Muslims”.  Finally, inclusivists accept that “Muslims do worship 
God” but do not see Islam as a “saving faith”.  Rather “God is able to use Islam” to save some 
people.  “Muslims are neither our enemies, nor our brothers and sisters; they are our neighbours” 
and need to be engaged in dialogue as part of the Christian mission. 
 
It was very obvious that none of the Evangelicals interviewed would ever consider endorsing 
pluralism, which Riddell sees as a product of secular society, “theocentric rather than 
Christocentric”, and “in fact a new religion” (2004b, 208).  Glaser was typical: “I’m definitely not a 
pluralist.  That’s for sure” (Glaser, Interview 35).  So all the participants would see themselves as 
being either exclusivists or inclusivists.  However, whilst some were happy to be clearly identified, 
some were less sure and were reluctant to be labelled.   
 
Of those interviewed only McRoy took a strong, unmodified exclusivist stance.   “Exclusivism says 
there’s only one way of salvation, and that is basically the Evangelical position,” he stated 
emphatically (McRoy, Interview 21).116  Others interviewed were more cautious in their response.  
Wood said that he would see himself as “a form of inclusivist” (Wood, Interview 21), but nobody 
else made an unqualified statement about their position.  Goldsmith described himself as “a 
moderate exclusivist – something like that” (Goldsmith, Interview 58).  Bell and Chapman both saw 
                                                             
116 Although it seems likely that some of the other participants in the Evangelical public sphere would 
also hold this position it is regrettable that they were not available for interview and their views are not 
a matter of public record.   
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themselves as being “between the exclusivist and inclusivist” position (Bell, Interview 41, Chapman 
Interview 30), whilst Glaser placed herself “towards the exclusive end of the inclusivist spectrum” 
adding that “it’s simply not for us to say who’s going to be saved and who’s not” (Glaser, Interview 
35).   
 
Others questioned the usefulness of the typology.  Andrew Smith admitted, “I’m not sure any of 
those three exist really .... I probably end up sounding like an inclusivist.  I think inclusivism is just 
exclusivism with a nice badge on it to be honest” (A.Smith, Interview 63).  Musk even found 
himself identifying with all three positions, as did Newbigin before him  (Musk, Interview 49).117  
This ambiguity is maybe indicative of the shift which Riddell observes as “Protestant churches by 
and large have moved from a position of exclusivism to inclusivism since the Second World War” 
(2004b, 133).  The majority of those interviewed reflected this change.  That said, there is clearly a 
certain amount of reticence within this public sphere to make categorical statements and to pass 
judgement on the ultimate salvation of Muslims. 
 
9.3.F HOW IS ISLAM TO BE UNDERSTOOD  IN THE CONTEXT OF ISRAEL AND THE END TIMES? 
One final important area of theology to consider is eschatology.  Whilst there is relatively little 
speculation about Islam and end time scenarios, there is still an issue for British Evangelicals 
surrounding the role and status of Israel.  It is immediately noticeable in surveying books published 
by Evangelicals in Britain that there is a great deal less emphasis on Islam’s place in a future 
apocalypse than is the case in America (Kidd, 2009).  In fact quite the reverse is true and many of 
the authors and speakers featured in this survey go out of their way to distance themselves from 
such dispensationalist views.  Musk, for instance, severely criticizes the outworking of this 
theology in America.  He claims that such views result in Muslims being seen as “obstacles to 
God’s plans for Israel in the last days” (2008, xxii).  Chapman agreed and suggested that such 
theology “inevitably puts the whole of Islam in a very demonized situation” (Chapman, Interview 
76). 
 
Of course, this eschatological view is not entirely absent from the British church.  Wood reported 
meeting a leader in a small church who was very pro-Israel and commented that “the Israel-
Palestine situation does reinforce for some people a particular eschatology and therefore colours 
                                                             
117 See Newbigin (1989, 182). 
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their whole approach to Muslims” (Wood, Interview 47).  Bell, who does not entirely dismiss 
eschatological concerns and believes that “we are now likely to be in the closing days of history” 
(2003, 9), is nonetheless impatient with those who focus on speculation about the future.  He 
suggests that “Christians would be more use if they invested time praying for Israel rather than 
delving into prophetic speculation” (Bell, 2006b, 113). 
 
The scarcity of apocalyptic speculation notwithstanding, modern Israel remains a key issue for 
British Evangelicals.  In fact disagreements over the degree to which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
causes conflict between Islam and the West is a major source of tension between Evangelicals 
which becomes clear as I change direction to look at how British Evangelicals understand Islamic 
ideology. 
 
9.4 WHAT IS ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY? 
 
Islam does not only challenge Christianity theologically.  For many Evangelicals the greater 
challenge is ideological and has far wider implications than a theological dispute.118  For these 
observers the essence of Islam is not just religious but political.  Solomon and Al-Maqdisi put it like 
this: 
 
(Islam) is a whole encompassing system.  It is first and foremost a socio-political and socio-religious 
system, as well as a socio-economic, socio-educational, legislative, judiciary, and military system, 
cloaked and garbed in religious terminology (2006, 6, emphasis in original). 
 
Viewing Islam as an ideology leads to concerns and questions over, amongst other things, Islam’s 
relationship to the West and its approach to power, violence, territory and global ambition.  These 
are explored conceptually below and will be taken up in the next chapter when considering 
Evangelical reactions to socio-political developments in Britain. 
 
  
                                                             
118 It is worth noting that scholars of Islam also acknowledge the ideological nature of Islamic texts in 
the formative as well as the modern period (Rippin, 2000). 
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9.4.A IS ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY COMPATIBLE WITH WESTERN FORMS OF THINKING? 
As observed above (§9.1.b), those who focus on Islam as an ideology nonetheless almost all 
endeavour to emphasize that “the vast majority of (Muslims) lead law-abiding lives and live 
peaceably with their neighbours, including those of other faiths” (Cox and Marks, 2006, 1).  They 
also accept that there is a measure of diversity within Islam.  Nonetheless, many of them question 
whether Islam as they understand it is ideologically compatible with Christianity, liberal democracy 
and the West, and, by and large, conclude that it is not.  This incompatibility, however, is not 
uniformly viewed as being the fault of Islam.  Two books that illustrate these different approaches 
are Cox and Marks’ The West, Islam and Islamism: Is ideological Islam compatible with liberal 
democracy? (2006) and Musk’s second edition of Holy War: Why do some Muslims become 
fundamentalists (2003)? 119  
 
Cox and Marks are concerned that "peaceable Islam may be endangered by the beliefs and 
practices of radical Islamists" which is "perhaps the greatest challenge facing Islam today" (2006, 
10).  They suggest that the epistemological principles on which Islamism rest are fundamentally 
opposed to those of western liberal democracy.  Whilst the latter are academic and rational, the 
former are “closed, dogmatic and monolithic" due to a reliance on "claims of revealed truth and 
infallibility" (ibid 21).  They compare this “ideological mode” to that of former Marxist regimes and 
conclude that radical Islamists are trying "to undermine or even destroy the Western societies 
they have so far failed to emulate scientifically or economically” (ibid 57).   
 
Musk typically evinces a more sympathetic interpretation of “Islamic fundamentalism”.  In his 
comparison between Islam and the West he notes that, whilst the Islamic concept of tawhid puts 
God at the centre of the Muslim worldview, western secular humanism has put man at the centre 
of its worldview.  He goes on to suggest that western Christians have largely acquiesced with this 
view and have thus accepted the relegation of their faith to the private domain.  Thus, for Musk, 
“the irony of the situation is that modern Islamic ‘fundamentalists’ adhere to a worldview that is 
                                                             
119 It is interesting to note that this book was first published under the title of Passionate Believing 
(Musk, 1992).  The second edition, however, published in 2003 specifically in response to 9/11, is 
entitled Holy War.  In his interview the author informed me that he preferred the original title but the 
publisher wanted to include the phrase ‘holy war’ in the new edition.  The new edition added two new 
chapters explaining the history and rise of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.  Musk describes the book 
as “the most important of the materials I have written concerning Islam” (2003, 7). 
  189 Chapter 9 
 
far closer to the biblical norm than is our western aberration” (2003, 68).  He suggests that Islamic 
ideology is really a critique of western materialism and should “provoke us to stop and reflect” 
(ibid 250).  So for Musk it is not so much Islamic ideology which is incompatible with western 
liberalism but secular liberalism which is incompatible with belief in God and the public practice of 
religion. 
 
There is one point, however, on which all Evangelical commentators seem to agree: Islam 
embraces, and indeed actively seeks, temporal political power.  Green bluntly describes Islam as “a 
violent political force masquerading as a religion”(S. Green, 2006).  Others are more subtle and 
make reference to the Islamic principle of din wa dawla (religion and government) pointing out 
that since its inception Islam has always sought political power (e.g. Moucarry, 2008, 38).  
Sookhdeo suggests that one of the reasons for this is that, whilst in Christianity God is seen as 
“love”, in Islam God is seen as “power” (2006, 101).  Several follow Cragg in tracing the cause to 
Muhammad’s decision to move to Medina at the hijra (the migration in 622 AD) (e.g. Wood, 2009, 
72).  His acceptance of political power at that point is contrasted with Jesus who, in the Garden of 
Gethsemane, chose the suffering of the cross over temporal power.  In similar vein Musk quotes 
Newbigin’s stark comparison of the two founders: “the Prophet rode into Mecca to conquer; Jesus 
rode into Jerusalem to die.  The crux lies there” (in Musk, 2003, 257).  Knell summed up all this in 
his interview: “Islam is very much about power.  It’s about power, it’s about success, it’s about 
achievement, it’s about military might, and Islam always struggles when it’s not in a position of 
power” (Knell, Interview 16).   
 
9.4.B IS ISLAM INHERENTLY VIOLENT? 
This perceived Islamic struggle for power is a major source of concern for Evangelicals.  The 
question is what form this struggle takes.  The contentious Arabic word for it – jihad, meaning 
“fight” or “battle” (Cowan, 1976) – is variously interpreted and many are concerned that its most 
natural expression is in “holy war”.  Yet again, however, Evangelicals are divided in their opinions.  
Whilst some see jihad as inherently violent and blame Islamic terrorism on the nature of Islam and 
the contents of its sacred texts, others believe that the causes of Islamic violence equally lie in 
western attitudes and foreign policy.   
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All recognize that talking about “Islamic violence” is a sensitive issue.  Referring to recent terror 
plots Williams said: 
 
that is Islamic terror.  That is what it is.  We have evidence that that’s actually what it is and people 
begin to get scared of saying it .... Of course not every Muslim backs that stuff, but again what 
we’re seeing is that in the public domain and amongst leadership these sorts of atrocities are 
happening in the name of Islam (Williams, Interview 76). 
 
Evangelicals are also careful to stress that semantically Islam does not mean “peace” and point out 
that the literal meaning of the Arabic word islam is “submission” (e.g. A. Smith Interview 27, 
Solomon, 2006a).120   The connection between these two is that in Islam peace is achieved when a 
person – or society – submits to God’s revealed will.  This sounds ominous to many Evangelicals as 
it appears that the Muslims’ goal is “to bring the rest of mankind to such submission” (Musk, 2003, 
243).   
 
Sookhdeo is particularly critical of those politicians and church leaders who portray Islam as 
essentially peaceful (Sookhdeo, 2006, 11). Maybe one such church leader he has in mind is Lord 
Carey who, whilst he sees “a sharp ideological tension” between the West and the Muslim world, 
believes that this “does not reflect the true values of Islam” (Carey, 2004b).  Not all are convinced 
by this.  Referring to Carey’s speech Dye rather sceptically remarks: "let us hope that his 
assumption concerning the peaceful nature of Islam is correct" (2007, 61).   
 
One other point of general agreement is that the Qur’anic revelation moves chronologically from 
peace to violence.  Cotterell in his explanation of Islam on the EA website explains that “there is 
what has been called a trajectory of violence running through the Qur’an from submission, to 
defensive fighting, to aggressive fighting” (2005).  This chronological shift again is thought to have 
come about as a result of Muhammad’s move from Mecca, where he was in a position of 
weakness, to Medina, where he was in a position of power and not afraid to use military force.  
                                                             
120 It is interesting to note that in Sookhdeo (2006) it is wrongly stated that “‘salam’ (peace) and ‘Islam’ 
may sound similar but they are unrelated and do not come from the same (Arabic) root” (ibid 13).  In a 
parallel passage in Sookhdeo (2009) this has been corrected to “It is true that both ‘salam’ (peace) and 
‘Islam’ (submission) come from the same root.  But in Arabic a root can carry a variety of meanings ....  
Form 1 leads to the noun ‘salam’ (peace).  Form 4 leads to the nouns ‘islam’ (submission) and ‘Islam’ 
(the religion)” (ibid 18). 
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Since that time Goldsmith (2009) suggests that violence has followed Islam down through the 
centuries. 
 
In this regard most of the participants go on to discuss the Islamic concept of al-nasikh wal-
mansukh (abrogation).  This is the principle whereby discrepancies in the revealed text are 
resolved by concluding that later revelations abrogate or supersede earlier revelations.  The Orr-
Ewings explain this concept and then, commenting on the infamous “sword verse” (Surah 9:5)  121, 
point out that: 
 
there are some Muslims who argue that this verse need not be interpreted literally any more, but 
many do still hold that the Qur’an is the immutable Word of God and that these sections have 
enduring practical relevance.  It is true that the Qur’an also contains verses urging tolerance of non-
Muslims, as we have seen, but these verses frequently predate the more belligerent ones and are 
thus abrogated by them” (2002, 31).   
 
Musk recognizes that a similar principle is used in Christianity to explain the progression from the 
violence of the Old Testament to the teaching of Jesus in the New Testament.  However, in 
company with several others he feels that whilst abrogation in Christianity leads from war to 
peace, in Islam it leads from peace to war.  He suggests that “the doctrine of abrogation features 
strongly in Islamists’ arguments for a literal interpretation of the concept of jihad” and he goes on 
to list all the Qur’anic verses expressing toleration that were later abrogated by the “sword verse” 
(Musk, 2008, 58).  The doctrine of abrogation is thus seen as problematic by almost all participants 
and Musk calls on Muslim scholars and leaders “to address the issue of abrogation as part of their 
response to the Islamists’ agenda” (ibid 57).122   
 
                                                             
121 “When the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and 
seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war).” Surah 9:5, (Yusuf Ali 
translation). 
122 Interestingly this is a contentious issue within Islam too.  Taha (1987) suggested that there were 
two messages in Islam: the first an historically conditioned message formulated in response to 
humankind’s weakness and based on the later Medinan revelations; the second a form of higher Islam 
based on the earlier Meccan revelations which humankind can rise to as it evolves.  This led him into 
conflict with the ‘ulama in Sudan over the relevance and application of the shari‘a and he was executed 
for heresy and political sedition in 1985.  His work is continued today by An-Na‘im (1990).  (Taha, 1987) 
(An-Na'im, 1990). 
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Chapman is one of the few Evangelical authors that mention another principle used by Muslims to 
explain violent verses in the Qur’an, namely asbab al-nuzul (the occasions of revelation).  He 
points out that “many very orthodox moderate Muslim scholars have their own ways of dealing 
with (textual) problems .... They have always insisted that every verse needs to be understood in 
the context in the life of the Prophet in which it was revealed” (Chapman, 2005b).  Thus, for 
instance, they would understand Surah 9:5 to be only applicable in time of war and not incumbent 
on all Muslims at all times.  Moucarry agreed: 
 
well I would say, you can’t use verses in the Qur’an without putting them in their historical context 
.... because yes there are texts in the Qur’an which could be misunderstood if they are interpreted 
in isolation from the Qur’an as a whole (Moucarry, Interview 55).  
 
Despite this many Evangelicals insist that Islam is inherently violent and that this is the traditional 
Islamic position.  Following the 7/7 bombings Sookhdeo criticized the general reluctance to name 
the violence as “Islamic” and argued that “if (the bombers) say they do it in the name of Islam, we 
must believe them. Is it not the height of illiberalism and arrogance to deny them the right to 
define themselves?”  He went on to suggest: 
 
could it be that the young men who committed suicide were neither on the fringes of Muslim 
society in Britain, nor following an eccentric and extremist interpretation of their faith, but rather 
that they came from the very core of the Muslim community and were motivated by a mainstream 
interpretation of Islam?” (P. Sookhdeo, 2005b, , emphasis added).123 
 
The reason for believing Islam to be inherently violent is explained in different ways.  Firstly, some 
see the cause lying in the Qur’an itself.  "The problem with finding and promoting moderation 
within Islam is that the most 'natural' reading of Islamic texts, as well as much influential historical 
interpretation of these, provide fuel for the radicals" (Dye, 2007, 50).  Cox and Marks share this 
opinion feeling that moderate interpretations rely on disingenuous, selective “cherry picking” of 
tolerant texts: 
 
                                                             
123 For a strong riposte see Chapman (2005b). Chapman (2005b) An Open Letter to Patrick Sookhdeo, 
Fulcrum Forum, http://www.fulcrum-
anglican.org.uk/news/2005/200510chapman.cfm?CFID=913355&CFTOKEN=884c8f00a1260bab-
45C1DA48-FEBC-ABC8-5DEACC7F58CDA6D6, accessed 14 June 2010 
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ironically, the most straightforward expositions of the Qur’an and the Sunna are often those given 
by the Islamists whose brutal clarity is in stark contrast to the evasiveness of many cherry pickers 
(Cox and Marks, 2006, 194-5). 
 
Defending his polemical debating style Jay Smith says, “I just open up the Qur’an and I read its 
pages and I try to find out where people are sourcing their material for what they are doing in the 
world today" (J. Smith, 2008a).124  Even more irenic Evangelicals recognize the violence that lies 
within the pages of the Qur’an.  Bell says that “the under-reported fact of the matter is that the 
Qur’an itself contains over a hundred violent jihadic passages and a hundred and nine passages 
urging war in the name of Islam” (2006b, 44).125  Even Musk admits that for the Islamists “the 
Qur’an is the primary motivator and justifier of their extreme actions” (2008, xiv). 
 
Secondly, for some it is not just the Qur’an but also the example of Muhammad which incites 
violence in Islam.  Azumah observes that “Muslims have always taken pride in the military exploits 
of Muhammad” (2008, 41).  Cotterell makes a similar observation and compares Jesus, “the man 
of peace”, with Muhammad who “was most decidedly not a man of peace: according to the 
earliest biography of Muhammad (written by Ibn Ishaq, a Muslim), he was personally engaged in 
26 or 27 battles!” (2007).  Many feel, therefore, that it is not surprising that some Muslims turn to 
violence as “Muhammad's own example shows clearly that he frequently interpreted jihad as 
literal warfare and himself ordered massacre, assassination and torture” (P. Sookhdeo, 2005b).  
This necessarily “casts a bleak question mark” over the assessment of Muhammad as an 
“exemplar, the perfect example” (Riddell and Cotterell, 2003, 30). 
 
The third commonly identified cause of Islamic violence is the teaching and interpretation of jihad.  
Many authors note that there are different categories of jihad within traditional Islamic thinking 
ranging from the internal struggle against sin to outright warfare against non-Muslims.  Some 
suggest, however, that the softer interpretations are a more recent innovation.  For instance, 
Azumah claims that “the notion that jihad is a spiritual struggle or a last resort in self defence is 
purely a post-modern apologia and is hardly borne out by mainstream Muslim scholarship” (2008, 
41).  Rather Sookhdeo, in his 669-page book on the topic, believes that: 
                                                             
124 Smith made a similar point on the BBC programme Newsnight, ‘Should Wilders have been granted 
entry to the UK?’ (broadcast 12 February 2009) which can be seen at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/7888607.stm (accessed 20 December 2010) 
125 Bell references these statistics from Richardson (2003). (Richardson, 2003) 
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there is no doubt that in Islamic history jihad has normally been viewed, both in traditional Islamic 
law and in Islamic practice, as the armed conflict against non-Muslims permanently waged to 
ensure the victory of God’s chosen community and religion, the Umma, over all polytheistic 
powers, peoples and lands” (Sookhdeo, 2007a, 13).
126
 
 
This leads some Evangelical participants to portray jihad purely in terms of inter-religious 
confrontation.  In particular Solomon and Al-Maqdisi suggest that “it is the enmity itself that fuels 
and drives jihad in all of its forms – toward the Jew first but ultimately to all religions, as when it 
comes to jihad, no non-Muslim is exempt” (2010, xvi).  According to them the whole of Islam, 
including each one of the five pillars or duties, is aimed at furthering jihad against non-Muslims 
(2009b, 10).127 
 
Several of the participants point to one further significant theological motivation for violence and 
particularly of martyrdom missions and suicide bombings.  Islam, they claim, offers no assurance 
of a place in paradise other than to die in jihad.  This point comes out strongly in the writing and 
speaking of the Orr-Ewings.  For instance, at the popular Keswick Convention Amy Orr-Ewing 
stressed her belief that it is not sociological or political grievances that produce suicide bombers 
but rather the lack of eschatological assurance in a religion that apparently offers no certainty of 
future paradise apart from martyrdom in jihad (A. Orr-Ewing, 2006).  Sookhdeo makes the same 
connection in his Pocket Guide to Islam claiming that for Muslims desperate to escape hell 
“becoming a suicide bomber is the one sure way to avoid the torments of the grave” (2010a, 17). 
 
9.4.C ARE THERE OTHER CAUSES OF ISLAMIC VIOLENCE? 
Nonetheless, not all Evangelicals accept that Islam is inherently and essentially violent.  Some take 
a middle path.  Riddell and Cotterell, for instance, believe that “the Islamic sacred texts offer the 
potential for being interpreted in both ways (i.e. peaceful and violent).  It depends how the 
individual Muslims wish to read them” (2003, 192).  In a speech in the House of Lords Nazir-Ali 
                                                             
126 Note White’s (2009a) scathing review of this book that caused controversy in the EPS in 2009 
(§11.4.c). 
127 Again, whilst in this thesis I do not attempt an exploration of debate on these issues amongst 
Muslims, it is important to note that some Muslims share these concerns.  See for instance An-Na’im’s 
discussion of the incompatibility of shari‘a with international law as it “sanctions the use of force to 
propagate Islam” (An-Na'im, 1990, 151). 
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drew attention to the role of highly educated ideologues who use and manipulate poor, 
uneducated Muslims particularly from the madrasas of Pakistan and suggested that “some urgent 
dialogue needs to take place between Muslims and Christians on when armed conflict might be 
justifiable” (Nazir-Ali, 2004).  Still others point to local regional factors (Azumah, Interview 7, Bell, 
Interview 39) or cultural factors such as preservation of izzat (honour) (McRoy, 2006, 233). 
 
For others though the violence perpetrated by some Muslims is not necessarily indicative of the 
nature of Islam.  Whilst not exonerating Islam entirely, these commentators are aware of other 
contributing factors and are often highly critical of the role of the West, in marked contrast to 
those who appear to attach no blame at all to western actions or attitudes.  These Evangelicals 
believe that understanding the causes of Muslim anger is a critical issue in Christian-Muslim 
relations. 
 
I know this is almost the $64,000 question, but I’m not convinced that Islam is inherently violent. .... 
this is the pivotal issue that underlines whatever position people are going to take.  You either 
believe Islam is inherently violent or you’re prepared to stand back and say there are contributing 
factors within it that seem to allow it, condone it, qualify it (Bell, Interview 39). 
 
Sudworth was at pains to point out that, whilst there might be “tendencies within Islam, .... to say 
any system or people is inherently violent is an unchristian statement because it’s a 
predetermined predisposition which denies that God can work to change people whether they’re 
Christian or not” (Sudworth, Interview 41).   So Chapman insists that: 
 
instead of suggesting that 'the Qur’an is essentially violent', Christians should listen to the internal 
debate between moderate and extremist Muslims and add whatever weight they can to support 
Muslims who challenge the more violent interpretations of the Qur’an, and who do so from within 
Islam (Chapman, 2007a, 5, emphasis in original). 
 
Of course, these Evangelicals are very careful to stress that they do not in any way condone 
violence.  Chapman in his booklet on the topic declares at the outset his “condemnation of 
terrorism of every kind in the strongest possible terms ... A firm stand against terrorism, however, 
needs to go hand-in-hand with serious reflection on the root causes of terrorism” (2005a, 4). 
 
Indeed Chapman has been at the forefront of the debate about external causes of Islamic 
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violence.  He argues that “terrorism itself, it seems, is not the root of the problem; it is usually a 
reaction to a perceived injustice, and therefore needs to be seen as a symptom of other 
underlying problems” (Chapman, 2007b, 191).128  Others agree with him.  Bell observes that “Islam 
critiques the West; that’s why they are angry” (2006a).  Nazir-Ali explicitly identifies Israel-
Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kosova as the “flashpoints” which "are the cause of 
(terrorism) and not only the location for it" (2002, 92).  He recognizes that “there is a sense of 
injustice, and the sharper it is, the more extreme the measures to counter it will be" (ibid).  
Moucarry summed up this more self-critical approach in his interview: 
 
it is very easy to blame Islam and Muslims and make them a scapegoat without taking a very critical 
look at ourselves, you know.  I am sure that the foreign policy of many Western countries has 
contributed to these extremist interpretations of Islam which is found among Muslim extremists.  
So rather than accusing Islam of being a violent religion, perhaps some people should ask 
themselves whether they have any part in the way they have, through their foreign policy, pushed 
Muslims to take extremist views and extremist understanding of Islam (Moucarry, Interview 53). 
 
McRoy exemplifies such a self-critical approach.  Writing in The Muslim Weekly he declared that “if 
the British government wants to prevent another 7/7, it needs to address what caused it – foreign 
policy” (2005b).  He is particularly critical of western support for Israel and believes that the plight 
of the Palestinians is a major cause of Muslim anger. 
 
As already noted (§9.3.f) this latter point is a particularly contentious issue amongst Evangelicals.  
Should Christians support Israel or the Palestinians?  Again Chapman has been at the forefront of 
the argument.129  He believes that “if we want to understand the anger that has been building up 
within the Muslim world in recent decades, it is important that we try to understand what the 
creation of Israel has meant for Muslims” (Chapman, 2007b, 145) and again “we are dealing here 
with one of the most important and the most bitter of all the complaints that Muslims direct 
towards the West” (2004a, 194).  Several other authors also identify it as an issue.  Bell admits that 
“clearly one of the biggest blockages to gaining the trust of Muslims is the fact that they perceive 
the West (i.e. including the Christian church) to be endorsing and financially supporting the 
political state of Israel” (2003, 30).  Glaser too recognized that: 
                                                             
128 It should be noted that Chapman did not express this view in the first edition of Cross and Crescent 
(1995).  Indeed the topic of political Islam was largely missing from the first edition, an omission which 
is corrected in the second edition (2007) in response to world events. 
129 See Chapman (2002) and (2004c). (Chapman, 2002), (Chapman, 2004c) 
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you have the Christians who are very pro-Palestinian and you find Evangelicals in that situation who 
are really out for truth and righteousness and justice, and that makes them likely to be more 
sympathetic towards Muslims, and on the other side you’ve got your Zionist fruitcakes who want to 
be Jews and see all that’s going on in the Middle East in those terms (Glaser, Interview 53). 
 
Musk points out that some well-known Evangelical church leaders in the UK including David 
Pawson have “identified themselves as ‘Christian Zionists’” (Musk, 2003, 263, see also note 147 on 
page 309).  This is not just a theological position.  Moucarry believes it tends to make them “very 
negative in their approach to Muslims” (Moucarry, Interview 93).  This in turn has political 
implications as Arabs and Muslims conclude that, particularly in America, “the theology of 
Christian Zionism is behind the ‘biased foreign policy’ of the United States” (Musk, 2003, 263).  
This brings the issue to the forefront of Christian-Muslim relations: 
 
I’ve been to many interfaith conferences and the problem that comes up consistently is the 
question of the Israel and Palestinian conflict.  What has that got to do with Muslims and 
Christians?  That’s the Jews and Muslims.  There’s a serious issue there (Azumah, Interview 31).  
 
The Israel-Palestine issue is not only a cause of disagreement between Christians and Muslims but 
also amongst Evangelicals themselves.  Riddell believes that "while the conflict fuels the radical 
Islamist movement, it is not a root cause (of violence)” (2004b, 171).  Both Chapman (2007a, 4) 
and McRoy (2003) though take issue with this lack of causal association.  In his interview Riddell 
acknowledged this criticism but made his point even more explicit: 
 
if anybody suggests that really the root cause of ‘Islamic terror’, if you want to use that term, is say 
American and British foreign policy, then I have to say well the problem is that I see a similar 
phenomenon having happened during the early years of Islamic history .... there was a common thread 
there, so I just don’t buy the line that it’s all to do with present foreign policy issues and if there is a 
change of foreign policy it will just go away.  I just don’t buy that line (Riddell, Interview 55).130    
 
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi’s Al-Yahud: Eternal Islamic Enmity and the Jews is also an explicit 
rejection of the causal nature of contemporary Middle East politics.  They conclude that: 
                                                             
130 See also his article in Church Times, ‘The question no one wants to face’, where he says, “a statement 
that the problem lies in British foreign policy is simply a cop-out. Rather, the fundamental ingredients 
for such attitudes lie in parts of the Islamic sacred texts, which, taken literally along a timeline from 
Mecca to Medina, easily produce a mindset of hostile separation” (Riddell, 2006). 
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the myth that Israel has caused the enmity can also be seen for what it is – a distortion of ‘cause 
and effect’ meant to distract from the true roots of both the endemic Islamic ‘enmity’ towards the 
Jews, and the endemic Islamic ‘claims’ to Jerusalem and the entire holy land” (Solomon and Al-
Maqdisi, 2010, 124). 
 
Elsewhere Solomon suggests that to identify contemporary political situations as the cause of 
violence is “to put the cart before the horse” (Solomon, 2006c).  To quote Sookhdeo once more: 
 
no other religious group in recent times have been shown to pose such a threat of violence and 
terrorism across the globe as consistently as Muslims do.  Is there something distinctive about Islam 
as a religion that makes it more likely to justify violence in other religions? (Sookhdeo, 2007a, 44). 
 
9.4.D WHAT IS ISLAM’S GLOBAL AGENDA? 
The ultimate fear that some Evangelicals have about Islam as an ideology is that they believe it to 
be seeking world domination.  This fear forms the backdrop to the following chapter on 
Evangelical reactions to Islam in Britain.  However, the claims about the ideological roots of Islam’s 
global agenda properly follow on from the discussion of violence and are briefly explored here to 
set the scene for the next chapter. 
 
Some Evangelicals discuss these issues in the context of Huntington’s thesis of an inexorable “clash 
of civilizations”.  At least eleven of the Evangelical participants refer to this thesis in their writing 
or speaking, although it has to be pointed out that not all of them by any means agree with the 
inevitability embedded in it.  Carey, in particular, has used it to frame many of his speeches on 
Christian-Muslim relations but always concludes that such a clash is not inevitable.  Whilst he 
believes “it would be foolish to claim that Huntington’s thesis lacks total validity” (2005b) he 
clearly says that “I for one do not accept that the future is one of escalating violence, deepening 
bitterness and a grudging dialogue between 'incompatible faiths' and cultures” (2004a).   
 
Other Evangelicals disagree.  Solomon and Al-Maqdisi believe that “he is mistaken who thinks that 
the Islamic conquest that was started by Muhammed some 1400 years ago is over” (2009b, 29).  
For them it continues today.  Sookhdeo, referring to Huntington’s comments about Islam’s 
“bloody borders”, claims that “Islam has an inbuilt theological urge at its very core towards 
empire-building i.e. the continual expansion of its political dominion” (2007a, 103).  Elsewhere he 
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discusses the Islamic doctrine of “sacred space” and concludes that “Islam is a territorial religion, 
very conscious of whether or not an area is under Islamic control” (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 45).  He 
believes this is highlighted when Muslims talk about Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb and is a “key 
motivation of radical Muslims” (ibid 45).   
 
The Islam in Britain report also expresses concern about the political and territorial ambitions of 
Islam.  It quotes a spokesman for Regent's Park mosque saying "the Muslims will be the next 
civilization to lead the world and will take the world to new horizons" (ISIC, 2005, 15).  The report 
itself goes on to say: 
 
the real root of Muslim radicalism in Britain is Muslim self-understanding as a religious community 
theologically destined to world dominion.  Most contemporary Muslims, like most Muslims in the 
past, see Islam as a religious and political ideology inherently committed to expansion into infidel 
territory, which must be sanctified for Islam ... Radicalism and violence are inherent in much of 
traditional Muslim theology, ideology, sectarianism and history (ISIC, 2005, 53).   
 
As Green sees it, “Islam makes no bones about its goal, which is the establishment of a world-wide 
Islamic state under the dominion of Allah” (S. Green, 2006, 3).   
 
Again it should be emphasized that not all Evangelicals are so reductionist in their assessment.  
Even though Chapman notes that “bringing land under the control of Islam and keeping it within 
Islam has always been a very fundamental goal for Muslims who know anything of their history”, 
he clearly does not accept the inevitability of a “clash of civilizations” (Chapman, 2007b, 85).  The 
Orr-Ewings too, whilst broadly accepting Huntington’s thesis, caution that although “it is helpful to 
start with this broad brush approach, a simplistic projection of monolithic Western civilization 
pitted against a monolithic Islamic civilization must be avoided” (2002, 74).  However, as I turn to 
examine Evangelical reactions to the public role of Islam in Britain, it is clear that some 
Evangelicals do embrace Huntington’s thesis and believe that:   
 
Britain is facing a challenge unlike anything faced for many centuries.  It is the challenge of a new 
religion, which is both a faith and territorial power, a religion which could easily become 
numerically and structurally the dominant religion in coming years (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 229). 
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CHAPTER 10 THE SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAM 
 
Following on from these reflections on Islam’s global ambitions, this chapter explores the data to 
discover how the participants in the EPS view the socio-political implications of Islam in Britain.  It 
would be impossible to understand their various reactions without some appreciation of what 
they perceive to be the proper relationship between religion and the state.  The first section 
briefly examines the participants’ opinions on church-state relations.  The second section then 
explores Evangelical reactions to the increasing ethnic and religious diversity of British society and 
the deficiencies and failures that they perceive in multiculturalism.  This naturally leads on to a 
consideration of the Islamization that some observe in various sectors of British society ranging 
through everyday life, education, media, law and finance.  The chapter closes with a review of the 
participants’ various predictions concerning the future of Islam in Britain, which especially includes 
the fear of an Islamic takeover and the various solutions proposed to prevent this. 
 
10.1 EVANGELICALS AND THE STATE 
 
Some Evangelicals feel that Britain should be a “Christian country”.  Dye reminds his readers that 
in the 2001 UK Census over 70% claimed to be Christian and comments that this “should warn 
people against suggesting that Britain is no longer a ‘Christian’ country” (Dye, 2007, 19).  This is a 
strong theme of the campaign work of both Williams (CCFON) and Green (Christian Voice): 
 
the government should say frankly and unapologetically that this was, is and is going to be a 
Christian nation, and that anyone who does not like that state of affairs is free to leave (S. Green, 
2005, 18). 
 
However, most do not to take quite such an ideological view of establishment (§3.4.c).  Craig 
called Green a “Christendom man” (Craig, Interview 11) and Bell, Chapman, Knell, McRoy, 
Moucarry and Musk all expressed scepticism about Christendom and doubted that Britain had 
ever been a “Christian country”.  Glaser warns against harking back to the model of Israel in the 
Old Testament and interestingly - in the light of the attitudes of the BMC leaders (§11.3.c) - 
observes that: 
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 non-Western Christians sometimes dream of a Christian state, and criticize Westerners for 
separating ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ .... Wanting to link state and faith is natural, but can be dangerous.  
It should make us ask to what extent the separation of church and state reflects a wrong separation 
of faith and the rest of life, and to what extent it is a unique and liberating Christian idea” (Glaser, 
2005, 203). 
 
Nonetheless many regret a sense of decline in the nation and speak of a spiritual “vacuum” 
(Pawson, 2003, 22, Sookhdeo, 2006, 4).  They believe that Britain has “Christian roots” (Craig, 
Interview 41) and that “our ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ democracy was based on Christianity” (Glaser, 
2000a, 16, see also Newbigin et al., 2005).  This is something that most feel should be publicly 
acknowledged and Nazir-Ali urges people to “put the Christian case vigorously in public debate, 
that will remind the nation of its Christian heritage” (2009). 
 
Even former bishop Nazir-Ali, however, is ambivalent about the establishment of the church in 
Britain, suggesting that the church should "move from patterns of 'working with the grain', of 
being part of the social furniture, to being radically alternative communities” (Nazir-Ali, 2008e, 
11).  Bell, Knell and Jay Smith, all from non-conformist backgrounds, were ideologically in favour of 
disestablishment (§3.4.c), as was the Anglican Riddell who said: 
 
I don’t see how we can privilege one religious group over another in terms of the structures of state 
... I would disestablish the lot (Riddell, Interview 11). 
 
However, Craig, Sudworth and Andrew Smith each observed that, whilst they had held 
disestablishment positions in the past, they were now more pragmatically in favour of 
establishment of the church, partly because they saw it as a positive benefit for minority faiths 
(Chapman, Interview 16).  Sudworth warned against a “glib iconoclasm” and counselled that “for 
the church to voluntarily wind back things I’m not so sure is wise or appropriate” (Sudworth, 
Interview 19).  Speaking of the multicultural nature of Britain today Taylor agrees and says: 
 
it could well be argued that pluralism, limited by existing laws in terms of unacceptable elements of 
social and religious praxis …. and guaranteed by a state church acting as a broker for religion within 
the secular polity, is not only a more likely way forward than total assimilation (of different 
minorities), but the only realistic one (J. Taylor, 2005b, 125-6 emphasis added). 
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10.2 EVANGELICALS AND MULTICULTURALISM 
 
The Evangelical participants in this public sphere, however, are by and large critical of 
multiculturalism and the way that successive British governments have pursued it as a policy.  
Although a few see some positive benefits, the majority feels that it has failed and should be 
rethought.  Furthermore, several fear that Islam has been the beneficiary of these policies at the 
expense of other faiths in general and Christianity in particular. 
 
Sookhdeo has been an especially outspoken critic of multiculturalism and the place he believes it 
has afforded to Islam.  He himself came to Britain from Guyana in the 1960s as a Muslim and later 
converted to Christianity.  He remembers that at that time immigrants were expected to 
assimilate and adapt to the British way of life (Sookhdeo, 2009b).  However, all this changed with 
the advent of multiculturalism, which “has had serious consequences, which were not foreseen by 
the well-intentioned individuals who have promoted this doctrine so successfully” (Sookhdeo, 
2008a, 222).  For him the most serious consequence has been the freedom that he believes it has 
given to radical Islam: 
 
I am both aggrieved and alarmed to see how equality, peace and harmony in British society are fast 
disappearing, for which the main cause seems to be the egregious behaviour of a radical minority 
within one particular faith, Islam.  There is such fear of radical Islam that few voices dare to point 
out what is happening (Sookhdeo, 2006, 1). 
 
He warns that “careful thought needs to be given to the future of society in the United Kingdom” 
and whether the nation is headed towards fragmentary communalism or unifying integration of 
individuals (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 211). 
 
Certainly Sookhdeo is not alone in his concerns.  On the one hand, many of the participants 
interviewed expressed the sentiment that immigrants are welcome in this country and even bring 
a diverse richness.  Goldsmith was typical when he said “guests and newcomers are always 
welcome as far as Christians are concerned.  I’m very happy for people of different sorts to come 
to Britain” (Goldsmith, Interview 18).  Nazir-Ali emphasizes that, in fact, this is a Christian duty and 
makes the point that “in Britain it is the Judeo-Christian heritage, the Bible, which provides a way 
of welcoming people, of hospitality …. of treating the stranger as yourself.  That should have been 
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the basis of constructing an inclusive society (not multiculturalism)”.131 
 
On the other hand, almost all those I talked to added a caveat; all groups should be expected to 
adapt and embrace the British way of life.  For instance, Craig said “you’re welcome but this is who 
we are” (Craig, Interview 17) and Goldsmith likewise said “I feel that Muslims coming to Britain, 
and the same for Hindus or Judaists or Buddhists or whoever, that Muslims need to adapt to the 
British life, not Britain to them” (Goldsmith, Interview 18).  Quite clearly there is a feeling that this 
adaptation has not happened to the extent which it should have, and it is this omission that leads 
many Evangelicals to suggest that multiculturalism has failed.   
 
McRoy stated it typically bluntly: “multiculturalism has been a disaster because we’ve had the 
Balkanization of the United Kingdom” (McRoy, Interview 30).  Bell too saw multiculturalism as 
problematic:  
 
it became what we didn’t intend.  I think the original aspiration was honourable but naive.  And the 
whole thing got out of hand and I see multiculturalism as in demise at the moment and I think 
we’re in a vacuum and we’re saying, ‘what next’? (Bell, Interview 25). 
 
Sudworth was one of the few who expressed a different opinion and suggested: 
 
that’s the easy critique.  I think that I’m wary of the church and Christians who just take the 
simplistic critique because arguably what multiculturalism has done has brought in a concept of 
freedoms that otherwise wouldn’t have come in (Sudworth, Interview 23).   
 
10.2.A THE FAILURES OF MULTICULTURALISM 
Government policy 
Evangelicals suggest various reasons for the perceived failures of multiculturalism.  Some blame 
the government, others blame Muslims and others the concept of multiculturalism itself.  Riddell 
felt that “the problem is not with the growth of the (Muslim) community per se, my problem is too 
much of a hands-off policy from government” which has, firstly, not controlled the speed of 
change and, secondly, has allowed ghettos to develop (Riddell, Interview 17).  In an article in the 
Church Times (Riddell, 2005) he suggests that “it may even be necessary to monitor Muslim 
                                                             
131 A point made during a BBC Two Newsnight debate broadcast on 16 December 2010. 
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immigration until such time as the existing minority community is more effectively interwoven into 
the fabric of British society, and is more accepting of majority values”, a theme later picked up by 
Carey in various media articles (e.g. , 2008). Bell also believed that the government should have 
kept more control and introduced something closer to Singapore’s “social engineering” to ensure 
integration (Bell, Interview 27).  In addition Sookhdeo feels that the government has partnered 
with the wrong people, choosing “Muslim advisers from only one section of the Muslim 
community”, namely what he views as conservative Muslims from the MCB rather than 
modernists or liberals (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 218).  There certainly seemed to be a general feeling that 
the strategies of successive governments towards immigration and particularly Muslim 
immigration had been unwise. 
 
This particularly included the charge that the government had failed to take the religious aspect of 
immigration into account.  Glaser explained: 
 
what I do think has been a problem from the start .... was that the secular state treated everything 
as culture rather than religion, and missed the religious dimension out, and that I think has been a 
big problem and I think it’s that as much as anything else that has landed us in the state where we 
don’t know what to do with Islam (Glaser, Interview 21).  
 
In addition to a failure to understand Islam adequately, Taylor is aggrieved that the government 
has failed to explain properly the Christian roots of Britain to the newcomers: “most leading 
Muslims in Britain have never read the Bible and the government is spending millions on getting 
Muslims to understand their own version of ‘correct Islam’ rather than ensuring a working 
knowledge of the founding narrative of our island civilization” (J. Taylor, 2008c).  Thus the 
Christian roots that nourished the foundation of liberal democracy have been forgotten and “a 
society that has believed the nonsense peddled by the interfaith bureaucrats that 'all religions are 
equal' or that the words 'faith and faiths are interchangeable' has had a lot to learn in a very short 
time”(J. Taylor, 2005a). 
 
Insularity of Islam 
It is not only the government that is deemed culpable, however.  For some Islam itself is at fault 
for its perceived unwillingness to allow or encourage its followers to integrate.  According to the 
Islam in Britain report “Islam has an inbuilt drive to protect, segregate and to a large extent 
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control its adherents” (ISIC, 2005, 131).  Even Sudworth, his more positive views on 
multiculturalism notwithstanding, said: 
 
I think in the broad trajectory of the practice of the Islamic faith there is a tendency towards being 
quite a self-contained faith and so the issues of segregation and parallel societies I think are 
particularly pertinent when it comes to Muslim communities.  I think written into the origins of 
Islam and encouraged amongst many Muslim leaders .... has been a suspicion of the outside and 
therefore avoidance of influence from outside of Islam (Sudworth, Interview 39).  
 
As has been observed (§6.4.d), this insularity is sometimes understood as disloyalty to the country, 
and is explored further below in considering concerns about Muslim ghettos (§10.2.b).  The 
complaint is that Muslims put their religious identity before their national identity.  Interestingly, 
with one exception, all of the Evangelicals interviewed – both national elite and church leaders – 
said that they would prioritize their Christian identity over their national identity.  However, they 
almost all went on to say that they did not see these two as being in conflict.  It would seem that 
such priorities are not unique to Muslims. 
 
Philosophical roots 
Lastly, many Evangelical participants are deeply suspicious of the very basis of multiculturalism.  
Nazir-Ali calls it “a novel philosophy” (Wynne-Jones, 2008) and Musk saw it as a device of secular 
humanism:   
 
why we would think it would work in the first place is part of the lie that undermines the 
philosophical base for much of our country – the kind of secular humanism thing.  That if we just 
explain to one another where we’re at and so long as we all bow down to this altar of secular 
humanism then we’re going to get along because we can all be tolerant …. multiculturalism doesn’t 
work I don’t think (Musk, Interview 41). 
 
In fact several participants identified the root of the problem as being secularism and the vacuum 
that has been created by a loss of religious faith and values in Britain.  For example Williams 
observed that: 
 
secular liberal humanism leads to censorship and oppression, it also leaves a terrible spiritual 
gaping hole and what Islam offers is something that is very regulated, it’s rigid.  With a rising Islamic 
population I can see them filling that gaping hole unless the church wakes up” (A.Williams, 
Interview 30).   
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10.2.B NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF MULTICULTURALISM 
So it is clear that the majority of the participants in the EPS view the policy of multiculturalism, 
although not necessarily the presence of ethnic minorities, as being negative and problematic.  
Participants see several damaging outcomes of multiculturalism which are explored below.  The 
first is an endemic political correctness that stifles the debate of key issues surrounding 
immigration and religion.  The second is the development of the concept of Islamophobia, which 
according to many Evangelicals is a tool used to suppress criticism of Islam and leads to a definite 
bias towards Islam in some sectors, fuelled by fear of Islamic radicalism and violence.  Finally, 
there is concern that multiculturalism has allowed the development of “parallel communities” or 
even “no-go” Muslim ghettos. 
 
Firstly, there is frustration amongst some that in today’s politically correct climate it is no longer 
possible to openly criticize religion, and particularly Islam, for fear of either offending the Muslim 
community or being censured by the liberal establishment.  Referring to the Pope’s Regensburg 
address Carey laments that “the incident is a sad reminder that political correctness rules these 
days. We find ourselves forbidden to ask awkward questions” (2006).  Craig was vociferous in 
talking about “Hazel Blears and all the rest of the lot who are busy shovelling political correctness 
down our throats” (Craig, Interview 41).  He felt this had enabled Islam to get itself “very 
comfortably in a position where people don’t want to talk about it” (Craig, Interview 13).  These 
feelings were summed up in an article in The Sunday Telegraph entitled Time to Fight the Good 
Fightback: Christians are fed up with the assault on their religion from political correctness and 
Islam  which quoted Cox, Green, Nazir-Ali and Sookhdeo amongst others (O. Craig, 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, some wonder whether political correctness has reached its limit.  Glaser suspects 
that now "the ‘politically correct’ find themselves having to judge aspects of Islam, despite their 
post-modern conviction that all truth claims have equal validity" (Glaser, 2000a, 26).  Edwards, 
formerly of the Evangelical Alliance, went further and suggested in an interview that Evangelical 
Christians “do have a responsibility to be willing to be politically incorrect in challenging 
fundamentalism wherever we meet it” (Jesus Army, 2003). 
 
Secondly, there is particular concern that the concept of Islamophobia (§6.4.c) is sometimes used 
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inappropriately as a tool to enforce political correctness.  Nazir-Ali points out that whilst this 
phobia describes “an unreasonable fear of all Muslims .... it is very important to distinguish that 
from a reasonable fear, for example, of people who are committed to terrorism to achieve their 
aims” (2002, 72).  Sookhdeo claims that “the concept of Islamophobia has been used in recent 
years as a way of shielding Islam and Muslims from criticism” (2008a, 201).  Many are also 
adamant that there should be free debate and an openness to hard questions.   
 
Others, however, do recognize the reality of Islamophobia and some Evangelicals have even 
accused one another of being Islamophobic.  For instance, McRoy suggests that “some popular 
books by Evangelicals on Islam tend to be Islamophobic and/or inaccurate” (2007) and in another 
article claims that “some evangelicals – notably Christian-Zionists – have helped to promote 
Islamophobia” (2001).  Andrew Smith too is concerned: “sometimes Christians have told me about 
negative experiences they have had with Muslims and I have felt very uneasy. .... Sometimes it is 
blatant racism, or Islamophobia” (2009, 22).  However, the strident voices “totally reject the 
charge of Islamophobia - which is often just a word used to put off people from being critical of 
Islam while Muslims remain free to criticize anyone they choose” (Dye, n.d.). 
 
Thirdly, some Evangelicals directly link political correctness and Islamophobia to a perceived bias 
within certain sections of the British establishment towards Islam and against Christianity.  The 
Islam in Britain report believes this to be the result of a deliberate policy by Muslims to portray 
themselves as victims and to: 
 
place Islam and Muslims beyond criticism, thus achieving a privileged status in the UK. .... A measure of their 
success is that political correctness seems to be especially concerned with Muslim issues, largely ignoring 
the real problems of other minorities and often avoiding discussion of important issues .... criticism of Islam 
is considered unacceptable although Christianity is openly attacked and disparaged” (ISIC, 2005, 65, 73).   
 
Many examples of this frustration could be given. In expressing its concern about the appointment 
of a Muslim as head of BBC religious broadcasting, CCFON wrote that “our Government appears to 
make concessions to the Muslim community, in contrast to its marginalization of Christianity and 
the rights of Christians” (2009).  Craig was “angry” when Kingsway International Christian Centre, 
one of the largest churches in Britain, was forced to move out of its building in East London and 
then was refused planning permission to rebuild, at the same time as Tablighi Jama‘at were being 
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granted permission to build a “mega-mosque” in the same area (2008) (§6.2.b).  In one last 
example Christian Voice claimed that the organizers of Jerry Springer the Opera were “too 
cowardly to have a go at Islam. They know that Christians do not resort to violence and they think 
they will get away with it” (Christian Voice, 2009).  In fact Evangelicals suspect that they are doubly 
disadvantaged.   Not only do they feel unfairly treated in comparison with Islam, they also believe 
that they are portrayed as being bigoted and unrespectable compared to other “faces of 
Christianity” (Riddell, 2004b, 182).  All this is causing resentment and a determination to reassert 
the Evangelical Christian position: 
 
it seems certain that no other faith would be subjected to such strictures and, indeed, to the benign 
neglect to which the churches have become accustomed. A place for Christians in the public square 
must be reclaimed (Nazir-Ali, 2009). 
 
Lastly, Nazir-Ali made headlines in 2008 when he claimed that "no-go" areas existed in parts of 
Britain where it was dangerous for non-Muslims to enter.  He suggested that multicultural policies 
had facilitated Muslims “living as separate communities, continuing to communicate in their own 
languages and having minimum need for building healthy relationships with the majority”(Nazir-
Ali, 2008d).  Amidst a storm of criticism the bishop had to defend himself and issued a statement 
clarifying that he was not referring to all Muslims but to “the particular impact of Islamic 
extremism” and had in mind the kind of “parallel lives” described by the Cantle Report following 
the Oldham riots of 2001 (Nazir-Ali, 2008c).132  These claims were not new, however.  The Islam in 
Britain report had already warned that there was a danger of the “fragmentation of British society, 
the creation of Muslim-controlled enclaves, and .... riots and civil strife” (ISIC, 2005, 53).  Other 
Evangelicals also agreed with the bishop.  Riddell said that Nazir-Ali “was onto something” and 
“was a brave man to bring it into the public arena” (Riddell, Interview 45) and McRoy pointed out 
that churches have been attacked in Muslim areas (McRoy, Interview 52).  Sookhdeo too came to 
his defence and was quoted as saying: 
 
Muslims are being told not to integrate into British society, but to set up separate enclaves where 
they can operate according to shari‘a law .... ‘cleansing’ Muslim-majority areas of non-Muslims had 
already begun, with white residents urged to leave and churches threatened (Wynne-Jones and 
Sawer, 2008). 
                                                             
132 See Cantle (2001) ‘Community Cohesion’, available at 
http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/Default.aspx?recordId=96 
(accessed  6 April 2011). (Cantle, 2001) 
Chapter 10 210 
 
 
Sookhdeo sees the development of such Muslim areas as being commensurate with the Islamic 
doctrine of sacred space mentioned above (§9.4.d) and claims that “migrant Muslim communities 
in the West are constantly engaged in sacralizing new areas” by buying private homes, then 
building mosques, changing local place names and also by marching (2008a, 52).133  Solomon and 
Al-Maqdisi similarly argue that “the first foundational principle for the creation of a successfully 
visible Islamic society is to be separate and distinct” (2009b, 18 emphasis in original).  They believe 
that this is the outworking of the Islamic concept of hijra and is part of an alleged Islamic 
conspiracy to take over the West (§10.4.c). 
 
This contentious issue was neatly illustrated by an incident that happened in Birmingham a few 
months after Nazir-Ali’s remarks.  A Muslim police community support officer ordered two 
Christian evangelists to stop handing out tracts in the predominantly Muslim area of Alum Rock 
and threatened them with arrest (see Harrison, 2008).  Many Evangelicals were outraged.  
Christian Voice declared that the “Muslim no-go area ‘will be challenged’”  and organized a 
“Gospel outreach” in the area during which they reported that “despite the crude attempt to 
create a Muslim 'no-go' area for Christians, we found people were more than willing to take 
literature” (Christian Voice, 2008b, 2008c).  However, in his blog Sudworth counselled caution and 
questioned why the Telegraph had chosen to run this story just months after the earlier 
controversy.  Whilst defending the freedom to preach one’s religion he wondered whether 
Christians would be “so anxious to defend the freedoms of Muslims, dressed in religious garb .... to 
give out Muslim tracts, warning of the prospect of hell for Christians” (Sudworth, 2008a). 
 
This even-handed approach was also demonstrated by other participants in their reactions to the 
debate about no-go areas.  Several expressed understanding for why immigrants might choose to 
live together: 
 
it is not always easy to live in a country not your own, so you want to live in areas where you have 
people who come from your own country or from countries similar to your own.  So I can 
understand that people want to stick together to help each other.  I’m not saying that this is 
                                                             
133 He describes Muslim Sufi marches celebrating the birthdays of Muhammad and various saints and 
links these to sacralizing the territory.  This is reminiscent of the way in which some Evangelicals have 
occasionally marched to “claim the ground” (see Kendrick & Hawthorne (1993)). (Kendrick and Hawthorne, 
1993) 
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necessarily something useful in the long term but from a human point of view I can understand that 
(Moucarry, Interview 89).   
 
Moucarry, along with Glaser (Interview 45), went on to highlight the problem of “white flight”: 
 
I have no doubt that there are some white people who as soon as the area in which they live 
becomes less white, they tended to leave this area and to go to somewhere else because they don’t 
want to send their children to the same school.  So they are actually contributing to the creation of 
these ghettos.  So I think that it’s very unfortunate that we have these ghettos in Britain but we 
should not blame only Muslims or immigrants because we are all part of this process (Moucarry, 
Interview 89).   
 
Finally, Andrew Smith, whilst aware of the existence of Muslim areas in his neighbourhood, 
suggested that there may be:  
 
all sorts of areas (which) Muslims would feel are ‘no go’ areas for them, you know, quite nice 
middle class areas, and would feel unsafe and certainly some of the big white outer council estates 
(where they) would be very nervous about going (A.Smith, Interview 47). 
 
This highlights what Taylor believes to be the real problem.  She believes that: 
 
the issue for the Church in the multicultural millennium is not so much the ‘Islamization’ of a once-
Christian culture as the emergence, with state collusion, of discrete territories where vastly 
different norms prevail, shut off and sometimes resentful, a breeding ground for ferment and a 
target for hostility (J. Taylor, 2005b, 107). 
 
So Evangelical Christian leaders are clearly concerned about multiculturalism and the effect it has 
had on the religious landscape in Britain.  Many would agree with Riddell who said: “I support 
multiculturalism but it has to be multiculturalism that has social cohesion as a very core part of its 
public discourse” (Riddell, Interview 15).  However, the fear for some was expressed by Jay Smith: 
 
multiculturalism as an ideal is brilliant.  Multiculturalism works providing all cultures are willing to 
assimilate.  Multiculturalism doesn’t work when there is one culture that refuses to assimilate.  
Islam has never assimilated, and never will assimilate (J.Smith Interview 19).   
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The unwillingness of some Muslims to integrate is seen by some Evangelicals as a disturbing and 
threatening trend in Britain: 
  
the failed policies of immigration, multiculturalism and political correctness, together with an 
apparent abhorrence of the traditional Christian values our nation was built on, have opened the 
door to an invasion of a radical ideology intent on turning Britain into a fully-blown Islamic state, a 
khilafa. Just as the last century saw the death of the British Empire, some senior politicians believe 
we are witnessing the death of the British nation in this one (Dye, n.d.). 
 
10.3 THE “ISLAMIZATION” OF BRITAIN134 
 
This concern is typical of those Evangelicals who suspect that some Muslims have initiated a 
deliberate process of what they call the “Islamization” of Britain.135  Solomon and Madqisi fear 
that relatively “harmless changes” in a society may have “explosive potential” (2009b, 78).  They 
allege that the concessions and provisions which Muslims demand as part of the shari‘a are all 
part of a deliberate attempt to Islamize society.  Such participants often suspect a conspiracy and 
see what they believe to be symptoms of this in: the life of Muslim communities – including the 
very visible issues of clothing, diet, the prayer call and the building of mosques; education; media; 
Islamic finance; and demands for shari‘a. 
 
10.3.A MUSLIM COMMUNITY LIFE 
Some consider that Muslim women in some parts of Britain are adopting stricter dress codes than 
necessary as part of a deliberate attempt to assert Islam publicly (Sookhdeo, 2008b, 97).  They 
believe that there is a deliberate progression in a community from wearing the hijab to wearing 
                                                             
134 Note two booklets written by Sookhdeo and published by Barnabas Fund since this research was 
completed. The Way Ahead: returning Britain to its Christian path (Sookhdeo, 2010c) and Slippery 
Slope: the Islamisation of the UK (Sookhdeo, 2011) both warn of the perceived dangers discussed in 
this section.  Significantly, the second booklet was distributed free in the February 2011 edition of the 
Christianity magazine.  
135 See for example the title of the Pilcrow Press booklet The Islamization of Britain and What Must Be 
Done to Prevent It (Dye, 2007).  Note that the authorship of this booklet is not clear.  The foreword is 
written by Colin Dye, pastor of Kensington Temple, London, but no other author’s name appears in the 
publication.  Some of the text appears in an online article apparently written by Dye (‘Khilafa or 
Kingdom?’, http://www.pilcrowpress.com/khilafa-or-kingdom (accessed 24 March 2009)) but other 
parts of it appear on another website and are ascribed to Sam Solomon (see ‘Moderate Islam?’, 
http://europenews.dk/en/node/12574 (accessed 20 March 2009).  For the purposes of referencing I 
presume it to be written by Dye. 
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the niqab thus signifying increasing Muslim dominance (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2009b, 76).  
Craig was not concerned about the hijab but saw the “ominous” niqab as “a visible sign of 
separation and division which they quite quietly go round wearing” (Craig, Interview 41).  Nazir-Ali, 
however, is less concerned about clothing and likens the burqa‘ to a nun’s habit and other 
religious dress in the Middle East which is merely a mark of modesty (2002, 58). 
 
The provision of halal food for Muslims is also of concern to some participants.  Sookhdeo believes 
that the halal system is a deliberate attempt at “the creation of an Islamic consciousness” (2007b) 
which at the very least is divisive as it stops Muslims from visiting the homes of non-Muslims 
(2006, 73).  Dye claims that the halal food market is the fastest growing food market in the world 
and is worth $4 billion per annum in Britain alone.  He is concerned that in some areas of the 
country halal food is becoming a monopoly and forcing the unwanted “adoption of a form of 
religious ritualism in Britain” (Dye, 2007, 27).136  Solomon sees these visible trends in both dress 
and diet in a very negative light and equates them to a Muslim demand for shari‘a: “when the 
Muslims demand the right of the hijab they are literally demanding that part of shari‘a be 
implemented, so it is with halal meat, be it for school meals, prisons or hospitals”.   
 
On the contrary, Bell saw these things in an entirely different light.  He remarked that “the British 
openness and civility is there, which says we will cater for Muslims in our schools with halal school 
meals, for how the girls dress for PE, the stuff of life, and that’s what makes me proud to be 
British” (Bell, Interview 51). 
 
Another very public aspect of Muslim community life is the adhan (call to prayer) from the 
mosque.  Whilst Knell was willing to countenance a once weekly publicly broadcast call to prayer 
in predominantly Muslim areas, he did feel that it was anti-social (Knell, Interview 45), a point 
emphasized by Nazir-Ali when he points out that artificial amplification is not necessary and is of 
course only a recent innovation (2008d).  Others were concerned that it was an ideological 
statement and was highly “symbolic” (A. Williams, Interview 26).    “If it was a hooter or a buzzer I 
wouldn’t mind, but it’s not, it’s an ideology.  It may be a language that most people can’t 
                                                             
136 Christian Concern for Our Nation has more recently picked up this theme.  See ‘Growing concern as 
British public is misled over halal meat’, http://christianconcern.com/our-concerns/islam/growing-
concern-british-public-%E2%80%9Cmisled%E2%80%9D-over-halal-meat (accessed 22 November 
2010). 
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understand, but it’s actually a statement about Allah and about Islam .... so no thank you” (Craig, 
Interview 33).  The request for a prayer call at an Oxford mosque was something that Frog Orr-
Ewing was also opposed to on his blog (2008a).   
 
The building of the mosques themselves also excites a lot of debate amongst Evangelicals.  Several 
authors point out that “in a free society, adherents of different faiths should have the right to set 
up their own places of worship” as long as they show sensitivity and do not allow the mosques to 
become the centres of segregated communities (Riddell, 2004b, 183).  However, many are 
alarmed at the number of mosques, the size of some mosques, their strategic location and the role 
of mosques.   
 
Dye reaffirms the “renowned British tolerance” which allows Muslims to build mosques but is 
concerned about “the growth in the number of mosques” despite the fact that he acknowledges 
that there are still many more churches (2007, 20).  Belteshazzar and Abednego, in their much-
quoted booklet The Mosque and Its Role in Society (2006), emphasize their conviction that 
Muslims deliberately build these mosques to be bigger and grander than all other surrounding 
buildings, particularly churches. They believe that “such edifices are to prove a point more than 
(their) actual usage or need” and suggest that “soon in almost all major British cities the mosques 
will be the biggest most spectacular buildings” (ibid 22, 35).137  This point was echoed by Williams 
who claimed that Muslims “seek to build these symbols of dominance and power in strategic 
places” (Williams, Interview 69).   
 
The case which has caused the most controversy has been the attempt by the Tablighi Jama‘at (TJ) 
to build a “mega-mosque” next to the site of the Olympic complex (Johnston, 2006) (§6.2.b).  All 
participants interviewed were against the building of such a large mosque in such a prominent 
place.  The vigorous opposition has been led principally by Craig with support from CCFON, Jay 
Smith and many others.138  Craig has called public meetings, written letters, posted videos and 
used his position on the local council to raise objections, which were eventually heeded and as of 
                                                             
137 Note that this booklet also appears on Amazon as The Mosque Exposed authored by Solomon and al-
Maqdisi.  Belteshazzar and Abednego appear to be pseudonyms and it is interesting that they chose the 
names of two Jewish heroes who survived being thrown into the fire because of their faith. 
138 See Smith’s video ‘Challenging the Tablighi Jamaat's 'Olympics' Mosque’, 
http://www.youtube.com/user/PfanderFilms#p/u/1/UDuXmhi9ZC4 (accessed 24 June 2010 ). 
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April 2011 planning permission had not been granted.  Craig made it clear that “Muslims have a 
right to mosques” but insists that he is totally opposed to the building of this particular mosque as 
it would upset the balance in the local community and could also be a centre for extremist activity 
(Craig, Interview 11).139  The foreign funding of mosques is also problematic for some and should 
be more strictly controlled, particularly when the money comes from radical sources such as 
Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 219). 
 
A minority take a negative view of all mosques.  In their booklet Belteshazzar and Abednego stress 
their understanding that a mosque is not just a religious centre but also a political centre for the 
Islamization of society and a military centre from which jihad is launched (2006).  Christian Voice 
too has an extremely negative view of the mosque based on its understanding of Islam: “a mosque 
is regarded as an abomination in the sight of Almighty God” (Christian Voice, n.d.). 
 
Solomon and Madqisi suggest that all of these relatively “harmless changes” in the life of the 
Muslim community add up to a stealthy Islamization of society.  They believe that they are an 
example of how “the host society becomes indifferent to the religious, social and political tactics 
used to establish a totality of Islamic rule under shari‘a” (2009b, 77).  Moreover, they, along with 
others, claim that other sectors of society are also being gradually Islamized including education, 
the media, finance and law. 
 
10.3.B EDUCATION 
The education of the next generation is obviously a key area of concern for any faith group and 
Muslims in Britain unsurprisingly have been pressing for more freedom to educate their children in 
ways that they consider to be consistent with Islam.  The increased profile of Islam in education, 
however, has raised concerns amongst Evangelicals concerning the impact on the teaching of 
Christianity, on integration and on the accurate presentation of Islam in schools.  In addition there 
are major concerns about the Islamic funding of higher education. 
 
Chapman felt that it was “nonsense to say that every faith needs to have the same kind of space 
for teaching in RE” (Chapman, Interview 22).  He believes the emphasis should still be on the 
                                                             
139 See ‘Meet Alan Craig’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9dn-Tgf4AY for an example of his public 
campaign against the TJ mosque (accessed 12 August 2010). 
Chapter 10 216 
 
Christian tradition.  Others are concerned that Christianity is not presented as favourably as Islam.  
Sookhdeo claims that a “sanitized view of Islam” is taught uncritically and that Islam is treated 
“more sympathetically than Christianity” as teachers are afraid of being accused of Islamophobia 
(2006, 57). 
 
There is also concern over the growth and public funding of Muslim faith schools and the role of 
madrasas attached to mosques.  Dye (2007) in particular devotes 11 out of 66 pages in his booklet 
to education and refers to various reports that have highlighted disturbing trends in some Islamic 
curricula.  The fear is that they lead to segregation and not integration.  Cox and Marks refer to 
reports on how some teaching materials emanating from Saudi Arabia teach children to hate Jews 
and Christians (2006, 109).140   
 
A perceived Islamic influence in higher education is also a cause of concern for some.  Rosemary 
Sookhdeo recounts how her Masters dissertation was refused by Oxford University unless she 
changed her position on Islam, which she refused to do.  She laments that “in our universities it is 
now very difficult to be able to analyse and critique Islam.  The day of free speech and neutrality of 
research is closing” (R. Sookhdeo, 2004, 144).   Cox and Marks identify a problem in the sharp rise 
of funding from the Islamic world for British universities and especially Islamic studies 
departments (2006).  Solomon and Al-Maqdisi even claim that “Islamic studies at all the major 
universities have been taken over by outright Islamists or academics with strong Islamic 
sympathies” preventing any critical study of Islam or textual analysis of the Qur’an (Solomon and 
Al-Maqdisi, 2009b, 89).  There is also concern at the radicalization of university students and the 
increasing numbers joining Islamic societies on campuses (Dye, 2007, 38).  This is a particular focus 
for Jay Smith who spends a lot of time conducting debates on university campuses and teaching 
apologetics to Christian students (J.Smith, Interview 77).   
 
10.3.C THE MEDIA 
The media are a very strong influence in any society and control of them is often hotly contested 
and subject to many conspiracy theories.  Opinion in the EPS varies as to how Islam is faring in the 
media.  The Islam in Britain report, for instance, was scathing of the British media’s representation 
                                                             
140 Note that the BBC Panorama documentary ‘British schools, Islamic rules’ (broadcast 22 November 
2010) repeated these allegations. 
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of Islam: 
 
the Islamization of the British media has accorded Islam in Britain a privileged position not given to 
other religions.  The British public is presented with a partial view of Islam that does not correspond 
to reality.  Extremists are presented as moderates, criticism of negative phenomena in the Muslim 
community and in Islam is discouraged, and dangers to national security are played down (ISIC, 
2005, 80). 
 
Unsurprisingly, as director of the ISIC, Sookhdeo shares a similar view and feels that “there is 
virtually no critical attention given to the fundamentals of Islam (which) contrasts with the 
frequent programs questioning or ridiculing Christianity” (2008a, 219).  Goldsmith perceived the 
media to be repeating the refrain that Islam is a “peace-loving gentle religion” and suggested that 
this was unhelpful (Goldsmith, Interview 60).  Others, however, saw a different trend in the media 
and felt that too much air time was giving to radicals like Abu Hamza, creating an unfair 
impression of Islam (Musk, Interview 81).  Still others felt that the media are doing a good job, 
albeit to different ends.  Jay Smith felt that “the media is (sic) really holding their own and they’re 
actually confronting (radical Islam) a lot better than we are” (J.Smith, Interview 83).  Taylor, on the 
other hand, herself a journalist, explained that she is trying to educate journalists about Islam, 
religion and society, and feels that the media are beginning to understand the issues better and 
present a more nuanced picture (Taylor, Interview 50). 
 
When it comes to Muslim-produced media Sookhdeo is worried about the influence of satellite 
channels in Britain which broadcast Islamic programming from Asia and the Middle East.  In 2003 
he published an article in The Spectator entitled How Television Creates Terrorists in which he 
pointed out that “the national television station of Pakistan plays an important role in creating 
opinion among Asian Muslims in Britain” and went on to explain how some channels watched by 
British Muslims were radicalizing young people (Sookhdeo, 2003).  Others, however, are more 
positive about the possible roles of Muslim media.  For instance McRoy is willing to work with 
them and frequently writes articles which have been published in Q-News and The Muslim Weekly 
and has also appeared on Iranian television (McRoy, Interview).   
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10.3.D ISLAMIC FINANCE 
Another cause for Evangelical concern is Islamic finance which has been growing rapidly in Britain 
over the last decade.  Sookhdeo’s Understanding Shari‘a Finance (2008b) takes a close look at this 
topic and concludes that it is a strategic device being used to divide Muslims from non-Muslims 
and impose shari‘a principles on society.  He believes that it is a new phenomenon that has been 
created to “empower Islamists, while weakening moderates and progressives” by pressuring 
Muslims to use only shari‘a-compliant products (ibid 38).  For him: 
 
shari‘a finance is part of a wider agenda of jihad, in accordance with the vision of Islamist 
ideologists of the overthrow of non-Islamic systems and the establishment of a pan-Islamic 
Caliphate that will rule the earth (Sookhdeo, 2008b, 39). 
 
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi agree with this (2009b, 89) and Nazir-Ali questions whether the future 
implications of shari‘a-compliant banking have really been adequately considered by western 
governments (Nazir-Ali, 2008d).  Dye is also concerned with the raw power that particularly Arab 
investors hold over western financial markets.  He claims that “Britain has been held to ransom on 
numerous occasions” by Arab Muslim nations (2007, 25).   
 
10.3.E SHARI‘A, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH LAW 
One of the most controversial questions for Evangelicals relates to the compatibility of Islamic 
legal codes with liberal democracy.  The shari‘a is much more than a civil or criminal legal code; it 
is a way of life.  Problems arise, however, when the prescriptions of shari‘a come into conflict with 
human rights and other legal systems in a non-Muslim society such as Britain.  As Moucarry puts it 
Christians “believe in freedom, human rights, and democracy and we have real concerns about 
some aspects of Islamic law” (2007, 120).   So for Evangelicals the issues particularly revolve 
around freedom and rights, especially for the vulnerable, for non-Muslims and for apostates.   
 
Firstly, many Evangelicals believe that the rights of the individual, and particularly the rights of 
women, are not respected under shari‘a.  Azumah considers that "Muslims are not impressed by 
arguments that appeal to human rights" (2008, 131) and expressed concern that “Muslim women 
are very, very suspicious of shari‘a because they become victims” (Azumah, Interview 35).  This is a 
point made by Rosemary Sookhdeo in her writing.  She acknowledges that the Qur'an and 
Muhammad did seek equality for women but argues that “this theoretical equality has not been 
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seen in practice” (R. Sookhdeo, 2004, 37).  Rather “Islam is a man’s world” and, with the increasing 
trend towards shari‘a in the West, “it is the women and the girls who will pay the price” (ibid 127). 
 
Nonetheless, some Evangelicals do believe that “it is quite possible to encourage Muslims, for 
instance, to find the roots of tolerance within Islamic tradition itself" (Nazir-Ali, 2002, 71) and 
Wood cited an example of an imam he knew who was actively working for women’s rights within a 
shari‘a court in Britain (Wood, Interview 39).  However, the dominant view is that in shari‘a “the 
concept of the absolutely transcendent god leaves no space for the individual as a free moral 
being” (Sookhdeo, 2009c, 50). 
 
Secondly, Evangelicals are very concerned about the rights of non-Muslims living under shari‘a.  
This is particularly true for Christian minorities living in Muslim countries and organizations like the 
Barnabas Fund and Christian Solidarity Worldwide are devoted to upholding the rights of such 
communities and reporting instances of persecution141.  In fact McRoy suggested in his interview 
that, coupled with the killing of converts, this was the biggest grievance that Evangelicals have 
against Islam (McRoy, Interview 66).  Historically, Christians and Jews living under Islam were given 
the status of dhimmi (§3.2.a), a system of taxes and restrictions which Dye describes as 
“humiliating” and “second-class” (Dye, n.d.).  Although Sookhdeo acknowledges that this system is 
“not formally implemented by any modern Muslim majority state” he believes it has left its mark 
in “an enduring popular prejudice” which is the reason for much of the suffering (2006, 66).   
 
Other Evangelicals, however, suggest that it may be possible to overemphasize instances of 
persecution.  As factual and as terrible as such stories are Nazir-Ali presents the corrective that 
these cases have "to be set against other situations in the Muslim world where Christians do have 
the freedom to worship .... (we must not) tar them all with the same brush" (2002, 89).  When this 
is not done Glaser believes that Evangelical reporting can harm Christian-Muslim relations.  She 
asks: 
where do one-sided descriptions of Islam and Muslims reinforce prejudices?  Where might calls to 
aid suffering Christians, to defend Christian society, and to stand firm for the Gospel result in 
misdirected love? (Glaser, 2010a, 32). 
                                                             
141 See for example the case of Asia Bibi, a Pakistani Christian woman sentenced to death for allegedly 
insulting Islam (reported by Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 
http://dynamic.csw.org.uk/article.asp?t=press&id=1052 (accessed 20 December 2010). 
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The final concern about shari‘a surrounds the treatment of apostates from Islam, which Riddell 
has called "one of the greatest obstacles in Christian-Muslim interaction in the modern world” 
(2004b, 178).142  Even Chapman has to admit that all the traditional schools of Islamic law 
prescribe death as the penalty for those Muslims who leave the faith (Chapman, 2007b, 112).  
Several authors quote Mawdudi who saw Islam as a one-way street; you can enter but you cannot 
leave.  This causes Azumah to point out the irony of a religion which "enjoins propagation (but) in 
no uncertain terms prohibits others from undertaking the same activity” (2006, 13).  Sookhdeo’s 
Freedom to Believe, with a foreword by Nazir-Ali, is subtitled Challenging Islam’s Apostasy Law and 
focuses exclusively on this issue with many harrowing stories of how apostates have been treated 
under Islam.143  In the book he acknowledges that some Muslims are trying to move away from 
this traditional interpretation of the law but find this difficult, not least because it is "a fact of 
history that apostates were killed in the time of Muhammad on his orders" (ibid 22).  More 
recently, however, he has expressed appreciation for a group of moderate Muslim academics 
calling for an end to the prohibition of ridda (apostasy i.e. leaving Islam) (Sookhdeo, 2009d, see 
Suleiman, 2009). In short the treatment of apostates under shari‘a remains highly controversial for 
Evangelicals. 
 
Two events illustrate the tension that surround the shari‘a. The first was a lecture given by 
Archbishop Rowan Williams on Civil and Religious Law in England (2008) in which he seemed to 
suggest that aspects of shari‘a should be incorporated into British law.  The result was 
consternation not just in the national media but amongst many Evangelical Christians too.  Most of 
the participants interviewed felt that, at best, the Archbishop had been “naive” in his comments 
and handling of the press (McRoy, Interview 50, Knell, Interview 37).  Andrea Williams of CCFON 
complained that “the head of the established church can’t fight for our values” (Williams, 
Interview 21); Frog Orr-Ewing preached a critical sermon in his church the following Sunday 
(2008b); and Nazir-Ali was also an outspoken critic who believed that no extra provision was 
                                                             
142 For example see the Christian Solidarity Worldwide report ‘No Place to Call Home: Experiences of 
apostates from Islam, failures of the international community’ which gives details of the application of 
shari‘a and suffering of apostates in many Muslim countries, and is available from www.csw.org.uk 
(accessed 2 September 2010). 
143 For other instances see the case of Abdul Rahman, an Afghan sentenced to death for apostasy, 
(Nazir-Ali, 2006) and Sookhdeo’s (2002) report on the plight of Christians in Pakistan. (Sookhdeo, 2002) 
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needed for Islamic law: 
 
in my view, it would be simply impossible to introduce a tradition, like shari‘a, into this (British) 
corpus without fundamentally affecting its integrity .... it is perfectly possible for religious 
communities to rule on personal, family and financial matters as long as this does not interfere with 
the workings of the law of the land (Nazir-Ali, 2008b). 
 
As usual, however, opinion was divided and not all Evangelicals were so negative about the 
lecture.  Several positive articles appeared on the Evangelical website Fulcrum (e.g. Chaplin, 2008). 
Whilst labelling it a “PR disaster”, Taylor went on to suggest that the Archbishop had done 
something “enormously courageous” as he had “dropped a bomb on multiculturalism” (J. Taylor, 
2008a).  Edwards recognized that it was an important debate to have for the sake of all religious 
groups looking for exemptions from certain laws (Evangelical Alliance, 2008).  Bell, Chapman, 
Moucarry, Musk and Sudworth were also all positive about the lecture in their interviews although 
mostly regretted the manner in which the ensuing debate took place.  Even Jay Smith in a video, 
rather backhandedly, suggested that Williams’ “unfortunate references” had had the positive 
effect of opening the door for the media to “vent” their “simmering frustration” upon Islam which 
he believed to be the true target for much of the vilification that Williams received (J. Smith, 
2008c).   
 
The second incident concerning law illustrated similar opinions and tensions.  In 2005-6 the then 
Labour government was attempting to enact a bill outlawing incitement to religious hatred which 
some Evangelicals interpreted as being an attempt by the MCB and other Muslims to introduce a 
de facto blasphemy law to protect Islam, something that certain Muslims have wanted ever since 
the Rushdie affair (Cox and Marks, 2006, 132).144  Many non-Muslim groups, however, saw this as 
an attack on free speech and Evangelicals found themselves making common cause against the bill 
with secularists and comedians.  Christian Voice claimed that the legislation was “only brought in 
to buy Muslim votes at the …. General Election” as “Muslim leaders see it as a Bill which will stop 
anyone criticizing Islam” (Christian Voice, 2005b).  Craig also saw it as an attempt by Muslims to 
stifle debate because “that’s what they do; they’re not into democracy; they’re not into freedom 
                                                             
144 It should be noted that the Runnymede Trust report recommended the implementation of such a 
law (1997, 60). 
Chapter 10 222 
 
of speech” (Craig, Interview 39). 145   
 
Certainly almost everyone saw it as a badly constructed law that would be extremely difficult to 
implement fairly.  Lord Carey spoke against it in the House of Lords (Carey, 2005a) and McRoy 
compared it to a similar law in Australia that had resulted in Christians being prosecuted for 
supposedly insulting Islam (McRoy, Interview 62).  That did not stop a few participants 
acknowledging its good intentions and feeling a measure of sympathy with it, including Bell, 
Chapman, Moucarry and Andrew Smith.  One even wondered whether “there may have been an 
overreaction on the part of Evangelical Christians” (Chapman, Interview 70). 
 
These positive views notwithstanding both these episodes reveal a deep concern amongst many 
Evangelicals over shari‘a and legal provisions for Muslims in Britain.  As Cotterell asks, “how can a 
country have two sets of laws, without dividing the country into two countries?” (2006, 104).   
 
10.3.F BRITISH CONVERTS TO ISLAM 
A final aspect of the feared trend in Islamization is the number of British non-Muslims converting 
to Islam.  Compared to the issues considered above the Evangelical participants seem relatively 
unconcerned about this phenomenon despite the claim of a recent report that the number of 
converts  in Britain may be as high as 100,000 (Brice, 2010).  Most accept that “Muslims are 
expected to call, invite, non-Muslims to convert to Islam” (Cotterell, 2005) and see it as natural 
competition in a plural society.  Andrew Smith points out that many more Christian young people 
are enticed by secularism (A. Smith, 2009, 11) and Riddell suggests that more westerners are 
converted to Buddhism than to Islam (2004b, 187). 
 
Others are more anxious.  The Islam in Britain report notes an increase in conversions to Islam 
since 9/11 due to “intensive missionary efforts” and puts the number at between 10-20,000 
including celebrities, those disillusioned with western society and women marrying Muslims (ISIC, 
2005, 56).  This latter category is of particular concern to Rosemary Sookhdeo.  She has written a 
                                                             
145 Another similar example causing concern is the attempt of the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
to obtain a UN resolution outlawing the defamation of religion.  Open Doors have organized a petition 
against such a resolution signed by over 400,000 people worldwide.  See 
http://www.opendoorsuk.org/resources/RTB (accessed 20 December 2010) and also “Right to 
believe”, Inspire Magazine, Issues 54, Nov-Dec, 2010. 
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book (Stepping into the Shadows (2005)) specifically addressing the issue of western women 
marrying Muslim men in which she recounts the unhappy stories of women she has met – 
including some from practising Christian backgrounds – and warns such women about the dangers 
she perceives in their lack of understanding of Islamic culture.  Brice’s 2010 report suggests that 
the number of such marriages is exaggerated and that new converts do not always receive the 
support they need from mosques.  Goldsmith’s complaint, however, is that, in comparison to how 
apostates are treated, Muslims “trumpet abroad any ex-Christian converts to Islam (which) gives a 
misleading impression of one-way traffic towards faith in Islam” (2006, 138). 
 
10.4 EVANGELICALS, ISLAMIC CONSPIRACY AND THE FUTURE 
 
10.4.A HOW DO EVANGELICALS PERCEIVE MUSLIM INTENTIONS? 
Given all these concerns, for Dye at least, “the process of Islamization of Britain is already at an 
advanced stage and is continuing to advance, seemingly, with nothing standing in its way” (Dye, 
2007, 56).  But is there an agenda, a conspiracy, amongst some Muslims to turn Britain into an 
Islamic nation?  As always the participants do not agree.  For Taylor there is “no such thing as an 
‘Islamic vision for Britain’” (J. Taylor, 2005b, 108).  Knell too, speaking at Spring Harvest, 
emphasized what he sees as the many myths surrounding the idea of an Islamic agenda, 
suggesting that Muslims are not nearly so united as some people fear and reminding the audience 
that Muslims originally came to Britain by invitation to work (Knell, 2008).   
 
For others, though, there is clearly an Islamic programme to Islamize the West.  Cox and Marks 
warn that Muslim extremists are deliberately “using the freedoms of democratic societies in ways 
designed ultimately to destroy those societies and the freedoms they enshrine”, a concern which 
Cox has raised in the House of Lords (Cox and Marks, 2006, 112).  Furthermore Sookhdeo feels 
that at least the aspiration if not the methods are shared by Muslims of all persuasions: 
 
the Barelwi majority believe in a slow evolution, gradually consolidating their Muslim societies, and 
finally achieving an Islamic state. The Deobandi minority argue for a quicker process using politics 
and violence to achieve the same result. Ultimately, both believe in the goal of an Islamic state in 
Britain where Muslims will govern their own affairs and, as the finishing touch, everyone else's 
affairs as well (P. Sookhdeo, 2005b). 
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This makes the migration of Muslims to the West a serious problem and indeed Solomon and Al-
Maqdisi describe it as a Modern Day Trojan Horse (2009b).  They argue that, as Muhammad is such 
an important model in Islam, the hijra (migration) of the early Muslim community from Mecca to 
Medina in 622 AD serves as a model for all Muslims at all times in all places.146  In fact they believe 
that “hijra is an obligatory duty on Muslims for the enhancement and the advance of Islam” (ibid 
8).  So for them migration is not always economically driven but is frequently religiously driven 
with “the primary goal of the hijra (being) the establishment of an Islamic state” wherever 
Muslims find themselves (ibid 33).  This state is to be achieved through da‘wa and jihad as for 
them “the spreading of Islam is not simply a missionary activity like that of a church but it is the 
establishment of a community that would rise up as the soldiers of Allah to establish an Islamic 
state” (ibid 33).  They consider hijra to be “the most important method of spreading Islam as a 
way of life, meaningful religion, and a political system and consolidating it far beyond the Muslim 
countries” (ibid 3). 
 
For those Evangelicals convinced of such a Muslim agenda it amounts to a conspiracy.  Cox and 
Marks speak of "a concerted and coordinated strategic attack over a long period" (2006, 71) and 
refer to "the spread of the Muslim brotherhood across Europe (which) was long planned according 
to a document known as 'The Project'" (ibid 93).147  In an interview at the Counter Jihad 
conference148 Sookhdeo claims that in 1979 a conference took place to consider the future of 
Islam in Europe at which it was decided that Muslims “should not integrate as individuals into 
society but rather as communities” (Sookhdeo, 2007b).  There would then be a process whereby 
an Islamic consciousness would be created through women’s clothing, halal food, the creation of 
institutions and a focus on the needs of children in schools.  The final stage, according to 
Sookhdeo, would be for the Muslims to say to the West “if you don’t give way to what we want, 
then we are not to blame if you are attacked” (ibid). 
                                                             
146 They also point out that the Islamic calendar starts from 622 AD as this was the date when the status 
of Islam changed to a “powerful socio-religious political state” (Solomon & Al-Maqdisi, 2009, 3). 
147 This document was apparently found during a police raid on militants in Switzerland.  Cox and 
Marks source all their information from the article Poole, P. “The Muslim Brotherhood ‘Project’”, 2006, 
FrontPage Magazine, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4476, (accessed 4 
September 2010). 
148 The CounterJihad Conference, Brussels, October 18 – 19, 2007, brought together over 70 
organizations concerned with Muslim expansion in Europe and the keynote speakers included Bat 
Ye’or, Robert Spencer, Patrick Sookhdeo and Sam Solomon. See  
http://counterjihadeuropa.wordpress.com/2007/10 (accessed 10 May 2010). 
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10.4.B CAN MUSLIMS BE TRUSTED? 
Controversially these participants suspect that Muslims are using taqiyya as a deliberate strategic 
tool to achieve their ends.  The Islamic doctrine of taqiyya, meaning “dissimulation of one’s 
religion” (Cowan, 1976), 149 and the related concept of kitman, meaning secrecy or concealment, 
are usually interpreted as being the avoidance of unnecessary suffering by Muslims through 
concealing their faith at a time of persecution.  It is based on the example and words of 
Muhammad and particularly has been associated with periods when Shi’ites have been persecuted 
by Sunnis (Strothmann, 1987, P. Walker, 1995, Tabatabai, 1975).  However, some Evangelicals 
believe that Muslims today are using it as a permission to conceal their true purposes in order to 
advance the cause of Islam. 
 
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi claim that “taqiyya is practised by all Muslims” and is used to permit lying 
at time of war, espionage or making peace.  They go on to quote Muhammad as saying that “war 
is deception” (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2006, 25).  Sookhdeo suggests that taqiyya is “behind the 
activities of many contemporary Islamists ... to convince non-Muslims that Islam is and always has 
been peaceful and tolerant”  with the aim that non-Muslims will be “unprepared for the final 
onslaught” (2007a, 201).  For this reason he suggests that maybe Muslims cannot be believed or 
trusted as they frequently use this principle to defend Islam, misrepresent motives, rewrite history 
and further da‘wa (Sookhdeo, 2006, 33-7) and he includes a short section on taqiyya in his Pocket 
Guide to Islam (2010a).  Cox and Marks also suggest that "the doctrine of taqiyya could apply to 
those who, for example, quote peaceful or tolerant verses from the Qur’an to show Islam as a 
religion of peace but fail to mention other verses which are warlike or intolerant” (2006, 99). 
 
Some of the participants interviewed agreed.  Jay Smith believed that he regularly observes this 
principle at work - mainly among Sunnis rather than Shi‘ites: 
 
what I call it is the public/private face of Islam.  Publicly they’ll tell me exactly what I want to hear 
until I get to go and have dinner or tea with them and get away from Speakers’ Corner and when I 
get into KFC then I see their private face and their private face is exactly what I would expect.  Then 
you see the real Islam .... I say this is taqiyya .... my Muslim friends they laughed and said ‘of course 
                                                             
149 Taqiyya (تيقت) can also mean caution or prudence and comes from the Arabic root w-q-ā (ًقو) 
meaning to guard, preserve, shield and protect (Cowan, 1976). 
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what we hear in the mosque is not what we hear in public address, and we don’t at all have a 
problem with this because we are in a context of war here’ (Smith, Interview 54, 63). 
 
Goldsmith  agreed and said “I feel that taqiyya is an enormous problem in relationships, both on 
the personal level and on the larger dialogue level and on the political level” (Goldsmith, Interview 
40) and put this down to a comparatively low emphasis on truth in Islam compared to Christianity.  
Rosemary Sookhdeo concurs as she believes that “in Islam there is not such a condemnation of 
lying as there is in western culture” (2005, 64).  She is particularly concerned that it is common for 
Muslim men to lie in order to marry a woman who will be converted to Islam. 
 
Others interviewed, however, disagreed – sometimes vehemently.  Craig felt that it was not a big 
problem and was no different to what politicians do all the time (Craig, Interview 37).  Riddell felt 
that the doctrine is utilized by some Muslims but is probably not as prevalent as some suggest and 
is “used in a very sloppy fashion these days” (Riddell, Interview 35).  Moucarry was even stronger 
in his objection to the focus on taqiyya: 
 
well I must say that there are many Christians who say all sorts of rubbish about Islam, partly 
because of the ignorance of Islam and partly because of their prejudice against Muslims.  And they 
use all sorts of wrong arguments and this argument about taqiyya is one of them .... You know I 
have heard even some educated Christians speaking about Islam giving the right to Muslims to tell 
lies  …. this is completely nonsense.  Telling a lie is completely forbidden in Islam.” (Moucarry, 
Interview 51). 
 
The concern for these Evangelicals is that the emphasis on taqiyya from some participants in the 
public sphere makes it much more difficult for Christians to relate to Muslims.  Chapman said: 
 
one of the reasons why I find it so distressing is that the message that comes across to the ordinary 
Christian in the pew is that you can’t trust these people so don’t even try to, don’t even try to 
negotiate and dialogue with them (Chapman, Interview 62). 
 
It is a topic that Sudworth feels strongly about and has addressed in a couple of his blogs.  He 
admits that the doctrine of taqiyya has a “basis in Islamic history” but feels that it is: 
 
often used by the Barnabas Fund to cloak the efforts of progressive Muslims with a veneer of 
suspicion and deceit. Whilst recognizing the reality that exists within some Muslims, brandishing 
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this term about actually mitigates (sic) against the vulnerability that Christians ought to bring to 
relationships (Sudworth, 2008c).   
 
He made a similar point in reply to the Australian Evangelical, Mark Durie, who responded critically 
to another blog on the topic: “dare I say that EVEN IF others are deceiving us, we are to reach out 
our hand in love and friendship?” (Sudworth, 2009a, emphasis in original). 
 
One of the interviewees even pointed out that Christians do something similar when they are 
involved in “covert” mission in Muslim countries: “‘we must be careful what we say and what we 
do’ and all the rest of it.  Everybody practices taqiyya to some extent don’t they?” (Glaser, 
Interview 41).  Another was clearly angry about what he believed to be the western foreign policy 
decisions that he believed to have been made based on “lies” (Musk, Interview 81). 
 
The debate concerning taqiyya was exemplified by the responses to the document entitled A 
Common Word between Us and You (henceforth Common Word) published in October 2007.  This 
was an open letter signed by 138 prominent Muslim scholars from a wide spectrum of 
backgrounds.  It was addressed to named and unnamed Christian church leaders worldwide and 
the authors suggest that the shared fundamentals of Islam and Christianity are the unity of God 
and love – love both for God and for neighbour.  They go on to invite Christians to come together 
with Muslims on this common ground for the sake of world peace.  After the letter was published 
responses came from various Christian communities, some of which have been published on the 
website hosted by Royal Aal al-Bayt, the institute in Jordan which provided the main impetus for 
the Muslim letter.150  Some Evangelicals welcomed this approach and subsequently attended 
various dialogue events.  Many others, however, distrusted the motives of the Muslim authors.  
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi accused them of taqiyya (2009a) as did Barnabas Fund (2007).  This led to 
a particularly sharp disagreement amongst participants in the EPS which is discussed further below 
(§11.4.b). 
 
  
                                                             
150 See www.acommonword.com (accessed 9 December 2010).  As of 9 December, 2010 there were 71 
Christian responses from various churches, denominations and individuals worldwide. 
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10.4.C HOW DO EVANGELICALS SEE ISLAM DEVELOPING IN BRITAIN IN THE FUTURE? 
Some participants in the EPS are so concerned about Islamization and the intentions of some 
Muslims that they predict Britain will relatively soon become an Islamic state.  The most widely-
circulated prediction was made by Pawson when he reported being “suddenly overwhelmed with 
what could be described as a premonition that Islam will take over the country” (2003, 7).  
Significantly this came to him whilst he was listening to Sookhdeo speak and he considers it to be a 
“prophecy” that can only be tested by future events.  He speculates that it will be a judgement on 
the western church and suggests that “unless there is a radical change (which is what repentance 
is), much of the church could disappear” leaving only a refined remnant (ibid 189). 
 
Dye also believes that: 
 
we in Britain are being faced with a prophetic choice - either we submit to the kingdom of God, or 
we will have to surrender to the rules of shari‘a, which ultimately means the Islamic khilafa. We 
need to be aware that Britain is heading towards becoming a full-blown Muslim nation” (Dye, n.d.).   
 
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, again with reference to hijra, cite the historical examples of how sub-
Saharan Africa, Ethiopia, Malaysia and Indonesia all became Muslim majority states within a 
couple of hundred years due to Muslim migration (2009b, 85-8) and Sookhdeo conjectures that 
this could happen to the whole of Europe if Turkey is allowed to join the European Union (2008a, 
228).   
 
Evangelicals with such concerns predict that this will come about chiefly through the demographic 
expansion of Muslim communities in the West.  Pawson claims that Muslim families have “a much 
higher birth rate than other families” (2003, 73), something that Williams also mentioned 
(Williams, Interview 32).  Sookhdeo believes the Muslim population already to number 3 million 
and he points out that the average age of the British Muslim is only 28, compared with 41 for the 
general population.  Of these he says one third are under 16 (2008a, 58, 64).  The Islam in Britain 
report goes even further and predicts that the Muslim population in Britain will be between 5 and 
6 million by 2013 (ISIC, 2005, 14).  Solomon and Al-Maqdisi put this down to a deliberate policy of 
i‘dad (preparation) whereby they claim Muslim communities are required by their leaders to have 
high birth rates (2009b, 51).  Perhaps the most extreme prediction came from Green.  Speaking on 
a Channel Four documentary he said: 
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I don't think you have to be a prophet to predict that there is going to be war in this land within 
perhaps 30 to 40 years.  If the Islamic population in this country continues to increase they will 
assume power and that could be the point at which people here begin to feel they have to take up 
arms….. people will not want to live under the yoke of Islam (Modell, 2008b).151 
 
Again other Evangelicals disagree with these prognoses and see no immediate danger of an Islamic 
take-over.  Speaking at the Keswick Convention Bell interpreted the demographics rather 
differently:  
 
Muslim fertility rates are dropping noticeably in Europe, and dramatically in the Middle East and 
North Africa.  Fundamentalism thrives in communities with large extended families and poverty and 
this pattern is diminishing among Europe's Muslim communities.  A sub-replacement birthrate was 
one of the causes of the decline of Christianity in Europe and it looks set to do the same for Islam in 
Europe (Christianity Today, 2008). 
 
In their interviews Azumah, Craig, Glaser, Goldsmith, Knell, Riddell, Sudworth and Wood all clearly 
stated that they did not believe that Britain would become Islamic in the near future.  Bell was 
reassured by the vociferous public response to the controversy sparked by Rowan Williams’ law 
lecture: 
 
scratch the surface in this country and the answer is ‘no way will Muslims take over this country 
and make it a Muslim state’ .... in a sense it put paid to Patrick Soohkdeo’s assertion at Westminster 
Chapel last year that Britain will be a Muslim state within 5 years, quote, unquote (Bell, Interview 
49).152 
 
In fact Bell is emerging as one of the strongest critics of the Islamic takeover hypothesis, for which 
he was criticized by name in an unattributed article in Barnabas Aid (Barnabas Fund, 2010b).153  
Although Bell admits that “it is sometimes hard not to privately resent Western governments’ 
                                                             
151 This may represent an evolution of Green’s thinking as in 2005 he wrote: “this author believes the 
British establishment would not allow such a thing to happen .... however, events have a habit of taking 
politicians by surprise .... the long-term danger of an Islamic state in Britain may be so far off as not to 
be significant” (Green, 2005, 17). 
152 This appears to be a reference to a national conference for church leaders organized by the 
Maranatha Community on 6 February, 2007 at the Emmanuel Centre, London.  Speakers included 
amongst others Sookhdeo, Riddell and Solomon. 
153 Note that the web version of this article is attributed to Patrick Sookhdeo.  See 
http://barnabasfund.org/UK/News/Articles-research/?startno=9&Limit=4&View=2cols (accessed 17 
March 2010). 
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apparent support for Muslim development”, he describes fears of an Islamic takeover as 
“irrational” and a “logical impossibility” (2003, 7).  He believes that due to the internal struggles 
within Islam “radical Islam may be passing its zenith” (2006b, 155) and observed that “Muslims are 
so disorganized they couldn’t organize their way out of a plastic bag let alone take over the 
nation” (Bell, Interview 61). 
 
Chapman is supportive of Bell’s position.  In the first edition of Cross and Crescent he says: 
 
when a certain kind of Muslim rhetoric calls for a country such as Britain to become an Islamic 
state, we may need to do some straight speaking.  There is absolutely no way that a minority 
Muslim community could turn any European country into an Islamic state, however much they 
would like to do so.  But when Christians are taken in by such rhetoric and suggest that the Muslim 
community is actually planning to have the whole legal system in these countries abolished and the 
shari‘a adopted in its place, these Christians are playing on people’s fears about ‘the thin edge of 
the wedge’ and ‘the domino theory’(Chapman, 1995, 38-9). 
 
Interestingly this paragraph has been removed from the second edition in which Chapman warns 
that Christians need to be careful of their language but acknowledges that “some Muslims would 
like Islam to ‘rule the world’ and everyone in the world to become a Muslim, just as some 
Christians would like Christianity to ‘rule the world’ and everyone to become Christians” (2007b, 
46). 
 
10.4.D WHAT DO EVANGELICALS BELIEVE SHOULD BE DONE? 
Such comments reveal something of the tensions within the EPS which will be explored further in 
the next chapter.  However, these different assessments of the intentions of Muslims and the 
likely trajectory of Islam in Britain inevitably lead Evangelicals to propose very different courses of 
action.  Some feel that the onus is on Muslims to reform Islam; others suggest that it is for the 
government to resolve the issues; and still others believe that it is Christians that need to act.  
Some even feel that the ultimate solution lies with God.  Each of these approaches is expanded on 
below with examples of some of the specific suggestions that have been made by various 
participants. 
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Onus on Muslims 
Several of the participants in the EPS place the burden of change firmly on the shoulders of 
Muslims in Britain and indeed worldwide.  They want Muslim leaders to voice stronger and more 
unequivocal formal denunciations of violence (Riddell and Cotterell, 2003, 206) and believe that 
“the radical Muslims, who pose a threat to the world, would most successfully be dealt with by 
other members of the Islamic community” (F. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 2002, 83).  Several 
participants suggest that this will require a “reformation of Islam”.  Sookhdeo is particularly vocal 
in calling for such a reform: 
 
only an Enlightenment-type reform of mainstream Islam, including a complete reinterpretation of 
its violent and intolerant theological strands, supported by the majority of its religious and political 
leadership, can stop the drift to an ever more radical and aggressive Islam (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 221). 
 
Amongst other things, such a reformation would include Muslims:154 
 
a) Becoming more tolerant and more self-critical (Moucarry, 2007, 119). 
b) Re-interpreting the Qur’an (P. Sookhdeo, 2005b). 
c) Allowing the “historico-critical method (sic)” to be applied to the Qur’an (Musk, 2008, 
220). 
d) Downgrading the importance of the hadith material (Riddell, 2004b, 201). 
e) Abandoning the apostasy law (Knell, 2008, Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2009a, 24). 
f) Supporting and encouraging liberal and more secular-minded Muslims (Sookhdeo, 2008a, 
216). 
g) “De-politicizing Islam” (F. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 2002, 77). 
h) Accepting a clear separation between religion and state (Sookhdeo, 2007a, 436). 
i) Integrating into British society and giving up any ambition of turning Britain into an Islamic 
state (ISIC, 2005, 136). 
 
In response to the Common Word (§10.4.b) document Solomon and Al-Maqdisi suggested seven 
“tangible actions” that Muslims needed to take in order to achieve such a reformation, including 
establishing the equality of all human beings, especially men and women, and “declaring all 
                                                             
154 Note that in all the following pages the inclusion of a participant in a list does not imply that he or 
she believes the whole solution to lie in that issue or agrees with the other participants listed. 
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Qur’anic texts that discriminate with impunity against Christians and Jews, describing them as 
kaffirs, apostates, polytheists, children of apes or swine, (to be) void and not ever to be used” 
(Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2009a, 24).  Solomon also published a pamphlet entitled A Proposed 
Charter of Muslim Understanding laying out a charter of ten articles which he invited Muslim 
leaders to sign (2006b).  This attracted a scathing response from some Muslims including Sahib 
Bleher, the general secretary of the Islamic Party of Britain.  He described the concept of the 
charter, which called for new interpretations of the Qur’an and the issuing of various fatwas, as 
“half-baked” and a “presumptuous insult”. 155  
  
Some doubt whether such a reform can ever happen (Knell, 2008, Cox and Marks, 2006) (§9.1.c).  
However, other Evangelicals see encouraging signs.  Even Sookhdeo recognizes that “some 
Muslims have, with great courage, begun to do this” (2005b) and he particularly highlights the 
Contextualizing Islam in Britain report as an example (2009d, see Suleiman, 2009). 
 
Onus on the West and western governments 
Inevitably some Evangelical participants feel that the government and security forces should take 
a tough line with Muslims and particularly with radicals.  In a seminar at New Wine Sookhdeo 
pointed out that historically Islam had only ever been stopped by military force and if the Muslim 
armies had not been forced to retreat then Europe would be Islamic today (P. Sookhdeo, 
2004a).156  Riddell too allows that at times “a more forceful response will be required” (2004b, 
173).  Indeed all the participants agree that to some extent terrorism and violence should be 
confronted and dealt with by the security forces.   
 
However, whilst some support the “war on terror” (e.g. Williams, Interview 80) and a few even see 
it as part of “the long war against classical Islam” which has been going on for 1400 years 
(Sookhdeo, 2007a, 441), others are highly critical and are vehemently opposed to it.  Musk spoke 
                                                             
155 See his letter of January 2007 at http://flyingimam.blogspot.com/2007/01/eu-charter-of-
misunderstanding-muslims.html (accessed 20 March 2009). 
156 This is a point which other participants do not dispute.  For instance “the expansion of Islam ... was 
stopped only through battle” (Musk, 2005, 257).  However, whilst this may have stopped the military 
advance Jay Smith is not convinced of its overall efficacy: “there is little evidence that a philosophy, or a 
belief, perceived by its adherents to have its source in divine revelation, can be removed by the use of 
violence.  History has, in fact, shown that movements such as Islam have thrived and even expanded 
when attacked violently from without” (Smith, 2005, 372). 
  233 Chapter 10 
 
of his anger at the lies surrounding the invasion of Iraq and believed that, after all the West has 
done, “it’s a miracle that there are any Muslims who are prepared to sit down with other people” 
(Musk, Interview 81).  McRoy has also been a particularly forthright critic of the war and has even 
suggested that “only one supernatural source could have inspired the US and British governments 
to carry out this disaster; the Devil” (2005a). 
 
In addition to the “war on terror” other suggestions of firm actions the British government should 
take include: 
 
a) Increasing scrutiny of Muslim organizations, finances and media (Cox and Marks, 2006) 
b) Partnering with more moderate Muslims and distancing itself from the MCB (ISIC, 2005)157 
c) Ensuring that new arrivals to Britain learn English, respect the law and “accept the values 
of liberal democracy” (Cox and Marks, 2006, 145) 
d) Requiring new arrivals to sign something to the above effect (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 
2009b, 93) 
e) Deporting extremist preachers and refusing planning permission for “fundamentalist 
mosques” (Dye, 2007, 64) 
f) Linking overseas aid to progress on human rights (Cox and Marks, 2006, 142) 
 
Some want the government to accept that Britain should have a specifically Christian identity.  
Dye, for instance, wants the government to reject cultural relativism and recognize "the Christian 
consensus in Britain and uphold (this) in public policy matters".  Although he concedes that 
“governments must remain neutral in religious matters", he demands that they "take an active 
role in reversing the Islamization trend and preventing further Islamization in Britain” (Dye, 2007, 
64).  Christian Voice goes further: 
 
our Queen needs to proclaim a day of prayer to Almighty God for protection in the mighty name of 
Jesus .... Next, our Government should state that this was, is and shall remain a Christian nation.  
Christianity is the religion of the United Kingdom, and they should listen to God and begin once 
more to trust the Bible for lawmaking.  The whole nation should repent and turn back to God, but 
those in power and authority have to lead the way (Christian Voice, 2005a). 
 
                                                             
157 It is interesting to note that this happened to some extent with the formation of the Sufi Council of 
Britain in 2006. 
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However, some participants want the government, and the West in general, to take a rather more 
self-critical approach by admitting its own culpability.  In commenting on Sookhdeo’s view of the 
issue Chapman worries that: 
 
the onus is all on them (Muslims), because it is they who are disturbing the peace, and have got to 
do something about it if they want to live in peace with us. I suggest that this way of thinking 
absolves us in the West far too easily of all responsibility for the past and present, and puts most of 
the responsibility for the conflicts and their resolution on the shoulders of Muslims (Chapman, 
2005b, emphasis in original) 
 
Musk agrees and says: 
 
one cannot challenge the Muslim community to rethink its literalism with regard to the Qur’an or 
its sympathy towards an aggressively Islamist critical agenda, without asking that Western 
politicians find another way to engage with Muslims over issues of national and international 
justice.  Such a reciprocal call is especially urgent in that, as we have seen, Muslims view the foreign 
policy of the United States of America as strongly religiously motivated (Musk, 2008, 222). 
 
For these participants some of the things that the British government and the international 
community in the West should do include: 
 
a) Giving more political freedom to British Muslims so that they can “defend (their) honour 
politically” (McRoy, 2006, 235) 
b) Promoting exchange visits and ensuring travel for all (Nazir-Ali, 2004) 
c) Resolving the “flashpoints” in Israel and Palestine, Kashmir and Chechnya in a just way 
(Nazir-Ali, 2002, 68).  Chapman in particular believes that resolving the Middle East 
situation “in a more even-handed way would go a long way – perhaps even a very long 
way – towards defusing the anger that many Muslims feel towards the West” (2005a, 22) 
d) Apologizing for the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement – “the ultimate cause of everything that 
has happened since” – and supporting the Palestinians (McRoy, n.d.-b) 
e) Withdrawing all British forces from the Middle East (S. Green, 2005, 18, McRoy, n.d.-b) 
 
Onus on Christians 
Almost all of the participants also put some responsibility on Christians to help resolve issues.  As 
Jay Smith said commenting on Pawson’s prediction of an Islamic takeover: “I think it’s a danger.... 
(but) I don’t think it’s going to happen.  I think by far, if we do our job right, we have an awful lot 
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of responsibility to make sure it doesn’t happen” (J.Smith, Interview 43).  As always though, some 
see this in a rather more confrontational light than others. 
 
Ideas for Christians to confront Islam include: 
 
a) “Lobbying government, business organizations and other significant institutions to oppose 
Islamism” (Dye, 2007, 66) 
b) Engaging Muslims in ideological debate by “confronting the very foundations of Islam” (J. 
Smith, 2005, 372) 
c) “Rejecting traditional Muslim and Islamist demands” and supporting “the new voices of 
reason and moderation within Islam” (Sookhdeo, 2009d)  
d) Calling for reciprocity and better treatment of Christian minorities in Muslims countries 
(Carey, 2004a) 
e) Aggressively preaching the Gospel to Muslims (S. Green, 2005, 18) 
f) Re-evangelizing Britain including nominal Christians (Dye, 2007, 66, Riddell, 2004b, 188) 
 
Others are just as aware of the issues but come to rather different conclusions about what should 
be done.  Chapman counsels that: 
 
if there is any sense in which Islam wants to win the world, Christians all over the world will need to 
work out how to respond to the political challenge – and to do so in ways that are not Islamic but 
distinctively Christian (Chapman, 2007b, 338). 
 
These participants advocate: 
 
a) Christian leaders, particularly in America, apologizing for their insulting statements about 
Islam (Musk, 2008, 232) 
b) Heeding the Islamists’ critiques of Western culture and addressing decadence, greed and 
the “empty hole in (western) religious and thought life” (F. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 
2002, 104) 
c) Learning from the Islamic worldview concept of tawhid and “searching out ways in which 
Christ can be brought back into the centre of ‘what life is all about’ in the West” (Musk, 
2003, 266) 
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d) Being peacemakers and bridge-builders (Chapman, 2007b, 407) 
e) Christians demonstrating that “they do care about people who come to this country for 
various reasons and they want to help in getting these people integrated into British 
society (Moucarry, Interview 103) 
f) Blessing Muslim communities (Chapman, 2007b, 395) 
g) Loving Muslims: “the only chance we have against the relentless growth of Islam is 
millions of people revealing through their behaviour the love of Christ" (Brother Andrew 
and Janssen, 2007, 252) 
 
Onus on God 
Finally, it should be said that the majority of Evangelicals also believe that God is involved in 
determining the future in some way.  Some express this through their understanding of the 
sovereignty of God.  Bell frequently mentions this as a reason for his confidence both that Muslims 
are in the West as a part of God’s plan and that they will not “take over” (Bell, 2003, 7). 
 
Many if not all of the participants also call for prayer.  Brother Andrew calls for “a prayer 
offensive”, a type of “good jihad”, and challenges people to pray for terrorists including Bin Laden 
(Brother Andrew and Janssen, 2007, 262).  Riddell and Cotterell describe prayer as the “most 
potent weapon” (2003, 205); some include times of prayer in their seminars at conferences; 
others conclude their book or chapter with a prayer.  Clearly this is an important response for 
Christians and gives Bell cause for hope: “destructive fear is turning into constructive prayer” (Bell, 
2006b, 124). 
 
10.4.E  ARE EVANGELICALS AT WAR? 
So clearly some of the Evangelical participants are extremely concerned about what they see as 
the Islamic agenda in Britain.  Dye puts it starkly: “Now is not the time to play around with spiritual 
things - we are at war” (Dye, n.d.). 
 
However, Green’s prediction of a civil war in Britain notwithstanding, none of the participants 
advocate using physical violence against Muslims or seeing Muslims as the enemy.  In Global Jihad 
Sookhdeo has a section on “knowing your enemy” and suggests that “if an ‘enemy’ is to be 
identified, then the enemy is not Muslims but the classical interpretation of Islam” (2007a, 431).   
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Pawson is also keen to stress that “Muslims are not our enemies” but rather it is spiritual forces 
that need to be confronted.  This should not be done through "carnal warfare” as “for Christians to 
use political power to impose the values and standards of their faith on unbelievers is to come 
dangerously near to what we have described as the ‘essence’ of Islam, the establishment of a 
theocracy” (Pawson, 2003, 86).  For him the proper response is prayer and “spiritual warfare” that 
will liberate Muslims from their “bondage” (ibid 87). 
 
Those participants with a more open view of Islam, however, find this sort of language unhelpful.  
Bell suggests that “secularism seems to be a far more worthy candidate for the position of hidden 
enemy than Islam” and tends to see Muslims as allies in the struggle against secularization (Bell, 
2006b, 117).  Glaser too offers a strong critique of that sort of language when she says:  
 
we need to discern where, whether deliberately of unwittingly, Christian responses to Muslims are, 
first, portraying Muslims as ‘the enemy’ and, second, functionally ignoring Jesus’ call to his disciples 
to love their enemies (Glaser, 2010a, 32). 
 
These are questions that have crucial relevance for Evangelical relationships with Muslims and 
come into sharp focus in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 11 EVANGELICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Having mapped out how British Evangelicals conceptualize Islam and described how they are 
responding to the socio-political context of Islam in Britain, this chapter examines how the EPS in 
Britain is relating to other public spheres.  It begins by exploring its interaction with Muslims 
themselves particularly through the Evangelical engagement in “mission” to Muslims.  The second 
section broadens the perspective to consider what the data tells us about how Evangelicals engage 
with the British meso-public sphere, principally through campaigning, politics and the media.  The 
third section looks at the EPS engagement with its own grassroots.  It does this by presenting the 
material obtained from the interviews conducted with church leaders in London and assessing the 
influence that the various participants are able to bring to bear in these churches.  The data 
presentation concludes with a consideration of some recent events and publications which 
highlight once again the internal tensions that exist within the EPS today. 
 
11.1 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE TO MUSLIMS 
 
11.1.A THE EVANGELICAL MISSION TO MUSLIMS 
Chapman believes that the primary mode of Evangelical engagement with Muslims is in mission: 
 
first and foremost there is the response of people who say, ‘look, here are people who need to be 
evangelized and let’s get on with evangelizing them’ ....So the most significant Evangelical response 
that I can see in Britain and in other parts of the world is a desire to share the Gospel with them 
(Chapman, Interview 78). 
 
Encouraging this sort of mission has been Goldsmith’s particular emphasis and he sees interaction 
with Muslims “basically in terms of witness” although definitely not “arrogant preaching” 
(Goldsmith, Interview 52.  See also his Islam and Christian Witness (1982)).  All the participants, 
regardless of their attitude towards Islam, agree with this sentiment to some extent as “the church 
is mission, and a mission-less church is a Christ-less church” (Sookhdeo, 2006, 90).  Even the most 
liberal Evangelicals take such an approach or cease to be Evangelical by definition (§5.1).  So for 
instance Wood, who describes himself as a “liberal Evangelical”, said “I think it’s the role of the 
church anywhere and everywhere .... to bear witness to Christ and to engage in what I would call 
‘mission’” (Wood, Interview 19). 
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This does not mean that Evangelicals do not recognize the difficulty or unpopularity of such an 
approach.  Reflecting on the post-colonial period Riddell says: 
 
within Western societies in general, and even within some parts of the church, mission came to be 
regarded as controversial at best, and with downright hostility in certain quarters. It came to be 
seen by many as just another form of colonialism .... Simply put, being a missionary was no longer 
seen as fashionable (Riddell, 2003). 
 
If mission to Muslims is controversial amongst western Christians it is even more so amongst 
Muslims themselves.  Sookhdeo observes that Christian missionary work within the wider context 
of globalization is seen as “part of western efforts to dominate and weaken the world of Islam” 
(2010a, 102) and he suggests that given the history of the Crusades and colonialism: 
 
Muslims are convinced that Christianity can win converts from Islam only by using underhand 
methods, inducements and subtle pressure ...  Christianity is seen as an illegitimate competitor to 
Islam on a global level in the modern world, and Christian mission is seen as a challenge to Islam 
that demands a resolute response (Sookhdeo, 2009c, 63). 
 
Despite this opposition, Evangelicals remain adamant that they have a right to share their faith 
with Muslims, with the proviso that they are careful to eschew any type of “cajolery, bribery, 
undue pressure or intimidation” (Riddell, 2004b, 135).  They argue that Islam is also a missionary 
faith and see it as a fair competition: 
 
if both faiths have from the beginning behaved as missionary faiths, and if Islam has a clear mission 
in relation to the Christian church, would it not be a strange irony if Christians now were to give up 
any commitment to mission, just when some Muslims are redoubling their efforts to win the West 
for Islam (Chapman, 2004b)?  
 
This competition, however, is not without its dangers.  Musk recognizes that for all Christians “the 
struggle ahead is one of witness with its nuance of ‘martyrdom’” (Musk, 2003, 266) and suggests 
that: 
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if Huntington is correct, the focal points of ‘mission’ – Christian and Muslim – are going to be found 
at such crossroads of tension or civilizational fault line during the first part of the twenty-first 
century.  Countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and many African nations in the part of that 
continent that is south of the Sahara will discover themselves at the forefront of controversy over 
ethnic and religious commitment ...  Mission .... is likely to be very messy, very costly (Musk, 2005, 
299).158 
 
Despite the recognition of the problems, opposition and cost, however, Musk believes that “we 
live on the cusp of a dramatic shift in the willingness of Muslims to hear the Christian story” 
(Musk, 2008, xxix).  Indeed there is even general optimism amongst Evangelicals about the growth 
in mission to Muslims: “whether we like it or not there are Muslims bit by bit coming to Christ in 
Britain”, particularly Iranians (Glaser, Interview 69).  Bell quotes two eminent missiologists who 
report growth in the numbers of Muslims converting to Christianity.  David Garrison claims that, 
“more Muslims have come to Christ in the past two decades than at any other point in history” 
and statistician Patrick Johnstone suggests that, due to disillusionment with the upsurge in violent 
Islamism,  “Osama bin Laden is responsible for more Muslims following Jesus than anyone else 
alive today” (Bell, 2006b, 122-3).159   
 
Evangelicals are, of course, quick to contribute such “successes” to God rather than to their own 
methods.  "It is the work of God, the Holy Spirit, to convert people" (Nazir-Ali, 2002, 82) or as 
Taylor puts it: 
 
no one ‘converts’ anyone. It simply isn’t like that. The more you try, the less success you have – like 
torture. It is the infection of the Spirit that ‘converts’, not the pressure of the sales pitch (J. Taylor, 
2008c). 
 
This proviso notwithstanding the EPS is clearly not just engaging in discussion with other spheres 
but is expecting converts.  Even so, there is still disagreement amongst Evangelicals as to how this 
mission should be expedited.  Whilst there is general agreement that evangelism is likely to 
                                                             
158 Recent events in Nigeria bear this out.  For example Taylor reports Muslim attacks on Christians 
(Taylor (2010) At the Mass Grave of Dogo Na Hauwa, http://www.lapidomedia.com/nigeria/at-the-
mass-grave-of-dogo-na-hauwa, accessed 21 December 2010); and Christian Solidarity Worldwide 
describes Muslim attacks on churches in Kano (http://dynamic.csw.org.uk/article.asp?t=press&id=991, 
accessed 21 December 2010). 
159 Garrison’s comment was taken from the Friday Fax email bulletin of world mission, June 2005, and 
Johnstone’s observation was made during the Keswick Lecture, 2003. 
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include some sort of apologetics, there is a much sharper debate over the desirability of engaging 
in dialogue on the one hand or confrontational debate that spills over into polemics on the other.  
 
Apologetics 
Jay Smith is passionate about preaching: 
 
I want to make sure that (Jesus) is preached out in public and I want to let every Muslim know how 
much I love my Lord because I believe the only relevant model is the model of Jesus Christ, but I 
want to be as passionate in my public pronouncement of that as my Muslim friend is in his 
passionate pronouncement of Islam and the prophet Muhammad’s model (J.Smith, Interview 23).   
 
Given such a desire to preach the Gospel Moucarry observed that apologetics – or defensive 
arguments (§4.3.c) – are “unavoidable if we get involved with Islamic teaching” (Moucarry, 
Interview 67).  Azumah suggests that such apologetics need to be “robust” as “the aim of our 
response should be to correct and remove the misunderstanding (that Muslims have) as far as we 
are able” (2009a, 4).  However, even though most agree on the necessity of apologetics some still 
hesitate: 
 
there are also the people who focus very much on the apologetic.  I think that’s got its uses but it’s 
got to be kept within its context and it’s fine to teach Christians to deal with the Islamic apologetic 
– you need to do that – but to use that as a basis for relationship with Muslims or as a basis for 
evangelism or as a basis for dialogue is not helpful (Glaser, Interview 67).   
 
Debate 
For Jay Smith, though, defending the faith requires confrontational debate and he has been part of 
many initiatives to promote debates between Christians and Muslims.160  The Muslim-Christian 
Debate Website, which belongs to the Hyde Park Christian Fellowship with which Smith is 
connected, states that: 
 
given that Christianity and Islam share much common background, and that each makes its own 
(often competing) truth-claims, there comes a point where debate is necessary and right.
161
 
 
                                                             
160 See Brierly (2008) for an account of Smith’s debating style and work at Speakers’ Corner. (Brierly, 
2008)  
161 http://www.debate.org.uk (accessed 25 June 2010). 
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Up to 2005 Smith reckoned that he had taken part in over 30 formal debates (2005, 375) especially 
on university campuses.162  He has also taken part in numerous informal debates at Speakers 
Corner where he leads a team of Christians called the Codgers to speak and debate with 
Muslims.163  Craig has now joined Smith’s debating group (A. Craig, 2009b), and has taken part in 
several formal debates under the auspices of the Muslim Debate Initiative164 and on Premier 
Radio.165 
 
Such debates clearly lead to an interacting of the Christian and Muslim public spheres.  Not only 
do the participants interact during the debate but it also generates discussion or argument 
afterwards which is often carried out online.  Sometimes this is intra-public dialogue such as that 
following Craig’s 2007 debate with Abdur-Raheem Green  on Premier Radio’s “Unbelievable” 
programme about “Mosques in the UK”.  Green’s report of the debate on his website prompted 
Muslims to write in expressing their views.166  On other occasions it becomes inter-public with 
various postings on websites and blogs clearly aimed at the Other.  One such example was a 
dispute between the Codgers and the Muslim Debate Initiative over the involvement of women in 
debates.167  
 
Some of the more irenic participants, like Moucarry, have been involved in debates as well 
(Moucarry, Interview 81).  Chapman acknowledged that he had taken part in debates but added 
that “they’ve definitely been of a more dialogical nature than a polemical nature, and in my 
understanding that’s what debates ought to be” (Chapman, Interview 80).  And this is the crux of 
the issue between Evangelicals.  What should be the nature of the debate with Islam?  Is polemics 
                                                             
162 For example see his debate with Shabbir Ally ‘Islam or Christianity - Which Promotes Peace?’ held 
on 28 June 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YmYHnkMCUN4&feature=related (accessed 24 
July 2009). 
163 For example see the video of his debate with Adnan Rashid at Speakers Corner held on 22 June 2008 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cZaQAaS_PkU&feature=related (accessed 24 July 2009). 
164 A Muslim initiative.  See www.thedebateinitiative.com (accessed 6 April 2011). 
165 See for instance his debates with Adnan Rashid ‘Islam or Christianity: which one provides a 
comprehensive solution for Britain?’ held at East London Tabernacle, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4XleupL170 (accessed 13 April 2010) and with Abdurrahman 
Green ‘Mosques in the UK: does society have anything to fear?’ Unbelievable! Premier Radio, 14 October 
2008. 
166 See http://www.islamsgreen.org/islams_green/2007/06/unbelievable_mo.html (accessed 16 
March 2009). 
167 See http://www.thedebateinitiative.com/#/alan-craig/4537710664 (accessed 13 April 2010). 
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a valid, constructive form of interaction with Muslims? 
 
Polemics 
Moucarry defined polemics as “a war of words with Islam .... it’s about attacking and undermining 
Islam” and was clear that he does not think that this is what Christians are called to do (Moucarry, 
Interview 67).  Smith, however, disagrees.  He says that “the Gospel by definition is 
confrontational” (2007a) and, in a chapter defending his right to confront Muslims, calls polemics 
“tough love” which uses “one’s mouth, mind, and volition” to correct Islam rather than resorting 
to violence (J. Smith, 2005, 372).  One of Smith’s main strategies for doing this, in addition to the 
above debates, is the use of internet videos.  Under the label Pfander Films he has posted over 60 
short videos on the internet that can be viewed on You Tube and have been downloaded over 
600,000 times.168  Each video attracts responses posted on the website and some have provoked 
hundreds of comments from both Christians and Muslims.  Many of these videos, which last 
anything from one to ten minutes, not only defend Christianity but also attack Islam.  In one of the 
videos Smith warns: 
 
you Muslims need to be aware, you've had it so good for so long in Europe.  No-one ever refutes 
you in public.  Now we're doing so and we're doing so in a big way. And you're realizing our 
refutations are pretty good .... now you're getting the heat of what it's like to be on the other end 
(J. Smith, 2007b). 
 
Some Evangelicals support Smith’s approach.  Riddell comments that, whilst “this method is highly 
controversial, attracting much opposition from within Christian circles, including Evangelical 
opposition”, in fact Smith and his associates are “the only group to be responding directly to the 
Muslim radical minority and its anti-Christian polemic” (Riddell, 2004a, 15, 17).   
 
Others are rather more ambivalent.  Bell said in his interview: 
 
I would encourage people who had the gifting for polemic debate, and I feel that Jay Smith has a 
very valid ministry in that.  He needs to do that the best he can and in the best spirit and as 
effectively because some Muslims need that and they’re not going to hear anything else (Bell, 
Interview 73). 
                                                             
168 Named after the famous nineteenth century Christian polemicist in India, Karl Pfander.  See 
www.youtube.com/user/PfanderFilms (accessed 24 July 2009).  
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However, in his Friendship First Manual , which takes a “relational” and an “apologetic approach”,  
he expresses his fear that a polemical approach can result in “rhetoric being shouted across the 
chasm” in which case “a Muslim would be better off never meeting a Christian” (Bell, 2003, 10).  
Azumah too is ambivalent about the polemical approach.  On the one hand: 
 
the polemical approach might be found useful because you find a situation where Muslims are 
standing up and they are preaching and attacking Christianity and teachings and in Islamic culture 
sometimes silence means consent.  If there’s no-one challenging and responding back it is taken as 
a given that what they’re saying is the truth (Azumah, Interview 21).   
 
But then he immediately went on to qualify this: 
 
there is a place in which Christians have to learn to respond but even that I will culturalize (sic) it as 
more of apologetics than as polemical.  The Qur’an, if you like to put it bluntly, is a polemical piece 
of work against Christians and Christianity .... and I just think that sometimes you are playing into 
their hands when we go the polemical route (Azumah, Interview 21).   
 
Others are even more critical.  Commenting directly on Smith’s approach Chapman feels that “he 
blurs the distinction between an apologetic and polemics, and does not seem to recognize the 
limitations of the polemical approaches that have been adopted by both sides over many 
centuries” (2007b, 247).  Moucarry too is totally opposed to the use of polemics.  He said, “I am as 
much against polemics as I am in favour of apologetics” (Moucarry, Interview 67) and elsewhere 
claims that: 
 
 this approach is counterproductive. It usually provokes a defensive response—Muslims becoming 
more radical in their beliefs—and often an offensive reaction too—Muslims attacking Christianity 
even more vehemently (Moucarry, 2010). 
 
Dialogue 
It is clear that both Chapman and Moucarry would favour a more dialogical approach. 169  Many 
Evangelicals, however, have reservations about inter-religious dialogue. Goldsmith pointed out 
that in the past such dialogue has been the preserve of liberal Christians and moderate Muslims 
(Goldsmith, Interview 34).  Nazir-Ali refers to a "growing interfaith 'industry'” which seeks to 
                                                             
169 See for example Chapman (2003a). (Chapman, 2003a) 
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“minimize differences between the faiths” on the “questionable assumption” that this makes for 
greater social harmony (2008e, 20).  Despite this scepticism, since the Glen Eyrie Report of the 
Lausanne Movement promoted "a methodology based on respect, sensitivity and dialogue” 
(Riddell, 2004b, 140),170 more Evangelicals have been getting involved and overcoming what 
Moucarry sees as their “unwarranted suspicion of dialogue” (2010). 
 
Admittedly for most this is a somewhat cautious, conditional involvement.  Riddell calls it a “yes 
but” approach which maintains “red lines that must not be crossed” (2004b, 118).  For him it must 
be a “robust” and “honest” dialogue that does not refrain from asking hard questions (Riddell, 
Interview 29).  Azumah concurs and suggests that a “sustainable dialogue” is based on 
“appreciation and respect for our differences” not on finding common ground (2009b, 5).  This, of 
course, includes the sharing of one’s convictions, and Moucarry insists that in dialogue “there 
must always be the possibility of conversion” (2001, 19).   So the type of dialogue which most 
Evangelicals are prepared to be involved in would be what Bell called “proclamatory dialogue” 
(Bell, Interview 73).  Sudworth explains it this way: 
 
we don't need traditional evangelism or traditional dialogue: we need dialogue that includes the 
sharing of faith and evangelism that is prepared to listen (Sudworth, 2008b). 
 
Such dialogue is not without its difficulties.  Musk admitted that it is not always easy to find 
Muslims who are prepared to be involved (Musk, Interview 85).  Chapman is more optimistic and 
believes that many Muslims “are tired of talking to Christians who do not know what they believe 
and would far rather talk to convinced Christians who will argue passionately for their convictions” 
(2004b).171    
 
Despite the willingness of these Evangelicals to be involved, other Evangelicals, and particularly 
those who espouse a polemic approach, are severely critical of dialogue.  Jay Smith recalled 
                                                             
170 See www.lausanne.org/all-documents/lop-4.html for a copy of the report (accessed 23 September 
2010). 
171 This trend is also observed by American academic Joseph Cumming, who believes that “the rules for 
interfaith dialogue are changing”.  He recalls a Muslim disillusioned with the relativism of an interfaith 
dialogue event saying to him: “we want to work with you Evangelicals, because we feel like we have 
something in common with you … we want to be talking with Christians who take their scriptures 
seriously”  (Cumming, 2008, 314).  See also Hellyer (2008). (Hellyer, 2008) 
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former Archbishop Akinola of Nigeria describing the situation in the West and saying: “all you’re 
doing is dialoguing.  You’re dialoguing yourself to death.  It’s become an industry here in Britain” 
(J.Smith, Interview 83).  Sookhdeo points out that “Muslims find it hard to believe that Christians 
are not seeking to convert them during the dialogue process (and so) often suspect that such 
dialogue is a form of Christian deception” (2006, 81).  He worries that Muslims will use dialogue as 
a means to advance the cause of Islam and that “Christians will do all the giving and Muslims all 
the taking” (ibid 81).  He also cautions that Muslims may employ taqiyya (§10.4.b) during dialogue 
and so “any undertakings or pledges made by the Muslim side cannot necessarily be relied on, nor 
can any factual information given be automatically accepted as true” (ibid 82).172  Solomon and Al-
Maqdisi are also implacably opposed to dialogue and suggest that:  
 
the obligation of jihad with its variants and nuances does not give the Muslim any room whatsoever 
in dialogues - as the goal remains that of bringing the hegemony of Islam everywhere (Solomon and 
Al-Maqdisi, 2009a, 8). 
 
Despite these criticisms, Evangelicals are involved in dialogue and interfaith initiatives both in 
Britain and internationally.  For instance: 
 
  
                                                             
172 It should be noted that, despite Sookhdeo’s concerns, Barnabas Fund, in a statement about the Yale 
response to the Common Word, kept the door to dialogue open and proposed what they believed to be a 
“third way”: 
“Currently Christian responses to Islam are many and various. Some would suggest that there 
are two opposing positions: one is to embrace Islamic ideals and the other is to regard Islam 
itself as intrinsically evil and to have nothing to do with it. But Barnabas Fund believes that 
there is a third way, that is, for Christians to meet with Muslims, recognizing that there are two 
main areas for discussion. One area has to do with Muslims and Christians living in society and 
the other has to do with theology and spirituality. Barnabas Fund`s belief is that the latter is 
not the priority in our world today. We must recognize that there are vital differences in 
theology between Islam and Christianity which are unbridgeable, and therefore discussions on 
theology can never be very productive although they can result in increased understanding 
and respect for each other. It is the discussion of Muslims and Christians living in society which 
is the priority and indeed is urgent, and from which practical and positive change can be 
expected. Therefore, as the Pope has set out, discussion with Muslims must include full 
equality, human rights and religious liberty for Christian minorities, this liberty to comprise 
not only freedom of worship but also the freedom to share the Christian faith and to convert to 
it” (Barnabas Fund, 2008). 
To date I can find no evidence that Barnabas Fund or Sookhdeo have engaged in such a dialogue. 
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 Chapman, Glaser, Riddell and Taylor were involved in the Faith and Society dialogue in the 
1990s (Glaser, 2000a);   
 Wood and Andrew Smith are both involved in the CMF; 
 Azumah, Glaser and Nazir-Ali have all participated in the Building Bridges seminars 
initiated by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, after 9/11;173 
 Chapman and Moucarry have both attended the International Evangelical Christian-
Muslim Dialogues;174   
 and several of the participants have taken part in or been supportive of the Common Word 
initiative (§10.4.b). 
 
It remains controversial, however.  Riddell observes that “the situation will not be much helped if 
three groups emerge: one of Christians who refuse to work with Muslims, one of Muslims who 
refuse to work with Christians, and a third group of 'professional dialoguers'".  He believes that 
ideally there needs to be "engagement between all Christians and all Muslims" (Riddell, 2004b, 
192 emphasis in original).  
 
11.1.B EVANGELICAL FRIENDSHIP WITH MUSLIMS 
Engagement between the two spheres does not only happen at a formal level and many 
Evangelicals and Muslims relate at a personal level.  Chapman’s observation that dialogue is 
“nothing more than two people meeting face to face and talking together” (2006) brings to mind 
Hauser’s comment that if only two or three meet together then “some portion of the public 
sphere is made manifest in their conversation" (1999, 64).  However, whilst some may have a 
utilitarian view of friendship with Muslims, for others whatever the outcome of dialogue “the 
bottom line is a commitment to remain friends and good neighbours”(Sudworth, 2007, 100). 
 
Bell in particular champions a relational approach to Muslims.  Both of his main publications 
(2003, 2006b) are intended to facilitate Christians in building friendships with Muslims.  He 
believes that “the biggest step in relating the Good News to a Muslim is when we step away from 
confrontation and towards genuine friendship” (2003, 13).  Indeed the title of his second book has 
given rise to the term “grace approach” which is now widely used to describe a friendship oriented 
                                                             
173 See Ipgrave, Michael (ed), Building Bridges Series, London, Church House Publishing 
174 www.bridgesoffaith.org  (6 April 2011). 
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approach to Muslims. 
 
Andrew Smith has also emphasized a relational approach in his youth work (A. Smith, 2009).  He 
suggests that the question of how to equip Christian young people:  
 
to build positive friendships with Muslims will continue to be a significant issue for Christian youth 
workers in the coming years …. the challenge is to find a way of speaking that is faithful to the 
integrity of both the Christian and the Muslim, but leaves the relationship in a good place. The 
philosophical way to describe this is to ask, 'How can I meet you as you without losing myself in the 
process?' (A. Smith, 2009, 28, 21). 
 
Even those who take a more polemical approach believe that friendship with Muslims is in some 
way important.  For instance, Cox in a book endorsement says “we must develop an appropriate 
response (to 9/11) which will enable us to live peacefully and in friendship with our Muslim 
neighbours” (F. Orr-Ewing and Orr-Ewing, 2002).  Jay Smith frequently refers to those whom he 
debates with as his friends, including apparently the notorious radical, Sheikh Omar Bakri 
Muhammad (J. Smith, 2008b).  He says that, although the relationship is argumentative, the 
Muslims “love that adversarial relationship because they see that I am a man of God and they see 
that I am as passionate as they are” (J.Smith, Interview 7). 
 
It is significant to note that many of the participants in the EPS either have or have had Muslim 
friends.  From the interviews it emerged that Goldsmith, Chapman and Musk had a lot of contact 
with Muslims in the past when they lived overseas but regretted that they had less contact now.  
Andrew Smith, Sudworth and Moucarry all currently work closely with Muslim colleagues and the 
latter, being Syrian, had Muslim friends whilst growing up some of whom he is still in contact with.  
Andrew Smith and Sudworth, along with Craig and McRoy, also live in neighbourhoods with large 
Muslim populations.  Glaser and Riddell too reported having good Muslim friends at different 
times in their lives and Glaser reckons that she is currently in contact with Muslims “several times 
a week” (Glaser, Interview 25).  However, for some, such as Wood and Musk, most of their current 
contact with Muslims comes through attending various dialogue forums.  Due to lack of interview 
data, it was not possible to discover whether Cox, Green, Solomon and Sookhdeo have Muslim 
friends, although it should be noted that Rosemary Sookhdeo refers to many encounters with 
Muslim women and says that she has “a close relationship with a few” (2004, 13). 
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Of course, some of the participants are themselves from Muslim families.  Azumah, who feels that 
"building and maintaining a relationship of trust and friendship with your Muslim friend is more 
important than defeating him or her in an argument" (2006, 38), said, “my Muslim family (is) still a 
quite closely knit family and we keep in touch, we get involved in each others’ lives and family 
issues” (Azumah, Interview 5).  Nazir-Ali too says that he has “never found any difficulty in making 
friends with Muslims and getting on with (his) Muslim relatives.  Many of (his) best friends are 
Muslims” (2002, 79).   
 
Sookhdeo, however, has a somewhat different attitude.  Although I was unable to interview him, it 
seems from his writing that he is not so close to his Muslim family, a large proportion of which he 
claims supports Bin Laden (Sookhdeo, 2003).  He sees friendship with Muslims as potentially 
problematic.  Firstly, he explains that some Muslims will resist the approaches of Christians as they 
are taught to see them as infidels and so treat them in a “capricious way” (Sookhdeo, 2006, 71).  
Secondly, he sees friendship as problematic as he believes that some Christians “have great 
difficulties in critiquing Islam because of their love for Muslims in general or their friendship with 
particular Muslim individuals” (Sookhdeo, 2009a, 12).  Solomon, also from a Muslim background, 
shares these concerns given the “climate of enmity” between Christians and Muslims engendered 
by the hatred in Islam (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2010, 1).175   
 
For most participants, however, friendship with Muslims is a worthwhile goal in itself.  Nazir-Ali 
recommends that "there's nothing like friendship to reduce prejudice" and he encourages 
Christians to get to know their Muslim neighbours and make friends (2002, 76).  Such an approach 
was probably behind Andrew Smith’s interesting and significant observation: 
 
what I perceive is that the people who are living and working amongst Muslims have the kind of 
welcoming loving agenda, the ones who don’t meet many have the fear agenda.  To put it really 
crassly and simply .... my experience has been you tend to find the loving welcoming where you’ve 
met them and the fear and panic when you haven’t (A.Smith, Interview 67). 
 
This seems to be borne out by the above data. 
                                                             
175 See also Modell (2008b) during which Solomon proposes “Islam = hate” as a description of Islam in a 
lecture to the Lawyers Christian Fellowship. 
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11.1.C EVANGELICAL COOPERATION WITH MUSLIMS 
The willingness of some to risk friendship with Muslims raises an interesting question: 
 
what would happen if, instead of constantly thinking in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us’, Muslims and 
Christians were to work together in facing the big issues in our society? (Chapman, 2003a, 13). 
 
Moucarry certainly believes that they “should not merely tolerate each other but should work 
together, actively cooperating for the common good" (Moucarry, 2007, 120) and models this in his 
work for World Vision (Moucarry, Interview 25).  Azumah, McRoy, Musk, Nazir-Ali, Sudworth and 
Wood have all expressed similar sentiments.  Bell sees Muslims as “a kind of spiritual 
reinforcement in the battle for Biblical morality in a society where secularism is its biggest threat” 
(2006b, 150) and Goldsmith said: 
 
Muslims and Evangelicals will have the same view on abortion and homosexuality and the practice 
of it and some other moral issues, and I think some Evangelical Christians will .... be a bit surprised 
(and) will find themselves actually supported by their Muslim friends and them supporting their 
Muslim friends (Goldsmith, Interview 86). 
 
Others, however, have not found this to be the case.  In Williams’ experience of political lobbying 
she has not seen Muslims campaigning on moral issues: 
 
although many people would say that Muslims stand up for these various principles I’ve just 
outlined, actually in parliament, where is the (Muslim) voice?  Where is the lobby? (Williams, 
Interview 28). 
 
She suggested that Muslims were only interested in protesting about insults to Islam.  Sookhdeo 
too is suspicious of Muslim self interest.  In the field of relief work he claims that “the norm is that 
Muslim agencies only help Muslims” and he fears that charitable donations could be used to fund 
jihad rather than the needy (Sookhdeo, 2006, 85).  He is very critical of Christians that work 
together with Muslims and argues that: 
 
it is hard to find any warrant in the Bible for interfaith cooperation.  In fact it can be argued that 
cooperation with other faiths actually led to the decline of Israel and brought judgment upon the 
people of God (Sookhdeo, 2006, 84). 
 
Despite such suspicion there are examples of Evangelicals and Muslims working together.  Andrew 
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Smith is involved in The Feast and works alongside Sudworth in the Springfield Project both of 
which reach across the communities of south Birmingham.176  Along with Wood, Smith is also very 
active in the CMF which, in addition to being involved in education and community projects, has 
recently issued joint Christian-Muslim statements condemning the treatment of Christian 
minorities in the Middle East.177  In one final example, the Oasis Trust, part of the Faithworks 
movement, involved in education and health, has helped Muslims to set up a city academy school.  
In order to conform to government requirements on equalities the Faithworks Charter promises to 
acknowledge “the freedom of people of all faiths or none both to hold and to express their beliefs 
and convictions” and to never impose Christian faith on others.178  Chalke, the movement’s 
founder, points out that the organization even employs Muslims.179 
 
11.1.D EVANGELICALS, MUSLIMS AND RECIPROCITY 
For many Evangelicals, however, the contentious issue of reciprocity (§4.3.c) is still an enormous 
barrier to working together with Muslims in Britain.  Many authors point out that Muslims here 
enjoy privileges denied to Christians living in Muslim countries.  For instance, Pawson feels that in 
Britain “Muslims are welcome to take advantage of Western freedom to practise their religion, 
build their mosques and even preach inflammatory sermons but such privileges are not reciprocal 
in Islamic countries”  (Pawson, 2003, 164).  Others agree and ask the question: 
 
should Muslims also not acknowledge that there are few Muslim countries that offer Christians, 
Jews or those of other religions the freedom to practice their religion that Muslims enjoy in 
Western societies? And should they not work to redress this asymmetry and to promote religious 
and other freedoms in Islamic countries? (Cox and Marks, 2006, 151). 
 
This is a theme that Carey makes frequent reference to and indeed he says that “during my time 
as Archbishop this (reciprocity) was my constant refrain” (Carey, 2004a).  He often mentions Saudi 
                                                             
176 http://www.springfieldproject.org.uk and http://www.thefeast.org.uk (both accessed 22 November 
2010).  
177 See for instance the press release concerning the death of 46 Iraqi Catholics in 2010 at 
http://www.christianmuslimforum.org/index.php/working-together/news/syriac-catholic-murders-
in-baghdad (accessed 22 November 2010). 
178 The Faithworks Charter, http://www.faithworks.info/Standard.asp?id=7432, (accessed 21 
December 2010). 
179 According to Steve Chalke, the founder of Oasis, speaking at “The Big Response” event at Woodlands 
Christian Centre, Bristol, 21 October 2010. 
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Arabia’s repression of non-Muslim religions and appeals for freedoms to be given to Christian 
minorities everywhere (2005b).  He does not neglect to equally criticize the West though.  In a 
speech to a Muslim audience he pointed out the disservice that a lack of reciprocity does to the 
reputation of religion in the eyes of the secular public sphere: 
 
do we truly support complete freedom of religious belief and practice on a reciprocal basis in our 
respective societies or do we sometimes place impediments and restrictions in the way? I believe 
this is as pertinent for my society as it is for yours.  Indeed, when we fail to honour and provide for 
those of other faiths within our societies we weaken the credibility of religion itself in the eyes of 
those who desire a secular vision for the future of mankind and who might even seek to exclude 
religion altogether from the ‘public square’ (Carey, 2004c). 
 
Despite the logic to this argument, Riddell mentions that there are some Christian groups, such as 
the WCC, who have abandoned the principle of reciprocity in favour of reconciliation (2004b, 180).  
They argue that Christians are called to love others according to the Golden Rule of treating others 
as they themselves want to be treated.  This would require granting freedoms whether or not they 
themselves received those same freedoms.  Most, however, attempt to hold these two in tension.  
For instance,  Nazir-Ali argues that: 
 
reciprocity is not tit-for-tat.    It is about the identification of certain common values, even if they 
have origins in different belief and cultural systems, for the sake of the  peace  and  goodwill  which  
is  a  universal  seasonal  theme  at  this  time. For  people  of  faith,  it  means  a  commitment  to  
fundamental  freedoms  in every  part  of  the  world:  it  is  because  I  have  experience  of  
difficulties  in building  churches  in  parts  of  the  Muslim  world  that  I  support  the  rights  of 
Muslims and others to places of worship in this country (Nazir-Ali, 2004). 
 
Other Evangelicals uphold the Golden Rule in the hope that in so doing Muslims will voluntarily 
offer the reciprocal treatment: “if Christians are sincere and open in their attempts to follow the 
Golden Rule, they may be surprised to find that in time some Muslims may be willing to work on 
the same basis” (Chapman, 2007b, 48, emphasis in original).  As Sudworth puts it: 
 
our goal is reciprocity, but even if we do not receive anything in return, our path is one of selfless 
love (Sudworth, 2007, 108, emphasis in original) 
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11.2 EVANGELICALS AND THE BRITISH PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Whilst the EPS primarily engages with Muslims and Christians, it also inevitably interacts with the 
British meso-public sphere.  Some Evangelicals are actively seeking such engagement:   
 
the past decades have seen an increasing concern among Evangelicals to be effective in public life: 
partly because we feel more secure now that Evangelicals are not such a minority among Christians. 
It is also becoming obvious that Britain has largely lost the Christian basis for its democracy, and 
God is calling us to make sure that our voice is heard (Glaser, 2000a, 28). 
 
We have already noted those participants who have recommended or demanded that the 
government respond to Islam in certain ways (§10.4.d).  These demands, however, are mainly 
published in books or pamphlets unlikely to gain a wide audience in the circles of power.  So some 
participants adopt other strategies to get their message into the wider public sphere including: 
lobbying and campaigning; involvement in politics; engaging with mainstream media; and 
developing Christian media for a wider audience. 
 
11.2.A LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGNING  
There are many different groups involved in lobbying and campaigning on behalf of Christian 
values.  Christian Voice describes itself as “a prophetic ministry .... looking to take the battle to the 
Lord’s enemies” and organizes protests, leafleting, letter writing and email campaigns.180  Their 
“gospel outreach” in the supposed “no-go” area of Alum Rock has already been mentioned 
(§10.2.b) and they have held other “witnesses” against Islam, homosexuality, the Jerry Springer 
Opera and the incitement to racial hatred bill (Christian Voice, 2008a).181   
 
Christian Concern for Our Nation (CCFON) sees itself as a resource for Christians who want “to 
stand against the tide of legal and political changes that threaten the Christian values our society 
was built on”.182  This includes organizing demonstrations outside parliament and campaigns on 
                                                             
180 http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/about.html (accessed 6 March 2009). 
181 Christians Witness Against Redhill Muslim March, 
http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/Alerts/alert013.html (accessed 9 March 2009). 
182 http://www.ccfon.org (accessed 6 March 2009). 
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issues such as the clear labeling of halal products.183  It was clear from the interview with Andrea 
Williams, its director, that Solomon is the main influence with regard to CCFON’s approach to 
Islam (Williams, Interview 9). 
 
Barnabas Fund, under its director Patrick Sookhdeo, is particularly active in campaigning for the 
rights of persecuted Christians around the world.  Its magazine, Barnabas Aid, frequently includes 
appeals to write letters and sign petitions for issues related to Muslim persecution of Christians.  
For instance a 2009 campaign saw over 30,000 people sign a petition seeking the abolition of the 
Islamic apostasy law.184 
 
The Christian Institute, whose strap line is “Christian influence in a secular world”, exists for “the 
furtherance and promotion of the Christian religion” but, whilst it reports on issues to do with 
Islam, in general it has a lower emphasis on Islam than the groups mentioned above.185  
Representatives occasionally make comments in the media such as the observation by its director, 
Colin Hart, that the “police never arrest Muslims who make remarks about homosexuality” - only 
Christians (O. Craig, 2006). 
 
The London Institute of Contemporary Christianity (LICC), founded by leading Evangelical John 
Stott to “envision and equip Christians”, occasionally comments on news stories related to Islam 
but is more concerned about presenting a positive Christian voice than campaigning against 
Islam.186   Its director, Mark Greene, comments that “Christians are not at war with Muslims – any 
more than we are at war with secularists”.187 
 
Lapido Media,188 founded by journalist Jenny Taylor, is concerned with “religious literacy in world 
affairs”.  It carries links to world-wide media stories about religion and frequently publishes 
                                                             
183 Petition against halal meat, http://www.christianconcern.com/our-concerns/islam/petition-
against-halal-meat (accessed 21 December 2010). 
184 Barnabas Aid, Nov/Dec, 2009, http://barnabasfund.org/uk/BooksResources/Barnabas-Aid-
Magazine (accessed 15 September 2010). 
185 http://www.christian.org.uk/who-we-are (accessed 15 September 2010). 
186 http://www.licc.org.uk (accessed 15 September 2010). 
187 Islam and Fear in the Veins, http://www.licc.org.uk/node/217 (accessed 10 March 2009). 
188 Note that ‘Lapido’ means to “advocate” in the Acholi dialect of Northern Uganda.  See 
www.lapidomedia.com (accessed 10 March 2010).  
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articles commenting on Islam.  Whilst some of these raise concerns, others present a positive view 
of Islam.189 
 
The Evangelical Alliance (EA) is an umbrella organization representing a very considerable number 
of Evangelicals and occasionally comments on Islam-related issues but tends to adopt a cautious, 
positive, inclusive position.  It is not clear, however, that this approach reflects the views of their 
members.  An online survey conducted by the EA of reactions to the shari‘a debate in 2008 only 
attracted 200 responses, but did indicate that the majority viewed Islam and shari‘a negatively.190 
 
11.2.B POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
Apart from such para-church associations and pressure groups some of the participants in the EPS 
are more directly involved in the political life of the nation and on occasion use their position to 
speak out on issues related to Islam.  Craig is the leader of the CPA and until 2010 was an elected 
local councillor in Newham, London.  He particularly used his position to campaign against the 
building of the “mega-mosque” (§6.2.b).  He also ran for mayor of London and answered questions 
about Muslims during the hustings.191 
 
Nazir-Ali, Cox and Carey are all in the House of Lords and have at times used that platform to give 
speeches concerning Islam.  For instance Nazir-Ali has commented on reciprocity, religion and law, 
and jihad and terrorism (2004).  Cox has also raised concerns about security, militant extremists in 
Britain and the implications of shari‘a on marriage law (Cox and Marks, 2006, 80, 105,145).  In 
addition to his role in the Lords Carey has also made various other speeches in his role as the 
former archbishop of Canterbury, some of which have received significant media coverage (Carey, 
2004a, Petre, 2004). 
 
Edwards too, formerly in his role as general secretary of the Evangelical Alliance and more recently 
as an equalities commissioner, has been involved in political life.  He was invited to meet with 
                                                             
189 See for instance Taylor’s blog on her 2010 visit to India (www.lapidomedia.com/india/laptop-islam 
(accessed 6 April 2011)) or her 2008 article on a Muslim-Jewish theatre company 
(www.lapidomedia.com/engage-excel-be-patient (accessed 6 April 2011)). 
190 www.eauk.org/public-affairs/upload/Summary-of-Sharia-law-debate.pdf (accessed 6 March 2009). 
191 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2MyKE1WQdE (accessed 15 September 2010).  In 
response to a question about the stereotyping of Muslims Craig points out the need to be able to 
distinguish those Muslims who have separatist tendencies from other Muslims. 
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political and Muslim leaders following 9/11 and over the years has been involved in various 
consultations relating to religion, diversity and social cohesion (Edwards, Interview). 
 
Other participants too are also occasionally called upon to advise government or public bodies: 
Bell reported being consulted by the police (Bell, Interview);  Solomon is described as “an advisor 
to British as well as European parliamentarians” (Solomon and Al-Maqdisi, 2009b, back cover); and 
Sookhdeo is: 
 
adjunct professor at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, senior visiting 
fellow at the Defence Academy of the UK, and also guest lecturer at the NATO school, 
Oberammergau.  He is a fellow of the Security Institute of the UK.  He has served as cultural adviser 
for Iraq and Afghanistan (Sookhdeo, 2007a, back cover).
192
 
 
Clearly there are opportunities for British Evangelicals from the EPS to engage in politics and public 
policy. 
 
11.2.C RIGHT WING LINKS? 
In the United States, Evangelicals have a reputation for supporting right wing political policies and 
pursuing what Murad (aka Timothy Winter) calls “theopolitics” (Murad, 2009).  Even there, 
however, this is clearly not always the case and the rather different approaches of Campolo and 
others have already been mentioned (§7.2.a).  The same spectrum exists in Britain, albeit with 
Evangelicals exercising considerably less influence.  Nonetheless, concerns have been expressed 
about  a possible overlap between some conservative Evangelicals and right wing political parties. 
 
For instance, speaking at New Wine Bell expressed his concern that "some prominent Christians in 
their speaking and writing are sounding closer to the BNP than Jesus” (2007).  Considering the 
                                                             
192 Note that on the Marshall Centre website (www.marshallcenter.org (accessed 21 December 2010)) 
he is also listed as: 
Visiting Fellow, Cranfield University, Royal Military College of Science, Department of Defence 
Management and Security Analysis 
Consultant to Permanent Joint Headquarters 
Advisor to Cranfield University’s Resilience Centre 
Member of UK Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategic Issues Group 
Member of the Security Institute 
Specialist in the field of Islamic war and its cultural and geo-political dimensions 
Consultant and lecturer on security and counter-terrorism 
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problem in reverse Sudworth says, “it is troubling for me that some of the extremist groups that 
have hit the headlines in recent weeks are using language that I hear all too frequently in church 
circles” (2009c).    
 
Some of the parallels are with mainstream right wing politics.  Baroness Cox was instrumental in 
enabling Wilders to screen his controversial film Fitna in the Houses of Parliament and, whilst she 
distanced herself from his views, she defended her invitation to him on the grounds that she was 
encouraging free speech and debate (C. Green, 2010).  Wilders himself wrote an endorsement for 
Solomon and Al-Maqdisi’s Modern Day Trojan Horse (2009b).  In another example Solomon was 
commissioned by the UK Independence Party MEP Gerard Batten to write his Proposed Charter of 
Muslim Understanding (Solomon, 2006b).193 
 
Evangelicals, however, are sometimes linked to rather more extreme right wing groups.  On 
occasion radical right wing politicians talk about “Christian” Britain and quote various Christian 
public figures.  For instance, Nick Griffin, leader of the British National Party (BNP), quoted Nazir-
Ali and Nigerian Archbishop Okoh in an article about immigration (Griffin, 2009).  In 2006 an article 
in The Guardian referred to a supposed “brief but passionate liaison between the BNP and the 
Evangelicals” particularly highlighting what it called an “ill-fated combination of the BNP and 
Christian Voice” (G. Fraser, 2006).  This situation arose after the creation of the Christian Council of 
Britain (CCB) which is believed to have been launched by BNP members in opposition to the 
MCB.194  As some of members of CCB subsequently appeared at a Christian Voice demonstration 
against “Jerry Springer-The Opera”, Christian Voice had to publish a piece on their website 
distancing themselves from the BNP.195  Interestingly Barnabas Fund also felt the need to issue a 
statement denying any association with either the CCB or BNP.196 
 
                                                             
193 This charter was launched by Batten in the House of Lords in April 2007, 
http://www.ukip.org/content/latest-news/123-gerard-batten-mep-launches-proposed-charter-of-
muslim-understanding-in-house-of-lords-monday-29th-a (accessed 26 July 2010). 
194 ‘BNP Members Involved in 'Christian' Front’, 
http://www.ekklesia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/article_060314bnp.shtml, (accessed 5 
November 2009). 
195 See http://www.christianvoice.org.uk/Alerts/alert003.html (accessed 6 November 2009). 
196 See http://barnabasfund.org/US/News/Archives/Further-response-to-the-Christian-Council-of-
Britain.html (accessed 6 November 2009). 
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Some Muslim supporters of the London “mega-mosque” also tried to discredit Craig by associating 
him with the BNP.  A video was posted on the internet containing footage of both Craig and Griffin 
supposedly demonstrating how the CPA and BNP both “incite hatred against the Muslims in the 
UK”.197  Various websites appeared attacking Craig and insinuating connection with the BNP.198  
McRoy points out, however, that the CPA “made opposition to the BNP a major campaigning 
issue” during elections (McRoy, n.d.-a) and Craig himself frequently expresses concern at the rise 
of the BNP as a reaction to the political correctness of the political elite (A. Craig, 2009a). 
11.2.D THE MEDIA  
A number of the participants have engaged with mainstream media in an attempt to get their 
message across to a wider audience.  Sookhdeo has had several pieces published in British 
newspapers, particularly The Spectator (Sookhdeo, 2003, 2005b, 2005c).  Nazir-Ali is frequently 
quoted in the press, occasionally writing articles himself (Nazir-Ali, 2008a, 2008d), and Riddell too 
has had a couple of articles published in the American Spectator (Riddell, 2008a, 2008b).   
 
A few have appeared on television.  McRoy mentioned that he had been interviewed by the BBC, 
CNN and Sky News (McRoy, Interview 74).  He has also appeared on Iranian television, as has 
Goldsmith (Goldsmith, Interview 70).  Craig appeared alongside Andrea Williams on the BBC chat 
show The Big Questions to discuss whether Islam is changing the streets of Britain199 and Azumah 
appeared on the same series to discuss whether Islam encourages violence.200  Jay Smith appeared 
on the BBC’s Newsnight programme defending the right of Dutch politician Geert Wilders to enter 
the UK and screen his film, Fitna, which Smith did not believe should be banned.201   
 
All of the above were unedited live debates and the participants were able to speak for 
themselves and the producers gave no commentary on their contribution.  Documentary makers 
are sometimes more biased.  Green, Solomon and Williams appeared in In God’s Name, a 
                                                             
197 See ‘BNP and Christian Peoples Alliance’, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pePCBxlV2M4 
(accessed 15 September 2010). 
198 http://www.christianpeoplesalliance.com and http://www.alancraig.org were both anti-Craig sites 
although they misleadingly used domain names that suggested they belonged to Craig and the CPA.  
Both sites have since been removed after complaints (accessed 16 March 2009). 
199 The Big Questions, BBC One, 13 January 2008. 
200 The Big Questions, BBC One, 13 September 2009. 
201 Newsnight ‘Should Wilders have been granted entry to the UK?’, BBC Two, 12 February 2009 
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documentary which portrayed them very negatively as anti-Muslim “Christian Fundamentalists” 
(Modell, 2008b).  Nazir-Ali, Jay Smith and Bell were also all featured in the Channel Four 
Dispatches documentary Unholy War (Barnett, 2007). Bell was particularly upset afterwards and 
felt that the programme had misrepresented him, demonstrating some of the challenges that 
participants in the EPS face as they engage with the secular media (Bell, Interview 103).  Whilst 
they are seeking to comment on Islam, they are also vulnerable to possible misrepresentation by 
secular journalists who may have their own agendas. 
 
Of course, Evangelicals have a plethora of their own media (§5.5.b) and, whilst these are primarily 
designed for a Christian audience, the nature of modern media means that they are accessibly to 
any member of the public whether through publication, the internet or radio and television 
broadcast.  It has already been seen above that this can lead to interaction between various 
spheres (§11.1.a) and as will be seen below (§11.4) the ramifications for the EPS can be significant. 
 
11.3 THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE WITH THE EVANGELICAL 
CHURCHES 
 
The EPS clearly interacts with both Muslims and society as a whole, and different participants 
within the sphere have their own emphases and specialities to those ends.  However, the sphere’s 
main thrust in the majority of what is written and said is to interact with its own constituency and 
to inform, influence and mobilize Evangelicals in British churches with respect to Islam.  This 
section explores the different roles and agendas that the various participants adopt depending on 
their skills and approaches to Islam.  It then looks at how they are seeking to equip the churches 
and the Evangelicals in them.  The interviews with the church leaders are then examined to 
determine which participants, and hence which approaches to Islam, have the greatest influence 
within the churches.  In particular the interview data interrogates the leaders’ attitudes towards 
Islam, their reaction to specific issues concerning Islam in public life, and their prognoses for the 
future vitality of both Islam and the Evangelical church in Britain.  
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11.3.A THE VARIOUS ROLES OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
The majority of the participants interviewed felt that their role was to teach Christians about 
Islam.  Azumah, Chapman, Glaser, Goldsmith, Moucarry, and Riddell all felt this to be their most 
dominant role and the one they felt best equipped to fulfil.  As Riddell expressed it: 
 
my comfort zone .... as an educationalist (is) presenting a range of viewpoints to my students, and 
when I speak in church similarly, for them to make of that what they will (Riddell, Interview 27). 
 
Not all would have such an open pedagogical view as Riddell.  Some see themselves as equipping 
Christians for a specific task.  Sudworth, for instance, had the explicit objective of “teaching and 
equipping towards faithful Christian presence that is able to love a Muslim unconditionally 
(Sudworth, Interview 69).  Jay Smith had the rather different objective of training Christians to 
engage in debate: 
 
I think the best thing to do to help, whenever I go on a university campus or when I go to a church, 
is to show them how to defend their faith (J.Smith, Interview 77). 
 
Interviewees also identified other roles.  Bell described himself as a consultant, Knell as a 
coordinator, McRoy as a commentator, and Goldsmith as an inspirer and encourager.  Finally, 
several participants recognized the role of “warner”.  Bell said that his role was as: 
 
a warner about what could be if we don’t respond and play our part, and the agenda of a minority 
of Muslims and all the rest of it (Bell, Interview 69). 
 
Glaser saw the warning rather differently: 
 
a warner, yes, but not a warner against Islam as such.  I think there’s enough warning against Islam.  
I don’t think people need that, but a warner against responding to fear and terror with fear and 
terror really.  That’s my warning (Glaser, Interview 59). 
 
The role of warning against Islam is certainly played by some of those not interviewed and they 
are presumably those whom Glaser was referring to.  Sookhdeo, Solomon, Dye and Cox in their 
approach and style of writing all warn either the church or the nation about the threat that they 
believe Islam to pose.  Pawson casts this in more spiritual language and sees himself as a 
“prophet” bringing a warning to the church (Pawson, 2003, 91).  Certainly his premonition of an 
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Islamic takeover could be seen in this light (§10.4.c). 
 
11.3.B THE EQUIPPING OF THE CHURCHES 
Their perceptions of these roles clearly dictate how the participants seek to equip and influence 
the churches.  As in any public sphere they employ a variety of methods to this end.  In the light of 
the expressed desire to influence the church, it is interesting to note that many participants, and 
several of the church leaders interviewed, felt that Evangelicals in Britain are not well-equipped to 
address the questions that Islam poses to them.  Williams felt the grass roots were “confused” 
(Williams, Interview 82) and Azumah said: 
 
it is difficult to tell where the Evangelical church is drawing its information and resource about 
Islam from, beyond the media for instance.  And if that is where most of them are drawing their 
information from I don’t think that is equipping people enough (Azumah, Interview 23). 
 
An open charismatic church leader agreed with this and reflected: “I think talking about the church 
as a whole in the country, I would say no, we’re not very well equipped”.  Several had not thought 
about the question and Warnke definitely felt his members were more influenced by the media 
than anything else (Warnke, Interview).  Bell felt that the Pentecostal churches were particularly 
disengaged apart from some, like Kensington Temple, which took a “strident demonized view” 
(Bell, Interview 107).  He also observed that it was difficult to engage the BMCs on this subject.  Of 
all the church streams he felt that it is the New Churches that are leading the way in reaching out 
to Muslims in Britain. 
 
So the key question becomes “how effective is the elite of the EPS in influencing grass root 
members in the churches with respect to their attitude towards Islam?” 
 
Tellingly in reply to the question “what is the greatest influence on your members’ attitudes 
towards Islam?” not one of the leaders mentioned a participant in the EPS, although it did 
transpire in conversation that some believed one or other of the participants to influence certain 
individuals within their congregation. 
 
In terms of profile, most of the church leaders recognized the names of Sookhdeo, Cox and 
Pawson (see Figure 11.1 and also Appendix B) although it should be noted that not all were aware 
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of the latter two’s engagement with Islam but knew them only as high profile Christian figures.  It 
was no surprise to find that Chapman, Goldsmith and Nazir-Ali were also well-known.  It was 
perhaps surprising though that not more had heard of Bell, who is a regular speaker at 
conferences, or Musk, who is a prolific Evangelical author on Islam.202 
 
 
Figure 11.1 – Church leaders’ awareness of the national elite 
No. of leaders out of 14 recognizing the 
participant’s name 
Participant’s name 
11 Sookhdeo, Cox (3 unaware of her book on Islam) 
9 Pawson (5 unaware of his book on Islam) 
8 Chapman, Goldsmith, Nazir-Ali 
7 Orr-Ewings, Jay Smith 
6 Riddell, Solomon 
5 Knell 
3 Musk 
2 Azumah, Bell, Taylor 
1 Moucarry, McRoy 
0 A.Smith, Sudworth 
 
Of the 14 church leaders I spoke to in London 10 said that they have recommended a book on 
Islam, but only 5 mentioned the book title or name of more than one of the British authors 
included in this research (see Figure 11.2).  Chapman was the most commonly recommended 
author followed by Sookhdeo and Brother Andrew (who is not British but is popular in this 
country).  Ten authors were recommended in total. 
 
Of the 11 churches that have bookshops, bookstalls or sell books online only six stocked books 
related to Islam.  Sookhdeo’s books were displayed in four shops and Chapman, Glaser and the 
Orr-Ewings were stocked in just two.  It was noticeable that the BMCs both online and in their 
shops almost exclusively sold books, DVDs and CDs by their own pastors along with a little 
American material.  Two online stores also made Jay Smith’s audio teaching available. 
                                                             
202 It should be noted that no specific question was asked about non-author participants such as Craig, 
Williams and Green although their names arose occasionally during the interviews. 
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Figure 11.2 – Church leaders’ book recommendations 
No. of book recommendations Author Book 
5 Chapman Cross and Crescent 
3 
Sookhdeo 
Brother Andrew 
Various 
Secret Believers 
2 
Musk 
Nazir-Ali 
Riddell 
Not specified 
1 
Cox 
Goldsmith 
Moucarry 
Orr-Ewing 
Not specified 
 
National Evangelical leaders would also expect to be invited to preach or conduct training 
seminars in various churches.  However, only 8 of the church leaders recalled inviting an outsider 
speaker or trainer to come to their church to teach on Islam.  The most prolific trainer in these 
churches is Jay Smith with his emphasis on apologetics and polemics.  He had spoken or conducted 
training at four of the churches.  Goldsmith recounted in his interview that he had spoken at three 
large London churches but that this was prior to 2001 and he was not recalled by any of the 
present incumbents.  Apart from Smith only Solomon, Orr-Ewing, Cox (twice each) and McRoy 
(once) had spoken or conducted training sessions at the churches as far as the leaders questioned 
could remember.  This tallied with the acknowledgement by the majority of the participants that 
they had not been invited to speak in any London churches.  Most surprising is the fact that none 
of the leaders reported Sookhdeo speaking at their church, although one mentioned that he had 
spoken at an independent event hosted in their building. 
 
Only one of the churches mentions Islam regularly during their services.  Five others said that it 
was never mentioned, although one of them said it may be discussed in their small pastoral 
groups.  Five church leaders said that Islam may occasionally be referred to during a sermon and 
one of them, a BMC, said that this would likely be a warning of the threat that Islam poses.  
Otherwise only three leaders said that they put on special training events for those interested in 
finding out more about Islam and Muslims, and three others said that teaching about Islam is 
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included as an element of an existing training course for leaders and those involved in various 
ministries.   
 
One interviewee mentioned that the national conference for his group of churches sometimes 
offers a seminar on Islam (Ash, NFI, Interview 13) and indeed Bell and Chapman both mentioned 
speaking at that conference.  No data were obtained on how many church members had heard 
any of the ten or so participants who speak at national conferences such as Spring Harvest or New 
Wine.  These conferences were not mentioned by any of the leaders as a big influence on their 
church members. 
 
Neither was there any evidence that these churches are using or had ever used any of the courses 
or study guides that have been developed by the participants, such as Cross and Crescent 
(Chapman, 2003b) or Reflecting on Islam (Sudworth, n.d.).203 
 
In addition to the opportunity that Evangelicals may have to hear about Islam in their churches, 
various Evangelical theological training colleges also teach about Islam.  However, Azumah, who 
took over from Riddell as the director of the Centre for Islamic Studies at London School of 
Theology (LST) in 2009, believed that his college was the only one with a full-time specialism in 
Islam.  LST offers undergraduate modules studying Islam, a new MA in Christian-Muslim relations 
and a distance learning course called the Carey Course in Christian-Muslim Relations.204 Other 
Evangelical training colleges such as Moorlands, All Nations and Redcliffe Christian College to name 
a few also offer optional modules in Islam.  Some feel this provision is inadequate and are trying to 
redress the balance.  Glaser sees this as one of her main roles: 
 
I think my primary function at the moment is as teacher, trying to get Islam onto the agenda in 
these theological colleges and to develop a place here in Oxford (the Centre for Muslim-Christian 
Studies) where if people are training for ministry they can actually take Islam into account 
throughout (Glaser, Interview). 
 
                                                             
203 For an overview of courses designed to help Christians understand Islam see De Ruiter’s 
unpublished D.Min. thesis Sharing Lives (2009), Bakke University, Seattle.  For an evaluation of some 
older courses see Chapman’s unpublished M.Phil. thesis Teaching Christians about Islam: a study in 
methodology (1993), Centre for the Study of Islam and Muslim-Christian Relations, Selly Oak. 
204 http://www.lst.ac.uk/smartweb/cis/courses, (accessed 21 December 2010). 
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As long ago as 1989 Chapman wrote, “what is needed now is an interdisciplinary approach.  The 
challenge facing us is to find ways of allowing Islam to impinge on almost every discipline of 
theology” (1989, 27).  Azumah agrees with this sentiment.  He wants Islamic studies to be 
compulsory for all LST students and argues that: 
 
Islam asks us questions about Christians and Christianity in a way that no other religion does and to 
pretend that you can do Christian theological studies in the twenty-first century without engaging 
with Islam, it’s just not on (Azumah, Interview 25).205 
  
It remains to be seen whether the various Evangelical colleges will heed this warning and what 
approach they would adopt in the presentation of Islam. 
  
11.3.C ATTITUDES OF EVANGELICAL CHURCH LEADERS IN LONDON TOWARDS ISLAM 
It was envisaged that the responses of the London church leaders interviewed would give a 
general indication of which way these Evangelical churches are leaning in their approach to Islam 
and whether they reflect the opinions held by any particular participants in the EPS.  The interview 
questions ranged from discussing their general views on the church in Britain, Islam and mission to 
their responses to specific issues and events in British public life (see the interview schedule in 
Appendix F). 
 
Views on “Christian” Britain 
When asked whether Britain is a “Christian country” interestingly it was the BMC leaders that had 
the strongest reaction.  They felt that it had been in the past and should still be today: 
 
this is a Christian nation – it was founded on Christian principles.  Our government, the Queen, is 
supposed to be the head of the church, and we have allowed Muslims to come into our country, 
which is a Christian country (Babatunde, Interview 27). 
 
For them it is the weakness of the church that has allowed the erosion of this heritage because 
Christians “did not speak up when they were supposed to speak up, they didn’t do things when 
they were supposed to do them” (a spokesman for KICC, Interview 28).  Another leader 
commented that the Christian legacy was “being eroded in the name of pluralism, acceptance and 
                                                             
205 See also Glaser (2010b). (Glaser, 2010b) 
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accommodation” and believed that “we can be hospitable but we don’t have to accommodate 
everything” (Oloyede, Interview 27).   
 
Such views amongst the BMC leaders give great encouragement to certain participants in the EPS 
like Jay Smith: 
 
thank God for the Africans here.  They’re the only ones that get it.  I think they get it because 
they’ve been faced with Islam head on.  The thing I love about Africans is they say exactly what they 
believe.  They’re so politically incorrect .... this is a real battle coming and they’re not running away 
from it (J.Smith, Interview 83). 
 
Cox too is supportive of the African presence and wrote a positive endorsement for Babatunde’s 
book Great Britain has Fallen (2002) which attracted some criticism in the press (Ahmed, 2002). 206   
 
The majority of church leaders, however, did not feel that Britain is, or indeed ever has been, a 
Christian country.  Melluish said, “I don’t know if we’ve ever been a Christian country.  I think that 
we’ve been a religious country” (Melluish, St Paul’s, Interview 37).  In fact envisaging any country 
as being “Christian” was considered by most to be detrimental.  Three of the leaders specifically 
mentioned the establishment of Christendom at the time of Constantine as a negative 
development for the church and as a model that should not be adopted again.  One non-Anglican 
leader even favoured disestablishment although he could not see a viable way of achieving it.   
 
It was also very noticeable that most of the leaders were wary about their churches getting 
politically involved.  Ash’s response was typical: 
 
I would be more inclined to say that individual Christians should be involved in politics but the 
church, a local church or the church as a larger organization, is not there to be a political body (Ash, 
NFI, Interview 65). 
 
So whilst many leaders were supportive of individual members campaigning and lobbying on 
issues, most would agree with Brownell who said, “I don’t encourage people to sign petitions in 
the church.  I don’t want Sundays used for politicking stuff” (Brownell, ELT, Interview 66).  One 
                                                             
206 See also Babatunde (2005). (Babatunde, 2005) 
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conservative Anglican church was particularly clear that the church’s task was to preach the 
gospel: 
 
I suppose we’re more concerned about Christians living out their faith and sharing the Lord Jesus 
with friends and neighbours.  Obviously politics is involved with that but there would be less of a 
political agenda, so it’s not that you live in a world isolated from what your government decides but 
the emphasis usually on a Sunday would be on a Bible passage and the implications for our lives 
and conduct at work and with family. 
 
Despite this though, the majority still felt that Christians should have a strong public voice and 
Palmer worried that “Christians are rapidly losing the art of knowing how to speak their faith into 
the public square” (Palmer, All Souls, Interview 69).  Again the BMCs were particularly forceful:  
 
We feel the Christian voice should be heard in every nook and corner of this nation and we should 
be involved in politics, we should be part of local councils (a spokesman for KICC, Interview 28). 
 
Definitely Christians should get involved .... Get out there, go and vote, don’t just vote, campaign.  
Get elected. (Babatunde, WHCC, Interview 64). 
 
Most, however, were content to support the work of Christian groups like the Evangelical Alliance 
and four leaders particularly commended the work of CCFON.  Interestingly none specifically 
supported the work of Barnabas Fund although several were aware that their members received 
their newsletters. 
 
Reaction to Islam 
Against the backdrop of these views of church and society the church leaders were by and large 
remarkably unconcerned about the presence of Islam in Britain.  Brownell, despite living and 
working in East London, felt that competition with Muslims was “not a big issue”, except maybe in 
the black community which he believed to be the target of Muslim proselytism (Brownell, ELT, 
Interview 20).  This was reflected by a greater concern with Islam in general amongst BMC 
leaders.207  As a former Muslim, Oloyede saw Islam as a challenge and said: 
 
                                                             
207 Although it should be noted that Ademolake was entirely unconcerned and attributed this lack of 
concern to the area of Nigeria he came from where Christians and Muslims live together very peaceably 
(Ademolake, RCCG, Interview 21).  He even sees Islam as a preparation for the Gospel and points to the 
number of former Muslims who are now pastors in black churches as evidence of this. 
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(they) take ground and (they) don’t give it back.  The way to take over is by child birth, getting 
involved in politics and taking strategic ground.  So the whole agenda is not negotiable, Muslims are 
here to take over.  My own opinion is you can have pets but don’t have a lion cub as a pet because 
one day it’s going to grow up and devour something you don’t want it to devour ....  The doctrine of 
Islam ... is a challenge in contemporary western and global diplomatic relations.  It is a threat to 
peaceful coexistence (Oloyede, GH, Interview 29, 31). 
 
Even taking the BMCs into account, however, for most leaders: 
 
Islam is just one of a plethora of other challenges which people are facing.  So I don’t think it’s 
necessarily higher on the spectrum than some other issues that people might be facing (Ash, NFI, 
Interview 11) 
 
In fact the great majority of the leaders specifically saw the Muslim presence as a positive 
opportunity and, unsurprisingly for Evangelicals, all the leaders mentioned the need to share the 
Gospel with Muslims.  Melluish said, “I think it’s an opportunity.  I think that the world has come 
to our doorstep so we have an opportunity to reach the world from our front doors” (Melluish, St 
Paul’s, Interview 33).  Babatunde even believed that there will be a “another Pentecost” in Britain 
that will send people back to their own countries to preach the Gospel and declared, “that’s why 
our view of Muslims must change; we must see them as a major evangelistic opportunity; we must 
love Muslims and pray for them” (Babatunde, WHCC, Interview 33). 
 
Mission to Muslims 
In response to this perceived opportunity all the leaders interviewed placed a premium on 
communicating the Gospel to Muslims in some way.  For most this needed to be done in word and 
deed: 
 
the Gospel does need to be shared with words, so although we should live attractive lives and we 
should be visible as Christ’s disciples by the way we love one another, we also have a message that 
He tells us to share (a conservative Anglican leader). 
 
Indeed several churches expressly saw their focus as building the church rather than battling 
against other religions.  A spokesman for KICC said: 
 
we believe that as long as we continue to preach the undiluted Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ and 
make Jesus known to people, we are seeing conversions of people from such backgrounds into the 
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Christian faith, and we have no particular public view of the Muslim (a spokesman for KICC, 
Interview 19). 
 
Others did see a need for debate.  One young leader in a “reformed charismatic” church thought 
that the general approach in his church would be apologetic and polemic with an emphasis on 
theology, truth and knowing the weaknesses of Islam.  This would certainly be the training that Jay 
Smith would give at the workshops he has held in these churches.  Chow, however, demurred 
from polemics saying “I think as far as I can see the church’s stance is not to be confrontational, so 
I think we would probably be more apologetic” (Chow, CC, Interview 57).  Melluish was not even 
convinced about apologetics: 
 
I don’t think we need to be defending our position but I think we need to be sharing and showing 
the grace of God, and I think that that’s probably what will change things.  I don’t think our 
Heavenly Father needs defending.  I think our Heavenly Father needs demonstrating (Melluish, St 
Paul’s, Interview 110). 
 
 Warnke went even further: 
 
apologetics in the defence sense that’s not going to take you anywhere (and polemics) that’s just 
sheer stupidity to do that.  Where do you think that’s going?  What’s the point of that?  How does 
that demonstrate something healthy or loving or kind? (Warnke, Vineyard, Interview 95). 
 
In fact it is significant that almost all the leaders stressed a relational rather than confrontational 
approach to evangelism.  So a leader in a conservative Anglican church said, “any kind of polemic 
should not be an angry rude kind of thing, a shouting match wouldn’t commend the Gospel” and 
Ashimolowo of KICC said in a TV interview, “we must reach (Muslims) in love; don't start 
arguing”.208  Nonetheless this did not preclude him seeing Islam (as opposed to Muslims) as a 
spiritual enemy to be fought.  He continued, “a spirit has been woken up again .... we need to pray 
against that strong man".  In another interview he described this as “a clash of kingdoms in the 
realm of the spirit”.209 
 
                                                             
208 ‘Interview with Ex-Muslim Christian Matthew Ashimolowo’, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lzIeX0YILQ4, (accessed 21 December 2010). 
209 ‘London Church Forced Off Its Property’, CBN News, broadcast 25 April 2008, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nnr7kl9qBQQ, (accessed 8 September 2010). 
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The nature of Islam 
Such a view reflects how some of the leaders perceive the nature of Islam (compare §9.1 for the 
perceptions of the EPS elite).  Whilst HTB were careful to stress that Gumbel rarely says anything 
negative about other religions and would never refer to Allah as a demon, at least five others did 
feel that Islam’s origin must in some way have been “demonic” or “satanic” but were quick to 
point out that they did not believe that “every Muslim is subject to the devil” (Brownell, ELT, 
Interview 36). 
 
This association with the demonic was reflected in the leaders’ views on the identity of Allah.  Only 
Ademolake, in keeping with his very relaxed, open attitude to Islam, admitted that he “just think(s) 
of that literally and believe(s) they’re talking about the same god” (Ademolake, RCCG, Interview 
25).  For the rest, Muslims at best are describing God very differently to Christians.  When asked 
whether it was the same god Warnke replied, “no definitely not.  Look at the qualities” (Warnke, 
Vineyard, Interview 25).  A conservative Anglican explained the comparison in terms of the Trinity: 
 
I would say he’s someone different just because fundamental to the Christian understanding of God 
is he is Trinitarian - Father, Son and Holy Spirit - and fundamental to the Islamic concept of Allah is 
that he’s not. 
 
One leader, however, did acknowledge a desire within Muslims to worship the same God: 
 
I don’t think Allah as they present Allah is the God that we worship but I think the spiritual nerve 
that’s within them that seeks to look to God is the same spiritual nerve that sits in me.  So I think 
that their conclusion of who God is is not the same as my conclusion of who God is (Melluish, St 
Paul’s, Interview 68). 
 
These views notwithstanding the majority of the leaders recognized the diversity of Muslims and 
drew a difference between the religion and the people.  Many agreed with Melluish that “most 
Muslims are God-fearing, very loving people, and very open to relationship and connection” and 
that there is only a “small fundamentalist arm that does cause anxiety” (Melluish, St Paul’s 
Interview 33).   
 
Again some of the BMC leaders, drawing on their experience of Islam in Nigeria, had a more 
negative view.  Oloyede believed that radical Islam is in fact normative and claimed that “the 
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whole agenda, their whole world view –whether you are a jihadist or a moderate -  is that 
everyone should become a Muslim” (Oloyede, GH, Interview 35).  Babatunde agreed: 
 
you know, they hate you .... I don’t want to generalize, there are some wonderful Muslims, and 
there are some very very good Muslims, but I believe they’re a threat because part of the agenda in 
this nation is to take over this nation (Babatunde, WHCC, Interview 27) 
 
This agenda includes deception in the form of taqiyya and Oloyede recounted some examples 
from the Nigerian situation.  Apart from him though, only two of the church leaders had ever 
heard of taqiyya despite the profile it is given in some Evangelical writing on Islam (§10.4.b). 
 
Islam was definitely seen as being more political than Christianity: 
 
obviously Islam is intrinsically political in a way that Christianity isn’t because .... the establishment 
of shari‘a is one of the great aims of Islam in spreading the message (a conservative Anglican 
leader). 
 
For some this is what leads to the greater potential for violence in Islam:   
 
the only absolute you won’t kill for is that ‘God is love’, therefore we (Christians) are there to love 
people and consequently the kind of world dominance or world evangelization of Christianity is 
very different from the dominance which is spoken of (by Muslims), who actually in the Qur’an are 
encouraged to use force for the glory of God as they would put it.  So this is again where of course 
Christianity and Islam, Qur’anic Islam, clearly stand one against the other (an open charismatic 
leader). 
 
Virtually all of the leaders felt that the Qur’an was susceptible to supporting violence and Palmer 
felt that “there is a strong case that needs answering that (Islam) has got a link to violence” 
(Palmer, All Souls, Interview 39).  Some believed that whilst “there is terrorism it is probably a 
minority sector” among  Muslims (Chow, CC, Interview 45).  However, a BMC leader said, “from 
the little I know those guys that practice all those (violent) things they are probably closer to the 
real thing in the Qur’an” (Babatunde, WHCC, Interview 49).  Only Warnke totally disagreed saying, 
“oh my goodness! No not all.  It’s definitely not a violent religion” (Warnke, Vineyard, Interview 
57) although Brownell did concede that, just like Christians, Muslims probably have a hermeneutic 
to handle the violence in their text (Brownell, ELT, Interview 40). 
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Issues and events 
The church leaders were then all asked to respond to some recent public events related to Islam: 
 
A Common Word  
Three of the leaders were aware of the Common Word initiative (§10.4.b) but had only discussed it 
with other leaders and had chosen not to speak to the whole church about it.  Two of these were 
very suspicious of the Muslims’ motives.  Three other leaders were vaguely aware of it but the rest 
had not heard of it.  A frequent comment highlighted scepticism over whether there could be any 
common ground with Islam and that the best outcome of any dialogue would be peaceful social 
relations rather than theological agreement.  For instance, Oloyede said, “social enterprise I feel is 
a very good place to dialogue with Muslims but not doctrine” (Oloyede, GH, Interview 56). 
 
The “mega-mosque” 
Whilst most of the leaders accepted the right of Muslims to build mosques in this country, all of 
them were against the building of the large, “mega-mosque” in East London due to its size, 
location and Tablighi Jama‘at’s reputed connection to radicalism.  Some had encouraged their 
members to sign petitions against it and a few knew Alan Craig.  The biggest complaint though was 
over a lack of reciprocity (§11.1.d).  Many of them pointed out that in many Muslim countries 
Christians would not be allowed to build any sort of church let alone one so large.  They also 
commented on how unfairly KICC had been treated in comparison.  KICC’s church building was the 
subject of a London Authority compulsory purchase order to make way for the Olympic site.  The 
church was apparently promised permission to erect a new building but have since not been 
granted permission to build at suitable locations (A. Craig, 2008).210  This has only fuelled anger 
over plans for the proposed mega-mosque. 
 
A public adhan 
Opinion was more evenly split on whether Muslims should be allowed to make a public adhan.  
Half of the leaders felt that if it was in a Muslim majority area then it was difficult to oppose.  The 
other half did oppose it on the grounds of it being an infliction on others although Palmer was 
unsure: “I’m uneasy but I’m battling to try and work out what consistent public policy reason I can 
                                                             
210 For a statement from KICC see 
http://www.inspiremagazine.org.uk/news.aspx?action=view&id=2175, (accessed 19 January 2011). 
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give for (my opposition)” (Palmer, All Souls, Interview 51). 
 
Shari‘a in Britain 
Except for Warnke who made some positive remarks, all of the leaders were concerned about the 
comments made by Rowan Williams on shari‘a in Britain (§10.3.e).  They felt that he had not 
represented the views of their church and that it would be dangerous to allow more than one law 
in Britain.  This leader’s view was typical: 
 
it would be a problem in society as a whole because every group will then begin to demand that 
they have their particular bit of the country where their rules exist.  And I think that while we are 
trying to be a non-discriminating society that we ought to have an openness which is maintained by 
one law throughout the whole of the land (an open charismatic leader).  
 
Incitement to religious hatred bill 
The church leaders were also unanimous in their opposition to legislating against religious hate 
speech.  They all believed that this was an erosion of freedom of speech and felt that it would 
eventually be used to curb their own freedom to preach the Gospel.  Many of their church 
members had signed petitions against the bill and KICC and WHCC had joined CCFON in a 
demonstration outside parliament. 
 
The “war on terror” 
Most of the leaders were mildly critical of the western response to Islamic terrorism and 
comments ranged from “badly handled” to “double standards” to “bloody awful”.  However, all 
concluded that something needed to be done about terrorism and so supported some sort of 
military response, although Melluish worried that if it became “Christian fundamentalism fighting 
Islamic fundamentalism ....(then) no-one wins and we’re all caught in the middle somewhere” 
(Melluish, St Paul’s, Interview 108). 
 
Israel-Palestine 
The leaders did not appear unduly interested in the Israel-Palestine situation and did not feel that 
it affected their relations to Muslims, although a couple commented that they had people in their 
churches who were very pro-Israel.  Most were against Christian Zionism but tried to avoid 
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mentioning the issue in their churches.  One leader felt that it was maybe an issue of concern for 
older members in his church but that younger members were more aware of Palestinian rights. 
 
The future of Islam in Britain 
A few of the leaders felt that there would definitely not be an Islamic takeover of Britain.  
However, the majority of them admitted that it was a possibility although not in the near future.  A 
spokesman for KICC said: 
 
if we let it, anything can happen .... the Roman Empire fell, people didn’t think it was going to fall, 
and it didn’t fall necessarily by a war, but people just became very lax .... so I think there’s always a 
possibility in any place for there to be a change in the religious demography (a spokesman for KICC, 
Interview 46). 
 
However, there was not undue concern and none of them seemed to give much credence to 
Pawson’s prediction of an imminent Islamic takeover.  Admittedly Ademolake was anxious that the 
church was more African than indigenous in the UK today and suggested that Christianity was 
likely to “fizzle out” in the next two generations (Ademolake, RCCG, Interview 84), but others felt 
that as long as Christians assumed their responsibility then there would not be a problem: 
 
I think that we have to work to ensure it doesn’t (happen) and if we need to turn the temperature 
up, we need to turn the temperature up, and as Christians we need to be aware of that and I’m 
very prepared to be a spokesman for that sort of thing in this community (Melluish, St Paul’s, 
Interview 114). 
 
A couple of the leaders also referred to the doctrine of Christ’s second coming as their ultimate 
assurance that whatever happened politically did not overly concern them. 
 
The future of the Evangelical church in Britain 
In summary the London church leaders did to some degree reflect the same spectrum of opinions 
about Islam as the elite of the EPS.  The BMC leaders particularly tended to demonize Islam and 
see it in more essentialist terms.  Some of the more conservative leaders also shared this view but 
expressed it rather more diplomatically, being reluctant to be dogmatic.  In contrast, the open 
church leaders typically had a more positive response and pointed to the diversity of Islam.  In 
both cases, however, their views were more moderate than those of the elite and there did not 
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seem to be a direct influence from the national sphere, except in a couple of cases where Jay 
Smith has been involved in training.  Certainly none of the leaders were overly concerned about an 
Islamic conspiracy to imminently take political control. 
 
In fact the majority of the leaders were remarkably confident about the future of the Evangelical 
church in Britain.  Although some felt that “it’s going to get worse before it gets better” (Warnke, 
Vineyard, Interview 105), this was “not primarily from Muslims but partly from the secularists” (a 
conservative Anglican leader).  This was not to be viewed negatively, in fact the result of these 
challenges would be “a slimmer and a fitter church than before, more willing to stand by certain 
Biblical precepts” (an open charismatic leader).  For Evangelical church leaders in London at least 
the future looks bright. 
 
11.4 INTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
This optimism is clearly not shared by all the participants of the larger EPS.  In this final section I 
consider the internal relationships within the EPS and highlight the evident tensions between 
those Evangelicals who generally see Islam as a threat and those who see it as an opportunity; 
between those who believe that the solution is for Muslims to change and those who believe that 
the West needs to change.  The resulting rift within the EPS is one that appears to be increasing. 
 
Chapman warned of this danger in 1989: “the issues we are dealing with are far too serious and far 
too complex for us to allow ourselves to be polarized into two camps” (1989, 29).  In spite of this 
warning most of the participants recognize that such a shift has in fact occurred: 
 
there is a polarization amongst Evangelicals about responses to Islam: should we be confrontational 
or should we be irenic? (Glaser, 2010b). 
 
Such a plethora of positions on Islam has led to great confusion, and Christians are now deeply 
divided.  Islam has in fact become an agent of division amongst Christians both liberals and 
Evangelicals (Sookhdeo, 2009a, 13). 
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Azumah describes this division in stark terms as “a struggle for the soul of the Christian faith” 
(2009a, 4).211 
 
It is not difficult to draw the lines between the different camps.  With a few exceptions it is clear 
and a matter of public record where people stand.  Moucarry suggested that Chapman and 
Pawson mark the two ends of the spectrum (Moucarry, Interview 77); Knell contrasted Bell and 
Sookhdeo (Knell, Interview 63); and Musk located Riddell and Cotterell in the middle of the 
spectrum (Musk, Interview 109).  Several of the more irenic participants expressed the opinion 
that it was the more polemical voice that had the most influence amongst the churches.  The 
reverse might also be true and Barnabas Fund believe there has been “a sea change in relations 
between Islam and the non-Muslim world” resulting in “a new Evangelical engagement in the 
interfaith dialogue movement, replacing the older, liberal involvement” – an approach that is 
“helping the Islamization of the West” (Barnabas Fund, 2010b) .  These alignments are reflected in 
the way that participants: 
 
 quote one another either supportively or critically;212  
 recommend one another’s book at conferences;213  
 share platforms at different conferences;214  
 write endorsements for one another’s books.215 
 
Participants on both sides clearly feel that they have suffered and been wronged because of this 
polarization.  For example, Bell recounts how an imam once asked him, “who are you leaving 
                                                             
211 A phrase borrowed from Cumming (2008). (Cumming, 2008) 
212 Participants are clearly aware of these critiques.  For instance Riddell said “Chapman has been quite 
critical of some of the things that Peter Cotterell and I have written” (Riddell, Interview 53) presumably 
referring to articles like Chapman (2007a) in which Chapman suggested that Riddell and Cotterell do 
not give enough importance to political issues compared to textual issues. 
213 For instance Knell was promoting Bell’s Grace for Muslims at Spring Harvest 2008. 
214 For instance Cox, Riddell, Sookhdeo, Solomon all spoke at a conference organized by The Maranatha 
Community entitled Islam: its significance for the churches and the United Kingdom today on 6 February 
2007 at the Emmanuel Centre, London. 
215 For instance Cox has endorsed books by Sookhdeo, Orr-Ewing and Riddell.  Solomon and Maqdisi 
dedicated Modern Day Trojan Horse to Cox, Sookhdeo and Wilders amongst others.  Chapman has 
endorsed books by Musk and Goldsmith, and Sookhdeo has endorsed books by Solomon and Pawson.  
And, maybe demonstrating his middle position and the respect in which he is held as an academic, 
Riddell has endorsed books by both Sookhdeo and Moucarry and himself been endorsed by Nazir-Ali. 
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behind on your side in order to do what you’re doing?” and he had to admit that he had “left quite 
a few Christian friends behind to become a peacemaker” and in the process had been accused of 
being “politically naive, theologically liberal, or both”  (2006b, 54-5).  Sookhdeo too refers to the 
opposition he perceives from other Christians.  At New Wine 2004 he claimed that he and 
Barnabas Fund had been banned from some churches, was censored by others and had been 
abandoned by British Christians (P. Sookhdeo, 2004b). 
 
These tensions between the two sides have been particularly highlighted in various public 
exchanges since 2001 and, in drawing the data presentation to a close, a few examples will suffice 
to illustrate the positions and strength of feeling on both sides. 
 
11.4.A MEDIA ARTICLES 
Sookhdeo’s article The Myth of Moderate Islam published in The Spectator (2005b) attracted some 
forthright public criticism from Chapman.  In An Open Letter to Patrick Sookhdeo published on the 
Fulcrum Forum (2005b) Chapman tried to avert “the danger of positions becoming totally 
polarized” by listing seven points on which they both agreed but then went on to criticize 
Sookhdeo’s article for: 
 
 suggesting that there is no such thing as moderate Islam;  
 ignoring certain Islamic hermeneutics of the Qur’an;  
 downplaying the importance of political issues;  
 and stoking fear by inflating demographic statistics. 
 
In his turn Sookhdeo published a lengthy article highlighting Recent Changes in Christian 
Approaches to Islam  which criticizes leading Evangelicals such as Chapman for “giving insufficient 
attention to the nature, history and goals of Islam” as well as “diluting basic Christian doctrines” 
(2010b, 11).  Several times he refers to the “new Evangelical enthusiasm” for “interfaith dialogue 
and accommodation with Muslims” (ibid 19 emphasis added) and he is particularly concerned 
about the effects he believes this is having on theology (reviving the heresies of Marcionism and 
Arianism), Christian unity, evangelism and Christian minorities in Muslim countries.  He rebukes 
Bell for “over-optimistic” interpretations of demographic trends (ibid 12) and accuses him of 
implying that Muhammad was indeed a prophet and that “Islam’s arrival in the world is willed and 
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approved by God” (ibid 16).  Glaser is criticized for imputing authority to the Qur’an and even 
Brother Andrew, normally widely admired by Evangelicals of all hues for his boldness and work 
with the suffering church, is censured for “borrowing terms from Liberation Theology” in 
sympathizing with the Palestinian people (ibid 13).  Of course, Chapman too is specifically criticized 
for sympathizing with Muslim grievances, for suggesting that Christians have more in common 
with Muslims than with secularists and for his participation in the Common Word initiative. 
 
11.4.B A COMMON WORD216  
This latter point highlights how the Common Word initiative (§10.4.b) has been a vivid, if not the 
most vivid, illustration of tensions in the EPS.  Barnabas Fund saw it as part of a plan by Muslim 
governments to “woo Evangelical Christians whom they now (view) as an important political force 
in the West” (Barnabas Fund, 2010b).217  Indeed several of the participants saw it as a deliberate 
ploy to deceive Christians, and Solomon and Al-Maqdisi bluntly suggested that the true message of 
the Common Word was “accept  Islam  or  face  the consequences” (2009a, 4).  They along with 
Barnabas Fund (2007) identified it as an example of taqiyya (§10.4.b) and were highly critical of 
those Evangelicals who signed a positive response drafted by some of the faculty at the University 
of Yale (reproduced in Volf et al., 2010): 
 
ironically, the Evangelical response (from Yale) seems more in tune with a liberal ecumenical and 
inclusive interfaith approach, which comes close to accepting Islam as a legitimate way to God, 
Muhammad as a prophet of God and the Qur’an as a revelation from God (Barnabas Fund, 2008). 
 
Sookhdeo even accuses the Yale authors of “dhimmi” behaviour “seeking to appease the Muslims 
because they are afraid” (2009a, 90).  Others too were concerned.  Dye described the signatories 
as “more attracted to the prize of a delusional ‘peace’ than by their duty to confront error with 
truth” (2009, xv) and Craig was disappointed with some “very big Evangelical names” who signed 
the response (Craig, Interview 35). CCFON saw the Common Word as an act of Muslim aggression, 
                                                             
216 For a more in-depth discussion of Evangelical responses to the Common Word initiative see my 
forthcoming article Love: a Common Word between Evangelicals and Muslims? in Journal of Political 
Theology. 
217 Note that this unattributed article in Barnabas Aid, March/April 2010 is a shorter (~3,500 words 
compared to ~14,000 words) version of Sookhdeo’s online article (2010) of the same title mentioned 
above.  This particular phrase, however, is absent from the longer version. 
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insisting that “no common ground can be found at the centre of the two religions”, and they 
issued a statement saying: 
 
(the Evangelical signatories) should consider withdrawing their signatures. This is not without cost, 
however. Revoking one’s signature to a peaceable and accepting response to A Common Word is a 
rejection of the invitation to convert to Islam. This is a rejection of the most peaceable offer of 
conversion in our generation. It is also a refusal to submit to Islam and it gives Muslims everywhere 
a Qur’anic ground to perpetrate jihad against those who do so. Those who are brave enough should 
count the cost (Christian Concern for Our Nation, 2008). 
 
Whilst some rejected the Common Word outright others gave it a cautious, conditional “yes but” 
welcome (§11.1.a).  McRoy advised that “we can be engaged with it whilst being cautious” 
(McRoy, Interview 54) and Riddell, whilst welcoming the letter and describing it as “good” and 
“important”, cautioned that it needed “careful exegesis” (Riddell, Interview 31).  Some suggested 
that the Muslims needed to change their behaviour or offer some token of their sincerity before a 
dialogue could be entered into.  For instance the Open Letter written by the Maranatha 
Community (2008) welcomed the Common Word  but raised the issue of the Islamic treatment of 
apostates and requested that a Muslim mufti issue a fatwa  clarifying the approach of Islam to 
other religions and outlawing the use of violence.  They also suggested the formation of Christian-
Muslim working groups to tackle various issues. 
 
Others were more positive about the initiative.  Musk expressed appreciation that unusually the 
Muslims had quoted from the Bible (which they normally take to have been corrupted) (Musk, 
Interview 72) and Moucarry was pleased they had accepted that Muslims and Christians worship 
the same God (despite their misgivings about the Trinity) (Moucarry, Interview 85).  Sudworth said, 
“for me it can only be a positive move because it’s the beginnings of a dialogue” (Sudworth, 
Interview 53).  Elsewhere he asks, “are we as Christians to be mean-spirited, cynical, arrogantly 
waiting for ‘them to get themselves in order’ before we engage in relationship”  and suggests that 
the Barnabas Fund criticism of the Common Word is “more than a little outrageous” (2008c).  
Chapman also felt that “some of the Evangelical responses were extremely ungenerous” 
(Chapman, Interview 58) and believed that “it’s not an exaggeration to say that the Common Word 
has split Christians – and especially Evangelical Christians – down the middle” (2008).  He robustly 
defended his decision to sign the Yale response and said: 
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I don’t want to be in the position of assuming that Muslims can never change their ideas or make 
any new approaches to Christians and Christianity .... I suggest, therefore, that the best way to test 
the genuineness of this remarkable invitation is to accept it with enthusiasm, and then, having done 
our homework thoroughly, start (or continue) the dialogue face to face .... (asking) all the hard 
questions we want (Chapman, 2008). 
 
11.4.C AN EVANGELICAL “SPAT” 
One final illustration will serve to demonstrate the fault lines within the EPS.  In 2009 a critical 
review of Sookhdeo’s Global Jihad (2007a) was posted by an Evangelical author on the Evangelical 
Fulcrum Forum (White, 2009a).218  A robust response was published on the same website on 
behalf of Barnabas Fund (Zeidan and Hamid, 2009)  which the reviewer then replied to (White, 
2009b).219  However, the exchange became particularly sharp when the original review was picked 
up and referenced approvingly by a Muslim blogger.220  This led to the condemnation of the review 
by an anonymous “white missionary” writing on an American Evangelical website.221  He accused 
White of deliberately drawing the blogger’s attention to the review and claimed that it was in fact 
part of a wider conspiracy to discredit Sookhdeo which had been planned at a secret meeting in 
2008 attended by amongst others Bell, Chapman and Knell.  Sudworth too was implicated because 
he recommended the review and placed a link to it on his blog.222  At this point Barnabas Fund 
emailed their supporters to ask them to pray for their staff because of “what appears to be an 
orchestrated, multi-pronged attack” on Sookhdeo (Barnabas Fund, 2009).  Solomon and the 
Maranatha Community were also named as “targets” that were in danger. 
 
The whole affair attracted wider publicity when Melanie Phillips published an article in The 
Spectator referring to the incident and claiming that there was a “new axis” in Britain between 
radical Muslims and some Evangelical Christians who were trying to discredit other Evangelicals 
                                                             
218 For a Muslim review of the book see Bajwa (2009). Bajwa (2009) Sookhdeo's Paranoia of 'Global 
Jihad', http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_SookhdeoParanoia accessed 11 March 2009 
219 He also commented on his own website and highlighted that the response which Barnabas Fund 
posted on the Fulcrum Forum differed in content to the article that was emailed to its supporters.  
www.benwhite.org.uk/blog/?p=628, (accessed 22 December 2010). 
220 Indigo Jo, ‘Review of Rotten Book by the Sookhdevil’, 
http://www.blogistan.co.uk/blog/mt.php/2009/01/31/review_of_rotten_book_by_the_s#comment-
667057  (accessed 20 February 2009). 
221 ‘Talk of the Sookhdevil: British Evangelical Author Attacked for Exposing Militant Islam’, 
www.virtueonline.org/portal/modules/news/article.php?storyid=9941&com_id=104215&com_rootid
=104146&com_mode=thread&#comment104215 (accessed 18 February 2009). 
222 www.distinctlywelcoming.com/barnabas-fund (accessed 22 December 2010). 
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(M. Phillips, 2009, see also Tooley, 2009).  She deplored the “targeting of Sookhdeo” and in 
speculating on the reason for such an alliance suggested that: 
 
the answer lies in a profound split amongst Evangelicals: between Christian Zionists who love Israel 
and want to defend the church against the predations of radical Islam, and those who want Israel to 
be destroyed and radical Islam appeased (M. Phillips, 2009).223 
 
The rift in the Evangelical community is clear for all to see and the unseemly “spat” has still not 
been resolved.   
 
11.5 CONCLUSION 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the incident it neatly illustrated how the EPS interacts with the 
British – and indeed international – media and the unavoidable interconnectedness of today’s 
reticulate public sphere.  This chapter has shown that the EPS is necessarily in relationship with 
not just other Christians but also with Muslims and the mainstream media.  Everything that is 
published or said in public is accessible to all.  The different micro-public spheres will inevitably 
collide.  The following analysis, amongst other things, considers the possible outcomes of such 
collisions.
                                                             
223 It should be noted that Phillips has written on a similar topic before (Phillips, 2002) when some of 
the same Evangelicals were criticised for apparent anti-Semitism. 
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PART IV – BRITISH EVANGELICALS AND MUSLIMS: AN ANALYSIS  
 
CHAPTER 12 THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
I now focus on an analysis of the empirical material presented in the light of the theoretical 
perspectives discussed in Part I.  In particular I concentrate on answering the questions outlined in 
the introduction (§1.4): 
 
1. What is the nature of the Evangelical public sphere which has formed around the subject 
of Islam and Muslims in Britain and how is it mediated within British churches? 
 
2. What are the patterns of responses to Islam and Muslims exhibited within this public 
sphere? 
 
3. How will these responses affect community relationships amongst Evangelicals, Muslims 
and government? 
 
4. What are the likely trajectories of British Evangelicalism in the light of the Muslim 
presence? 
 
The following sections address these questions one by one bringing together the data from Part III 
and the theory from Part I. 
 
12.1 THE EVANGELICAL MICRO-PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
One of the main contentions of this thesis is that the concept of a religious micro-public sphere is a 
useful analytical framework for studying religious discourse.  My working definition (§2.5) has 
been that micro-public spheres are: 
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public discursive spaces of variable size in which individuals and groups coalesce around 
matters of mutual interest or concern to form an opinion through rational debate, and 
which together are subordinate nodes of a larger network of public spheres notionally  
making up the meso-public sphere in a particular society or nation. 
 
In the following I explore how this definition corresponds to the current debate about Islam 
amongst Evangelical Christians and show how the data illuminate this theory.  I also discuss the 
question of transnational influence and evaluate the EPS’s influence within the British churches 
and the wider public.  The section concludes with a short assessment of the usefulness of this 
approach for the sociology of religion. 
 
12.1.A EVIDENT EXISTENCE 
The earlier discussion (§2) of the work of Hauser (1999) and Warner (2005) highlighted three 
features of such spheres: issue, text and media, and participants. 
 
Firstly, an issue of mutual concern to a group of citizens generates debate and receives publicity 
due to particular events (Hauser, 1999, 61).  It should be clear by now that this is so in this case.  
All the participants are interested in or concerned by the increasing presence of Muslims and Islam 
in Britain which is challenging the way that Evangelicals think about both faith and society.   
 
There is no shortage of general discussion but particular events act as triggers: they precipitate 
argument; provoke feeling; demand a response; and draw the sphere to the attention of other 
publics.  So for example, the Common Word initiative (§10.4.b), the Archbishop’s lecture on 
English law (§10.3.e) and a critical book review (§11.4.c) all stimulated particularly intense debate.  
This has spilled out from the Evangelical community and caused comment amongst Muslims and 
the mainstream media (§11.4.c).  Clearly the EPS is active in pursuing its cause (or causes) and is 
seeking to influence its own constituency, as well as more general public opinion (Hauser, 1999, 
77). 
 
The second feature illustrated by the data is the great diversity of media deployed in the 
dissemination of the texts.  Warner sees a public as “the social space created by the reflexive 
circulation of discourse” consisting of “the concatenation of texts through time” (2005, 90).  The 
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empirical material certainly bears witness to such a concatenation utilizing virtually every type of 
media from the more than 40 formally published books, through chapters, articles, newsletters 
and oral texts to internet videos, blogs, forums and email circulation lists.   
 
The majority of this discourse is rational and includes analyses of not just theological and religious 
concerns (§10.3) but of historical, social and political issues as well (§11.3).  The authors are clearly 
aware of and critique the material generated by other publics, including the Muslim and secular 
spheres.  At the same time, much of the discourse is highly reflexive and includes critique of 
parallel texts generated internally within the sphere.  This entails a healthy level of self-criticism, 
although this is sometimes absent in the writing of those who adhere to a more Manichean view 
of the world.  
 
The final element of a public sphere is its participants.  In this case the “primary membership” 
(Hauser, 1999, 77), or what I have called the “national elite”, is plainly discernible.  Whilst there is 
an identifiable core, however, the debate clearly remains “permeable” to strangers, which is one 
of Hauser’s key criteria for a public sphere (ibid).  This is particularly true for Christians of other 
churchmanship but is also true for those outside the Christian community as attested to by 
internet responses to videos and debates, reviews of Christian books written by Muslims and 
indeed public debate and dialogue between Evangelicals and Muslims, both formal and informal 
(§11.1.a). 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the key participants all self-identify as Evangelicals, it is clear that 
there is something of a blurred boundary between an Evangelical public sphere as such and a 
wider, more inclusive Christian public sphere.  This has meant that judgements have been made as 
to who is or is not an active participant of this sphere (§8.2.a).  The scope of the public is all those 
who would consider themselves to be Evangelical Christians.  This in itself limits the extent of the 
sphere as many Christians would want to distance themselves from that label.  Yet amongst 
Evangelical Christians it is only those who have an interest in this particular issue who choose to 
participate and amongst these there will always be a minority whose knowledge, occupation or 
vocation gives them particular motivation or expertise.  These form an elite which is somewhat 
reminiscent of Habermas’ bourgeois coffee shop circles.  That said, the elite is not a static group 
and is never convened in its entirety.  It is self-organizing and is not formally constituted, nor is it 
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answerable to any external body.  As Warner suggests, it only “exists by virtue of being addressed” 
(2005, 67).  Each individual participates as an autonomous actor but inevitably brings an agenda 
which may well be influenced by organizational allegiances or vocation.  Different participants 
meet at conferences, speaking engagements and so on but there is no external requirement to do 
so.  Indeed some never meet, being separated by geography, circumstance or ideology.   
 
12.1.B TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
The lack of obligation to meet, coupled with modern communications, means that the EPS is open 
to transnational influence and participation (§2.4.c).  Whilst there may be a centre of gravity for 
British participants in the UK, it is impossible to isolate the British Evangelical sphere from the 
significant contributions made to the debate by Evangelicals worldwide.  Amongst those 
participants resident in Britain some, such as Azumah and Riddell, have either recently arrived 
from or returned to their home countries.  There are also those who occasionally attend 
conferences or write papers that are read in Britain, such as the widely circulated analyses of the 
Common Word written by the Australian Mark Durie (2008a, 2008b).  In particular there is always 
an influence from the United States within British Evangelicalism (Guest, forthcoming).  This was 
certainly the case during the Common Word debate in which the controversial response written by 
Evangelical scholars at Yale University (reproduced in Volf et al., 2010) was signed by some British 
Evangelicals (§11.4.b).  
 
The influence of the BMCs with their African roots should also not be underestimated.  Jenkins has 
written about the rise in importance of the church in the global south (2007b) and has suggested 
that it might yet have a significant impact on the church in Europe (Jenkins, 2007a).  Certainly the 
concept of reverse mission was prevalent amongst the black leaders interviewed, who all had 
strong connections with churches in Africa (§5.4).  They believed that black Christians would play a 
role in restoring Christianity in Britain. 
 
This transnational influence, however, does not diminish the validity of talking about a “British 
Evangelical public sphere”.  The ongoing relationships, the shared public space – particularly 
within the churches – and the issues of common concern in Britain all create cohesion amongst 
the participants.  These men and women are obliged to interact and argue their case with one 
another if they want to maintain influence and credibility. 
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12.1.C INFLUENCE IN THE EVANGELICAL CHURCHES 
Such interaction is particularly necessary if the EPS is to influence Evangelical Christians in the UK.  
Yet one of the most surprising outcomes of this research is that, even though some of those 
interviewed felt that the church in Britain was not well-equipped to relate to Muslims, the elite of 
this sphere quite clearly have relatively little influence on the 14 church leaders interviewed.  
Given that these leaders represent a large number of Evangelical churchgoers in inner London 
(§8.2.b), this must be seen as a serious failure to achieve one of the sphere’s major objectives.   
 
Of the key participants Sookhdeo’s was the name most recognized by the church leaders.  
Contrary to expectations, however, he had not been invited to speak at any of the churches in 
question and Barnabas Fund did not receive support from these churches, although individuals in 
the congregations were believed to be supporters.  This was surprising as amongst several of the 
other participants it was widely felt that Sookhdeo was the most influential voice in the British 
churches (§11.4) (see also Ipgrave, 2008, 8).  This is clearly not so amongst large Evangelical 
churches in the London area at least. 
 
Of the other names Pawson and Cox were well known but not due to their work on Islam.  
Amongst other specialists on Islam it was Chapman, Goldsmith and Nazir-Ali who were the most 
widely cited.  This, however, did not translate into invitations to speak at the churches or any 
sustained effort to promote their books.  Few recalled recommending books at all and not many 
books on Islam were available in church bookshops or bookstalls.  This raises the question of 
whether books, a favoured tool of Evangelical teachers, are an effective medium to communicate 
with the churches.  Whilst some of the leaders clearly read widely, they had by and large chosen 
not to read on Islam.  Whether the church members read books on Islam, or indeed whether they 
read much at all, is a question for further research. 
 
The most successful participant in terms of invitations to speak and conduct seminars in London 
churches was Jay Smith who trains Christians to debate with Muslims.  Along with his work in the 
universities, he had been invited to four of the churches studied and has also spoken at Kensington 
Temple.  He is amongst those who make the most innovative use of alternative media.  Whilst he 
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has not written a full book he has a lot of material on the internet and supplements his Sunday 
debates at Speaker’s Corner with video material (§11.1.a). 
 
None of the churches use any of the more traditional course material available about Islam.  Three 
of the churches arrange special training courses about Islam and only one regularly mentions Islam 
from the pulpit.  Otherwise, despite many saying that they felt the church should have a strong 
public voice, they were reluctant to be involved in anything that they deemed political, preferring 
to leave this to individuals or specialist lobby groups such as CCFON (§11.3.c). 
 
In general the church leaders saw Islam as just one issue amongst many that they have to deal 
with.  None of them believe that an Islamic takeover of Britain is imminent, suggesting that the 
“warners” (§11.3.a) are not very successful in convincing the churches of their fears.  On the other 
hand, neither were these leaders engaged in dialogue with Muslims and by and large had not 
heard of the Common Word initiative.  It would seem that they are either unconvinced that Islam 
poses any sort of challenge for the church in Britain or are simply too busy to be able to do 
anything to equip their congregations.  Rather, the most common view amongst the church 
leaders was that the presence of Muslims is an opportunity for evangelism amongst people whom 
it would be difficult to reach in their home country.  The extent of their success in this is unknown 
as it was too sensitive to ask questions about Muslim converts, although the BMC leaders 
mentioned that many African Christians are from a Muslim background. 
 
In short, the EPS is what Fraser (1992) would call a “weak” public sphere which has no authority or 
decision making power (§2.4.a).  It has less influence in the London churches studied than might 
have been expected despite some of the church leaders admitting that their members were not 
well-equipped to think about Islam and were mainly influenced by the mass media (§11.3.b).   
Whilst it is not possible to conclusively say who or what is influencing the average Evangelical 
church member without further research (§13.3), these findings should certainly give pause for 
thought for those whose aim is to influence the Evangelical grassroots. 
 
12.1.D LACK OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE WIDER PUBLIC SPHERE 
The EPS fairs no better in the meso-public sphere than it does in the churches.  Relatively few of 
the participants have access to the mainstream media with the exception of Nazir-Ali, Cox and 
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Carey largely because of their political and institutional church roles, and Sookhdeo, who has had 
several articles published in The Spectator and other newspapers.  These figures are also 
occasionally quoted by journalists but other participants are rarely mentioned (§11.2.c). 
 
Admittedly Craig has been more successful through his role in local politics and Bell, Sookhdeo and 
Solomon have all been consulted by various public bodies (§11.2.b).  In addition Edwards was 
invited to attend meetings with the government and other faith groups in his then role as general 
secretary of the EA.  Otherwise policy makers have shown little interest in or knowledge of either 
the expertise of some of these figures or the debate that is taking place among Evangelicals with 
regard to Islam. 
 
12.1.E MICRO-PUBLIC SPHERES AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 
In concluding this discussion I want to consider the extent to which the notion of a religious public 
sphere is a useful tool for the sociology of religion.  How does it aid the study of faith communities 
and the discourse within them?  To what extent might this construct be a useful tool for the faith 
communities themselves and indeed for others wishing to understand and engage with them? 
 
The concept of the public sphere takes seriously the socio-political dimensions of faith 
communities.  It foregrounds the issues and concerns of religious actors over their more static 
theological beliefs and ecclesial practices, highlighting their role as citizens within a democratic 
society. The discursive emphasis teases out their diverse attitudes, opinions and reactions rather 
than assuming a monolithic response stereotyped by historical assumption.  Spectrums and 
polarizations come clearly into focus and the evanescence of opinion is captured and taken into 
account.  This emphasis is critical at a time when not just social scientists but also state and social 
welfare bodies need to listen to what faith communities are saying and is very much in line with 
the new openness towards faith-based discourse demonstrated by Habermas himself (§3.3.a).  
Society may discover a positive benefit by engaging with such discourse and it would expose 
religious discourse to public debate and ensure that it is not privileged with an immunity from 
rational scrutiny which would allow extreme ideas to develop in isolation (Trigg, 2007) (§3.3.b).    
 
Secondly, the idea of multiple publics creates space for minority voices to be heard as distinct 
from other more powerful voices in the communities of which they are part.  For instance, 
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Evangelicals often feel that their concerns and opinions are not adequately represented by the 
discourse of a larger established church, and fear that their distinctive understanding of the 
Christian message is not heard in the public arena.  Dissenting voices of all kinds are lost if the 
media focus on one particular constituency within a faith community.  Moderate Muslims, for 
example, are heard less often than their more radical counterparts.  Recognition of multiple 
discursive public spheres might create a more nuanced picture – one that allows for intra-public 
discontinuities and polarities. 
 
The hope of all counter-public elites is that through the publicity given to their opinions and 
arguments they will gain or retain an influence over the individuals and groups within their own 
communities and even beyond.  The micro-public sphere concept facilitates an assessment of their 
effectiveness in this endeavour.  Religiously informed debates are not simply academic exercises 
but have serious consequences for community relations (§12.3).  Whilst the mass media, as has 
been mentioned, is an ever present and at times overwhelming influence, other religious actors 
clearly wield great influence.  The extent to which this benefits the community at large depends on 
the quality and nature of the debate within the religious micro-public spheres. 
 
Finally, this concept provides a model for the interaction of different groups, and assesses the 
nature of their response to one another.  When one faith community accesses and engages with 
the texts of another then public spheres are not only intersecting but are generating potential for 
wider opinion forming.  The notion of multiple micro-public spheres offers a useful analytical tool 
for examining this type of interaction and for understanding the place of religious counter-publics 
in a modern democracy. 
 
12.2 RESPONSES TO ISLAM WITHIN THE EVANGELICAL PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Turning to consider the Evangelical discourse on Islam, the following section marks out the 
responses apparent in the data and considers the variables that might influence these responses.  
It then proposes an adaptation of Bennett’s (2008) typology of responses and compares it with 
that of Lochhead (1988). 
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12.2.A MAPPING THE RESPONSES BY THEMES 
Part III clearly sets out the different Evangelical responses and attitudes towards Islam in Britain 
today.   To make the arguments more explicit Figure 12.1 presents a number of the themes 
running through the data and links them to the earlier sections of Part III.  Each theme constitutes 
a spectrum and so participants do not necessarily gather at the extremes.  In many cases they 
occupy a range of intermediate positions.  
 
Some of the themes correspond closely to the “distinctions” presented in the Runnymede Trust 
report on Islamophobia (1997) (§6.4.c).  This does not imply, however, that participants are 
necessarily Islamophobic and a later discussion addresses this issue in more detail (§12.3.b).  Nor 
should it suggest that there are only two discrete, mutually exclusive positions that Evangelicals 
can hold, equating to the Runnymede Trust’s “open” and “closed” views or Bennett’s 
“confrontational” and “conciliatory” (Bennett, 2008).   Indeed it is clear from the data that, whilst 
there is currently a high degree of polarization, some participants find themselves either on 
middle ground or even in “unexpected” places.   
 
The first set of themes in Figure 12.1 focuses on how the participants view Islam and are thus 
drawn mainly from Chapter 9 which considered how Evangelicals understand Islam.  They include 
the Evangelical assessment of the danger that Muslims pose to western societies.  The second set 
of themes draws on Chapter 10 and focuses on how participants in the EPS view Britain and the 
role of the church within it.  Clearly for some there is nostalgia for a lost “Christian Britain” and an 
ideological assumption of an established church at the centre of society.  For others these things 
should never have existed as they did and are in fact to be resisted.  The third set of themes again 
draws from Chapter 9 and focuses on the participants’ approach to Christian theology and 
contrasts the more conservative views with the more open.  These reflect Bebbington’s 
assessment of the increasing polarization within British Evangelicalism between those who are 
concerned to uphold doctrine and those who prioritize cultural relevance (§5.3).  The data 
suggests that the former group is more likely to take a confrontational approach to Islam and the 
latter group a conciliatory approach.   
 
This parallels Hoover’s observation in the American context (§7.2.a) of a divide between what he 
calls “the centre right and the hard right” of the Evangelical movement (2004, 16).  The difference 
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in Britain is that the conciliators are probably to the left of those in the United States, although it 
should be noted that the interviewees were not explicitly asked about their political views. 
 
Whilst these spectra broadly fit the current polarization of the EPS they do not necessarily 
accurately predict where each of the participants stands on every issue.  For instance, whilst the 
data has suggested that conservative Evangelicals are by and large more positive about the need 
for a “war on terror”, McRoy, who describes himself as conservative, is adamantly opposed to it.  
Jay Smith is from a Mennonite peace church background that rejects confrontation and yet he is 
polemical in his approach.  So clearly each participant must be considered as an individual and the 
spectra should not be used to stereotype.  That said they do provide a general portrait of two 
types of responses which I initially equate to Bennett’s categories (2008) (§4.3): confrontationalist 
and conciliator. 
 
12.2.B FACTORS AFFECTING EVANGELICAL RESPONSES 
Before considering these types in more depth, it should be remembered that the responses of the 
participants inevitably reflect their age, gender, social class, education, ethnic and cultural 
background, life experience and relationships with Muslims (see Appendix A).  Whilst the 
dominant profile of the EPS is a white, middle class male over 50 years old, there is a significant 
presence of women and non-white ethnic backgrounds.  Sudworth, Andrew Smith and the Orr-
Ewings are all of a younger generation and seem particularly comfortable in a multicultural 
context.  The women, who are widely respected by the men, are not unsurprisingly especially 
concerned about the perceived treatment of women in Islam. 
 
The majority of the participants are university educated and some hold, or are working towards, 
doctorates in related topics.  Those who take a confrontational approach, however, are less likely 
to have degrees related to Islam from western universities than those who are more conciliatory.  
This is by no means always true, and in particular Sookhdeo holds a doctorate from the School of 
Oriental and African Studies and Jay Smith is working towards a doctorate at the London School of 
Theology.  
 
Although the majority of the participants are British Caucasians, eight of them are from non-white 
ethnic backgrounds and a different eight are not British by birth.  Most significantly some have a 
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Muslim background.  Pakistani Nazir-Ali was brought up in a family with both Christians and 
Muslims but chose to be a Christian.  Three others - Azumah, Sookhdeo and Solomon - are 
converts to Christianity from Islam.  Clearly these backgrounds along with the life experience of 
each participant profoundly influence attitudes towards Islam.  Importantly those who are from a 
Muslim background and who report suffering to different degrees at the hands of their former co-
religionists (Solomon and Sookhdeo) tend to a more negative response.  This is similar to the 
experience in the American context where it is converts who provide “the inflammatory 
characterizations of Islam” (Kidd, 2009, 147) (§7.2).  That said, Azumah is more irenic and Nazir-Ali 
is carefully nuanced in his approach.  So whilst a Muslim background must be a significant aspect it 
is by no means the sole factor.   
 
Many of the participants have spent long periods in the Muslim world.  By and large these 
Evangelicals are more likely to be conciliatory than those who have spent little or no time living 
amongst Muslims.  It could also be the case that it depends on where the participant has lived.  
Those who have lived in the Arab Middle East (Bell, Chapman, Moucarry and Musk) appear to have 
a more open view of Islam than those whose main contact has been with South Asian Islam, 
including Asian Islam in Britain (Jay Smith and Sookhdeo).   
 
Finally, those Evangelicals who reported strong relationships with Muslims, either in the past or 
present, are more likely to have a sympathetic view of Islam.  From the material in the public 
domain, confrontationalists on the whole do not appear to have close relationships with Muslims 
and indeed some may have suffered at their hands.224  Significantly these last two points both 
corroborate Zebiri’s observation that relationships with Muslims have “a philosophical and 
epistemological impact" on approaches to Islam (1997, 224) (§7.2.b).     
 
12.2.C TYPES OF RESPONSES 
 Bearing in mind the earlier discussion of modes of interaction (§4.3), I suggest that the typology 
proposed by Bennett does indeed reflect the responses to Islam of British Evangelicals, provided 
that they are considered as the polar extremes of a spectrum.  However, I also propose that these 
poles be modified with reference to how the views are held and enacted.  In all cases it must be 
                                                             
224 Note that details of these relationships are lacking as I was unable to obtain interviews with all of 
these participants. 
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emphasized that these are ideal types and should not be allowed to obscure the variety and 
nuance that exists.  Neither should they be taken to describe any particular Evangelical although 
some are found to fit the description more closely than others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following paints a broad-brush, general description of the two types: 
 
Firstly, the confrontationalists: 
 
These Evangelicals are “at war” with Islam, which they see as a threat not just to the 
Christian faith but to the freedom of western civilization.  In their writing and speaking 
they focus on Islam as an ideological system and in the Orientalist tradition identify an 
essential essence which is “true Islam”, even if some Muslims fail to acknowledge it as 
such.  They rely on their own reading of Islamic texts and do not draw on other theological 
or sociological resources, Christian or otherwise, their goal being to undermine Islam 
through polemical debate.  Typically they do not have ongoing relationships with Muslims 
although they themselves may be converts from a Muslim background.  
Confrontationalists are concerned that there is a conspiracy amongst a large number of 
not just radical but even moderate Muslims to overthrow western governments, and that 
Muslims routinely use deceit sanctioned by taqiyya to achieve these ends.  This, however, 
is a spiritual battle, as Islam is a tool of Satan and so is in opposition to the truth that 
resides in Christianity.  Britain has been a Christian country in the past and should be so 
again today, but secular pluralism is destroying it and the achievements of the British 
Empire have been diminished by post-colonial guilt.  This has left the church in a parlous 
state and there is a real danger of it capitulating to Islam, encouraged by liberal Christians 
– including some Evangelicals who compromise and dialogue with Muslims.  The only 
solution is for Islam to change, whether through internal reformation, Christian mission or 
the coercion of western democratic states.  Until then the battle rages and the church 
must be warned and put on its guard. 
Conciliator    Confrontationalist 
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Secondly, the conciliators: 
 
These Evangelicals focus on Muslims as people and are interested in “lived Islam”.  They 
have a non-essentialist view of Islam and tend to talk of varieties of Islam.  For them Islam 
is not a threat, although certainly there is a very small minority of atypical Muslims who 
are dangerous extremists.   Conversely the presence of Islam in Britain is an opportunity 
not only for Christian mission but also for reversing the tide of secularism in the West.  
Whilst these Evangelicals ideally wish for Muslims to become Christians, they are also keen 
to work together with them as allies on issues of social justice and the common good.  
Typically they have had Muslim friends in the past, although they often regret that they 
are now too busy or disconnected to maintain friendships with Muslims outside of formal 
dialogue.  They are highly educated and have specialized in a field related to Islam.  They 
do not see Britain as a Christian country and frequently question whether such a concept 
is either possible or desirable.  Multicultural pluralism is inevitable and so peaceful 
coexistence is a goal worth pursuing through dialogue, albeit a robust dialogue that does 
not shy away from addressing difficult issues.  This may include engaging in apologetics to 
defend theological truths and evangelism remains a primary concern, although these 
Evangelicals are inclusivists and tend to foreground issues of justice and peacemaking.  
After all Christians and Muslims have to live together whether or not they convert one 
another, and confrontationalists are making this more difficult. 
 
As made clear above, these two ideal types do not necessarily exist in their pure forms.  Some 
participants – on both sides - are ideologically driven in their approach and discern essential, 
universal principles at work.  They find it difficult to engage with those of a different opinion and 
when they do interact it tends to polarize their positions.  Others are rather more pragmatic and 
take a moderate stance allowing for ambiguity and complexity.  They are more likely to look for 
practical solutions and are quicker to see the good in the Other and the Other’s point of view.  
They are characterized by a “yes but” approach which engages in dialogue but expects tokens of 
goodwill and practical progress.  They are willing to make concessions for the sake of an imperfect 
peace.   
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These tendencies lead me to propose two terms to modify the ideal types: “dogmatic” and 
“pragmatic”.  Whilst there are no fixed boundaries, four possible combinations of Evangelical 
response to Islam result (Figure 12.2): 
 
 
 
I do not intend to place any of the participants in these categories, although some obviously tend 
more than others to the dogmatic positions – especially on the confrontational side.  Such labeling 
would, however, be invidious.  It would also be unfair as they probably take up different stances 
and feel more strongly about some issues than others.  It is also more than likely that the 
participants are in a state of flux and that their positions change over time.  This is not a 
longitudinal study and data have only been collected over a short period from 2001 to 2010.  For 
instance, I have not attempted to answer the question of whether attitudes changed as a result of 
9/11.  If a before and after comparison were made, however, it might well show that some 
participants have become more polemical and more pragmatic or less pragmatic since that date.  
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point and will be mentioned later as topics for possible 
future research (§13.3). 
 
I have already noted that Sookhdeo was more welcoming of Asian migrants in Britain in his earlier 
writing (§7.3 footnote) than in the writing reviewed in this thesis.  He was more positive about 
Muslims, suggesting that “the Muslim’s ethic is displayed in the character and life of Jesus”, and 
was critical of polemics as “we should not be negative in our approach, demolishing the other 
person’s religion” (Sookhdeo, 1977, 5, 6).  He went on to declare that “our attitudes to the 
immigrant are very important.  If they betray a hint of coolness, of prejudice, of superiority or 
Figure 12.2 – A typology of Evangelical responses to Islam 
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patronage, then our work is nullified” (ibid 58).  Clearly a shift has taken place and it would be 
interesting to discover what has prompted this change. 
 
A Church Times article suggests that Nazir-Ali too has experienced a “transformation” in a similar 
period (A. Brown, 2006), although such a change may be more in the public’s perception than in 
his actual approach.  His early books (1983, 1987) contained a strong emphasis on Christian-
Muslim dialogue and he is by no means opposed to this now.  However, since certain comments in 
the press (Nazir-Ali, 2008d, Maher, 2008) he has been seen as taking a harder line against Islam.  
Again more in-depth inquiry would be needed to ascertain whether any change has indeed taken 
place and what has motivated it. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that both Musk (1992, and 2003) and Chapman (1995, and 2007b) 
brought out significantly updated editions of earlier books following 9/11.  Both included new 
material on political Islam and Islamic terrorism in direct response to global events.  Both also bore 
altered titles.  As noted (§9.4.a) the new title for Musk’s book was Holy War and Chapman’s 
subtitle was subtly changed from “responding to the challenge” to “responding to the challenges 
of Islam”, in recognition of the diversity of contemporary Islam. 
 
12.2.D  COMPARISONS WITH OTHER TYPOLOGIES 
The types and modifiers I propose are similar in some respects to those suggested by Lochhead 
(1988) (§4.3) but also have significant differences.  Whilst both attempt to move away from binary 
extremes, the proposed typology is specifically constructed to portray the Evangelical community 
whereas Lochhead’s is a rather more general classification. 
 
Obviously Lochhead’s isolation category is not applicable to the participants in the EPS as they are 
all by definition engaged with Islam and Muslims and want to encourage others to do likewise.  His 
second category, hostility, on the other hand corresponds very closely with the confrontationalist 
position.  For Lochhead this is when the Other is seen as a threat, a deceiver and an agent of war 
(1988, 13) which obviously describes the picture that some participants paint of Muslims.  The 
term “confrontational”, however, is not necessarily negative and is therefore less judgemental 
than the term “hostility”.  This has the benefit of assuaging concerns about physical violence.  
Admittedly some of these Evangelicals would support state violence in order to counter a military 
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threat (and indeed see the “war on terror” to be such a legitimate use of force) but none of them 
would countenance the use of violence by private citizens – although Green’s comments about the 
possibility of future civil unrest should be noted (§10.4.c). 
 
Lochhead’s third category, however, is more problematic and cannot be directly equated with the 
pragmatic label.   Competition is axiomatic to Evangelicalism.  It is part and parcel of the so-called 
Great Commission to “make disciples of all peoples” (Matthew 28.19).  Lochhead admits as much 
when he says that “the competitive attitude toward other religious communities underlies almost 
all popular treatment of the subject by conservative Christian Evangelicals" (ibid 20).  But then he 
goes on to add the words “that are not explicitly hostile”.   It seems to me, however, that hostility 
is still a form of competition. The only difference that Lochhead can offer is that, whilst they both 
focus on the differences, the “competitors” acknowledge the legitimacy of the Other being “in the 
same business”.  The pragmatic modifier, on the other hand, captures the realism of those who 
recognize that, despite their competitive orientation, fairness is incumbent upon all.  These 
participants seek to deal equally with people on all sides be they Christians or Muslims.    
   
Lochhead’s final type is partnership.  Again whilst there are similarities, there are many differences 
and the conciliators may stop well short of what Lochhead had in mind.  They do talk more about 
similarities between Christianity and Islam than do the confrontationalists but they always retain 
the element of competition or else they would cease to be Evangelical.  They ultimately cannot 
prioritize similarities at the expense of what they hold to be truth and would certainly not 
subscribe to “the essential unity of all religions” (Lochhead, 1988, 23).  Notwithstanding this, there 
is a desire to work together, which could be described as partnership (see §12.3 for a discussion of 
bridging capital), and there is a new engagement in dialogue, which Lochhead believes to be 
imperative.  Conciliator remains a better description though as it embraces the problematic 
history of the relationship, recognizes that there needs to be give and take on both sides and 
anticipates that it will be an ongoing process, not least because competition is set to continue. 
 
It is also worth reflecting on Smith’s (2002) findings amongst American Evangelicals (§4.3.d).  His 
four categories of responses to cultural pluralism do correspond to some extent to the typology 
presented here.  Those in opposition to pluralism, for instance, would equate closely to dogmatic 
confrontationalists.  However, none in this study could really be said to be ambivalent.  The 
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participants were rather characterized by having strong opinions, despite the occasional admission 
of uncertainty.  Of the other two categories realistic acceptance would maybe equate with 
pragmatic conciliation and enthusiastic tolerance with dogmatic conciliation.  However, whilst 
Smith found this last group to include the large majority of American Evangelicals in his study, it is 
not at all clear that dogmatic conciliators would form the largest group within the EPS or amongst 
the church leaders, unless it were an enthusiasm for the evangelistic opportunities that Muslims 
present. 
 
Thus this adaption of Bennett’s typology can be seen to reflect other typologies – both general 
and context-specific.  However, the typology presented here is particularly tuned to the British 
Evangelical context and could therefore prove useful for future work. 
 
12.3 COMMUNITY RELATIONS: EVANGELICALS, MUSLIMS AND GOVERNMENT 
 
Given these types and the ongoing competition implicit in the Evangelical-Muslim relationship 
what are the implications for community cohesion and relationships?  The following section looks 
at the degree to which the two communities are in competition with one another and with wider 
society.  It also raises the question of whether Evangelicals are Islamophobic – and for that matter 
whether Muslims are “Christophobic” (Centre for Islamic Studies, 1999).225  The section closes with 
a discussion of the social capital that Evangelicals contribute to social cohesion. 
 
12.3.A UNENDING COMPETITION 
It is not only Evangelicals that see themselves as being in competition.  Many Muslims feel 
themselves to be in competition with the West and are in some cases no less missionary-minded 
than Evangelicals.  Although there are few  reliable statistics, they seem to be relatively successful 
amongst young black men in Britain, some of whom have church backgrounds (§11.3.c, see also 
Reddie, 2009).  Therefore it is amongst the BMCs that one might expect there to be the greatest 
concern about Muslim activity.  Yet the BMC leaders, including those from a Muslim background, 
whilst they were keen to see Muslims converted, did not see Islam as a threat and focused on 
their own ministries rather than trying to counter the efforts of Muslims. 
                                                             
225 Whilst the report cited uses the term Christophobia with relation to Muslims, Jenkins (2007a, 39) 
uses this term with reference to the secular elite of Europe. 
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Given the inevitable tensions that such conversions create, the CMF’s joint statement on ethical 
witness goes some way towards addressing the issue of competition.226  In it Christians and 
Muslims recognize that both are missionary faiths but try to agree on a minimum best practice.  
The ten points include some that address particular Muslim concerns.  For instance, the promise 
that both sides will: 
 
speak of our faith without demeaning or ridiculing the faiths of others (Point 6) 
 
assuages Muslim concerns over blasphemy and the denigration of Islam.  Other points are maybe 
more pressing for Evangelicals.  In particular the promise that:  
 
whilst we may feel hurt when someone we know and love chooses to leave our faith, we will 
respect their decision and will not force them to stay or harass them afterwards (Point 10) 
 
is perhaps aimed particularly at addressing the contentious issue of the treatment of apostates 
who leave Islam.  It was interesting that at the London launch event for the statement one of the 
Muslim speakers himself pointed out that this promise was un-Islamic and was unlikely to be 
respected by the Muslim community.  For a Muslim to become a Christian was, for him, an 
unacceptable retrograde step.  This clearly illustrates that this particular topic will continue to be a 
source of conflict between Evangelicals and Muslims unless the prohibitions on ridda, advocated 
by all the traditional schools of shari‘a, are conclusively abandoned.  In short, Evangelicals accept 
that there will be competition but they want a level playing field.  Whilst both Christians and 
Muslims have signed the CMF document, it remains to be seen whether these guidelines will find 
broader acceptance in the respective communities. 
 
This competition, however, is wider than just Evangelicals and Muslims.  The data have clearly 
revealed that both these groups are also in competition, and even conflict, with government, 
secular liberals and other parties.  This is the sort of complex interaction that Gorski calls a “socio-
political conflict model” (2003, 116) (§4.2.b).  This broader context must always be borne in mind 
when considering Evangelical responses to Islam. 
                                                             
226 www.christianmuslimforum.org/images/uploads/Ethical_Guidelines_for_Witness.pdf (accessed 22 
December 2010). 
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12.3.B BUT ARE EVANGELICALS ISLAMOPHOBIC? 
So are Evangelicals Islamophobes?  One Muslim community worker I talked to perceived 
Evangelicalism as: 
 
an aggressive brand of Christianity ........... intent on conversion, especially of Muslims ...... 
particularly anti-Muslim in its outlook ..........strongly associated with George Bush. 
 
From such a viewpoint, the shared competitive spirit and the desire to encourage conversion may 
render all Evangelicals equally “anti-Muslim” in Muslim minds.  Nevertheless, this study has shown 
that not all Evangelicals share the same view of Islam and not all of them are afraid of it or see it as 
a threat.  It is not true that all Evangelicals are Islamophobic.   
 
At the same time some clearly do fear Islam.  This is something of a paradox for those whom the 
Bible commands to “fear not” (Matthew 10.28) and to “love your enemies” (Matthew 5.44).  
These Evangelicals would fulfil most of the criteria of the “closed” view equating to Islamophobia  
(Runnymede Trust, 1997).  They would, nevertheless, almost certainly reject the Islamophobic 
label.  They are highly critical of the Runnymede Trust report and reject the concept of 
Islamophobia altogether seeing it as a tool used by Muslims to gain protection from all criticism 
(§11.2.b).  This is something that the report itself specifically sought to rule out by making clear 
that: 
 
in a liberal democracy it is inevitable and healthy that people will criticize and oppose, sometimes 
robustly, opinions and practices with which they disagree (Runnymede Trust, 1997, 4). 
 
Maybe it is one of the failings of the report that in practice it is difficult to distinguish between 
“legitimate criticism and disagreement” and a full-blown phobia.  Confrontationalists would argue 
that their concerns and criticisms are justified because the dangers they see in Islam are real.  It is 
not part of this research to pass a judgement on whether or not they are right.  On the one hand, 
as the saying goes “just because you’re paranoid does not mean to say that ‘they’ are not out to 
get you”.  In other words more confrontational Evangelicals may – and in some cases clearly do – 
have some very legitimate concerns.  On the other hand, there is a very fine line between raising 
legitimate concerns and provoking fear.   
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All the participants in the EPS profess to love Muslims and want others to love them too.  
However, when an ordinary Evangelical Christian finishes reading a book or listening to a seminar, 
do they go away fearful of meeting a Muslim or inspired to engage and break down barriers?  This 
is the litmus test of whether the participant’s message is merely robust or Islamophobic; whether 
it promotes love or hatred. 
 
12.3.C SOCIAL CAPITAL: BONDING, BRIDGING AND LINKING 
With this in mind, and given the present polarization within the EPS, the ongoing competition 
between the communities and the accusations of Islamophobia, what are the implications for 
community cohesion?  Clearly there is a great deal of social capital (§3.4.b) tied up in the 
Evangelical community’s networks, buildings, leadership, voluntary service and financial resources.  
But how will that capital be put to use?  It could be a tremendous force for good but also a 
significant force for harm. 
 
If it is true that a religious group constructs and maintains its collective identity by “drawing 
symbolic boundaries that create distinction between themselves and relevant outgroups” (C. 
Smith, 1998, 143), then the confrontational approach is likely to significantly strengthen the 
“ingroup commitment” of Evangelicals at the expense of their relationship with Muslims.  A shared 
intolerance of the Muslim “outgroup” and the stoking of fear that they are “predators” in the 
evolutionary stakes (§4.2.c) would ensure that tensions remain high and that there is a minimum 
of contact between the two communities.  So this approach runs the risk of strengthening internal 
“bonding capital” but at the same time increasing the isolation of the Evangelical community 
(§3.4.b). 
 
The conciliatory approach, however, increases the potential for “bridging capital” between the 
communities (§3.4.b).  Those that engage in dialogue and who see Muslims as potential allies are 
more likely to build strong relationships and may be willing to enter into partnerships over certain 
issues.  This is already happening is some cases (§11.1.c).  For instance, some Evangelicals have 
expressed the hope that Muslims will join them in the struggle against increasing secularism and 
believe that Muslims will be supportive on ethical issues.  Others, however, have voiced doubt 
that Muslims are interested in campaigning on such issues and accuse them of focusing exclusively 
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on Muslim self-interest (§11.1.c).   Dogmatic confrontationalists, of course, resist involvement in 
such partnerships as a matter of principle, and even those who are more pragmatic may be wary 
of joint ventures and place conditions linked to reciprocity on any engagement. 
 
Finally, it is worth considering the Evangelical-Muslim relationship in the light of the present talk of 
the “Big Society”.  The government is keen to partner with civil society and to benefit from the 
social capital tied up in faith communities.  Indeed some Evangelical groups are already involved 
(§11.1.c).  This is an example of “linking capital” (§3.4.b) and it is likely that other Evangelical 
groups will want to benefit from the funding that such partnerships attract.  As already seen 
though, this comes at a price.  Equality legislation means that other faith groups must be treated 
equally and welfare initiatives cannot be used to preach the gospel.  Bretherton warns that the 
government advances may not be so much a “gift horse” as a “Trojan horse” (2006b, 391).  
Doubtless other Evangelicals will see it as a compromise which can only dangerously undermine 
the church.  They worry that in their desire to be involved in social action some Evangelical 
churches will erode the boundaries and so liberalize before succumbing to their final demise.  This 
is a familiar story (§4.4) and raises the question of the future of Evangelicalism in Britain. 
 
12.4 POSSIBLE FUTURES 
 
Drawing on the work of Smith (1998) and Guest (2007), I above (§4.4) summarized three possible 
strategies by which religious groups could attempt to maintain their religious strength in a pluralist 
society: rejection of surrounding groups leading to the formation of an isolated counter 
community; accommodation with other groups possibly leading to assimilation and ideological 
pluralism; a middle position of “engaged orthodoxy” (C. Smith, 1998). Bearing in mind the 
different contexts – American and British – within which these theories have developed, this 
section discusses whether in the light of this study any of these processes are evident in British 
Evangelicalism and whether there are any implications for the future of that movement. 
 
12.4.A REJECTION AND RETRENCHMENT 
Confrontationalists clearly exhibit some of the traits of what Berger calls “retrenchment”.  They 
tend to dig in and emphasize their distinctive characteristics, thus isolating themselves from 
Muslims (§4.4).  In essentializing Islam as violent and demonizing Allah as a counterfeit god they 
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draw the sharp boundaries that Berger (1992, 41) once argued are needed for survival. As 
discussed above, they create a clear outgroup against whom they can construct an oppositional 
identity. This identity is important as, on the one hand, these Evangelicals do not feel that they 
themselves are taken seriously in public life and feel marginalized and mistreated by society. On 
the other hand, they resent politically correct multiculturalism, which they accuse of uncritically 
accommodating other religions in what should be a “Christian country”. Thus Muslims provide a 
focus for their grievances on both counts. Muslims are successfully making themselves heard in 
the public arena, and are also apparently the beneficiaries of unfair positive discrimination and 
concessions not available to other faith communities. For some “separatists” (Hunter, 1987) - or 
“isolationists” (Lochhead, 1988) - the reaction to all this could be a defensive retrenchment, a 
withdrawing from all other groups into a social ghetto.  Whilst such an approach is almost 
certainly to be found amongst some British conservative Evangelical churches (Ipgrave, 2008), no 
evidence of it was found during the interviews and neither was such a response found within the 
EPS.   Perhaps this was due to the fact that I selected only larger Evangelical churches in central 
London which tend to be more confident and engaged with society.   
 
For the confrontationalists in the EPS, however, the retrenchment is offensive, expressing itself in 
activism and campaigning to redress the perceived imbalance and injustice.  In short it is leading 
them to emphasize difference and take their fight into the public square.  This would suggest that 
the presence of Muslims may be pushing these Evangelicals to move to the right on Stark & Finke’s 
normal distribution of religious niches (Figure 4.1), thus increasing both strictness and the degree 
of tension with society as a whole.  This would emphasize their sectarian isolation and suggest 
that, whilst according to secularization theory they might maintain their identity and strength in 
the short term, in the longer term they are unlikely to grow.  If true, this would be an interesting 
development as it would mirror a similar shift that appears to be happening in the Muslim 
community with the increasing radicalization of a minority of, particularly, young Muslims who are 
in a high degree of tension with society (§6.4).   
 
On the other hand it could be argued that the confrontational Evangelical message is in tune with 
a sizeable section of the British population today who are equally concerned about issues such as 
immigration and Islam.  Indeed the debate about Islam in the EPS as a whole is a remarkable 
reflection of the same debate taking place within British society.  Confrontationalist concerns 
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about immigration and radicalization resonate with the message of certain right wing groups 
which are gaining in popularity at present not just in Britain but across Europe (§11.2.c).  There 
may be a case for suggesting, therefore, that this group will find itself in decreasing tension with 
certain parts of society.  Whether or not this would make their religious message more appealing 
to the general population remains to be seen.  More likely the reverse could occur and some 
Evangelical Christians may be drawn towards the more extreme political groups.  This may have 
been the thinking behind the formation of the CCB (§11.2.c). 
 
Talk of a “Christian” Britain notwithstanding, it should also be pointed out that some who adopt a 
confrontational approach to Islam would also favour a complete separation of church and state, 
not least as a bulwark against political Islam.  For instance the Islam in Britain report urges British 
Muslims to accept such a partition (ISIC, 2005, 135).  At times it even seems that some would 
prefer ideological secularism to ideological Islam.  For instance, Ipgrave comments that: 
 
there are points at which (the Barnabas Fund) argument comes close to the position that it is better 
to have a wholly secular society than one in which Islam has influence.  Thus Sookhdeo offers a 
significantly 'privatized' view of religion (Ipgrave, 2008, 8). 
 
12.4.B ACCOMMODATION AND CAPITULATION 
This again is a reminder that the Evangelical-Muslim encounter takes place in a wider socio-
political context involving political, ideological and cultural conflict as well as religious difference 
(Gorski, 2003).  Thus Evangelicals are not just engaging with Muslims but also a host of other 
socio-political actors.  For confrontationalists, however, the struggle includes those Evangelicals 
whom they deem to be too liberal and open towards Muslims. They are concerned that these 
Christians are engaged in “cognitive bargaining” (§4.4). The weaknesses they perceive in the 
conciliators include: a propensity to self-criticism; a refusal to place blame on Muslims; and a 
willingness to make concessions.  They fear that these could all lead to accommodation and 
boundary erosion. Specifically, the conciliators’ willingness to dialogue with Muslims and to 
countenance the idea that the two faiths share the same god could signal a liberalization of the 
faith, which confrontationalists believe will inevitably end with “cognitive surrender” to Islam, 
secularism and ideological pluralism.  
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Were this to happen it would again be in line with secularization theory which suggests that as a 
religious group seeks common ground with other groups it inevitably dilutes and compromises its 
own identity, thus fatally weakening itself (§4.2.a).  Such a move is signalled by a move to the left 
on the Stark & Finke bell curve eventually leaving the moderate position of reduced tension to 
dissolve in a low tension sell-out to liberalism.  Bruce (2003) believes that such a shift is already 
underway amongst Evangelicals, and particularly charismatics, and will prove to be the death knell 
of the new churches.   
 
Again, however, this is not necessarily the case.  Certainly if conciliators move too far to the left on 
the issue of Muslims then they risk losing their support base, which typically expects to be in a 
degree of tension with society and other groups.  Indeed, if that tension is lacking then 
Evangelicals may feel that they are not being true to their calling which involves an expectation of 
suffering.  On the other hand, conciliators could also risk losing support within society more 
generally by being seen to embrace a group that is already relatively unpopular and in a high 
degree of tension with society.  Thus they could find themselves once again moving right and in 
increasing tension with society over their support and care for for a widely unpopular Muslim 
community. 
 
12.4.C THE MIDDLE GROUND AND ENGAGED ORTHODOXY 
Such considerations should make us wary of definitive predictions about the relative longevity of 
either of these groups and Smith in the American context has argued that the above scenarios are 
not inevitable (§4.4).   He believes that it is possible for a religious group to occupy the middle 
ground and yet maintain their distinctive faith. Remembering that it was formulated for the 
American context, could Smith’s concept of “engaged orthodoxy” and his subcultural identity 
theory of religious strength apply to the engagement of British Evangelicals with Muslims? And if 
so to whom does it apply: confrontationalists or conciliators? Dogmatists or pragmatists? 
 
Smith’s theory states that: 
 
in a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively stronger which better possess and 
employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear distinction from and significant engagement 
and tension with other relevant outgroups short of becoming genuinely countercultural. (C. Smith, 
1998, 118) 
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It is evident that Muslims are acting as such an outgroup for British Evangelicals today.  All 
Evangelicals are employing at least some of the cultural tools mentioned by Smith (§4.4) – 
emphasising boundaries, ultimate truth, moral superiority, evangelism, displaced heritage and so 
on – although these describe the confrontational rather better than the conciliatory approach.  All 
groups are likewise seeking to utilize various media, new technologies and the meso-public sphere 
itself, although again some are doing so rather more effectively than others (§11.2.d and §12.1.d).  
At the same time it is obvious that, whilst confrontationalists are good at creating “clear 
distinction”, conciliators are better at creating “significant engagement”.  The point of Smith’s 
theory, however, is that both of these are necessary conditions for continued strength: distinction 
and engagement.   
 
This would suggest that the pragmatic rather than the dogmatic approach may be the obvious way 
for Evangelicals to ensure their continued strength.  On the one hand, it would ensure that they do 
not become an isolated countercultural community, but, on the other, it would ensure that they 
do not lose the “tension” with Muslims that will prevent them from sliding into accommodation 
and compromise.  The pragmatists’ desire to enter into a constructive dialogue which both 
supports and critiques the place of Muslims in society could strengthen their standing within the 
meso-public sphere and indeed provide a positive model for others struggling to engage in a 
discerning debate about Muslims in Britain.  Thus British Evangelical Christians could become part 
of what Davie sees as the necessary process of creating “a space in European societies in which a 
serious discussion of religious issues is able to take place in a constructive and forward-looking 
way” which includes finding a “middle way between relativism and fundamentalism” (Davie, 2010, 
53). 
 
12.4.D LIKELY TRAJECTORIES 
It is possible that the Muslim presence will force Evangelicals to become more counter-cultural 
and isolated.  There is also the possibility that Evangelicals could compromise and so fail to 
maintain any distinction from a liberal Christianity that some believe to be in terminal decline.  
Both the confrontationalist and the conciliator fear that the other is gaining the ascendency within 
the British Evangelical community and is thereby dragging the church either to irrelevant 
obscurantism or to assimilated dissolution.  It could even be argued that given the controversies 
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since 2007 and the Common Word (§11.4) the EPS has already effectively divided into two camps.  
Whether or not the rift can be healed remains to be seen.  However, the question is how this 
divide will affect the Evangelical church more generally.  Will it cause yet more fission within an 
already fractious movement? 
 
From the results of this research, it seems that, at the present time, few if any of the participants 
in the EPS have sufficient influence with the London Evangelical church leaders interviewed to 
catalyze such a fissure.  This is not to say that it could not happen elsewhere.  In particular, it may 
be possible in less cosmopolitan areas where there is little contact with Muslims but fears run 
high.  In London, however, the church leaders do not appear to be overly concerned about Islam 
and treat it as just one amongst the many issues – both negative and positive – that they have to 
deal with.  Certainly it has not yet excited the sort of tensions seen, for instance, over the 
charismatic movement, sexual orientation or gender issues.  Mainstream representative bodies, 
such as the EA, do not seem inclined to raise the profile of the debate about Islam.  This may well 
be because they see it as potentially divisive and do not want to risk destabilising the Evangelical 
community. The EPS will have to work hard if they want to attract the leaders’ attention and 
increase their own influence amongst church members.   
 
The potential does exist, however, for the EPS to engage with the meso-public sphere and 
contribute constructively to the debate about Islam in Britain whilst maintaining their orthodoxy.  
In order to do this they will have to earn the right to be heard through the quality of their rational 
argument and also through their example of practical engagement with Muslims on the ground.   
 
This means that Evangelicals will have to adopt a pragmatic approach that accepts the 
pluralization of society but does not settle for parallel communities; that does not essentialize 
Islam but promotes rational debate about Islamic texts and history; that works for reciprocity but 
does not gloss all Muslims as oppressors of minorities; that emphasizes equally the dangers of 
Islamic radicalization and also the rights of ordinary Muslims who have no interest in world 
domination; that promotes not fear and isolation but love and engagement. 
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CHAPTER 13 CONCLUSION 
 
13.1 LOOKING BACK: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS THESIS 
 
The introduction (§1.3.b) highlighted a lack of research into British Evangelicalism in general but 
more specifically an almost complete absence of research into Evangelical-Muslim relations in 
Britain.  This thesis is intended to fill that gap.  By reviewing over 40 books published in this 
country since 2001 I have provided a comprehensive overview of contemporary British Evangelical 
approaches to Islam.  The data presented in chapters 9, 10 and 11 are supplemented by an 
annotated bibliography in Appendix C which should prove a useful resource for practitioners and 
future researchers alike. 
 
In addition to the formal published material I have analyzed texts from a wide range of other 
media including magazine articles, newspapers, conference audio recordings, videos and internet 
websites, blogs and forums.  I have brought this data together with material from fieldwork 
interviews conducted both with the national elite of the EPS and church leaders in London.  I 
believe that the resulting synthesis has created an accurate and revealing “snapshot” of 
Evangelical thought on Islam and Muslims in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
 
My focus, however, has been not so much on belief – although this is clearly important both for 
the participants and for myself, nor on policy – although I make some comments about this below; 
rather I have focused on attitudes and relationships with all the implications that these have for 
social cohesion and the well-being of communities.  Thus the theoretical and analytical approach 
that I have chosen for the treatment of the data differs somewhat from previous studies of 
interfaith relations.  These have customarily been conducted either within a theological or a public 
policy framework.  It is my hope that this primarily sociological approach will bring a new insight to 
the study of Christian-Muslim relations in Britain. 
 
In particular I have illustrated that it is not possible in this age of globalized media for a faith 
community to maintain an isolated internal discourse about other faiths.  Through what I believe 
to be my unique instrumentalization of the concept of religious micro-public spheres I have sought 
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to emphasize that such communities have to understand themselves as a small part of a much 
wider “montage of publics” (Hauser, 1999) and thus as a tiny, but not insignificant, part of the 
process of public opinion formation in this country.  It is an approach that could be replicated in 
the study of other faith communities. 
 
Of course the research did not always proceed as anticipated.  As mentioned I was unable to 
secure interviews with some of the participants who adopt a more confrontationalist approach 
(§8.3).  This was a real disappointment although not a great surprise.  However, although it would 
have helped to put a human face to their voice and would have filled some of the gaps regarding 
their backgrounds and theological views, the abundance of texts that these participants contribute 
to the public domain meant that I had no shortage of material.   
 
In the event I do not believe that the study has been significantly diminished by this omission, in 
fact it may have been enhanced.   The fact that several of the more confrontational participants 
declined to be interviewed is itself informative in several ways.  Firstly, as I have already discussed 
(§8.3.b) it highlights the security concerns of Evangelicals.  The death threats along with the real 
danger faced by many converts from Islam give pause for thought.  There is clearly a violent and 
oppressive element in some Muslim traditions, be it religiously or culturally motivated.  This is a 
significant ongoing factor that has to be addressed primarily by the Muslim community.  Secondly, 
it emphasizes the sensitivity of the debate within the EPS.  Some individuals were reluctant to talk 
to me or to talk about certain topics for fear of exacerbating the problems and souring 
relationships.  This is clearly a contentious issue for British Evangelicals.  Lastly, it reflects the 
perception that some participants may have of my own views and allegiances.  Whilst at the 
outset I do not believe that I was well-known to any of those taking a more polemical approach, it 
may have been the case that they associated me with a more irenic position and so felt me to hold 
a partisan position.   
 
At the same time I was unable to broaden my enquiry to the Evangelical grassroots.  My original 
intention had been to explore the views of not just elite participants and church leaders but also 
those of ordinary members of Evangelical churches (§8.1).  However, attempts to conduct focus 
groups or to use questionnaires proved impractical within the time constraints of a doctoral thesis 
and will have to await future research.  This means that I have no empirical evidence about 
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Evangelical opinion more generally, other than by extrapolating from the comments of the church 
leaders.  For this reason I have avoided making comments that appear to totalize the Evangelical 
community and have restricted my observations to the elite EPS and London church leaders. 
 
13.2 LOOKING FORWARD: FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
By and large, however, I believe that this thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge in 
both the study of Christian-Muslim relations and the sociology of religion, and I hope that it will be 
used by both academics and practitioners alike.  There is certainly considerable potential for it to 
be used as the basis for further research in this area.  For instance, the study could be widened to 
look at Evangelical churches across Britain and not just in the capital.  There are many churches 
situated in other cosmopolitan cities that no doubt have a wealth of stories to tell about 
community relations with Muslims.  Equally there are even more Evangelical churches in much less 
cosmopolitan settings than London which would have virtually no contact with Muslims.  How 
would this affect their views and approaches?  A study of the contrast between the urban and less 
urban settings would be illuminating. 
 
A second piece of work might explore the attitudes and responses of grassroots Evangelicals.  It 
seems likely, but remains unproven, that the major influence on most Evangelicals is the mass 
media.   Exploring this would lend itself to a more quantitative enquiry.  Ideally an organization like 
Christian Research or the EA would conduct a questionnaire amongst church members in order to 
determine what influences the ordinary Evangelical in their thinking about Islam.  Are they reading 
the books and attending the seminars described in this thesis?  Or are they driven by the latest 
editorial in the Daily Mail?  Are they interested in Islam or do they simply not care?  Where are 
they on the confrontation-conciliation spectrum? 
 
Thirdly, an extremely interesting piece of work would be to compare British Evangelical writing 
before and after 9/11.  In theory this could be extended back to the Protestant Reformation in 
order to produce a comprehensive work bringing Zebiri (1997) up to date.  This would provide a 
parallel to Kidd’s (2009) review of the American Evangelical literature. 
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It would also be well worth conducting a mirror image of this research amongst British Muslims to 
look at their responses to Evangelical Christians.  This would build on the work of Goddard (1996, 
2004) and apply it more specifically to the Evangelical wing of the Christian church.  Whenever I 
met Muslims during my research I tried to ask them for their reaction to the word “Evangelical”.  I 
had expected a degree of ignorance but in fact most have had a definite opinion ranging from 
diplomatic to more forthright responses approximating to “Evangelicals are anti-Muslim”, “pro-
‘war on terror’” or “out to convert us”.  This suggests that this may well be a fruitful topic of 
research.227 
 
Finally, it would be valuable to consider how broader trends and changes in British Evangelicalism 
may affect the future of its relationship with Islam.  Bebbington reflects on the increasing 
polarization within the movement between those more conservative Evangelicals who embrace a 
“logo-centric modernity”, and charismatics and open Evangelicals who display “a postmodern 
delight in variety, authenticity and relevance to felt needs” (2009).  Which will be best equipped to 
respond to Islam?  Will more traditional ecclesiastical structures be better equipped to relate to 
Muslims than the new “emerging” churches with their minimal emphasis on structure and 
tradition?  Will those with a more conservative view of theology and ethics win greater respect 
from Muslims than those who adopt a more open approach?  In a competitive market place will 
Islam prove more in tune with the spiritual and moral aspirations of twenty-first century society 
than either of these groups? 
 
13.3 LOOKING OUT: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
It is hoped that this research will be of benefit to a variety of different communities, both 
academic and non-academic alike.  For sociologists the concept of micro-public spheres could 
become an analytical tool for the study of religious discourse and could prove a fruitful avenue of 
investigation with other faith groups.  To this end my article Micro-public Spheres and the 
Sociology of Religion (McCallum, 2011) opens up the concept for debate within the discipline. 
 
For government and policy makers this research should act as a timely reminder that, as others 
have argued before me (Habermas, 2006, Trigg, 2007), the religious voice needs to be heard in 
                                                             
227 I believe that Phil Rawlings has begun doctoral work on this topic at Chester University. 
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public, both for the benefit of rational debate but also for the sake of holding religious 
communities accountable for the discourse within them.  The debate within such groups is a part 
of the “reticulate public sphere” (Hauser, 1999) which forms public opinion in this country.  Indeed 
the debate about Islam within the Evangelical community, properly appropriated, could be a 
significant resource for those in public life when trying to decide, for instance, which Muslim 
organizations to partner with or how to incorporate religious demands into public policy.  Davie 
(2007) argues that issues debated within the church are often those that society itself is struggling 
to come to terms with.  The discussion concerning Islam within the EPS reflects the range of 
responses within society in general and would be instructive if it could be accessed by a wider 
audience. 
 
For Muslims I hope that this research will highlight the range and nuanced nature of responses to 
Islam within the British Evangelical community.  Not all Evangelicals are like the stereotypical 
American Evangelical and certainly not all are anti-Muslim.  Both amongst highly educated authors 
and ordinary Evangelicals at the local church level there are those that understand the diversity of 
Islam and want to partner with peace-loving Muslims for the good of society.  That good, however, 
is bound to include an invitation to a robust debate about religious freedom and the rights both of 
Christian minorities living in Muslim lands and of those who choose to leave Islam and embrace 
another faith.  Reciprocity and fair competition is likely to remain an important touchstone for 
Evangelicals of all persuasions. 
 
Finally, I believe that the Evangelical community and the EPS, in particular, should find much here 
to stimulate further debate and reflection.  Some may be uncomfortable that “one of their own” 
has objectivized his coreligionists.  I may be accused of bringing “dirty laundry” into the public 
arena or even of creating a security risk.  For this reason I have taken care not to publish personal 
details not already in the public domain and I do not believe that this research significantly 
increases the risk to anyone’s personal safety.  In particular I have chosen not to write about 
mission work amongst Muslims or about converts from Islam.  I believe strongly, however, that no 
faith community in today’s globalized world can ring-fence its discourse.  The church especially is 
not meant to.  It is no accident that the New Testament writers referred to their associating 
together as the ekklesia, the gathering together of citizens in the marketplace to discuss the affairs 
of the city (§2.2).  A Christian micro-public sphere by its very existence is inextricably connected 
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together to other public spheres, as some notable recent examples have demonstrated (§11.4).  
Evangelicals have to be aware that whatever they write, say or teach today will be heard and 
interpreted tomorrow by journalists, politicians, security services and, maybe most importantly of 
all, by Muslims.  It is, therefore, incumbent upon all who contribute to the public sphere to assess 
critically how their contribution will be understood by these different audiences and whether or 
not it contributes constructively to the common good and to the greater cohesion of British 
society, in addition to the goals and ambitions of the Christian church. 
 
In particular participants in the EPS might reflect on how their words may be interpreted and used 
by political groups and especially those of the extreme right.  Evangelicals often share right wing 
concerns over immigration, identity and culture and as has been seen such groups do draw on 
statements by Christian leaders in order to support their own agendas (§11.2.c).  Evangelicals must 
take care to distance themselves from xenophobic politicians and to not put arguments into their 
hands. 
 
In this regard the discussion concerning taqiyya and the trustworthiness of Muslims (§10.4.b) is 
particularly important.  Some Evangelicals are creating the impression that lying is sanctioned in 
Islam and that no Muslim can be trusted.  This is an extremely disturbing trend as it leads to a 
breakdown in trust.  If one always suspect that one’s interlocutor is lying then it becomes 
impossible to conduct any meaningful dialogue.  It is imperative that Evangelicals research further 
the theology and tradition surrounding the Islamic principle of taqiyya and come to a clear 
understanding of how to take it into account. 
 
Participants in the EPS may also want to reflect on the degree to which their voices are heard not 
only in the meso-public sphere but also in the churches.  Generally, with a few exceptions, the 
voices heard in the mainstream media are those who have a platform because of their political or 
institutional church roles.  Others, however, are attempting to engage a broader public in more 
diverse ways.  Glaser at the Oxford Centre for Muslim-Christian Studies, Taylor at Lapido Media 
and Jay Smith with Pfander Films are all endeavouring to enter the debate in creative ways.  Such 
resourceful thinking will be required by anyone hoping to make a wider impact. 
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More surprising has been the lack of influence the EPS has amongst church leaders, at least in 
London.  It may well be that traditional media are not going to impact busy contemporary 
Evangelicals.  Perhaps new strategies must be developed in order to equip church leaders juggling 
multiple agendas.  An over-reliance on book publishing and conventional broadcasting may also 
fail to capture the imagination of a new generation of Evangelicals who rely more heavily on the 
latest technologies and are looking for experiential engagement rather than didactic instruction. 
Here too the EPS may need to think creatively about how it wants to convey its message to the 
churches. 
 
13.4 LOOKING IN: A PERSONAL REFLECTION 
 
At the start of my doctoral journey I would have described myself as a conciliator.  A follower of 
Christ?  Certainly.  A Christian? If understood correctly.  An Evangelical?  Only with conditions 
attached to an unpopular label.  Certainly my friendships with Muslims in Tunisia had given me an 
appreciation for their culture and it was hard to see them as a threat.  After all, the popular 
revolution of 2011 notwithstanding, Tunisian Muslims are, by and large, a peaceable people and I 
regularly go back to visit my colleagues and friends. 
 
Now as I move on to the next stage of the journey I am maybe more pragmatic.  My research has 
convinced me that there are some tough questions to answer – for both Christians and Muslims.  
It is not possible for Evangelicals to absolve themselves of political responsibilities; neither is it 
possible for Muslims to ignore that which is perpetrated in the name of Islam.  For progress to be 
made confrontationalists and conciliators, dogmatists and pragmatists, Christians and Muslims 
need to come together, draw from one another’s strengths and find grace for one another’s 
weaknesses in order to develop a vision for how people of all faiths and none can coexist in this 
country.   
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I end my journey by returning to the large gathering of Evangelical Christians mentioned at the 
beginning of the introduction and imagining what a different event it could have been .... 
 
…. the speaker is receiving a standing ovation.  The talk has covered not just the basics of Islam 
and the challenges posed by political Islam, but also the shortcomings of Christian and Western 
responses to Islam.  Christians need to be aware that the Muslim community in the UK is 
struggling to come to terms with living in a non-Muslim country and Christians need to find 
practical ways to help.  At the same time a local mosque school is teaching unacceptable anti-
Christian propaganda.  Something needs to be done. The speaker shakes hands with an imam who 
has pledged to help.  During the seminar the imam spoke about the difficulties his community is 
facing in countering the radicalization of its young people.  The audience clearly found his 
contribution moving.  They have never heard a Muslim speak before.  Together the Christian 
speaker and the imam announce a plan for a joint Christian-Muslim appeal to fund the rebuilding 
of a church destroyed by a Muslim mob in Pakistan.  The audience rises to its feet ….    
 
…. The imam has departed and as people leave the seminar, they are chatting about the 
difficulties that have been raised and are discussing what could be done.  Some seminars in town?  
A joint project?  A letter in the paper?  A meeting with the local MP?  Whatever happens, a 
conversation is needed with their friends from the mosque.   
 
Back in the auditorium the confrontationalist and the conciliator stand united in one person on the 
empty stage, reflecting on the seminar.  “Have I been accurate and fair?  Have I addressed the 
difficult issues as well as encouraged people to befriend Muslims?  Did the imam feel welcome?  
Have I spoken with both grace and truth?” 
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APPENDIX A: KEY PARTICIPANTS IN THE EPS (FOLD OUT COPY IN REAR POCKET) 
 
Azumah, John Interview 40 mins in his office at London School of Theology 
Director, Centre of 
Islamic Studies, 
London School of 
Theology 
Ethnicity African Ghanaian  
Church Presbyterian, Evangelical 
Background An academic from a Muslim family in Ghana, came to UK in 2007 
Media Books, academic papers, TV (‘The Big Questions’) 
Concerns Christian witness to Muslims, African context, academic 
engagement 
 
Bell, Steve Interview 81 mins in his office in Milton Keynes 
British Director, 
Interserve 
Ethnicity Afro-Caribbean  
Church Conservative, charismatic Anglican from a Pentecostal background 
Background 10 years in Egypt, 20 years in Christian mission leadership in UK 
Media Books, conference speaking and seminars 
Concerns Breaking down prejudice and stereotypes so that Christians can 
build ‘grace relationships’ with Muslims 
 
Chapman, Colin Interview 84 mins at his home near Cambridge 
Retired, former 
lecturer and 
missionary 
Ethnicity White British (born in India) 
Church Open Evangelical Anglican 
Background Lived in Egypt and Beirut, lecturer at several colleges, dialogue 
events 
Media Books, articles and speaking 
Concerns Helping Christians understand and build good relations with 
Muslims, justice, honesty about the failings of Christians and the 
West, especially concerned with the Israeli/Palestinian conflict 
 
Cotterell, Peter Interview No interview 
Retired Ethnicity White British 
Church Unknown 
Background 20+ years as a missionary in Ethiopia, 19 years at London School of 
Theology, 6 as principal. 
Media Books and articles 
Concerns Teaching - theology, comparative religion and Christian mission 
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Cox, Caroline 
(Baroness) 
Interview No interview 
Member of House 
of Lords, Patron of 
Christian Solidarity 
Worldwide, founder 
of HART 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Unknown 
Background 18 years in Lords, political engagement and advocacy work 
Media Public speeches in Lords and elsewhere, one book 
Concerns Rights, freedom and protection of liberal democracy, plight of 
Christian minorities, slavery in Muslim countries 
   
Craig, Alan Interview 45 mins in his London office 
Local politician Ethnicity White British 
Church Conservative “but open” Evangelical Anglican 
Background Local politics and recent public debating 
Media Blog, internet video, debates, political arena 
Concerns Radical Islam and groups such as TJ, particularly involved in 
campaigning against the East London mega-mosque 
 
Glaser, Ida Interview 55 mins in her Oxford office 
Academic Director, 
Centre for Muslim-
Christian Studies, 
Oxford 
Ethnicity White British, Jewish father, nominal Christian mother 
Church Anglican, non-sectarian Evangelical 
Background Teaching in Malaysia and elsewhere, Christian theological training 
Media Books and articles 
Concerns Theological reflection in the presence of Islam, being truthful about 
Islam 
 
Goldsmith, Martin Interview 70 mins in his home in Hertfordshire 
Retired missionary 
and associate 
lecturer at All 
Nations Christian 
College 
Ethnicity White British Jew 
Church Open Evangelical 
Background 10 years as a missionary in SE Asia and lecturer for 30+ years at All 
Nations Christian College 
Media Public speaking and books 
Concerns Holding the middle ground and encouraging witness and mission to 
Muslims 
 
Green, Stephen Interview No interview 
National Director, 
Christian Voice 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Unknown 
Background Campaigning against Islam amongst other moral campaigns 
Media Public protest, tracts, website 
Concerns Recreating Britain as a “Christian country”, campaigning for 
Christian laws, opposing the building of mosques 
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Knell, Bryan Interview 70 mins at my home in Yeovil 
Church Relations 
Director, Global 
Connections 
Ethnicity White British 
Church “Mainline” Evangelical – charismatic “in belief although not in 
practice” 
Background Working in the UK with students and Christian organisations 
Media Public speaking, networking 
Concerns Coordinating a positive response to Islam in the UK, mobilising 
churches to reach out to Muslims 
 
McRoy, Anthony Interview 82 mins at his home in East London 
Lecturer at 
Evangelical 
Theological College 
of Wales, religious 
journalist and 
commentator 
Ethnicity White Irish Catholic 
Church Conservative “born again” Evangelical, Brethren and Baptist 
Background PhD in Islamics, living in East London, short visits to Muslim 
countries 
Media Magazines (Christian & Muslim), internet, TV/radio, one book 
Concerns Researching  and commentating on Islam in Britain and the Middle 
East 
 
Moucarry, Chawkat Interview 83 mins at his home 
Director of 
Interfaith Relations, 
World Vision 
Ethnicity Syrian Arab from Roman Catholic background 
Church Liberal Evangelical with no clear denominational identity 
Background PhD Sorbonne, teaching All Nations Christian College, work with 
World Vision 
Media Books, speaking, debates 
Concerns Building bridges with Muslims, improving theological 
understanding 
 
Musk, Bill Interview 90 mins at his home in Tulse Hill, London 
Area Bishop for 
North Africa 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Open Evangelical Anglican 
Background Several years living in Arab world, pastoral and mission work 
Media Books and speaking 
Concerns Educating people to think fairly about Muslims, critically examining 
Christianity in the light of Islam 
 
Nazir-Ali, Michael Interview Off the record interview 
Former Bishop of 
Rochester 
Ethnicity Asian from Muslim-Christian family 
Church Evangelical Anglican 
Background Many years as an academic, bishop, General Director of CMS 
Media Books, press releases, speaking, media interviews 
Concerns Theological integrity, robust dialogue, rights and freedom, Christian 
basis of British society and values 
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Orr-Ewing, Frog & 
Amy 
Interview No interview 
Frog is a vicar. 
Amy is Director of 
Training, Ravi 
Zacharias Trust 
Ethnicity White British and white Australian 
Church Open charismatic Anglican 
Background Amy lived in Birmingham, both studied theology, visited 
Afghanistan 
Media One book, Amy conference speaking, Frog preaching & blog 
Concerns Militant Islam and apologetics 
 
Pawson, David Interview No interview 
Freelance Bible 
teacher 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Unknown 
Background Little knowledge or experience of Islam, Bible teacher 
Media Books and videos 
Concerns Predicting a coming takeover of Islam in Britain and challenging the 
church to greater commitment and faithfulness 
 
Riddell, Peter Interview 45 mins by skype call to Australia 
Dean, Centre for the 
Study of Islam and 
Other Faiths, Bible 
College of Victoria, 
Australia 
Ethnicity White Australian 
Church Anglican, dislikes labels, prefers “Christian” to “Evangelical” 
Background Academic, PhD in Islamics, specialist on SE Asia 
Media Books, articles and lectures 
Concerns Intellectual engagement with topic of Islam and the challenge 
facing the Muslim world which is at a “crossroads” 
 
Smith, Jay Interview 75 mins at British Library, London 
American 
missionary, Hyde 
Park Christian 
Fellowship, London 
Ethnicity White American 
Church Brethren in Christ (Anabaptist) 
Background Brought up in India, 5 years in Senegal, over 20 years in London 
Media Debate (especially Speakers’ Corner), video, YouTube, internet 
Concerns Countering radical Islam by polemic debate, historical criticism, 
Christian apologetics, evangelism 
 
Solomon, Sam Interview No interview 
A freelance “senior 
lecturer, researcher, 
human rights 
activist and advisor” 
Ethnicity From a Middle Eastern Muslim background 
Church Not known – although closely associated with Kensington Temple 
Background  “Trained in Shari‘a law for 15 years” 
Media Speaker and author, videos can be found on YouTube 
Concerns Teaching Christians by revealing the “true face” of Islam and 
actively seeking the reformation of Islam 
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Sookhdeo, Patrick Interview No interview 
International 
Director, Barnabas 
Fund 
Ethnicity Guyanese from partial Muslim background, came to UK in 1960s 
Church Anglican 
Background PhD from SOAS, director of Barnabas Fund, campaigning for 
suffering church 
Media Books, Barnabas Aid magazine, speaking, writing in newspapers 
Concerns Islamization of Britain and the threat of political Islam, the suffering 
church in Muslim countries 
 
Sookhdeo, Rosemary Interview No interview 
Author, speaker 
(wife of Patrick) 
Ethnicity White New Zealander 
Church Anglican 
Background 30 years ministry amongst Muslim women 
Media Books and public speaking 
Concerns Women in Islam and female converts to Islam 
 
Smith, Andrew Interview 43 mins in his office in Birmingham 
Director, Youth 
Encounter, Scripture 
Union 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Open Evangelical Anglican 
Background 22 years as a schools and youth worker in Birmingham 
Media Youthwork material, training seminars 
Concerns Helping young Muslims and Christians to understand one another, 
equipping Christians to understand Muslims 
 
Sudworth, Richard Interview 65 mins at his home in Birmingham 
Ordained Anglican, 
PhD student and 
partner with 
Christian Mission 
Society 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Charismatic open Evangelical Anglican 
Background Lived in North Africa and Muslim area of Birmingham, community 
projects, pastoral ministry 
Media Book, blog 
Concerns Christian integrity and witness, good community relations, robust 
Christian engagement in public life 
 
Taylor, Jenny Interview 30 mins interview at Westminster Central Hall 
Journalist and 
director of Lapido 
Media 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Anglican, “contemplative charismatic” Evangelical 
Background A professional journalist with a PhD in religion and society 
Media Newspapers articles, blogs, website 
Concerns Secularism and loss of religious values and literacy leading to public 
policy which has allowed radical Islam to grow. 
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Williams, Andrea Interview 55 mins in her London office 
Director, Christian 
Concern for Our 
Nation and Lawyers’ 
Christian Fellowship 
Ethnicity White European descent from Italian parents 
Church Conservative (but open) Evangelical Anglican 
Background Lawyer and campaigner. Mainly influenced by Sam Solomon.   
Media CCFON sends out weekly emails, runs a website and produces 
reports.  Williams has appeared in several TV documentaries. 
Concerns Campaigning for Christian-based laws and religious freedom.   
 
Wood, Nicholas Interview 68 mins in his office in Oxford 
Baptist minister and 
Fellow of Regent’s 
Park College, Oxford 
Ethnicity White British 
Church Liberal Evangelical Baptist 
Background Dialogue groups, Joppa Group, Christian-Muslim Forum 
Media Book, occasional articles in Baptist Times 
Concerns Interfaith dialogue, developing a theology of mission 
  325 Appendix B 
 
APPENDIX B:  LONDON EVANGELICAL CHURCHES (FOLD OUT COPY IN REAR POCKET) 
Codes used for EPS participants in table below 
JA 
SB 
CC 
PC 
CCx 
AC 
CD 
IG 
MG 
Azumah, John 
Bell, Steve 
Chapman, Colin 
Cotterell, Peter 
Cox, Caroline 
Craig, Alan 
Dye, Colin 
Glaser, Ida  
Goldsmith, Martin 
SG 
BK 
AM 
CM 
BM 
MNA 
O-E 
DP 
PR 
Green, Stephen 
Knell, Bryan 
McRoy, Anthony 
Moucarry, Chawkat 
Musk, Bill 
Nazir-Ali, Michael 
Orr-Ewing, Amy & Frog 
Pawson, David 
Riddell, Peter 
AS 
JS 
SS 
PS 
RS 
JT 
AW 
NW 
Smith, Andrew 
Smith, Jay 
Solomon, Sam 
Sookhdeo, Patrick 
Sudworth, Richard 
Taylor, Jenny 
Williams, Andrea 
Wood, Nicholas 
 
Name 
Denomination 
London Location 
Size 
Leader 
Affiliation 
  Participants 
heard of 
CCx = the 
participant is 
known but 
not re Islam 
Trainers/ 
Speakers 
Invited to 
church 
Authors 
in book 
shop or 
recom-
mended  
All Souls 
Langham Place 
Interviewee Hugh Palmer - Rector SB 
CC 
CCx 
MG 
BK 
CM 
BM 
 
MNA 
OE 
DP  
PR 
PS 
JS 
JT 
Some from 
outside 
 
JS based at 
All Souls 
None 
 
Recom’d 
CC 
CCx 
CM 
BM 
MNA 
PR 
PS 
 
Anglican 
 
Central 
 
Large (~2000) 
 
Hugh Palmer 
 
EA 
Membership All ages, mainly white but 60 
nationalities, middle class, 
professional 
Church’ship Conservative Evangelical, 
exclusivist 
Attitude Careful, diversity of Muslims, 
struggling to work out view 
Training Occasional mentions in sermons, 
regular training courses 
Campaigning Some have signed petitions Total  14 -  
 
Chinese Church Interviewee Peter Chow, mission secretary MG 
BK 
PS 
 
  N/A 
 
Recom’d 
MG 
PS 
 
 
Non-denom. 
 
Central, West & 
South 
 
Large (1-2000 in 
7 congregations) 
 
Pastor Ong 
 
EA 
Membership 95% Chinese, mainly under-50 
Church’ship Evangelical 
Attitude Leaders see that Islam may be a 
threat to outreach in some areas.  
Islam is not evil 
Training Little said except maybe by guest 
speaker at annual mission 
conference 
Campaigning Might make members aware of EA 
issues but action is left to 
individuals 
Total  3 -  
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Christchurch NFI Interviewee Simon Ash, a full-time leader JA 
SB 
CC 
CCx  
MG 
MNA 
O-E 
DP  
CCx  
AO-E 
 
Ravi 
Zacharias 
Trust 
N/A 
 
Recom’d 
O-E 
 
 
New Frontiers 
 
Central 
 
Medium (600) 
 
Dave Stroud 
 
EA 
Membership Young, mainly white, students + 
professionals 
Church’ship Charismatic, reformed Evangelical, 
Exclusivist 
Attitude Islam not a big issue to be afraid 
of 
Training Nothing specific in congregation 
but opportunity for seminars at 
NF leadership conferences 
Campaigning Left to the individual to be 
politically involved.  Not the role 
of the church. 
Total  8 -  
      
East London 
Tabernacle 
Interviewee Kenneth Brownell, leader CC 
CCx 
MG 
BK 
AMc 
MNA 
AO-E 
DP  
PR 
SS 
PS 
JS 
AMc is 
member + 
trainer 
 
JS 
MG  
PS 
Steer 
Madany 
Hicham 
FFM 
 
Recom’d 
CC 
PR 
PS 
 
 
Baptist 
 
East 
 
Small (1-200) 
 
Kenneth 
Brownell 
 
EA, FIEC 
Membership All ages, ethnically diverse (35 
nationalities), more working class 
Church’ship Conservative, reformed 
Evangelical, exclusive but allowing 
extra revelation 
Attitude Islam is an opportunity not a 
problem 
Training Regular seminars either on 
evenings or Saturdays 
Campaigning Nothing during church time but 
some members do sign petitions 
Total  12 -  
 
Glory House Interviewee Jonathan Oloyede one of the 
founders and former leaders.  
Now leads City Chapel (~100). A 
former Muslim 
CCx 
BK 
SS 
PS 
JS 
 CCx 
SS 
None 
 
Not 
known 
 
Independent 
Pentecostal 
 
East 
 
Large (3500) 
 
Albert Odulele 
 
 
Membership Mainly African, all ages,  
Church’ship Pentecostal 
Attitude Radical Islam is normative and has 
an agenda. 
Training No special training.  The 
expansion of Islam mentioned in 
sermons.  Most have friends and 
family who are Muslims so know 
something about Islam 
Campaigning Prayer and evangelism rather than 
petitions and protests 
Total  5   
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Holy Trinity 
Brompton 
Interviewee 
(telephone) 
Graham Tomlin, Dean of St 
Mellitus College + a leader 
CC 
MG 
O-E 
PS 
 MG 
O-E 
David 
Marshall 
 
 
CC 
PS 
O-E 
IG 
 
 
Recom’d 
CC 
 
Anglican 
 
Southwest 
 
Large (3-4000) 
(200 staff) 
 
Nicky Gumbel 
 
Alpha 
Membership All ages, white, middle class, 
professional 
Church’ship Reluctant to use labels 
Attitude No particular approach to Islam 
but would tend to be irenic.  
Attitudes of members would be 
very mixed 
Training Never mentioned in sermons, 
theology course includes Islam 
Campaigning Not involved in petitions etc Total  4   
 
“An Evangelical 
Charismatic 
Church” 
Interviewee Anonymous CC 
CCx  
MG 
BK 
BM 
MNA 
O-E  
 
DP 
PR 
JS 
SS 
PS 
JS N/A 
 
 
Recom’d 
CC 
MNA 
 
Non-denom. 
 
Southeast 
 
Medium 
 
EA, CT 
Membership All ages, classes and ethnicities 
Church’ship Open charismatic Evangelical, 
inclusivist 
Attitude Islam an opportunity 
Training Their training course includes 
sessions on Islam 
Campaigning No Total  12   
      
Kingsway 
International 
(KICC) 
Interviewee “A spokesman for KICC” CCx 
MNA 
DP  
SS 
 
 Own 
books 
but none 
on Islam 
 
None 
 
Independent 
Pentecostal 
 
East 
 
Large (9000) 
 
Matthew 
Ashimolowo 
 
 
Membership 80% African, + some Afro-
Caribbean, “many - maybe 30%” - 
from Muslim backgrounds 
Church’ship Pentecostal  
Attitude Aware of Islam but focus on 
preaching the Gospel 
Training None.  Occasional mention in 
preaching 
Campaigning Occasionally join protests and 
send out emails.  Usually leave to 
individuals 
Total  4   
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Redeemed 
Christian Church 
of God 
Interviewee Simeon Ademolake, pastor of 
Harvest Chapel + local councillor 
CCx  
SS 
 
None N/A 
 
None 
 2-300 churches 
in London 
 
Harvest Chapel ... 
 
East 
 
Small (30) 
Membership 80% Nigerian, mainly families 
Church’ship Pentecostal Evangelical 
Attitude Muslims are not rivals but an 
opportunity. 
Training None with no plans to start.  
Focus on Christian teaching. 
Campaigning Encouraged the church to pray 
about the “mega-mosque” 
Total  2   
 
“A conservative 
Evangelical 
Anglican” 
Interviewee “a leader of the church” JA 
CC 
CCx 
MG 
MNA 
OE 
PR 
PS 
JS 
JT 
 People 
within 
church 
CC 
IG 
PS 
Steer 
Others 
 
Recom’d 
CC 
 
 
Anglican 
 
- 
 
Large (1500) 
 
- 
 
Reform + Gospel 
Partners Trust 
Membership All ages, mainly white middle class 
(but increasingly less so), lots of 
students, more ethnicities now 
Church’ship Conservative Evangelical, 
exclusivist 
Attitude Near a Muslim area and aware of 
Islam as a threat and an 
opportunity 
Training Occasional 5-10 mins slots in 
services, some training courses 
Campaigning None Total  10 -  
 
“A central 
London church” 
Interviewee “a young leader in the church” CC 
CCx 
BM 
DP 
PR 
PS 
JS 
  BA 
O-E 
DP 
PS 
 
Recom’d 
BM 
BA 
 
Independent 
 
Central 
 
Medium (3-500) 
 
- 
 
EA 
Membership All ages, mixed class and ethnicity 
Church’ship Reformed charismatic Evangelical, 
exclusivist 
Attitude Generally low awareness of Islam.  
Emphasis on apologetics and 
polemics 
Training Regularly mentioned in sermons 
but no training provided 
Campaigning None Total  7 -  
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St Paul’s Ealing Interviewee Mark Melluish, senior pastor CC 
CCx 
MG 
MNA 
O-E 
DP 
PR 
PS 
JS 
 BA 
JS 
Not 
known 
 
Recom’d 
BA 
 
Anglican 
 
West 
 
Medium (800) 
 
Mark Melluish 
 
New Wine, EA 
Membership 30s-50s, mainly white but mixed 
nationalities and class 
Church’ship Charismatic Evangelical 
Attitude Islam and diversity are 
opportunities. 
Training Occasionally discussed in small 
groups.  Brother Andrew visited. 
Campaigning They encourage people to sign 
petitions and write letters. 
Total  9 -  
 
World Harvest 
Christian Centre 
Interviewee Wale Babatunde, senior pastor CCx 
MNA 
DP 
SS 
PS 
 
 SS None 
 
Wale has 
his own 
book on 
decline 
of UK 
 
Independent 
 
South 
 
Small (200) 
 
Wale Babatunde 
 
 
Membership 30s-50s, mainly African (Nigerian),  
working class 
Church’ship Charismatic Evangelical, 
exclusivist 
Attitude Upset at the loss of Christian 
character of UK.  Muslims are an 
evangelistic opportunity 
Training Some sessions in their training 
course but no training for general 
members 
Campaigning Protests outside parliament, 
writing letters, signing petitions 
Total  5 -  
 
Vineyard, 
Greenwich 
Interviewee Dan Warnke, leader DP  
PS 
None 
 
Friend from 
Muslim 
background 
None 
 
Recom’d 
BA 
 
Vineyard 
 
South 
 
Small (80) 
 
Dan Warnke 
 
EA 
Membership White middle class, below 50, lots 
of students and singles 
Church’ship Open charismatic Evangelical 
Attitude Islam not a threat, could be 
positive in terms of justice and 
development issues 
Training None 
Campaigning Not against other religions but on 
justice issues 
Total  2 -  
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APPENDIX C:  ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EVANGELICAL BOOKS 
AND BOOKLETS 2001-2010 
 
Azumah, John (2008), My Neighbour's Faith: Islam Explained for African Christians Hippo Books, 
pp176. 
 
 As an African Azumah has written this book for the African context.  However, although it 
contains many African examples and frequently quotes African Muslim writers, it is still 
highly relevant and applicable to any other context.  He urges Christians to take the 
challenge of Islam seriously – especially in the seminary – but is cautious about trying to 
define what “true Islam” may be.  For him this is an intra-Muslim debate.  What does 
concern Christians is what Islam teaches about them and he devotes a chapter to the 
Qur’anic teaching about people of other faiths, which he sees as progressing from positive 
to negative as Muhammad moved from Mecca to Medina.  He also assesses Islamic 
teaching on jihad and concludes that “the notion that jihad is a spiritual struggle or a last 
resort in self defence is purely a post-modern apologia and is hardly borne out by 
mainstream Muslim scholarship”.  Despite these negative mainstream interpretations 
Azumah remains positive about Muslims.  Although modernisers are only a small fringe 
group he is hopeful that there can be reinterpretation of these texts as “the Qur’an is 
made for Muslims and not Muslims for the Qur’an”.  He goes on to examine the variety of 
Christian responses to Muslims and also addresses some of the difficult theological 
questions that Islam poses.  Always mindful of Christians suffering in some Muslim 
majority countries, Azumah believes that whilst it is essential to seek good relations with 
Muslims this should never be at the expense of Christian integrity and solidarity. 
 
Bell, Steve (2003), Friendship First: the manual, Market Rasen, Friendship First Publications, pp84. 
 
 This is a very practical book written in an attractive, easy-to-use magazine style and its 
target audience is the 'ordinary Christian' who wants to reach out to the 'ordinary 
Muslim'.  Bell explains the basics of Islamic faith and practice, but clearly points out the 
diversity that there is within Islam worldwide.  The sections on barriers to Muslim's 
receiving the Gospel include several helpful tables comparing western and eastern culture, 
and Christian and Muslim theology.  Other barriers are historical - from the Crusades 
through the State of Israel to the Gulf War - and semantic.  The last part of the book 
includes many anecdotes and presents ideas and advice for building relationships with 
Muslims and for discipling believers from a Muslim background.  The appendices include a 
useful glossary and a more in-depth discussion of whether Allah can be considered to be 
the God of the Bible. 
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Bell, Steve (2006), Grace for Muslims, Milton Keynes, Authentic Media, pp190. 
 
 Bell strongly believes that the presence of Muslims in the West is part of God's sovereign 
plan and represents not a threat but a significant opportunity for the church in Britain.  
This increasingly influential book is partly autobiographical and recounts the author's time 
in Egypt and his subsequent work in trying to educate British Christians in the need to 
extend grace to Muslims.  Christians need to understand Islam as an Arabised form of 
Judaism which can in fact prepare Muslims to receive the Gospel.  He sees the real enemy 
to faith in the West as being godless secularism and believes that Muslims can be allies for 
Christians seeking to restore Judeo-Christian values.  He finishes the book with advice on 
how to form grace relationships with Muslims and tells of his dream for a multicultural 
church in Britain. 
 
Brother Andrew and Al Janssen (2007), Secret Believers: What Happens When Muslims Turn to 
Christ?, London, Hodder & Stoughton, pp278. 
 
 Brother Andrew is the well-known Dutch author of God's Smuggler.  What is less well 
known is that he has spent much of the last few years travelling in the Middle East. The 
majority of this easy to read and yet challenging book recounts the story of converts to 
Christianity in a Muslim country.  Although fictional, the story is based on real-life 
situations known to the authors and makes sobering reading as they recount the 
challenges, persecution and eventual martyrdom faced by these faithful believers.  
Remarkably after such an account the message of the remainder of the book is not that 
Christians should fear Muslims or be resentful, but rather it is a challenge to a "good jihad" 
that would bring hope to the Muslim world.  Andrew presents four challenges to the 
church today: "to love all Muslims by giving them the Good News, to forgive when we are 
attacked, to live lives totally committed to Jesus Christ, and to engage in the real war - the 
spiritual war".  He suggests that the only hope for the world is if millions of Christians learn 
to love Muslims with Christ's love.  This will certainly be costly but he challenges Christians 
to pray - and pay the price. 
 
Chapman, Colin (2005), ‘Islamic Terrorism’: Is there a Christian response?, Cambridge, Grove 
Books, pp28. 
 
 This short booklet looks at the some of the reasons for the violence and terrorism inspired 
by Islamism today.  Being very careful to define terms, it looks at the grievances and goals 
of Islamists and the various reactions of other Muslims to the violence used by some.  
Chapman sees two broad Christian responses to this violence which may be summed up as 
either 'the problem is with them' or 'the problem is with us'.  The former exemplified by 
Riddell & Cotterell (Islam in Conflict) and Sookhdeo (Understanding Islamic Terrorism) 
focuses on the inherent violence of the Qur’anic text and Islamic history, whilst the latter 
focuses more on political grievances.  Whilst he believes that we should seek to 
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understand the motivation of such terrorists, Chapman makes his own condemnation of 
violence clear and calls Christians to grapple with the hard questions, to be more self-
critical and to be passionate about justice. 
 
Chapman, Colin (2007), Cross and Crescent: Responding to the Challenges of Islam, 2nd edition, 
Nottingham, Inter-Varsity Press, pp432. 
 
 In this completely revised second edition of his popular textbook, Chapman includes new 
material on political Islam, ‘Islamic terrorism’, the Qur’anic view of Christians and advice 
on how to explain Christian beliefs about Jesus. The aim of the book is to improve 
relationships between Christians and Muslims by helping Christians to understand Islam 
and to enter into dialogue with Muslims.  It explores the fundamental differences between 
the two faiths and seeks to address controversial issues.  The author gives serious 
consideration to Islamist grievances and suggests that “terrorism itself is not the root of 
the problem; it is usually a reaction to a perceived injustice”.  He examines the other 
questions and concerns that Christians have about Islam and Muslims but reminds the 
reader that “Muslims often think the same” about Christians - western ‘Christian’ support 
for violence in Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq being among the prime examples.  For 
Chapman personal relationships are the “absolute priority” and Muslims must be 
approached first and foremost as fellow human beings. 
 
Chapman, Colin (2008), The Bible through Muslim Eyes and a Christian Response, Cambridge, 
Grove Books, pp32. 
 
 "This booklet attempts to articulate what Muslims generally think about the Bible, and to 
suggest a Christian response to these views".  Chapman's hope is that it will result in 
dialogue - relationship, discussion, listening and working together - between Christians 
and Muslims.  The booklet lays out in parallel on facing pages the approaches of Muslims 
and Christians to such concepts as revelation, prophethood, translation of scriptures, the 
human condition, forgiveness and salvation.  It highlights arguments Muslims commonly 
cite against the trustworthiness of the Bible and suggests possible respectful Christian 
responses. 
 
Cox, Caroline and John Marks (2006), The West, Islam and Islamism: Is Ideological Islam 
Compatible with Liberal Democracy?, 2nd edition, London, Civitas Institute for the Study of Civil 
Society, pp237. 
 
 This book contrasts the epistemology of the ‘ideological mode’ of Islamism with the 
‘academic mode’ of western liberal democratic societies, and draws parallels with the 
threat that Marxist communism posed to the free world in a previous generation.    Using 
careful definitions the authors stress that the majority of Muslims are peaceable and law-
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abiding, but suggest that the greatest challenge facing the Muslim world – and the West - 
today comes from the increasing number of radical Islamists within its own ranks.  They 
detail the strategies and tactics being used by Islamist organisations which abuse the 
freedoms of western societies in order to promote their own agenda.  These include the 
deliberate employment of deception (taqiyya), intimidation, infiltration and front 
organisations.  The book ends with a challenge to western societies to get tough on 
Islamists, deporting them if necessary, and a challenge to Muslims to accept the values of 
liberal democracy and stand up against Islamism.  Overall the book does not give much 
hope that moderate Muslims will succeed in reforming Islam as in fact the Islamist 
understanding of traditional interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna is, according to the 
authors, the truest to the original texts. 
 
Dye, Colin (2007), The Islamisation of Britain: and what must be done to prevent it, Pilcrow Press, 
pp73. 
 
 The authorship of this booklet is unclear.  The foreword is written by Colin Dye, pastor of 
Kensington Temple, London, and some of the text appears in an online article ascribed to 
Dye (Khilafa or Kingdom?, http://www.pilcrowpress.com/khilafa-or-kingdom).  However, 
other parts of the text appear online ascribed to Sam Solomon 
(http://europenews.dk/en/node/12574).  The booklet claims that the Islamisation of 
Britain is "already at an advanced stage” and it expresses particular concern over the 
penetration of Islam into the spheres of British politics, law, economics, education and the 
media.  Quoting surveys and statistics it casts doubt on the notion of "moderate Islam".  
For sure there are many "moderate Muslims" but there is little evidence for "moderate 
Islam".  It is the radical version of Islam, as exemplified in the violent verses of the Qur’an, 
which is normative and now espoused by as many as 40% of British Muslims.  The booklet 
concludes with proposed solutions for the reversal and prevention of Islamisation to be 
adopted by the government and the church.   
 
Glaser, Ida (2005), The Bible and Other Faiths: what does the Lord require of us?, Leicester, Inter-
Varsity Press, pp253. 
 
 This book is not specifically about Islam but is a very helpful exploration of the resources 
that the Bible offers for understanding other faiths.  Parallels may be seen in the 
Samaritans or the other religions of those days.  Muslims may be like the righteous 
Gentiles who found salvation.  Perhaps most helpful of all, Jesus’ relationship with the 
religious Jews of his time is seen as a model for Christian responses to Muslims.  Glaser 
also points out that Jesus challenged the link between religion and political power and 
warns Christians against coveting the power that other religions may have.  Blessing will 
only come to a multifaith world through God’s people, whom He has chosen, living in a 
dynamic relationship with the living God as a witness to all. 
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Glaser, Ida (2010), Crusade Sermons, Francis of Assisi and Martin Luther: What does it mean to 
'take up the cross' in the context of Islam?, Oxford, Church Mission Society, pp34. 
 
 In this short pamphlet Glaser contrasts the approaches of Crusade preachers such as 
Jacques de Vitry with Francis of Assisi and Martin Luther.  The Crusades focused on a 
literal holy war against the presumed enemies of Christ, much like some modern Islamic 
conceptions of jihad today.  Luther also saw the Turks of his day as a threat but insisted 
that only the emperor should physically fight, leaving the church to a spiritual warfare of 
prayer.  Francis’ approach was rather different, however, as he took Christ’s command to 
discipleship and love of enemies so seriously that he and his followers were prepared to 
‘go amongst Muslims' - even under Islamic law.  This reflected Jesus’ love for his enemies 
at the cross and his total disinterest in a political agenda of power.  His kingdom is of a 
different kind.  The challenge to C21st Christians is which theological model they will draw 
on.  Will their one-sided preaching play on xenophobic fears like the Crusade sermons and 
insist on defending a political entity?  Or will they follow in the true way of the cross, going 
amongst and loving those that may seem at times like enemies?   
 
Goldsmith, Martin (2009), Beyond Beards and Burqas: Connecting with Muslims, Nottingham, 
Inter-Varisty Press, pp158. 
 
 This is a gentle, easy-read that mixes stories from Goldsmith's long experience with 
illustrations of key issues in relation to the Christian-Muslim encounter.  Each of the 11 
chapters shares a personal anecdote or story from which he then draws out a couple of 
theological or sociological observations.  The book considers the difficulty of explaining 
theological concepts to Muslims such as the trinity, the sonship of Christ and knowing 
God.  It also touches on the sensitive issues of violence and the problem of Muslim 
treatment of apostates from Islam.  Goldsmith comes across as having a sensitive respect 
for Islam whilst at the same time being unafraid to highlight problem areas.  His chief 
concern as always is that Christians should take up the challenge of mission and share 
their faith, and there is encouragement that Muslims are indeed becoming Christians in 
spite of, or maybe even because of, Muslim extremist violence.  He observes that most 
converts from Islam share three experiences in common:  they have a relationship with a 
Christian friend, have read the New Testament, and have experienced a supernatural 
miracle. Goldsmith strongly encourages Christians to be bold and confident - but not 
confrontational - in their relationships with Muslims.    
 
Green, Stephen (2005), Understanding Islam, Surbiton, Christian Voice, pp24. 
 
 A very badly written, 24-page pamphlet, or ‘briefing paper’, from Christian Voice, a 
campaign group that describe themselves as ‘Christianity with testosterone ... looking to 
take the battle to the Lord’s enemies’.  There are almost no references or citations apart 
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from to one book from America titled ‘Prophet of Doom’ (Winn, 2004).  Green clearly 
spells out his belief that Allah is none other than Satan masquerading as an Arabian moon 
deity.  The Qur’an is a human repackaging of ‘yarns’, ‘garbled versions’ and ‘plagiarised 
poems’ from Jewish literature and is full of errors and anachronisms.  As the later violent 
verses abrogate all earlier peaceful verses Islam is essentially ‘a way of war’ and 
martyrdom is the only sure hope Muslims have of paradise.  The solution to all this is for 
the British government to return the country to its Christian heritage and for the Queen to 
announce a day of prayer, whilst Christians must witness and evangelise Muslims.  
‘Anyone who does not like that state of affairs is free to leave’. 
 
Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity (2005), Islam in Britain: The British Muslim 
Community in February 2005 Pewsey, Isaac Publishing, pp150. 
 
 This report by the Institute for the Study of Islam and Christianity, directed by Patrick 
Sookhdeo, seeks to paint a snapshot of the British Muslim community in February 2005.  It 
is motivated by concern over what it sees as the increasing segregation and Islamist 
radicalisation of the Muslim community which has been allowed by Britain’s multicultural 
policies.  It cites many sources, mainly from the media, as it looks at such issues as shari‘a, 
Islamophobia, political correctness, taqiyya (dissimulation), politics, education and 
finance.  In all of these areas the report discerns a disturbing “gradual Islamisation” of 
Britain.  Its recommendations stress the need for good community relations but also the 
need for an open, critical discussion which recognises the reality of the trend to Islamism.  
In particular the British government should be careful in relating to the Muslim Council of 
Britain, which the report believes to be non-representative and sympathetic to radicals.  
Muslims themselves need to be encouraged to develop ‘a new, liberal form of British 
Islam’ that would seek to integrate into British society and renounce all aspirations of 
separatism and Islamic political power in Britain. 
 
Marshall, David (2006), Learning from How Muslims See Christianity, Cambridge, Grove Books, 
pp28. 
 
 In this booklet Marshall, in the spirit of Cragg, asks whether Christians have anything to 
learn from the Muslim critique of Christian theology, praxis and socio-political 
engagement.  Whilst maintaining confidence in the Christian message to Muslims, he 
suggests that Islam challenges Christians to "take a fresh look at the cross" and maintain a 
proper balance between incarnation and transcendence.   He also muses on the questions 
that Islam may pose to Christians who are increasingly adopting informal forms of prayer.  
Having drawn an interesting parallel with the Christian-Marxist encounter, Marshall goes 
on to point out that the inherently political nature of Islam means that Muslims today 
understand Christianity either to be implicated in western political processes or to have 
failed in its mandate to shape society.  Particularly in the British context the presence of 
Muslims challenges Christians to rethink the connection between faith and politics. 
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McRoy, Anthony (2006), From Rushdie to 7/7: the radicalisation of Islam in Britain, London, The 
Social Affairs Unit, pp236. 
 
 This book written for the Social Affairs Unit is a re-writing of McRoy's PhD thesis from 
London Bible College and springs from his concern that “some expressions of Muslim 
radicalism are now the dominant and guiding forces in British Islam”.  He endeavours to 
lay aside his Christian standpoint and take an impartial, academic look at the causes of 
Muslim radicalisation in Britain since the 1980s.  He looks at the various crises that have 
affected the Muslim community and particularly looks at jihad and democracy within 
Islam.  The last part of the book looks at the history and policies of a selection of Islamic 
organisations in Britain which he classifies as being either participationist or rejectionist.  
Despite all the socio-political grievances of Muslims and the “theological underpinnings” 
of radicalisation that he mentions early on, in the final analysis he believes the real 
underlying cause of Muslim violence, whether it is the Rushdie Affair or 9/11, to be izzat 
and ghairat, that is honour and the desire to defend their religion from offence and 
desecration.  This suggests that the West should “quit the Muslim world” or “expect more 
outrages like 7/7”. 
 
Moucarry, Chawkat (2001), Faith to Faith: Christianity and Islam in Dialogue, Leicester, Inter-
Varsity Press, pp327. 
 
 As a Syrian Arab from a Roman Catholic family Moucarry writes about Islam with a great 
deal of understanding and empathy, and is convinced of the need for Christian-Muslim 
dialogue.  This book, which grew out of his studies at the Sorbonne, seeks to build bridges 
between the two faiths.  It looks at the key theological differences, including different 
views of scripture, the person of Christ and Muhammad’s claims to be a prophet, but also 
acknowledges that there is common ground.  Whilst Islam is not Good News, there are 
things that Christians can learn from Muslims.  He also looks at some contemporary issues 
including the problem of the state of Israel and Muslim immigration to the West.  He calls 
for Christians to respond not by withdrawing but rather by demonstrating God’s love for 
all. 
 
Moucarry, Chawkat (2004), The Search for Forgiveness: Pardon and Punishment in Islam and 
Christianity, Leicester, Inter-Varsity Press, pp373. 
 
 In this book based on his Sorbonne PhD, the author sets out to give his readers a new 
insight into Islam through an exploration of the topic of forgiveness.  Good use of Muslim 
sources and clear tables enable Moucarry to highlight the diverse theological approaches 
of Sunni, Shi‘i, Sufi and other Muslim theologians throughout history.    Whilst always 
looking for common ground, he also carefully draws outs the contrasts between Christian 
and Islamic understandings at each stage.  If in Islam God’s forgiveness is based on mercy 
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at an eschatological judgement, then in Christianity it is based on His love demonstrated in 
an historical act of salvation in Jesus Christ.  
 
Moucarry, Chawkat (2007), Two Prayers for Today: the Lord's Prayer and the Fatiha, Tiruvalla, 
India, Christava Sahitya Samithi, pp136. 
 
 This short book compares Christianity and Islam by comparing what the best known prayer 
from each teaches us about the nature of God, His glory and our needs.  In so doing 
Moucarry takes the Qur’an seriously and engages with how Muslims themselves, including 
some radical ideologues, understand these concepts.  We all have much to learn from the 
two prayers but in the final analysis it is the Lord’s Prayer that reveals God in His most 
fundamental relationship to mankind as “Our Father”.  The author also includes a chapter 
discussing whether Christians and Muslims are talking about the same God, and another 
looking at the relationship of religion to power.  Although he is prepared to be critical of 
the West, especially in its secularism and its foreign policies, he is also concerned about 
some aspects of shari‘a and its denial of rights, and believes that Christians should work 
together with Muslims for freedom, human rights and the common good.  Indeed 
Christians are in a unique position to be bridge builders between Islam and the West.   
 
Musk, Bill (2003), Holy War: Why do some Muslims become fundamentalists?, 2nd edition, 
London, Monarch, pp320. 
 
 The title of this updated edition of Musk's 1992 Passionate Believing was changed at the 
publisher's behest.  It reflects the events of 9/11 and includes two new chapters on the 
histories of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.  In what he considers to be his most 
important book, Musk tries to help westerners enter into the Islamic fundamentalist 
mindset and sees an irony in the fact that it is maybe closer to the Biblical worldview than 
much of western secular humanism.  He looks at the influence of some of the most 
important Muslim thinkers from al-Afghani to Mawdudi, Qutb and Khomeini, reflecting on 
the anger that many of them felt towards the West as a result of imperialism and 
globalization.  He sees in Islamism and the Islamic doctrine of tawhid (God's oneness) an 
implicit critique of the shortcomings of the western secular worldview and a challenge to 
Christians to become more public about their faith.  Christianity, however, is not to be 
equated with Islam.  Quoting Lesslie Newbigin he points out that whilst Muhammad chose 
the way of power in conquering Mecca, Christ chose to suffer and die in Jerusalem.  Thus 
there is ahead a struggle for Christians to witness, "with its nuance of ‘martyrdom’", as 
they seek to put Christ back into the centre of life. 
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Musk, Bill (2005), Kissing Cousins?: Christians and Muslims Face to Face Oxford, Monarch, pp480. 
 
 Musk writes this sympathetic book with the aim of trying to change attitudes and helping 
Christians to see the similarities that they share with Muslims as their ‘cousins’.  He 
examines themes such as prophethood, text and power in the two faiths and tackles the 
‘big question’ of whether Allah is the God of the Bible.  The answer lies in the 
continuity/discontinuity tension between Islam and Christianity which he suggests may 
reflect the same tension that the early church experienced with Judaism.  Musk also deals 
openly and honestly with the history of conflict between the two faiths including Islamic 
imperial expansion, the Crusades and the competition created by their shared sense of 
‘mission’.  After culminating with a comparison of respective views of humanity and Jesus 
Christ he ends by echoing Cragg’s call for an openness and humility towards Muslims and a 
renewed sense of ‘neighbourliness’ with cousins. 
 
Musk, Bill (2008), The Certainty Trap: Can Christians and Muslims Afford the Luxury of 
Fundamentalism?, Pasadena, CA, William Carey Library, pp257. 
 
 This book is a challenge not just to Muslims but to Christians as well to rethink how they 
understand their respective scriptures.  Whilst the Qur’an is not the sole cause of Islamist 
violence, a growing literalist, jihad-oriented interpretation of the text is winning support 
and presenting a significant challenge to the traditional understanding of the majority of 
Muslims.  However, Christian fundamentalism provides no less of a challenge and Musk 
suggests that Christianity too is in 'a struggle for its own soul' and he is particularly critical 
of the support of some American Christians for  both Zionism and the ‘war on terror’.  He 
examines issues of revelation, transmission, exegesis and interpretation in both Islam and 
Christianity and concludes that it is essential today that both a ‘hermeneutic of certainty’ 
and a secularist ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ make way for healthy doubt and critical re-
evaluation.  Throughout, however, he maintains a strong conviction of both the 
trustworthiness of the Biblical revelation, rightly understood, and also the need for 
Muslims to hear the Gospel.  Indeed, he believes that ‘we live on the cusp of a dramatic 
shift in the willingness of Muslims to hear the Christian story’ and that a post-7/7 world 
provides a unique opportunity for Muslims to rethink their ‘unhelpful certainty’.  
 
Nazir-Ali, Michael (2002), Understanding My Muslim Neighbour: Questions and Answers on Islam 
and Its Followers, Norwich, Canterbury Press pp96. 
 
 This is a very helpful, basic introduction to thinking about the place of Islam in the modern 
world.  It was written shortly after 9/11 as an informal conversation answering questions 
people were - and still are - asking about Islam.  Nazir-Ali describes Islam fairly and 
uncritically from a Muslim viewpoint.  Whilst sketchily covering the basics of the origins, 
beliefs and practices of Islam, he stresses the great diversity and variation within the 
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Muslim world and its history.  In answer to some of the controversial, difficult questions 
he gives measured, balanced responses that look to break down misunderstanding and 
reduce fear.  The answer to Islamophobia is after all "education, education, education" - 
on both sides.  Whilst extremist Islamic terrorism may be here to stay and needs to be 
dealt with, its causes are to be found in specific injustices in various parts of the world to 
which solutions should be sought whilst supporting the voice of moderate Muslims.  In all 
this Nazir-Ali is very deliberate in being non-sensational in his arguments.   In short, this 
book does what it says on the cover: it encourages Christians to understand their Muslim 
neighbours.   
 
Nazir-Ali, Michael (2006), Conviction and Conflict: Islam, Christianity and World Order London, 
Continuum, pp192. 
 
 This book is a scholarly engagement with theological and sociological texts from many 
sources, including both Christian and Muslim thinkers.  Against all expectations religion is 
making a global comeback.  Whilst admitting that religion can and does “go wrong”, the 
author believes that religion has a key role to play in world affairs.  To this end a dialogue 
between the religions is “almost indispensable for world peace today” and indeed 
governments should be able to draw on the fruit of such dialogue in their policy making.  
At the same time, Christians must come to such dialogue with Muslims as realists.  Nazir-
Ali looks at historical and contemporary grievances and explores the concepts of shari‘a, 
jihad and extremism, not hesitating to raise problematic issues such as religious freedom, 
apostasy, reciprocity and the dhimmi status of minorities.  However, he does so in a non-
judgemental style that does not accuse or demonize Islam and indeed recognizes the role 
that the West itself has played in “assisting in the emergence of an internationally linked 
Islamist movement”.  He finishes on an optimistic note as he believes that God is at work 
in the world and that self-criticism can lead to spiritual renewal. 
 
Nazir-Ali, Michael (2008), The Unique and Universal Christ: Jesus in a Plural World, Paternoster 
Press,  
 
 In this typically erudite book Nazir-Ali examines the Christian understanding of the 
uniqueness of Christ particularly in the presence of Judaism, Hinduism and Islam.  He 
reflects on the Christian basis of the Enlightenment values found in western societies and 
points to Christ as their well-spring.  Civic pluralism, evident in such ambiguous terms as 
multifaith and interfaith, is inevitable and not undesirable.  Theological pluralism, 
however, is another matter and is to be seriously questioned.  Nothing good comes from 
"fudging" important issues and Christian distinctiveness is to be maintained.  He goes on 
to explore the nature, work and lordship of Christ in scripture and considers how this 
affects the relationship of the Christian faith to other religions, especially in its evangelistic 
mission. The book finishes with a brief reflection on the Homogeneous Unit Principle, 
contextualization and the extent to which a follower of Christ can remain within their own 
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culture.  Whilst sympathetic to some newer missiological thinking, he is particularly 
concerned for a sound ecclesiology and an integrity that would not look like deception to 
Muslims and thus "make the apostasy worse".  Such "fads" will not further the enduring 
"missionary task of the Church". 
 
Newbigin, Lesslie, Lamin Sanneh, et al. (2005 (1998)), Faith and Power: Christianity and Islam in 
'Secular' Britain, 2nd edition, Eugene, OR, Wipf & Stock, pp177. 
 
 Reflecting back on the 1998 publication of this book the 2005 edition remarks on the 
prophetic character of the book in the light of the events of 2001 and subsequent years.  It 
features Newbigin’s last published work, a typical call for a renewed Christian confidence 
and vision for society in the face of failing secularization.  In this Christians should be 
provoked by Muslims who are doing a better job at challenging secularism in the public 
arena.  Sanneh too sees the Muslim presence as an opportunity for “stocktaking”.  In 
exploring Newbigin’s approaches to a pluralist society he reaffirms the need for the 
separation of state and religion but also suggests that a society which in the past has 
drawn on Christian resources has now to replenish itself.  Taylor adds a critique of 
multiculturalism taking the Bradford riots of 1995 as a case in point.  She criticises the 
“cult of silence” which refuses to criticise Islam and unacceptable cultural practices, and 
explodes the myth that the state can be neutral on moral and religious issues.  Presciently 
she suggests that the demand for shari‘a will be “inevitable” but must be resisted whilst 
continuing to enable Muslims to take a full intellectual part in public life.  In all this the 
church will need to learn to be a “bridge builder”.  The final word goes to Newbigin who 
challenges Christians to fully engage in seeking the “good of the city” of which they are a 
part with no embarrassment at asking for a privileged place for Christian principles, which 
are in the long run the only possible guarantors of the religious freedom for all which we 
have come to cherish. 
 
Orr-Ewing, Frog and Amy Orr-Ewing (2002), Holy Warriors: a fresh look at the face of extreme 
Islam, Carlisle, Authentic Lifestyle, pp117. 
 
 This book is largely inspired by the authors’ story of how they met with some leaders of 
the Taliban on a visit to Afghanistan, an experience which seems to have stirred a mixture 
of concern and compassion.  After a standard introduction to Islam and an academic 
engagement with the concept of fundamentalism, they particularly focus on the issue of 
jihad and conclude that the more peaceful verses in the Qur’an have been abrogated by 
later more belligerent verses.  The central issue for them is that the Qur’an’s emphasis on 
eschatological judgement is not accompanied by any assurance of salvation – apart from 
in jihadi martyrdom.  Therefore, for them, it is not economic or socio-political issues that 
drive Islamist violence but rather it is theology.  Whilst they are careful to stress the 
diversity that exists within Islam, they accept that such ‘Islamisms’ today are creating a 
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clash of civilizations which poses a threat to the West with all its shortcomings.  This 
should not be confused, however, with a threat to Christianity, as Christians have always 
suffered under different tyrannical regimes.  The important thing is to rise to the challenge 
of seeing Muslims find assurance of salvation in Christ.  
 
Pawson, David (2003), The Challenge of Islam to Christians, London, Hodder & Stoughton, pp196. 
 
 This book has become well-known for its prediction that Britain will be taken over by Islam 
in the near future.  Pawson claims to have had this ‘premonition’ whilst listening to Patrick 
Sookhdeo speaking and after further research felt that events and trends confirmed his 
fears.  The author admits that he knows little of Islam but relies on the writing and 
research of others.  Sadly it is impossible to check any of his sources as the book contains 
no references, footnotes or citations for any of its quotes.  However, the main thrust of 
the book is not about Islam, which clearly worships a different god, but rather about 
Christianity.  The challenge of Islam will refine the church in Britain with maybe only a 
remnant remaining.  To prepare the church Pawson feels very strongly that God gave him 
three words: reality, relationship and righteousness.  The second half of the book 
expounds these in relation to the Gospel and he finishes with a challenge to the church to 
be bold in its witness. 
 
Riddell, Peter (2004), Christians and Muslims: Pressures and Potential in a Post 9/11 World, 
Leicester, Inter-Varisty Press, pp254. 
 
 This book benefits from an excellent table of contents which allows it to be used as a 
resource for questions concerning Christian-Muslim relations.  Building on the foundation 
of Islam in Conflict Riddell addresses many of the tough questions that need to be asked 
and yet does so with respect, sympathy and balance.  In addition to considering Islam’s 
place in contemporary international affairs and British society today, he also gives a very 
helpful overview of Christian-Muslim interaction taking into account the responses and 
approaches of the different Christian traditions (which he labels liberal, traditional and 
evangelical) and transnational organisations (such as the WCC and WEA).  The last chapter 
addresses over 30 specific questions including ‘So what is Islam?’, ‘Is Islam a religion of 
peace?’ and ‘To which Muslims should Christians be talking?’  His answers to all these 
questions are nuanced and take into account the diversity that is found amongst Muslims.  
He stresses a two-pronged approach that engages with Muslim as people and Islam as a 
system and counsels that "we should be wary of those Christians who take a blinkered 
approach" focusing on only one of these aspects.  Different types of Muslims 
(modernizers, traditionalists and Islamists) call for different approaches ranging from 
dialogue to polemical debate.  Indeed the only Christians engaging with radical Muslims 
are the ‘debaters’ and Riddell ends by stressing that “those committed to dialogue should 
not delegitimise the efforts of the debaters, nor should the reverse occur". 
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Riddell, Peter and Peter Cotterell (2003), Islam in Conflict: past, present and future, Leicester, 
Inter-Varisty Press, pp231. 
 
 “Islam stands at the crossroads”.  This is the central thesis of this very helpful book 
examining “the titanic struggle taking place between moderates and radicals for the hearts 
and minds of the Muslim masses in the middle”.  The authors achieve a clever balance of 
academic rigour and readability as they survey Islam and particularly its approaches to 
violence from the early days, through empire and decline to today’s highly charged 
interaction with the West.  Whilst western foreign policy and contemporary international 
conflict play their part, the real root of Islamic violence “derives from a potent cocktail of 
ingredients that go far back in time, to the beginning of Muslim-Christian historical contact 
and the very Islamic texts themselves” and not least to the violent example of Muhammad 
himself.  The answer to such violence and ‘westophobia’ will have to come from 
moderates within the Muslim community who encourage a new hermeneutic of Islamic 
scriptures that would proscribe violence and encourage peaceful coexistence.  In the 
meantime Christians should be compassionate and pray, but quite what their involvement 
with supporting a military response to radicalism should be is not so clear. 
 
Smith, Andrew (2009), My Friend Imran: Christian-Muslim Friendship Cambridge, Grove Books,  
 
 A short booklet about encouraging Christian and Muslim young people to form 
friendships.  Based on Smith’s experience of running Scripture Union’s Youth Encounter 
and the record of actual conversations with young people, it takes a realistic view of the 
difficulties but also the positive benefits of such relationships.  This is not a one way 
process for the purpose of mission however. Christians have to be prepared to be 
influenced by and learn from Muslims.  Some see this as a dangerous risk for young people 
to take but Smith points out that few have such concerns about contact with secular 
young people, which in reality leads to many more Christian young people ‘falling away’.  
The generation growing up today will only have increased contact with people of other 
faiths and this booklet is a timely call for churches to prepare their young people for the 
challenge. 
 
Solomon, Sam (2006), A Proposed Charter of Muslim Understanding, Pilcrow Press, pp28. 
 
 This booklet was commissioned by UKIP MEP Gerard Batten and is presented as a charter 
for Muslim leaders to sign in order to acknowledge their commitment to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.  It calls for 'ulama to issue fatwas concerning respect for 
non-Muslims, freedom of belief and rejection of violent jihad.  Its most striking demand is 
for a re-interpretation of 17 Qur’anic verses which are felt to be an "inspiration for hate 
and terrorism" including several which make reference to the Christian doctrine of the 
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trinity.  It is envisaged that all Muslims who breach the charter would be denounced and 
excommunicated from the Muslim community. 
 
Solomon, Sam and Elias Al-Maqdisi (2007), The Mosque Exposed, Charlottesville, VA, Advancing 
Native Missions Press, pp40. 
 
 This booklet has also been published as The Mosque and Its Role in Society under the 
pseudonyms Belteshazzar and Abednego.  It was written in response to the plans for a 
large "mega-mosque" to be built in East London.  Having emphasized that Islam is an all-
encompassing religio-political system, the booklet outlines the historical role of the 
mosque as not just a place of prayer and preaching but also a political headquarters and a 
launch base for jihad which, with reference to the writing of Mawdudi, it sees as "the 
driving principle" of Islam.  This, along with what the authors see as the obligation of hijra 
(migration) and the employment of taqiyya (dissimulation), which is "practised by all 
Muslims, Sunni and Shi'ites alike", is all part of the drive to expand Islam.  The building of 
mosques, which "soon in almost all major British cities will be the biggest most spectacular 
buildings", is seen as an assertion of the supremacy of Islam in the world.  The booklet 
concludes by citing a number of modern fatwas about the role of the mosque and the 
exclusion of non-Muslims from it. 
 
Solomon, Sam and Elias Al-Maqdisi (2009), The Common Word: The undermining of the church, 
Charlottesville, VA, Advancing Native Missions, pp110. 
 
 This short book is a specific response to and rebuttal of the letter A Common Word 
between Us and You.  It is in particular critical of those Christian leaders who signed the 
Yale response to this document entitled Loving God and Neighbor Together.  Indeed, in his 
preface, Colin Dye, pastor of Kensington Temple in London, suggests that these Christians 
seemed to be "more attracted to the prize of a delusional 'peace' than by their duty to 
confront error with truth".  This is a sentiment shared by the authors who argue that the 
Muslim commitment to jihad and the doctrine of al-wala wa al-baraa (allegiance and 
rejection) precludes any possibility of common ground or friendship between Muslims and 
Christians.  The Muslim discussion of God's love and love for neighbour in their letter is 
nothing but "skilled duplicity" and an example of taqiyyah (dissimulation).  They urge the 
Christian signatories to withdraw their signatures and the Muslim authors to reform 
Islamic doctrine and practice.  The appendices include the above two documents and also 
a collection of Islamic fatwas taken from www.islam-qa.com concerning relationships 
between Muslims and Christians . 
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Solomon, Sam and Elias Al-Maqdisi (2009), Modern Day Trojan Horse: the Islamic doctrine of 
immigration, Charlottesville, VA, Advancing Native Missions, pp137. 
 
 This book explores the Islamic doctrine of hijra (migration) and finds it to be the principal 
way in which Islam is to be spread in the world.  Starting with Muhammad's model the 
authors suggest that hijra is obligatory on all Muslims and is always prepatory to jihad.  
Indeed they believe that the five pillars and everything within Islam is geared towards 
jihad and the global domination of Islam.  They cite "five directives", with Qur'anic 
references, which they say have become a systematic doctrine: assemble, listen, obey, 
immigrate and wage jihad.  They claim that it is for this reason that immigrant Muslim 
communities always strive to remain "separate and distinct" whilst seeking to establish 
the shari'a and gain political power by stealth.  They cite historical examples where they 
believe this to have happened in Sub-Saharan Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia and warn 
that Islam is not a faith but a "whole encompassing political system, garbed in religious 
outfit".  In other words Muslim migration to the West is for the express purpose of 
establishing an Islamic state.  The extensive appendices cite examples of modern online 
fatwas regarding various related issues. 
 
Solomon, Sam and Elias Al-Maqdisi (2010), Al-Yahud: Eternal Islamic enmity and the Jews, 
Charlottesville, VA, Advancing Native Missions, pp193. 
 
 The authors believe that in this book "the total fallacy of Islam rooted in its doctrine of 
enmity is exposed".  They suggest that the real cause of the Middle East conflict is not land 
or political injustice.  Rather these things are only a "smokescreen" to obscure the real 
cause which is Islam's deep and everlasting hatred of the Jews. They calculate that roughly 
60% of the ayas (verses) in the Qur'an refer to the Jews, of which 500 are explicitly 
negative.  They also cite the Hadith  and Sira (biography of Muhammad) and suggest that 
this opposition to the Jews, stemming back to the seventh century, has been endemic 
throughout Islamic history.  The doctrines of fitrah (all humankind are born Muslims), 
da'wa (call to Islam) and waqf (endowment) are all discussed to demonstrate how 
implacably opposed Muslims are to any concessions with non-Muslims, particularly over 
the issue of territory, including Jerusalem.  Solomon and al-Maqdisi do not proffer any 
solutions to the Middle East conflict, rather they propose that the solution can only be 
found in what they believe to be a correct diagnosis of the cause - Islamic enmity towards 
the Jews.  Extensive appendices deal with Qur'anic references, the supremacy of 
Muhammad and issues relating to the Qibla, the al-Aqsa mosque and Islamic waqf.  The 
Constitution of Medina is also reproduced in both Arabic and English. 
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Sookhdeo, Patrick (2002), A People Betrayed Pewsey, Christian Focus Publications, pp424. 
 
 This book is based on Sookhdeo's PhD thesis completed at SOAS under the supervision of 
Dr Kate Zebiri.  It is written so that people will understand the pressure which the Christian 
community of some 3 million people in Pakistan (2% of population) is facing.  Sookhdeo 
believes that the process of Islamization in Pakistan in recent years may serve as an 
example of what may happen in other places.  It includes a long discussion of both the 
dhimmi principle and laws concerning blasphemy and apostasy, and their relation to the 
loss of rights and discrimination experienced by Christians in Pakistan.  He concludes that 
Christian minorities in Muslim countries are neither protected by their own government 
nor by the Church worldwide which is ill-equipped to understand and relate to Islam. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2006), Islam: The Challenge to the Church, Pewsey, Isaac Publishing, pp125. 
 
 The book opens with a short account of Sookhdeo’s personal history and his concern at 
the demise of elements of British society due to radical Islam.  The book then seeks to 
inform Christians in the West about Islam and the threat it poses to the church.  The 
author is particularly concerned about the territoriality and political intentions of Islam 
and fears that well-meaning western Christians do not understand the dangers of 
engaging in dialogue and co-operating with Muslims. After examining the basic beliefs and 
theology of Islam and highlighting the diversity of Muslims, he goes on to examine key 
issues such as shari‘a and the suffering of Christian minorities in Muslim countries.  Whilst 
God is love in Christianity, in Islam God is power.  This has brought the West to a 
crossroads in its relationship to Islam, and the Church must have the courage to meet the 
challenge. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2007), Global Jihad: The Future in the Face of Militant Islam, Pewsey, Isaac 
Publishing, pp669. 
 
 In this 669 page book including appendices and footnotes Sookhdeo sets out to examine 
Islamic concepts of jihad from a theological point of view against the backdrop of current 
radical Islamism  and Huntington’s infamous ‘bloody borders’.  He sees the cause of 
contemporary Islamic violence lying almost exclusively within the teachings of classical 
Islam and notes that historically the expansion of Islam has never been stopped except by 
military force.  However, whilst recognising the need for western military, political and 
economic responses, particularly in restricting the flow of funds to Islamist groups, he sees 
the only real hope of winning ‘the long war against classical Islam’ resting on liberal-
minded Muslims reforming Islam from within by rejecting the Hadith, reinterpreting the 
Qur’an, reversing or rejecting abrogation, and, above all, separating religion and state.   
Otherwise the only chance of peace will be for the whole world to be under the rule of 
Islam. 
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Sookhdeo, Patrick (2008), Faith, Power and Territory: A Handbook of British Islam, Pewsey, Isaac 
Publishing, pp360. 
 
 With a foreword by Peter Riddell, this book presents itself as an easy-to-use handbook on 
British Islam but also seeks to interpret that Islam and to make recommendations for the 
future.  It is an expansion of the ISIC report on Islam in Britain and in places the text is 
identical.  The main emphasis is on radical Islam and the Islamisation of Britain.  An 
overview of the history and basic tenets of Islam is followed by a discussion of radical 
Islam and the doctrine of sacred space before an assessment of Islam in Britain today.  
Sookhdeo assesses 37 influential Muslim thinkers (28 of whom are Islamist in their 
orientation) and then catalogues many of the Muslim organisations and institutions active 
in Britain today.  In his conclusion he suggests that Britain is facing a greater threat than 
any other for many centuries and notes that “there is no precedent of a non-Muslim 
society successfully halting the advance of Islam by peaceful means” (p229).  As violence is 
not an option, society must decide what sort of Britain it wants.  An open secular society 
which celebrates British heritage and values, or a segregated society based on voluntary 
apartheid and the threat of Islamic dominance.   
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2008), Understanding Shari`a Finance: the Muslim Challenge to Western 
Economics, Pewsey, Isaac Publishing, pp114. 
 
 This book takes a brief look at the recent development of Islamic finance.  The main 
contention of the author is that shari‘a finance is a new invention with little historical basis 
in Islamic theology or practice and has been developed by modern radical Islamists as a 
tool in their global jihad.  Their object is to separate Muslims from non-Muslims and to 
subvert western economic systems, with the ultimate goal being global Islamic 
dominance.  There is little regulation of the sector and concerns are expressed that 
finance, particularly from zakat, may be used to support Islamic terrorism.  Sookhdeo 
appeals to western governments to be circumspect and to introduce tougher regulation.  
The appendices include an overview of Islamic finance in various countries and a 
description of the incompatibility of shari‘a law with human rights and western society. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2009), The Challenge of Islam to the Church and Its Mission, 2nd edition, 
McLean, VA, Isaac Publishing, pp193. 
 
 The second edition of this book includes some corrections, updates and additions to the 
first edition.  There is an extra paragraph stressing the need to distinguish Muslims as 
people from Islam as a system and the need to love not hate them.  New stories and case 
studies have been added, particularly from the United States.  There are also several 
added references to the author’s concern that Evangelical Christians in particular are being 
co-opted by dialogue and interfaith initiatives, thus losing their theological grounding 
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especially when they engage in contextualisation.  Hopes that such dialogue will bear fruit 
are misguided and are leading to division in the church.  He particularly criticises the Yale 
response to A Common Word and the full text of the Barnabas Fund response is included 
in the appendix. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2009), Freedom to Believe: Challenging Islam's Apostasy Law, McLean, VA, 
Isaac Publishing, pp176. 
 
 This book is basically concerned with human rights and freedom under shari‘a, looking 
particularly at the issues of apostasy and blasphemy.  It examines the classical texts and 
notes that the strictest punishments are found not in the Qur’an but in the Hadith.  Whilst 
acknowledging that there is debate in the Muslim community over these issues, the 
author feels that the general trend towards Islamism in the Muslim world today means 
that interpretations and enforcement are becoming stricter.  This is a problem not just for 
Christians living under Muslim rule, who are vulnerable to the charge of blasphemy, or 
Muslims leaving Islam, who are treated as apostates and traitors, but also to liberal 
Muslims who are seeking to reinterpret Islamic legal understanding.  Amongst the real life 
examples that the author relates are the stories of some of these Muslims who face 
opposition and even death and yet represent in his estimation the only hope for freedom 
of religion within Islam. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2009), Understanding Islamic Terrorism: The Islamic Doctrine of War, 2nd  
edition(US), Pewsey, Isaac Publishing, pp278. 
 
 First published in the UK in 2004 the whole of the text of this book can be found in Global 
Jihad (2007) which is an expanded version of this book. 
 
Sookhdeo, Patrick (2010), A Christian's Pocket Guide to Islam, Christian Focus Publications, pp112. 
 
 A short handbook of the origins, beliefs, practices and history of Islam.  It is a mainly 
factual account with little comment or interpretation.  It includes a short section on 
taqiyya but otherwise resembles other ‘guides’ of its kind.  The appendices include some 
useful reference tables: a chronology of Muhammad’s life, the development of Islamic 
sects and the surahs of the Qur’an. 
 
Sookhdeo, Rosemary (2004), Secrets Behind the Burqa, Pewsey, Isaac Publishing, pp118. 
 
 This book is based on the author's MA dissertation which was controversially rejected by 
Oxford University after she refused to change her position on Islam.  Drawing on many 
anecdotes from the author’s relationships and long experience, the book explores the 
place of women in Islam and particularly in Muslim communities in the West.  It 
acknowledges that the Qur'an and Muhammad did seek equality for women but argues 
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that “this theoretical equality has not been seen in practice”.  This is demonstrated in the 
many Qur’anic passages and hadiths cited, although the traditional tafsirs for these are 
not presented.  The book goes on to explore the issues of honour and shame, marriage, 
the veil and Muslim women in the West, concluding that gender equality is lacking and 
that “Islam is a man’s world”.  With the increasing trend towards shari‘a in the West “it is 
the women and the girls who will pay the price”. 
 
Sookhdeo, Rosemary (2005), Stepping into the Shadows: Why Women Convert to Islam, Pewsey, 
Isaac Publishing, pp121. 
 
 This book is written out of concern over the many western women - including those 
brought up in practising Christian families - who are marrying Muslim men and converting 
to Islam.  Sookhdeo draws on her many years of experience living and working amongst 
Muslim women and recounts many stories and anecdotes.  There is advice on how to help 
family members or friends who are considering conversion and warnings about the 
differences between Muslim and western culture with regard to male-female 
relationships, children, honour and shame, and divorce.  Whilst Christians “have to love 
and care for Muslims and share the gospel with them” they should also be on their guard 
and be aware of the dark side of Islam and the deliberate attempts by some Muslim men 
to target marriage with western women for ulterior motives.  The book concludes with a 
well laid out table comparing doctrines such as God, Jesus, sin and salvation in the two 
religions. 
 
Sudworth, Richard (2007), Distinctly Welcoming: Christian presence in a multifaith society, 
Bletchley, Scripture Union, pp160. 
 
 Although not specifically about Islam, this is a book about the relationship of Christians to 
people of other faiths.  The author has spent time amongst Muslims both abroad and in 
Britain and urges Christians to respect other faiths whilst at the same time reflecting on 
what it means to be passionate and yet to have integrity in their own faith.  Sudworth 
reflects on the meaning of Christian mission in a post-Christendom society and gives many 
practical tips for Christians working in multifaith contexts.  This requires distinctive faith 
where all faith groups are true to their faith and it requires Christians to extend a risky 
welcome without knowing what the response may be. 
 
Wood, Nicholas (2009), Faiths and Faithfulness: Pluralism, Dialogue and Mission in the Work of 
Kenneth Cragg and Lesslie Newbigin, Milton Keynes, Paternoster, pp219. 
 
 This book is an academic engagement with the search for a theology of mission in a plural 
context.  Wood clearly identifies two strands within Christian thinking concerning the 
continuity or discontinuity between other faiths and the Christian tradition.  After looking 
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at the historical contributions of various theologians to this debate, he compares and 
contrasts the work of two great C20th missionary-theologians, Kenneth Cragg and Lesslie 
Newbigin, as representative of this paradigm.  This is a great resource for anyone wanting 
to get an overview of the work of these two great thinkers and there are many quotes and 
references.  Wood finishes by emphasizing the need to keep these two tendencies in 
balance and to keep Christology and mission central in theological reflection and in 
interfaith dialogue which for him is a vital part of the witness of the church. 
 
Zeidan, David (2003), Sword of Allah: Islamic Fundamentalism from an Evangelical Perspective, 
Waynesboro, GA, Gabriel Publishing, pp166. 
 
 As the title suggests this book addresses the topic of jihad.  The author traces the history 
of what he calls Islamic fundamentalism and examines the roles of key Muslim thinkers 
from Shah Wali Allah and ‘Abd al-Wahhab to Khomeini and Turabi.  Whilst claiming that 
the inspiration behind much Islamic violence is theologically rooted in the Islamic texts, he 
admits that there is “a grain of truth” behind the grievances and anger that many Muslims, 
not just the fundamentalists, feel towards the West.  Zeidan sees some parallels between 
Islamic and Protestant fundamentalism, but ultimately the difference lies in what is found 
in the original texts and the contrast between the lives and characters of Muhammad and 
Jesus.  Christians should not “fall for politically correct representations of Islam” as a 
religion of peace.  However, at the same time they should not be discouraged as “Muslims 
around the world are increasingly disenchanted with Islam and are turning to Christ”.  God 
is in control and may even have allowed the current global situation to provoke increased 
zeal on the behalf of Christians.  
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APPENDIX D:  INTRODUCTORY LETTERS 
D.1 – NATIONAL PARTICIPANTS 
 
Dear (name) 
 
I am writing to ask you whether it would be possible to interview you as part of my PhD research.  I 
don’t think we’ve ever met, although (appropriate mention of mutual friends) and I have obviously read 
your books. 
 
To tell you a little of my background I spent 10 years living and working in the Arab Muslim world as a 
university lecturer.  Since returning to this country 6 years ago, I have been leading Yeovil Community 
Church in Somerset and have also been involved in speaking on the subject of Islam and Muslims at 
several Evangelical conferences (New Wine 05 and 06, Grapevine 06 and Spring Harvest 08) as well as 
many churches and training events.  During this period I have become increasingly interested in the 
challenges posed to Evangelicals by the presence of Islam in the UK and the range of responses to this.   
 
In October 07 I started PhD research at Exeter University under the supervision of Prof Grace Davie and 
with partial funding from the following trusts: St Luke’s College Foundation, Spalding Trust, Sir Richard 
Stapley Educational Trust, Lady Ogle Christian Trust and the Foundation of St Matthias.  The research, 
provisionally entitled 'Evangelicalism, Islam and the Public Sphere in the UK', is looking at how the 
presence of Islam may be impacting Evangelicalism and particularly how it is changing the engagement 
of Evangelicals in the Public Sphere.  I am also looking at the range of Evangelical perspectives on Islam 
and attitudes towards Muslims. 
 
There are four distinct parts to my research.  Firstly I will be reviewing the Evangelical public discourse 
with regard to Islam, particularly since 9/11.  This will include looking at books, magazine articles, 
newspaper interviews, websites and speeches.   Secondly, I will be interviewing some of the key British 
Evangelical leaders, writers and speakers on Islam.  Thirdly, I will be interviewing church leaders from 
a cross-section of large Evangelical churches in London.  Lastly, if time and resources permit, I will 
conduct a few small focus groups amongst lay members in a couple of those churches. 
 
My main aim in these interviews will be to look at attitudes towards Islam and Muslims and how these 
influence participation in the Public Sphere at different levels.  I am coming to the research with an 
open mind and, as far as possible, no particular denominational or personal bias in order to enquire 
what is happening in the Evangelical community with respect to Islam in the UK today. 
 
The interview will cover the following topic areas: 
 
 Personal history and church background 
 Relevant history of interaction with Muslims 
 Current churchmanship 
 Views on the relationship between church, society and the state 
 Views with respect to the nature of Islam and its presence in British society 
 Current practical interaction or dialogue with Muslims 
 Current engagement in the Public Sphere with respect to Islam 
 An assessment of future trajectories of interfaith relations between Evangelicals and Muslims 
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The interview will be recorded and stored digitally before being transcribed for which reason I will ask 
you to sign a consent form which describes the conditions placed on the use of this data by the Ethics 
Committee at the University of Exeter.   Data from the interview – either attributed to you or 
anonymous at your discretion - may be included in my final thesis which will be held by the University 
of Exeter Library and may also be used in any subsequent publications.  If you would like to review a 
copy of the transcript and make any changes prior to the writing of the final report and/or you would 
like to receive a short final summary of the research then you will be able to indicate this on the 
consent form.    
 
If you are willing to be interviewed I wonder whether you would be free on any of these dates: 
 
(dates) 
 
If none of these dates are possible, then could you please suggest another date convenient to you. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Richard McCallum 
 
Department of Sociology 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
University of Exeter 
01935 471649 
rjm215@exeter.ac.uk 
http://www.eprofile.ex.ac.uk/richardmccallum/ 
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D.2 – CHURCH LEADERS 
 
Dear (name) 
 
I am a church leader in Yeovil, teach on Islam and am also part of Global Connections’ Muslim World 
Forum at the Evangelical Alliance.  However, I am currently doing PhD research looking at Evangelical 
responses to Islam and wonder whether I could come and interview you – or another senior member of 
your staff - as part of my research.  The interview would be a semi-structured conversation of 30-60 
minutes at a time and place of your choosing and could either be attributed or anonymous. 
 
My aim in doing this research is to help encourage the church in Britain in its response to Islam at this 
crucial time and I particularly want to interview senior leaders of Evangelical churches in London to get 
an idea of their perspectives and to see how they are seeking to educate and equip their congregations.  
I’m not looking for ‘experts’ on Islam and in fact would prefer not to interview those on staff who 
already have a specific interest or expertise in Islam and mission. 
 
To tell you a little of my background I spent 10 years living and working in the Arab Muslim world as a 
university lecturer.  Since returning to this country 6 years ago, I have been leading Yeovil Community 
Church in Somerset and have also been involved in speaking on the subject of Islam and Muslims at 
several Evangelical conferences as well as many churches and training events.  During this period I 
have become increasingly interested in the challenges posed to Evangelicals by the presence of Islam in 
the UK.   
 
So in October 07 I started PhD research at Exeter University under the supervision of Prof Grace Davie 
provisionally entitled 'Evangelicalism, Islam and the Public Sphere in the UK', looking at the range of 
Evangelical responses to Islam and Muslims.  I am examining how the presence of Islam may be 
impacting Evangelicalism and particularly how it is changing the engagement of Evangelicals in the 
public sphere.   
 
I currently plan to be in the London area on the following dates although if none of these suits then I am 
happy to try and arrange another time.  If you are willing then please let me know what works for you. 
 
(Dates) 
 
I do hope that we will be able to meet to discuss what I feel is an increasingly important topic at this 
time.  I can send more information about the interview and the research nearer the time. 
 
I hope this finds you well and look forward to hearing from you.   
 
With best wishes 
 
 
Richard McCallum
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APPENDIX E:  CONSENT FORMS 
E.1 – NATIONAL PARTICIPANTS 
This project is an investigation into how the presence of Islam and Muslims in the UK is changing the 
nature of British Evangelicalism particularly as reflected in its engagement in the Public Sphere.  It will 
look at the variety of Evangelical approaches to and public discourse on Islam and Muslims at three 
levels - national leadership, local church leadership and within the congregation - utilising textual 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. 
 
Confidentiality  
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence.  They will not be used other than for the 
purposes described on this form and in the accompanying letter.  Third parties will not be allowed to 
access them (except in the case of legal subpoena).  If you request it, you will be sent a copy of your 
interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit. 
 
Anonymity 
I will be interviewing you in your public role as a writer and speaker, so I should very much like to use 
your name and the name of your organisation in my final report.  However, if you would prefer to 
remain anonymous then you can give a pseudonym and organisational description of your own 
choosing in Section 2 below.  Otherwise please sign Section 1. 
 
1. Consent with use of name: I voluntarily agree to participate in the research specified above and to 
allow the use of my data for the specified purposes.  I am aware that I can contact the interviewer to 
withdraw my consent at any time. 
 
NAME: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
SIGNATURE: ……………………………………………………………………..  DATE: ………………… 
NAME OF CHURCH OR ORGANISATION: 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Consent with anonymity: I voluntarily agree to participate in the research specified above and to 
allow the use of my data for the specified purposes.  I am aware that I can contact the interviewer to 
withdraw my consent at any time. 
 
PLEASE TICK HERE:  YES □ NO □   DATE: ……………………………………….. 
 
CHOSEN PSEUDONYM: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
TYPE OF CHURCH OR ORGANISATION: ……………………………………………………………………………… 
I would like the opportunity to review a transcript of the interview  □ 
I would like to receive a short final summary of the research  □ 
 
Contact details 
For further information about the research or your interview data please contact: 
Richard McCallum, Tel. 01935 471649, rjm215@exeter.ac.uk  
 
If you have any concerns about the research contact: 
Prof Grace Davie, Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, Devon, EX4 4EH  
Tel. 01392 263302, g.r.c.davie@ex.ac.uk 
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E.2 – CHURCH LEADERS 
This project is an investigation into how the presence of Islam and Muslims in the UK is changing the 
nature of British Evangelicalism particularly as reflected in its engagement in the public sphere.  It will 
look at the variety of Evangelical approaches to and public discourse on Islam and Muslims at three 
levels - national leadership, local church leadership and within the congregation - utilising textual 
analysis, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. 
 
Confidentiality  
Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence.  They will not be used other than for the 
purposes described on this form and in the accompanying letter.  Third parties will not be allowed to 
access them (except in the case of legal subpoena).  If you request it, you will be sent a copy of your 
interview transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit. 
 
Anonymity 
I will be interviewing you in your public role as a church leader and I should very much like to use your 
name and the name of your church in my final report.  However, if you would prefer to remain 
anonymous then you can use a pseudonym and organisational description of your own choosing in 
Section 2 below.  Otherwise please sign Section 1. 
 
1. Consent with use of name: I voluntarily agree to participate in the research specified above and to 
allow the use of my data for the specified purposes.  I am aware that I can contact the interviewer to 
withdraw my consent at any time. 
 
NAME: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
SIGNATURE: ……………………………………………………………………..  DATE: …………………………… 
NAME OF CHURCH OR ORGANISATION: 
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Consent with anonymity: I voluntarily agree to participate in the research specified above and to 
allow the use of my data for the specified purposes.  I am aware that I can contact the interviewer to 
withdraw my consent at any time. 
 
PLEASE TICK HERE:  YES □ NO □   DATE: ……………………………………….. 
 
CHOSEN PSEUDONYM: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
TYPE OF CHURCH OR ORGANISATION: 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
I would like the opportunity to review a transcript of my contribution to the focus group discussion  □ 
I would like to receive a short final summary of the research  □ 
 
Contact details 
For further information about the research or your interview data please contact: 
Richard McCallum, Tel. 01935 471649, rjm215@exeter.ac.uk  
 
If you have any concerns about the research contact: 
Prof Grace Davie, Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, Devon, EX4 4EH  
Tel. 01392 263302, g.r.c.davie@ex.ac.uk
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APPENDIX F:  INTERVIEW SCHEDULES 
F.1 – NATIONAL PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Preliminaries 
 
Explaining my research:  What I am doing and why. 
 Evangelical Christian Responses to Islam 
 Effects of Islam on Evangelicalism  
 The public sphere setting 
 Producing something that will help Christians think through multiculturalism and Islam 
 
What I need from you 
 As you are a major national influencer 
 Your understanding of Islam 
 How you have come to that position 
 How you see your role as an educator 
 Your aims in educating Christians about Islam? 
 
What will happen to the data 
 Digitally stored 
 Used in thesis and possibly any other book 
 Do they want to check it first? 
 
Option of anonymity 
 Because they are already on record in the public sphere I would like to attribute quotes 
 Will ensure anonymity if wanted 
 
Sign consent form 
 
Check recorder 
 
Questions 
 
1. Background 
a) Family, places lived 
b) Faith, Church 
c) Education: theology and Islamics 
d) Taxonomy (see table) 
 
2. Views of church and state 
a) How do you see the church in relation to secular society? 
b) Christendom v Anabaptist 
c) Separation of church and state, established church 
d) Is Britain a Christian country?   
e) How do they view multiculturalism?  Is there room for Islam? 
f) Role of church today 
 
  
Taxonomy of Evangelicals in Britain 
Mainstream Evangelical Charismatic Evangelical 
Conservative Renewal 
Open New Church 
 Pentecostal 
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3. Views on Islam 
a) How would you describe your attitude toward Islam? 
b) Would you theologically be an exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralist? 
c) Would you use the word Allah to talk about God 
d) Relevant background on Muslims: events, friends, mission, MBBs, dialogue 
e) What is the nature of Islam?  Is there any good in Islam? Truth? 
f) Is Islam inherently violent? 
g) How homogenous are Muslims?  Can we generalise? 
 
4. Case studies 
a) The 2008 Shari'a debate 
b) “A Common Word between Us and You” 
c) In the light of the doctrine of taqiyya, can Muslims be trusted? 
d) Muslim 'no go' areas in the UK 
e) The incitement to religious hatred bill 
f) The London ‘mega-mosque’ 
g) The prayer call in Oxford 
h) 9/11, 7/7 and ‘war on terror’ 
i) How significant are views on Israel in affecting reactions to Muslims? 
 
5. Current  engagement with Islam and Muslims 
a) Current involvement with Muslims: dialogue, apologetics, polemics 
b) What types of responses do you see from Evangelicals to Muslims/Islam? 
 
6. Role as an influencer in the public sphere 
a) What do you feel is your role and what are your aims as an ‘influencer’ in the Evangelical community? 
b) Educator, evangelist, warner, peacemaker or …. ? 
c) Who are you trying to influence?  The public or just Christians? 
d) What is your recent and current involvement/? Invitations to churches, conferences? 
e) Who is most influential within Evangelical community? 
f) How can Evangelicals speak to public sphere? 
g) What has been your experience in the public sphere? Is the media fair? 
h) What publications on Islam do you have?  Books?  Journals?  Articles? 
i) Which London churches have you worked with? 
 
7. Future trajectories 
a) What is the role of EA? 
b) What will happen to Evangelicalism? 
c) Will Britain become Muslim? 
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F.2 – CHURCH LEADER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Preliminaries 
 
Explaining my research:  What I am doing and why. 
 Evangelical Christian Responses to Islam 
 Effects of Islam on Evangelicalism  
 The public sphere setting 
 Producing something that will help Christians think through multiculturalism and Islam 
 
What I need from you 
 As you are a leader of a large influential church 
 Your understanding of Islam 
 How you have come to that position 
 How you are trying to equip your church wrt Islam 
 The resources and influences you draw on 
 
What will happen to the data 
 Digitally stored 
 Used in thesis and possibly any other book 
 Do they want to check it first? 
 
Option of anonymity 
 Because they are already on record in the public sphere I would like to attribute quotes 
 Will ensure anonymity if wanted 
 
Sign consent form 
 
Check recorder 
 
Questions 
 
1. Church Background 
a) How would you describe the church? 
Taxonomy (see table) 
b) What sort of area, class, age ethnic profile of congregation 
c) Your own role and experience in the church 
d) Proximity to or contact with Muslims 
 
2. Focus on Muslims 
a) How serious is the issue of Islam and Muslims in Britain? 
b) How do you understand the situation? 
c) Is it something you are concerned about?  Fear?  Or is it an opportunity? 
d) Is the church in this country in competition with Islam? 
e) Is the British Evangelical church equipped to cope with the presence of Islam? 
 
  
Taxonomy of Evangelicals in Britain 
Mainstream Evangelical Charismatic Evangelical 
Conservative Renewal 
Open New Church 
 Pentecostal 
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3. Equipping the congregation 
a) What has the greatest effect on your members wrt Islam?  Church or media? 
b) Have you specifically tried to train, teach or equip your members? 
c) Have you preached on Islam? 
d) Have you invited a visiting speaker or conducted seminars? 
e) Do you recommend books or other resources?  
f) Table of authors/speakers (see below).  Mark which ones they have heard of etc. 
 
4. Views on Islam 
a) How would you describe your attitude toward Islam? 
b) Would you theologically be an exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralist? 
c) When Muslims say that they worship Allah do you understand that they are seeking to worship the 
same God? 
d) What is the nature of Islam?  Demonic?  Is there any good in Islam? Truth? 
e) Is Islam inherently violent? 
f) How homogenous are Muslims?  Can we generalise? 
 
5. Some Case studies 
a) How did/would you react and advise the church on: 
1. The London ‘mega-mosque’ – and the building/number of mosques in general 
2. The prayer call in Oxford 
3. The incitement to religious hatred bill 
4. “A Common Word between Us and You” (have they heard of it) 
5. The 2008 Shari'a debate 
6. Muslim 'no go' areas in the UK 
b) What is the church’s stance on Israel?  Does this affect reactions to Muslims? 
c) How do you understand 9/11, 7/7 and ‘war on terror’ 
d) Have you ever heard of taqiyya? Can Muslims be trusted? 
 
6. Engagement with Islam and Muslims 
a) What is the best approach to Muslims: evangelistic, dialogue, apologetics, polemics, service? 
b) What types of responses do you see from Evangelicals to Muslims/Islam? 
 
7. Church and the public realm 
a) What is the proper relationship between church and state? 
b) In what sense is Britain a ‘Christian country’? 
c) Should Christians/the church have a political response to these sorts of issues? 
d) What sorts of things can Christians do?  Lobbying?  Parties? 
e) What role does EA have? 
f) Have you ever heard of the Christian People’s Alliance? 
 
8. Future trajectories 
a) What effect do you think Islam will have on Evangelicalism? 
b) What will happen to Evangelicalism? 
c) What effect will Islam have on Britain?  Will Britain become Muslim? 
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Which of these speakers/authors do you recognise? 
Have they spoken in your church or had influence in other ways? 
Which of their books have you read or what event did you hear them speak at? 
 
Name Recognise Spoken at 
church 
Book read or event heard at 
Brother Andrew    
John Azumah    
Steve Bell    
Colin Chapman     
Baroness Caroline Cox    
Kenneth Cragg    
Martin Goldsmith    
Tim Green    
Martin Hall    
Bryan Knell    
Richard McCallum    
Anthony McRoy    
Chawkat Moucarry    
Bill Musk    
Michael Nazir-Ali    
Frog & Amy Orr-Ewing    
David Pawson    
Peter Riddell    
Sam Solomon    
Patrick Sookhdeo    
Andrew Smith    
Jay Smith    
Richard Sudworth    
Jenny Taylor    
Nicholas Wood    
David Zeidan    
Other(s)    
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APPENDIX G: CODES FOR ANALYSIS 
  
1. The EPS 
 
2. Opportunities for public 
speaking/writing 
 
3. Background of participant 
 
4. Interaction with Muslims 
 
5. Church & society 
a) Britain a Christian 
country 
b) Establishment 
c) Christians in public life 
d) Role of the church 
 
6. Theological issues 
a) Muhammad 
b) Qur'an 
c) Nature/origin of Islam 
d) Exclusive-inclusive-
plural 
e) Dis/continuity of 
Christianity & Islam 
f) Same God? 
g) Islamic denials of 
Christian doctrine 
h) Apocalyptic & 
dispensational views 
 
7. Missiological approaches 
a) Dialogue approach 
b) Apologetic approach 
c) Polemic approach 
d) Debate 
 
8. Christian-Muslim relations 
a) Reciprocity 
b) Working together 
c) Lack of freedom in 
Muslim countries 
d) Dialogue and forums 
e) Common Word 
 
9. Responses to Islam 
a) Islam is distinct from 
Muslims 
b) Diversity of Islam 
c) Fear & scaremongering 
d) Grace response 
e) Importance of church 
response 
f) Right wing + link to 
Christians 
 
10. Islam/state/Islamization 
a) Bias to Islam 
b) Conspiracy 
c) Taqiyya 
d) An Islamic takeover 
e) Responses/Solutions 
 
11. Multiculturalism 
a) Islamophobia 
b) Prayer call 
c) Mosque building 
d) Ghettoes/No-go areas 
 
12. Sharia/law 
a) Apostasy 
b) Rights/dhimma 
c) Archbishop's lecture 
d) Blasphemy/religious 
hatred bill 
 
13. Violence 
a) Causes of violence 
b) Islam inherently violent 
c) Crusades 
d) Jihad 
e) War on Terror 
f) Christian violence 
g) Palestine-Israel 
 
14. Equipping the church 
a) Roles 
b) Opportunities 
 
15. Christian-Christian relations 
a) 2009 Spat 
b) Awareness of other 
Christian responses 
 
16. Church leader responses 
a) General response 
b) Influence 
c) Mission approach 
d) Relations + meeting 
e) Equipping + training 
f) Allah = God 
g) Inherent violence 
h) Campaigns + politics 
i) Mosques 
j) Prayer call 
k) Incitement 
l) taqiyya 
m) Common Word 
n) Sharia 
o) No-go areas 
p) Israel-Palestine 
q) War on terror 
r) Christian country 
s) Identity 
t) Future
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